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Abstract 
This thesis will examine the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain from 1945 until 1975. 
After the end of the Second World War, the Franco regime was internationally isolated as 
a result of its ties with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. However, the dictatorship returned 
to the international stage during the 1950s and managed to survive on the margins of the 
Cold War world order until the death of Franco in 1975. Throughout these 30 years and 
while never loosening its dictatorial control over Spain, the Franco regime continuously 
tried to improve its international position and image beyond mere toleration. Foreign 
correspondents were working at the centre of this balancing act.  
Against this backdrop, this thesis has two central aims. First, it will examine the regime’s 
policy towards the foreign press. The thesis will show that the Francoist authorities never 
fully accepted the foreign press corps’ work within Spain and tried to exercise control over 
the foreign press corps until the end of the regime. Throughout the regime’s internal and 
external development, however, the Francoist authorities adapted the means they 
employed. At the same time, conflicting interests and strategies within the Franco regime 
shaped its policy towards the foreign press. This thesis will further show that conflicts with 
correspondents partially had their roots in the importance of the foreign press, distributed 
within Spain, for the Spanish public in general and the political opposition in particular.  
Second, this thesis will examine the foreign press corps itself. The presence of 
correspondents in Spain reflected the international media interest and the Franco regime’s 
changing international perception. As this thesis will further show, the composition of the 
foreign press corps also reflected the right-wing dictatorship’s ideological orientation and 
changing foreign relations.  
Through the examination of the foreign press corps, this thesis will break new ground in 
the understanding of the Franco regime. It will do so based on archival research in Spain, 
Germany, France, and Great Britain as well as interviews with former correspondents. The 
thesis applies a mixed-method approach, combining concepts and methods from historical 
research and the social sciences. As such, it will also contribute from a methodological 
perspective to current research on foreign correspondence. 
 
  
 3 
Contents 
Introduction 13 
Literature Review 16 
Concepts, approaches, and methods 24 
Structure 35 
Sources 35 
1. Administering the foreign press in Francoist Spain 39 
From the Civil War to the end of the Second World War 39 
International isolation, 1945-1951 46 
The Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1951-1962 54 
The decay of the regime, 1969-1975 70 
Conclusions 76 
2. Representing Foreign Correspondents in FrancoistSpain: Organizations of 
Journalists 79 
The Agrupación de Corresponsales de Prensa Extranjera 79 
The Asociación de Corresponsales de la Prensa Iberoamericana 85 
Towards a Club Internacional de Prensa 89 
Conclusions 102 
3. Foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain 105 
Foreign Correspondents in Franco’s Spain 1945-1975: An Overview 106 
US correspondents in Francoist Spain 114 
European correspondents 121 
Special relations: Latin America and the Arab world 135 
Correspondents from Eastern Europe, Cuba and China 142 
Conclusions 149 
4. Inside the community of foreign correspondents 151 
Accreditation times, employment status and career paths 152 
Nationality and gender 167 
Working conditions: Reporting from Francoist Spain 181 
Conclusion 195 
5. Reading the foreign news: The foreign press and the Franco regime 197 
International Broadcasters 197 
Distribution of and access to foreign print media 204 
Foreign press and the Spanish opposition 210 
Control of the foreign press by the Franco regime 225 
Conclusion 231 
 4 
6. Foreign correspondents and the Franco regime: between control and 
persuasions 233 
From international isolation to the ministry of Manuel Fraga 234 
Manuel Fraga and the Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1962-1969 249 
The late Franco regime and the foreign press, 1969-1975 266 
Conclusions 275 
Conclusions 279 
Bibliography 290 
Unpublished sources and interviews 290 
Published Sources 292 
Literature 296 
 
  
 5 
Declaration 
 
Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any 
other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of 
the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award. 
 
  
 6 
List of Abbreviations 
Agence France-Presse AFP 
Archivo Central del Ministerio de la Presidencia, Madrid ACMP 
Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, 
Madrid AMAE 
Archivo Fundación Nacional Franciosco Franco, Madrid AFNFF 
Archivo General de la Administración AGA 
Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior, Madrid AGMI 
Asociación de Corresponsales de la Prensa Iberoamericana ACPI  
Agrupación de Corresponsales de Prensa Extranjera  ACPE 
Associated Press AP 
BBC Written Archive BBC WA 
Boletín Oficial del Estado  BOE 
Bundesarchiv (Koblenz) BA 
Centre des Archives Diplomatiques (Nantes) CADN 
Club Internacional de Prensa CIP 
Comisiones Obreras CC.OO 
Deutsche Presse-Agentur dpa 
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas  CSIC 
Dirección General de Prensa (Directorate General for the Press) 
DG for the 
Press 
European Communities  EC 
European Economic Community EEC 
Industriegewerkschaft Metall  IG Metall 
Ministerio de Información y Turismo MIT 
National Archives, London NA 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei  NSDAP  
New York Public Library, Manuscripts and Archives Division NYPL MAD 
 7 
Oficina de Información Diplomática OID 
Partido Comunista de España PCE 
Partido Socialista Interior PSI 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español  PSOE 
Partido Socialista Popular  PSP 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes PAAA 
Radiotelevisione Italiana  RAI 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands SPD 
Unión General de Trabajadores  UGT 
United Nations UN 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization  UNESCO 
United Press UP 
United Press Interntional UPI 
Vicesecretaría de Educación Popular  VSEP 
Zweites Deutsche Fernsehen  ZDF 
 
 
  
 8 
Figures 
Figure 1: Foreign Correspondents in Spain, 1955-75 ..............................................................107 
Figure 2: Media with correspondents in Spain and correspondents accredited per media, 
1955-75 .........................................................................................................................................108 
Figure 3: Foreign Media in Spain 1955-75: Geographical Regions........................................113 
Figure 4: European Correspondents in Spain, 1955-75 ..........................................................123 
Figure 5: Latin American Correspondents in Spain, 1955-75 ................................................137 
Figure 6: Accreditation times of correspondents in Spain 1955-75  ...........................................154 
Figure 7: Accreditation timesof full-time correspondents, 1955-75 .......................................155 
Figure 8: Accreditation times of part-time correspondents, 1955-75 .....................................155 
Figure 9: Distribution of foreign press in Spain in 1965 (by type) .........................................205 
Figure 10: Distribution of foreign Press in Spain in 1965 (by print run) ..............................206 
Figure 11: Foreign print media not authorized for sale in Spain in 1968 ..............................228 
Figure 12: Foreign print media not authorized for sale in Spain, October 1975 ..................230 
 
  
 9 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis would never have been realised without the support I received. Above all, I have 
to thank my supervisor Wolfram Kaiser for his guidance, support, and patience. His 
steadfast commitment to my project was crucial for the completion of this thesis.  
Among the researchers who have commented on this research project its early stages, I am 
particular thankful to Hartmut Kaelble, Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares, and Oliver 
Rathkolb. They not only provided valuable comments, but also invited me to stay as a 
visiting PhD student at their institutions. Jean-Pierre Dedieu introduced me to his database 
for historical studies, which became very useful for this thesis. I also thank the archivists, 
in particular at the Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación and the 
Archivo General de la Administración, for their extremely helpful assistance.  
I am grateful to the former correspondents who have shared, sometimes for hours and 
repeatedly, their experience in Francoist Spain with me. The accounts of their life and 
working conditions under the Franco regime were of crucial importance for this thesis.  
I thank my parents, my grandmother and my brother for their encouragement and support. 
I thank my friends and above all Tim for bringing me back to a life outside of this thesis 
from time to time. My greatest debt, however, is to Agathe for her patience and support 
throughout the work on this thesis and for being there in good and in difficult times.  
Finally, I am also thankful for the funding I received from the Centre for European and 
International Studies Research, University of Portsmouth, the Humboldt-Universität zu 
Berlin, the German Academic Exchange Service, the German Historical Society, the 
Society for the Study of French History, and the Association for Cotemporary Iberian 
Studies. 
  
 10 
Dedication 
To my parents. 
 
  
 11 
Conventions 
Throughout this thesis the term Germany is to be used for the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the western zones of occupation before 1949. 
 
Dissemination 
 
Publications 
Books and Edited Volumes 
Guillamet Llaveras, Jaume; Marcel Mauri de los Ríos, Tobias Reckling, Ruth Rodríguez-
Martínez, Francesc Salgado and Christopher Tulloch. Las sombras de la transición. El 
relato crítico de los corresponsales extranjeros (1975-1978). Valencia: Publicacions 
de la Universitat de Valéncia, 2016. 
Müller, Manuel, Tobias Reckling, and Andreas Weiß, eds. “Communicating European 
Integration: A Historical Perspective.” Special issue, Journal of Contemporary 
European Research 10, no. 1 (2014). 
 
Articles and Book Chapters 
———. “Entre la dictadura y la democracia. La muerte de Franco y las primeras 
elecciones democráticas de 1977 vistas desde Alemania.” In El periodismo en las 
transiciones políticas: De la revolución portuguesa y la transición española a la 
primavera árabe. Edited by Jaume Guillamet and Francesc Salgado, 137–44. Historia. 
Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2014. 
Müller, Manuel, Tobias Reckling, and Andreas Weiß. “Introduction: Communicating 
European Integration - A Historical Perspective.” In Communicating European 
Integration: A Historical Perspective. Edited by Manuel Müller, Tobias Reckling and 
Andreas Weiß. Special issue, Journal of Contemporary European Research 10, no. 1 
(2014): 4–11. 
———, and Jurek Sehrt. “Democracy in the museum. The foundation and permanent 
exhibition of the Museo Adolfo Suárez y la Transición.” International Journal of 
Iberian Studies 26, no. 1 (2013): 103–111. 
———, and Jurek Sehrt. “Negociando la memoria de la democratización. Representación 
museística de la Transición Española.” In Claves del mundo contemporáneo. Debate e 
investigación: Actas del XI Congreso de la Asociación de Historia Contemporánea. 
Edited by Teresa M. Ortega Lopez and Miguel Á. d. Arco Blanco. Granada]: Editorial 
Comares, 2013. 
———, and Jurek Sehrt.“Zwischen Zentrum und Peripherie: Zeitgeschichte in spanischen 
Geschichtsmuseen.” Berliner Debatte Initial 24, no. 2 (2013): 32–47. 
———, and Jurek Sehrt. “Das 20. Jahrhundert in der Vitrine: Geschichtsmuseen in 
Spanien.” Museumskunde 78, no. 2 (2013): 106–113. 
 
 
 12 
Presentations 
———, and Jurek Sehrt. „Geteilte Erinnerungen. Die Musealisierung des spanischen 
Bürgerkrieges“ (Geschichte in der Vitrine. Sammlung und Ausstellung von 
Nationalgeschichten im Vergleich, Workshop at the University of Potsdam, 8-9 May 
2014) 
———, and Jurek Sehrt. „Whose perspective? Spain’s contemporary history on display 
in historical museums” (National Museums in a Changing Europe, Conference at the 
European University, 12-14 December 2012) 
———, and Jurek Sehrt. “Negociando la memoria de la democratización. Representación 
museística de la Transición Española” (Annual Conference of the Asociación de 
Historia Contemporánea, University of Granada, 12-15 September 2012) 
———. “From dictatorship to democracy: Foreign correspondents in Franco's Spain until 
the Spanish transition” (Annual Conference of Association for Contemporary Iberian 
Studies, 4 – 6 September 2012) 
———. “European public communication and Spain’s transition to democracy” 
(Towards a European Society? Transgressing Disciplinary Boundaries in European 
Studies Research, Conference at the University of Portsmouth, 28-30 June 2012) 
———. “Europe and Franco‘s Last Victims: Executions in Spain and the construction of 
a European Public Sphere during the 1970s” (Public Sphere, Ideology, Transformation 
of Power, Conference at the University of Vienna, 24-25 November 2011) 
———. „Er ist zwar Marxist, aber ein ehrlicher Mann“. Spanien in europäischen Medien, 
1975-82” (Presentation at Postgraduate Colloquium of the Sonderforschungsbereich 
640 Repräsentationen Sozialer Ordnungen im Wandel, Humboldt University, 10 
November 2011) 
  
 13 
Introduction 
In 1976, not one year after the death of Franco, José Mario Armero published the first study 
on the foreign press corps during the Spanish Civil War.1 Armero, by then the president of 
the private Spanish news agency Europa Press and with good contacts in the foreign press, 
presented his book in Madrid’s Club Internacional de Prensa (International Press Club, 
CIP). The Francoist authorities had founded the CIP at the beginning of the 1960s as a 
meeting place for foreign correspondents with Spanish journalists. Among the 
correspondents present at Armero’s book presentation were some who had personally 
covered the Spanish Civil War and still continued to report from Spain.2 The image that 
foreign correspondents created during the Spanish Civil War, in Amero’s opinion, had had 
a lasting impact on the international perception of Spain. It was in this context that the 
hundreds of foreign journalists who came to Madrid to cover the death of Franco reported 
on the end of the Franco regime.3  
Spain’s image at the time of the death of Franco was my initial research interest which 
eventually led to this thesis on foreign correspondents during the Franco regime. In the 
course of the preliminary research, I met a number of former correspondents in Madrid who 
had covered both the Franco regime and the transition to democracy. While listening to 
these correspondents’ anecdotes about living and working in Spain, the distinct nature of 
this ‘foreign beat’ became clear on more than one occasion. At the same time, it also 
became clear that while Francoist Spain was no hot spot for international media, it was also 
no no-man’s-land either. Throughout the life of the Franco regime, foreign correspondents 
worked within a complex system between control, dependence and acceptance, and they 
continued to shape from within Spain the foreign perception of the Franco regime. But 
under what legal and institutional structure did these correspondents work in Spain? How 
was the foreign press corps composed? What were the practical working conditions of the 
correspondents in Spain? Did the work of the correspondents have an impact on the Spanish 
public? How did the Franco regime attempt to influence and control the foreign 
correspondents within its borders? This thesis addresses these questions by examining 
different aspects of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain for the first time. In particular, 
                                                          
1 José M. Armero, España fue noticia: Corresponsales extranjeros en la Guerra Civil Española (Madrid: 
Sedmay Ediciones, 1976). 
2 ABC,“El libro «España fue noticia» presentado en el Club de Prensa,” 3 June 1976, 96 [unsigned]. 
3 Armero, España fue noticia, 13. 
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this thesis focuses on the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain from the end of the Second 
World War until the death of Franco in 1975. 
The Franco regime was a unique placement for foreign journalists in a number of ways. 
The right-wing dictatorship remained throughout its existence an anomaly in the European 
post-war order. It never fully regained access to Western political relations. This became 
clearly visible in its unsuccessful attempts to join the European Economic Community 
(EEC) at the beginning of the 1960s; its pariah status was too strong to be allowed into the 
evolving community of European democracies. At the same time, however, the Franco 
regime managed to survive for almost 40 years. After its international ostracism due to its 
ties with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy following the defeat of the Axis powers, Spain 
gradually returned to the international stage during the 1950s. In the context of the Cold 
War, the Franco regime’s fierce anti-communism helped regain international acceptance.  
Spain’s survival on the political margins of the Cold War world order was both 
accompanied and secured by the Franco regime’s continuous attempts to influence and 
improve Spain’s international perception beyond mere toleration. Besides its anti-
communism, the Franco regime actively used international PR campaigns, culture and 
tourism to both strengthen Spain’s economy and improve its international image. 
Researchers such as Neal Rosendorf but also Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Carolin Fischer, 
have examined the use of soft diplomacy by the Franco regime.4 This striving for 
international acceptance by democratic societies was a constant balancing act with the 
dictatorship’ firm hold on power. With the slogan ‘Spain is different’, this discrepancy was 
even reflected in the regime’s own external tourist campaigns.5 
While researchers have only just started to examine the Franco regime’s foreign 
propaganda, this thesis moves away from their perspective by focusing on the foreign 
correspondents within Spain. Foreign correspondents were working in the centre of the 
Franco regime’s desire to gain international acceptance and the retention of internal control. 
As central and the most direct communicators of opinions and images, foreign 
                                                          
4 Neal M. Rosendorf, Franco Sells Spain to America: Hollywood, Tourism and Public Relations as Postwar 
Spanish Soft Power (Basingstoke et.al.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Carolin 
Fischer, “Was ist und wozu braucht man «Nation Branding»? Versuch eines neuen Zugriffs auf Macht und 
Kultur in den internationalen Beziehungen am Beispiel der spanischen Diktatur,” in Internationale 
Geschichte in Theorie und Praxis: Traditionen und Perspektiven“ / „International History in Theory and 
Practice: Traditions and Perspectives, ed. Barbara Haider-Wilson, Wolfgang Mueller and William D. 
Godsey (Wien: Verlag Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Forthcoming) 
5 Sasha D. Pack, Tourism and dictatorship: Europe's peaceful invasion of Franco's Spain (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 68. 
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correspondents were crucial actors in the creation and shaping of foreign opinion on the 
regime. Accepting them and their work became a necessity for the regime’s foreign policy 
after the end of the Second World War.  
The Franco regime, however, never gave up its dictatorial control over Spain. This also 
applied to the 1960s, when Manuel Fraga Iribarne, as new Minister of Information and 
Tourism and responsible for both the domestic and foreign press, was charged with the task 
to ‘clean up the repressive image of the dictatorship’6. Despite limited reforms, the 
Francoist regime continued to repress the political opposition and to control and censor 
Spanish media. During the last years of the Franco regime, the intensity of this repression 
intensified still more.  
This unbroken claim to dictatorial control resulted in a dilemma in its relations with the 
foreign press corps. Correspondents’ reports could undermine the regime’s actively 
pursued improvement of its foreign perception. Despite the necessary acceptance of the 
foreign press corps in Spain, the Francoist authorities reacted by continuously trying to 
extend their influence over foreign journalists. This resulted in a permanent balancing act 
between the dictatorship’s internal control and its wider objective of international 
acceptance. This thesis will examine the regime’s policy, which resulted from this tension, 
and its impact on the correspondents’ working conditions against the background of the 
regime’s internal development and its external relations. Therefore, the thesis will 
contribute to knowledge about the interconnectedness of the Franco regime’s internal and 
external policy.  
At the same time, and while this thesis will not explicitly examine the foreign perception 
of the regime, the analysis of the foreign press corps within Spain nevertheless adds to its 
understanding. The thesis will analyse the changing composition of the foreign press corps 
against the background of the development of the Franco regime’s external relations. On 
this basis, the thesis will provide insights into the changing media interest in Spain that the 
Franco regime actively tried to improve. 
The Franco regime’s relations to the foreign press corps, however, cannot only be seen 
against the background of its external relations and its attempts to control and influence 
Spain’s foreign perception. Foreign correspondents were important communicators for the 
                                                          
6 Julián Casanova and Carlos Gil Andrés, Twentieth-century Spain: A history (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University  Press, 2014), 258. 
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Spanish political opposition.7 Outside of Spain, correspondents gave through their media a 
voice to the growing political opposition. However, the Franco regime allowed the 
distribution of foreign media within Spain after 1945. In the context of the controlled and 
censored Spanish media landscape, foreign media thereby became an important source of 
information for the Spanish public and a means of communication for the Spanish 
opposition. By examining this specific aspect, therefore, the thesis will shed light on the 
importance of foreign media and correspondents within Spain.  
By examining the foreign press corps, this thesis will break new ground on the 
understanding of the Franco regime’s external and internal policies. By combining source-
based historical analysis with methods from the social sciences, it also intends to contribute 
to the historical understanding of foreign correspondence both methodologically and as a 
subject of study. 
 
Literature Review 
Researchers interested in the foreign press in Spain, have so far concentrated on one of the 
two central media events in Spain’s history in the twentieth century: the war correspondents 
during the Spanish Civil War and, more recently and far less intensively, the foreign press 
corps during Spanish transition to democracy. Following Armero’s pioneering book and 
further studies,8 the role of the Spanish Civil War correspondents has recently been 
analysed by the historian Paul Preston9 and communication researcher David Deacon.10 In 
fact, the Spanish Civil War is widely seen as one of the moments that gave birth to modern 
                                                          
7 Elisa Chuliá, El poder y la palabra: Prensa y poder político en las dictaduras: el régimen de Franco ante 
la prensa y el periodismo (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva; Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 
2001), 217–18. 
8 Armero, España fue noticia; see also a later article by Armero: José M. Armero, “Corresponsales 
extranjeros en el bando nacional,” in Periodismo y Periodistas en la Guerra Civil, ed. Juan M. Martínez, 
45–57 (Madrid: Fundación Banco Exterior, 1987). 
9 Paul Preston, “Censorship and commitment: foreign correspondents in the Spanish Civil War,” 
International Journal of Iberian Studies 20, no. 3 (2007); Paul Preston, “Los corresponsales extranjeros en la 
Guerra Civil Espanola,” Ferrol Análisis, no. 23 (2008); Paul Preston, We saw Spain die: Foreign 
correspondents in the Spanish Civil War (London: Constable, 2008). 
10 David Deacon, British news media and the Spanish Civil War: Tomorrow may be too late (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2008); David Deacon, “Elective and experiential affinities: British and 
American foreign correspondents and the Spanish Civil War,” Journalism studies 9, no. 3 (2008); David 
Deacon, “«Going to Spain with the Boys»: Women Correspondents and the Spanish Civil War,” in 
Narrating media history, ed. Michael Bailey, 66–78, Communication and society (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2009); David Deacon, “‘A quietening effect’? The BBC and the Spanish Civil War (1936–
1939),” Media History 18, no. 2 (2012). 
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war correspondence. For this thesis, this research is of some relevance with respect to the 
background of some Civil War correspondents, who remained or returned to Spain later on.  
The research on the foreign press corps during the Spanish transition is just starting to 
develop out of a recent and growing interest in the international perception of the end of 
the Franco regime.11 This rather late interest in both the international perception of the 
transition and the foreign press corps during the regime change is somewhat surprising. 
After all, a leading historian of Spain’s international relations, Juan Carlos Pereira 
Castañares, pointed to the ‘relevant role’12 that the foreign press corps played during the 
Spanish regime change as early as 2004. Most notably, a forthcoming comparative book on 
the perception of the Spanish transition in Italy, France, Great Britain, Germany, and the 
US in a research project lead by the communication historian, Jaume Guillamet Lloveras, 
also discusses - though only briefly and based on limited archival evidence - the foreign 
press corps in Francoist Spain.13 Besides these contributions, former correspondents 
                                                          
11 Josefina Cuesta Bustillo, “Europa atenta a España: Representaciones y memorias de la transición y la 
democracia españolas en el exterior,” in Coetánea, ed. Carlos Navajas Zubeldía and Diego Iturriaga Barco, 
21–42 (Universidad de La Rioja, 2012); Encarnación Lemus López, “Los Estados Unidos y la imagen de la 
situación española en vísperas de la Transición política,” Historia del presente, no. 11 (2008); Florence 
Belmonte, “Desde Francia: miradas a la Transición.: Los franceses descubren España (noviembre 1975-
dicicmbrc 1978),” in Prensa y democracia: Los medios de comunicación en la transición, ed. Rafael 
Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Muñoz, 263–73 (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2009); Alfonso Botti, “La transición 
española a la democracia en la prensa italiana. Una primera aproximación,” in Prensa y democracia: Los 
medios de comunicación en la transición, ed. Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Muñoz, 275–96 (Madrid: 
Biblioteca Nueva, 2009); Encarnación Lemus Lopez, “Percepciones de la prensa norteamericana y la 
francesa ante la transición española,” in Prensa y democracia: Los medios de comunicación en la 
transición, ed. Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Muñoz, 249–62 (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2009); Gregorio S. 
Navarro, “La transición española en la prensa portuguesa a través de un estudio de caso: el Díario de 
Notícias (1976-1979),” Revista internacional de Historia de la Comunicación, no. 3 (2014); Alfonso Pinilla 
García, Ideología e Información. la Prensa Francesa ante la Muerte de Franco (Universidad de 
Extremadura. Servicio de Publicaciones, 2013); Moisés Prieto López, “Finding Democracy in Spain,” 
Media History (2014); Aline Angoustures, “La transition espagnole dans l’opinion française,” in De la 
dictature à la démocratie: voies ibériques, ed. Anne Dulphy et al., 279–92 (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2003). 
12 Juan C. Pereira Castañares, “El factor internacional en la transición española: la influencia del contexto 
internacional y el papel de las potencias centrales,” Studia historica. Historia contemporánea, no. 22 
(2004), 204. 
13 Jaume Guillamet Llaveras et al., Las sombras de la transición. El relato crítico de los corresponsales 
extranjeros (1975-1978) (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de Valéncia, 2016). Further publications 
of the research project ‘Noticias internacionales de España: la Transición (1975-1978)’, led by Guillamet, 
on the international perception of the transition include Jaume Guillamet, “El regreso de la monarquía y la 
transición a la democracia en España (1975-78). Los apoyos de la prensa británica,” Revista internacional 
de Historia de la Comunicación, no. 4 (2015); Manuel Mauri et al., “La Transición española en la prensa 
europea y norteamericana. Cuatro miradas: Francia, Italia, Reino Unido y Estados Unidos,” in El 
periodismo en las transiciones políticas: De la revolución portuguesa y la transición española a la 
primavera árabe, ed. Jaume Guillamet and Francesc Salgado, 111–35, Historia (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 
2014); Tobias Reckling, “Entre la dictadura y la democracia. La muerte de Franco y las primeras elecciones 
democráticas de 1977 vistas desde Alemania,” in El periodismo en las transiciones políticas: De la 
revolución portuguesa y la transición española a la primavera árabe, ed. Jaume Guillamet and Francesc 
Salgado, 137–44, Historia (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2014); Ruth Rodríguez-Martínez, Christopher 
Tulloch and Jaume Guillamet Llovera, “La muerte de Franco y la Transición española a través de la prensa 
internacional: la visión periodística del Reino Unido, Francia, Italia y Estados Unidos,” Estudios sobre el 
mensaje periodístico 21, no. 1 (2015). 
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William Chislett14 and Walter Haubrich15 have published articles on their experiences 
during the Spanish transition. Haubrich mainly concentrates on his own work for the 
German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Chislett, although also highlighting 
his work for the British The Times, aims at examining the foreign press corps in Spain from 
a more general perspective.  
What has been written about the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain so far has almost 
exclusively been produced either by correspondents themselves, resulting in texts which 
are useful sources for academic analysis, or by actors from the political opposition. The 
correspondents Benjamin Welles16 and Édourard de Blaye17 wrote general books on the 
Franco regime, in which they also briefly discuss the regime’s policy towards the foreign 
press, while Haubrich discusses the subject in a brief article.18 Of particular importance as 
a source is also the history of the Spanish press until 1966 by the correspondent Henry F. 
Schulte.19 Central proponents of the political opposition such as the communist Marcelino 
Camacho Abad,20 the socialist Enrique Tierno Galván21 and the monarchist José María de 
Areilza y Martínez de Rodas22, all stress in their memoirs the importance of the foreign 
press corps for their struggle against the Franco regime. 
Besides Schulte’s pioneering book, it was only after the end of the dictatorship that (mainly 
Spanish) researchers were able to further contribute to the understanding of the Franco 
regime’s press policy. The foreign press corps, however, receives very little attention in 
these studies. In 1986, the former Spanish journalist turned academic Felipe Maraña 
Marcos, published under his better known pseudonym Felipe Sahagún, a methodologically 
innovative history of Spanish foreign correspondence and access to international 
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information in Spain.23 In this context, Sahagún also briefly discusses the importance of the 
foreign press and in particular international broadcasters as a source of information in 
Francoist Spain.24 The foreign press corps itself is not included in Sahagún’s book. 
However, in his original doctoral thesis from 1985, on which his book was based, Sahagún 
also briefly examined the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain.25 While mainly descriptive 
and, due to the limited access to archival material at the time, primarily based on personal 
interviews, Sahagún’s excursion into the world of foreign correspondence during the 
Franco regime nevertheless remains a pioneering contribution.  
Sahagún’s short chapter in his unpublished doctoral thesis went largely unnoticed by later 
research. A telling reflection of this is Jeroen Oskam’s 1991 article on the Franco regime’s 
press policy as a research subject.26 While discussing the state of research at the beginning 
of the 1990s, Oskam does not mention the foreign press as a possible subject of study at 
all. Instead, the developing historiography of the press and press policy during the Franco 
regime adopted an almost exclusively national perspective, although brief references to 
foreign correspondents and the regime’s policy towards the foreign press corps can be 
found in a number of studies. This applies, for instance, to the influential studies by Justino 
Sinova27 from 1989 and Carlos Barrera28 from 1995. Sinova studies the development of the 
Francoist press policy until 1951, including a brief mention of the adaptation of the 
regime’s policy towards the foreign press.29 Barrera, who put a particular focus on 
journalists, briefly highlights the importance of regime critical Spanish journalists as 
sources of information for foreign correspondents, though without citing further evidence.30 
Within this area of research, Elisa Chuliá dedicates the most attention to the foreign press 
in her book from 2001.31 While in principle an examination of the Franco regime’s policy 
towards the Spanish press, Chuliá’s study briefly highlights the importance of foreign 
correspondents as communicators for the political opposition based on memoirs and 
autobiographies. Furthermore, and in contrast to previous research, Chuliá also, like 
                                                          
23 Felipe Sahagún, El mundo fué noticia: Corresponsales españoles en el extranjero: la información 
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24 Ibid., 230-232. 
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Madrid, 18 January 1985) [unpublished].  
26 Jeroen Oskam, “Censura y prensa franquista como tema de investigación,” Revista de estudios 
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Sahagún but without referring to his research, briefly discusses the importance of the 
foreign press as a source of information within Spain.32 Chuliá’s arguments nevertheless 
remain superficial, with no discussion of the actual constitution of the press corps in Spain 
and very little information on the regime’s policy towards foreign correspondents.  
Following Chuliá and Sahagún, the importance of the foreign press as source of information 
within Spain has received very little further attention and has contributed nothing to the 
wider understanding of the foreign press corps. So far, no in-depth examination of the 
perception of foreign media in Francoist Spain exists and very little research on the special 
case of the Spanish programmes of international broadcasters has been conducted. 
However, the latter mainly examines the particular cases of the Spanish programmes of 
Communist broadcasters from Eastern Europe and foreign broadcasts in Catalan.33 The 
importance of the Spanish programmes of the two most important Western broadcasters for 
Spain, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Radio Paris, have only recently 
begun to receive the attention of researchers. The University of Alicante has started a 
project on the influential Spanish programme of Radio Paris.34 The existing research on 
the BBC’s Spanish Service, however, has only examined the time up to the end of the 
Second World War.35 The research on the further development of the BBC’s foreign 
language broadcasts to Europe pays no attention to the broadcaster’s Spanish programme.36 
Like the historiography of the Francoist press policy and the limited research on the 
importance of foreign media within Spain, existing studies on the Franco regime’s foreign 
perception have so far also ignored the foreign press corps in Spain. In fact, the examination 
of the regime’s foreign perception itself is a rather new area of research. Early studies 
include, in particular, Ute Waffenschmidt’s37 1989 examination of the coverage of 
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Francoist Spain and the Spanish transition by the German public broadcaster Zweites 
Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) and Aline Angoustures’38 unpublished 1987 doctoral thesis 
and a later article on the French media perception of the Franco regime. While Angoustures 
fully concentrates on a media analysis, Waffenschmidt briefly examines the working 
conditions of the correspondents in late Francoist Spain. Her observations, however, were 
not only limited to the very small number of German TV correspondents but also primarily 
based on interviews.  
Besides these early studies, researchers have only started to publish further on the 
international perception of the Franco regime since around 2000. Moisés Prieto López39 
and Javier Muñoz Soro40, for instance, have studied the perception of military trials and 
executions during the Franco regime in Switzerland and Italy respectively. While Birgit 
Aschmann analyses the perception of the early Franco regime in Germany,41 Misael Arturo 
López Zapico examines the late Franco regime’s perception by The New York Times.42 
However, comparative studies, such as Rafael Núñez Florencio’s attempt at an overview 
of the regime’s international perception, still remain rare and leave a large gap in current 
research on the Franco regime.43 At the same time, these works are mostly media studies 
with little to no attention given to media actors.  
The existing literature on foreign media and the Franco regime therefore contributes little 
to the better understanding of the foreign press corps in Spain. Instead, it has mainly been 
the research on the Franco regime’s international and bilateral relations that has shed light 
on the foreign press corps so far. This applies to Aschmann’s44 study on the German-
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Spanish relations between 1945 and 1963 as well as Walter Lehmann’s45 more recent 
examination of German-Spanish relations during the 1950s. Although mainly concerned 
with the political, economic, social and cultural relations between Spain and Germany, both 
authors and Lehmann in particular, also discuss the media perception of the Franco regime 
in Germany and the German press corps in Francoist Spain.46 Aschmann and Lehmann thus 
relate the background of some German correspondents in Nazi Germany with their 
sympathies for the Franco regime, which also became visible in their journalistic output. 
Aschmann and Lehmann particularly focus on the German correspondent Heinz Barth, who 
was highly influential in the German public’s perception of Spain during the 1950s. In these 
studies, however, the examination of the German correspondents is only one aspect of a 
multi-faceted examination of Spanish-German relations. The analysis of the German press 
corps, therefore, is not put into the larger context of the general composition of the foreign 
press corps in Francoist Spain and the regime’s policy towards the foreign press in general. 
Nevertheless, Aschmann’s and Lehmann’s analysis based on archival sources has made an 
exceptionally important contribution to research in this area.  
In his 2014 study on the Franco regime’s soft diplomacy towards the US, Rosendorf also 
examined the Franco regime’s policy towards the foreign press corps.47 In his book, 
Rosendorf analyses in particular the Franco regime’s US public relations strategies, 
including the regime’s relations with US correspondents in Francoist Spain. Against this 
background, Rosendorf primarily argues that while the regime initially followed a strict 
policy towards the foreign press, this rapidly changed with its attempts to improve its 
foreign image during the 1950s and 1960s.  
However, Rosendorf’s discussion of the foreign press corps remains quite superficial for a 
number of reasons. First, the regime’s policy towards the foreign press corps for Rosendorf 
is only one aspect among many in the discussion of the regime’s PR strategy and not the 
main focus of his research. Second, like Aschmann, Rosendorf also concentrates on a 
specific nationality of correspondent, in this case US journalists. Third, and most crucially 
from the point of view of an historian, Rosendorf’s examination of the foreign press corps 
is exclusively based on newspaper articles and Schulte’s above mentioned book. His 
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general conclusion about the regime’s policy towards the foreign press, therefore, has 
limited empirical basis. Moreover and strongly connected to this shortcoming, this thesis 
will also show that his arguments concerning the regime’s press policy are misguided. 
Besides Rosendorf, Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Carolin Fischer also further contribute to 
the understanding of Franco regime’s international PR strategy.48 By applying the concept 
of nation branding, in their forthcoming article they mainly examine the use of Spain’s 
promotion as a tourist destination as an attempt to improve the Franco regime’s 
international image. In this context, the authors highlight the regime’s relations to foreign 
journalists. However, Gienow-Hecht and Fischer concentrate on travel and tourism 
journalists and do not discuss the foreign press corps in general.  
Against this background, this thesis will therefore fill an important gap in current research 
on Francoist Spain. At the same time, the examination of the foreign press corps in the 
Franco regime can also contribute an important case study to the limited historical research 
on foreign correspondents in general. In contrast to studies on war correspondents, such as 
the Spanish Civil War correspondents, historical research on foreign correspondence in 
general is still rare. Recently, and in the context of the rising interest in transnational 
dimensions of contemporary European history, however, historians have started to pay 
greater attention to foreign correspondents as important transnational actors. An example 
of this changing research focus is, for instance, a 2008 edited volume on journalists as 
political actors in British-German relations since the late nineteenth century by Frank Bösch 
and Domionik Geppert.49 Other (mainly German) researchers have followed Bösch’s and 
Geppert’s approach in more recent studies on the political agency of correspondents in 
various contemporary historical contexts. In her doctoral thesis, Antje Robrecht, who also 
contributed to Bösch’s and Geppert’s edited volume, examines foreign correspondents as 
‘diplomats in shirtsleeves’ in British-German post-war relations.50 In 2014, Norman 
Domeier and Jörn Happel published a special issue devoted to the interaction of 
correspondents with politics from 1900 to 1970.51  
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Within this current line of research, a young generation of historians have concentrated on 
foreign correspondence in dictatorial regimes. In his published MA thesis, Martin Herzer 
has examined the foreign press corps in Nazi Germany.52 In their doctoral thesis and further 
publications, Julia Metger53 and Dina Fainberg54 have investigated the foreign press corps 
in the Soviet Union. While Metger concentrates on the West German press corps, Fainberg 
examines US correspondents in the Soviet Union and Soviet correspondents in the US. 
Based on extensive archival research and also, in the cases of Metger and Fainberg, 
interviews with former correspondents, these researchers go beyond mere case studies of 
political agency of particular correspondents. They examine in great depth the working 
conditions as well as the state control of the foreign press corps in the Soviet Union and, in 
the case of Fainberg, in the US. These studies have not only contributed to a greater 
understanding of foreign correspondence. Additionally, they have moved beyond the 
conceptualization of foreign correspondents as semi-political protagonists in particular 
historical contexts. From a more general perspective, this thesis will connect to this current 
research trend and contribute to the understanding of foreign correspondence in the 
twentieth century in general and in dictatorial regimes in particular.  
 
Concepts, approaches, and methods 
This study will examine the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain by drawing on a multi-
method and multi-perspective approach. By applying concepts and methods from 
neighbouring disciplines, this study will not only provide an in-depth understanding of the 
foreign press corps in Spain, the correspondents working conditions and the Franco 
regime’s policy towards foreign correspondents but will also connect the historical research 
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on foreign correspondents to research by social scientists and communication researchers 
in particular. The empirical basis of this thesis is based on multi-archival and multinational 
research, personal interviews with correspondents and other additional material - as 
outlined in the following section on sources. 
Since this study is dedicated to foreign correspondents, first and foremost a working 
definition and conceptualization of this particular group of actors is in order. Historians 
have mainly concentrated on the political agency of correspondents. In part at least, this 
may have been caused by the correspondents’ tendency of (according to the communication 
researcher Kevin Williams) ‘playing up their role in world events’55. The examination of 
the political agency and impact of correspondents is important and will be considered in 
this thesis. It would be misleading, however, to use such a conceptualization as a general 
starting point for the analysis of an entire press corps. The concentration on political aspects 
of the correspondents’ work excessively highlights particular actors in particular 
circumstances. In order to gain a more general understanding of the foreign press corps in 
Francoist Spain - by borrowing a concept from anthropology56 - correspondents will be 
understood here as transnational cultural brokers between their beat abroad and their home 
audience. This conceptualization stresses the main task of correspondents, the interpretation 
and ‘translation’ of what is going on in their host country. By putting stronger emphasis on 
the transnational nature of correspondents, this understanding follows conceptualizations 
by communication researchers like Williams who understands a correspondent as a 
‘cultural intermediary between the story and the audience’57.  
This thesis will therefore primarily examine correspondents as transnational media 
professionals, working under particular conditions within the specific logic and constraints 
of foreign news reporting. The focus on the journalistic profession directly leads to Boyd-
Berrett’s oft-quoted definition of three basic types of correspondents: staff correspondents, 
who work abroad on a permanent basis for one media only; general reporters who go abroad 
for a short time in order to cover particular stories; and stringers who work on a semi-fixed 
freelance basis for a small number of regular costumers or sell their stories to the highest 
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bidder.58 Because of the focus on the development of the foreign press corps, this thesis 
will mainly concentrate on staff correspondents and stringers, however.  
On the basis of this conceptualization of foreign correspondents, the thesis will examine 
the foreign press corps from five perspectives. First, and of central importance is the 
analysis of the legal and institutional framework under which the foreign correspondents 
were working, and the Franco regime’s policy towards the foreign press. Not only does this 
approach provide basic insights into the working conditions of the foreign press corps. It 
also leads to an understanding of the changing attitudes and policies of the regime towards 
the foreign press. In this context, the thesis will also discuss the diplomatic implications of 
the regime’s policy towards the foreign press. The thesis examines these institutional and 
legal settings as well as the regime’s actual policy, using a historical-narrative approach 
based mainly on the analysis of archival sources. The examination of diplomatic 
implications additionally relies on research in archives in Germany, Great Britain, and 
France, the three most important Western European countries with close links to Spain, the 
regime, and the opposition, and with relatively broad reporting of Spain in the media. 
Additionally, these sources are supplemented with an oral history approach with interviews 
conducted with former correspondents. In this way, the thesis will provide a more in-depth 
understanding of the practical workings of the Francoist institutions, but also of the 
correspondents’ personnel experience with and perspective on the Franco regime.  
Strongly connected to the above is the second perspective, which examines three 
organizations for foreign correspondents. Even before the foundation of the previously 
mentioned CIP, the Francoist authorities allowed the creation of two associations for 
foreign correspondents from the end of the 1950s. The examination of these organizations 
and their relations to the Franco regime, primarily based on interviews and archival 
material, will allow for further insights into the Franco regime’s policy towards the foreign 
press. At the same time, it will also allow for conclusions on the correspondent’s attitudes 
towards the regime. 
The third perspective examines, through a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches and against the background of insights from communication sciences, the 
foreign press corps in Francoist Spain as media representatives. In particular, the thesis 
examines the changing size of the foreign press corps as well as its constitution in terms of 
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nationality and type of media (television and radio, print media, and news agencies). This 
quantitative approach not only provides an understanding of the constitution of the foreign 
press corps in Francoist Spain, but communication scientists such as Yoel Cohen have also 
shown that the size of foreign press corps can be used as a strong indicator for the 
understanding of the general level of international media interest.59 By following this 
approach, the examination of the changing size of the foreign press corps, therefore, not 
only provides the basis for the further examination of its constitution but also allows 
conclusions about the, thus far poorly examined, general international media interest in 
Francoist Spain and its change throughout the analysed time period.  
In order to explain changes in the presence or non-presence of correspondents, this 
quantitative study will be supplemented on a second level by a qualitative examination of 
particular national groups of foreign journalists. Cohen mainly argues that ‘elitism’ and 
‘proximity’ are central explanatory factors for understanding the global placement of staff 
correspondents abroad. Cohen refers to ‘elitism’ as the strong foreign press corps in Europe 
and the US. ‘Proximity’ is determined by practically every kind of bi-national relation, 
‘whether expressed in geographical, political, economic or cultural terms’60. By using these 
analytical insights, the thesis will discuss the changing presence and non-presence of 
particular groups of correspondents against the background of Spain’s international 
relations based on relevant research and archival material.  
While Cohen’s explanations have resulted from examining the global distribution of 
correspondents, other researchers like David E. Morrison and Howard Tumber have arrived 
at further insights for a particular case study61. Based on their examination of the foreign 
press corps in London during the 1980s, Morrison and Tumber argue that internal media 
logic is also a central factor for the explanation of the presence of correspondents. London, 
for instance, served as a basis for the covering the rest of Europe for some correspondents.62 
Even more important during the Cold War was Vienna, which was ‘used to “sweep” Eastern 
Europe’63. The thesis will show that this media perspective also has some explanatory 
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power for the examination of the foreign press corps in Spain - Madrid, although far less 
important as a news centre, nevertheless served as a base for coverage of Portugal and the 
Maghreb region.  
The focus on the media logic behind the presence of foreign correspondents in Francoist 
Spain marks the starting point for the fourth perspective on what the communication 
researcher Williams has termed the ‘occupational world’64 of the foreign press corps: the 
internal structure of the press corps and their practical working conditions. Besides the 
approaches of Williams as well as Morrison and Tumber, this exploration into the world of 
foreign correspondents will be based on a path-breaking study by the anthropologist Ulf 
Hannerz.65  
Though from different academic perspectives, these researchers aimed at an analytical 
understanding of foreign correspondence, which also makes their approach valuable for the 
systematic analysis of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. Hannerz in particular 
established useful analytical categories for the understanding of foreign press corps. Due 
to the different set of data available, these approaches have to be adapted to the constraints 
of an historical analysis. Morrison and Tumber, for instance, based their research on a 
survey. Like the anthropologist Hannerz, he carried out site visits at the correspondents’ 
offices and followed them during their daily working routines. None of these methods can 
be employed by historians. Nevertheless, their approaches and, in particular, the analytical 
categories developed by Hannerz, are helpful tools for the understanding of foreign press 
corps in historical perspective.  
A first analytical approach inspired by these studies is the examination of the 
correspondents’ careers.66 This also includes the previously mentioned accreditation status 
of correspondents as staff or stringers, their time of accreditation in Spain and typical career 
paths into journalism. In this way, an in-depth understanding of the constitution and 
development of the foreign press corps in Spain becomes possible. The importance of this 
approach, however, for the particular case of Francoist Spain goes beyond the mere 
understanding of the constitution of the foreign press corps from an occupational point of 
view. The accreditation as staff correspondent, for instance, in Francoist Spain came not 
only with a number of privileges, which made it highly attractive even for semi-
                                                          
64 Williams, International journalism, 93. 
65 Ulf Hannerz, Foreign News: Exploring the World of Foreign Correspondents (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004). 
66 Ibid., 71-75. 
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professionals. Also, the Francoist authorities granted the accreditation status as full-time 
staff correspondents at different times with varying ease. The examination of the 
accreditation status, therefore, also allows for conclusions on the regime’s changing policy 
towards the press corps as well as a better understanding of the changing size of the press 
corps. 
Furthermore, the examination of the duration of correspondents’ placement in Francoist 
Spain, also allows for a number of insights. Hannerz, as well as Morrison and Tumber and 
Williams, have highlighted the duration of correspondents’ placements, which is driven by 
individual choices and the policy of particular media, as crucial for the understanding of 
the occupational world of correspondents67. For the distinction between correspondents 
who stay for a long period of time at the same spot and others who move from one country 
to another throughout their careers, Hannerz uses the model terms ‘spiralists’ and ‘long-
timers’68. The reasons behind the length of the time period which foreign correspondents 
spend in the same location, were and are, of course, manifold. Personal reasons are naturally 
of central importance in this context. Correspondents might get married and start a family 
while on the ‘beat’. Also of particular importance, however, are the policies of the media 
the correspondents are working for as well as the conditions in the respective host countries. 
Hannerz presents the basic difference between long-timers and spiralists from the foreign 
editors’ point of view. Foreign editors often balance the obvious advantages of knowledge, 
personal networks and, perhaps most importantly, language skills, which come along with 
long-term placements, against the disadvantage of the possibility of their correspondents 
‘going stale’: ‘The correspondent […] start taking things in their surroundings for granted, 
instead of seeing stories in them. They get bored when they have to do basically the same 
story the second, third, or umpteenth time.’69 In order to avoid this, editors might find it 
necessary to continuously rotate their correspondents in order to get a new perspective on 
things with fresh eyes. 
The investigation of the duration of postings, however, not only allows for conclusions 
about the correspondents’ particular careers but the thesis will also show that local 
knowledge was crucial in Francoist Spain, not least for the establishment of local networks. 
Therefore, this thesis will quantitatively examine the general accreditation times of all 
                                                          
67 Ibid., 82-86; Morrison and Tumber, The foreign correspondent: date-line London, 461-462. 
68 Hannerz, Foreign News, 82-86. 
69 Ibid., 85. 
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correspondents officially accredited in Spain followed by a detailed discussion of particular 
correspondents.  
This perspective on the occupational world of the foreign press corps includes the 
examination of general sociological aspects, in particular gender and nationality. When 
researchers examine the gender of correspondents, they usually confirm that foreign 
correspondence was, and to a certain extent still is, the domain of men.70 In this respect, 
Spain was no different despite some notable exceptions. However, by examining women 
correspondents in Francoist Spain, further conclusions about the inner constitution of the 
foreign press corps become possible. This applies in particular to the surprising number of 
correspondent couples. 
Regarding nationality, Hannerz and communication researchers like John Maxwell 
Hamilton and Denis Wu, have highlighted the continued importance of hiring what has 
been termed foreign foreign correspondents: correspondents of a ‘nationality’ other than 
their media.71 For the press corps in Francoist Spain, this perspective is useful in order to 
shed light on political emigrants working as correspondents as well as a small number of 
stringers who worked for various media from different countries. This approach is more 
important for the discussion of a particular sub-group of Spanish foreign correspondents. 
The thesis will show that these Spanish journalists were of great importance within the 
foreign press corps due to their personal contacts and intimate knowledge of the Franco 
regime. The same applies to a certain extent to what is known in journalistic terms as local 
hands,72 in this case, Spaniards who supported foreign news offices and correspondents as 
secretaries, translators, local guides and so on.  
The focus on Spaniards as either colleagues or employees for and within the foreign press 
corps directly relates to the working conditions and routines of correspondents. Based again 
on the observations made by Hannerz, Morrison and Tumber and Williams73 as well as 
Christopher Tulloch’s74 investigation of Spanish foreign correspondence, the thesis will 
systematically examine the working conditions and routines of foreign journalists under the 
Franco regime. The primary focus will be on the core work of correspondents, the gathering 
                                                          
70 Williams, International journalism, 98; Hannerz, Foreign News, 92-93; Morrison and Tumber, The 
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71 H. D. Wu and J. M. Hamilton, “US Foreign Correspondents: Changes and Continuity at the Turn of the 
Century,” International Communication Gazette 66, no. 6 (2004), 528; John M. Hamilton and Eric Jenner, 
“Redefining foreign correspondence,” Journalism 5, no. 3 (2004), 306. 
72 Hannerz, Foreign News, 152-54. 
73 Williams, International journalism. 
74 Christopher D. Tulloch, Corresponsales en el extranjero: Mito y realidad (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2004). 
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of information. Based on the interviews conducted, the thesis will discuss access to and the 
importance and use of particular sources such as the domestic press and personal contacts.  
Under the conditions of the Franco dictatorship, access to reliable information for 
correspondents was far more difficult than in democratic regimes. While classical 
information sources such as official press conferences and the Spanish press were, as the 
thesis will show, of limited value, the interviews conducted for this thesis revealed that 
other strategies of newsgathering gained in importance. This applies especially to personal 
contacts and the exchange of information among correspondents. However, little academic 
attention has been dedicated so far to this ‘evolution of cooperation’, to use the title of the 
famous book by Robert Axelrod75, among correspondents in dictatorships. Only Hannerz 
briefly mentions - but does not discuss further - the increased importance of the exchange 
of information among correspondents in his examination of correspondent’s work in 
China.76 The thesis will fill this gap through the application of an analysis of the social 
networks among correspondents in order to examine the importance of this exchange of 
information. 
In contrast to historical research, where social network analysis is used more as a concept 
than a method, the thesis applies social network analysis as a method and not as a catch-all 
phrase. Methodologically, I have employed an adapted approach often used for the 
examination of expert networks.77 I presented the interviewed correspondents with what 
social scientists call a full population: a table with the names of all accredited staff 
correspondents. Since all of the interviewed correspondents were accredited during the last 
years of the Franco regime, I used a complete list with all 180 accredited staff 
correspondents from 1975. In a second step, the correspondents were asked to rank the 
importance of their colleagues in terms of informational exchange with numbers reaching 
from ‘0’ for no importance at all, to ‘10’ for highly important. Finally, the interpretation of 
the findings was accompanied by additional qualitative results derived from the interviews. 
The conducted interviews are also of fundamental importance for the fifth perspective of 
this thesis, which is concerned with the political role of correspondents and the impact of 
their work within Spain. As we have seen above, historical studies have so far mainly 
concentrated on the political role of correspondents. While this study explicitly moves away 
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from this limited approach, it nevertheless proves useful to examine particular aspects of 
the correspondents’ work in Francoist Spain. By following this approach, this thesis will 
show that parts of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain had an important function as 
transnational communicators for the political opposition under the Franco regime. They 
made information accessible abroad which (due to the control by the Francoist authorities) 
was unprintable within Spain. In this way, correspondents also became particularly 
important contacts for journalists who were critical of Franco. This thesis will examine this 
political function of correspondents as transnational communicators based on interviews 
with correspondents and Spanish journalists as well as autobiographies and other writings 
by central actors of the political opposition. 
The political importance of foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain went beyond the 
mere publication of information abroad, however. As has been outlined, and in contrast to 
communist countries in Eastern Europe, the foreign press was, in principle, freely available 
in Francoist Spain. Against this background, the thesis examines the general distribution 
and access to foreign media as well as the regime’s attempts to control it. On this basis and 
by directly studying the function of parts of the foreign press corps as communicators for 
the political opposition, this discussion will focus in particular on the dissemination of 
information critical of the regime. The thesis will not only discuss the distribution of print 
media, but also of international broadcasters and the under-examined Spanish programme 
of the BBC in particular. With this approach, the thesis follows political scientists such as 
Lutz Holger Kern, who have examined the impact of foreign media for the particular case 
of East Germany.78 
Interviews with both foreign correspondents and Spanish journalists are therefore an 
important source for this thesis. This approach, however, is of particular relevance to the 
analysis of social networks but also comes with some problems and flaws. First, while I 
was able to identify all correspondents by name through accreditation lists, some were 
already deceased and I was also unable to interview all of those who were still alive. Taking 
into consideration the number of 180 fully accredited staff correspondents in 1975 and my 
limited resources, it was a challenging task to find these correspondents almost 40 years 
after the end of the Franco regime. With this in mind, it was not the aim of my research 
project to cover the full spectrum of the foreign press corps with these interviews. Instead, 
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the interviews served two central aims: first, reconstructing the occupational world of 
correspondents in Francoist Spain; second, accompanying archival material with the 
personal experiences and perspectives of the correspondents. As a result, I aimed at 
interviewing a representative number of correspondents and succeeded in conducting 22 
face-to-face interviews and one Skype interview.  
A second issue with conducting interviews with correspondents lay in the fact that most, 
though not all, of the correspondents interviewed were working for German media. This 
reflects the method I used in order to establish contacts with correspondents, practical 
conditions, and the fact that, as will be shown, German correspondents constituted the 
strongest group within the foreign press corps. Methodologically, I used an approach 
similar to what is known as ‘snowball-sampling’ to qualitative researchers in the social 
sciences.79 This method, which social scientists frequently apply to the examination of 
expert networks,80 is also used in order to locate individuals who are hard to find. In other 
terms, I started with locating a small number of correspondents and was then referred from 
one correspondent to another by obtaining the necessary contact details. This approach also 
had a considerably positive impact on the willingness of the correspondents to be 
interviewed. The same approach was used in order to examine the exchange of information 
with Spanish colleagues by interviewing a small number of Spanish journalists to whom I 
was referred by former correspondents. With respect to the foreign press corps, it turned 
out that many of the German correspondents remained it touch with each other after their 
retirement. Furthermore, it also became clear that a considerable number of retired German 
correspondents remained in Spain and quite often in Madrid. A considerable number of 
correspondents therefore could be interviewed, in some cases more than once, during 
research stays in the Spanish capital. I also conducted further personal interviews in 
Germany.  
A third issue stemmed from the methodological approach of interviews with former 
journalists itself. Leaving the obvious problem of failing memory aside, the method of 
going through the list of the 180 correspondents accredited in 1975 proved tiresome for the 
often elderly interviewees. Indeed, only half of the interviewed correspondents were 
actually willing to go through all the names and usually went through the list and just named 
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some other correspondents with whom they maintained especially close relations. 
Furthermore, not all interviewed correspondents responded equally well to the question of 
evaluating the importance of other particular correspondents for their work as 
correspondents. Often, they evaluated their personal relationship or simply awarded some 
‘points’ out of retrospective courtesy. Despite these limitations, the approach, together with 
additional information derived from the interviews, proved to be very valuable for the 
examination of the informational exchange among correspondents in Francoist Spain and 
for the understanding of the correspondent’s work in Spain in general. 
The interviews were conducted as semi-structured interviews in order to gather information 
on various aspects of the correspondents’ work in Francoist Spain. These aspects included 
the regime’s attitude towards the correspondents, the correspondents’ perspectives on the 
Franco regime, their contacts to the Francoist opposition, their general working conditions 
as well as particular events with special importance for the relationship between the regime 
and the foreign press, such as the Burgos trials at the end of 1970. I intentionally tried to 
avoid general discussions about the Franco regime’s development. This was not the subject 
of this thesis and would have been more important in the context of a media analysis. At 
the same time, the retrospective reasoning and remembering of events which took place 
more than 40 years ago by observers like journalists, corrupted by the knowledge of the 
final outcome and later reading of its analysis, is itself of little value. In his influential book, 
The Black Swan, Nassim Nicholas Taleb has shown that retrospective rationalising of, at 
the time, unforeseeable events is very widespread.81 The interview results also have to be 
considered with particular care for another reason. While none of the interviewed 
journalists, for instance, admitted to have accepted any kind of bribes by the regime, the 
dangers of being placed in Francoist Spain were sometimes overestimated by singling out 
particular events. At the same time, the contacts to the political opposition (and their 
importance) as well as the generally claimed highly critical attitude towards the Franco 
regime seemed, in some cases, overestimated.  
Nevertheless, the interviews with former correspondents as well as Spanish journalists 
proved highly valuable for this thesis. The interviews not only complemented the archival 
research, but also made the investigation of the ‘occupational world’ of correspondent’s in 
Francoist Spain possible in the first place.  
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Structure  
The first two chapters of the thesis will examine the foreign press corps from an institutional 
perspective, beginning with the Franco regime’s institutions and legal framework for the 
foreign press (Chapter 1). The development of the regime’s institutions and laws for 
correspondents is examined against the background of the Franco regime’s political 
evolution. Following this focus on the regime, Chapter 2 concentrates on different 
organisations for and by foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain.  
The next two chapters put the focus of the foreign press corps itself, beginning with an 
examination of the presence of foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain (Chapter 3). First, 
the chapter quantitatively examines the coming, staying and going of foreign 
correspondents in Spain by taking into account the type and geographical origins of the 
represented media. Second, it discusses the changing numerical presence of correspondents 
against the background of the Franco regime’s international political, economic and societal 
relations. Following this analysis, Chapter 4 focuses on the examination of the occupational 
world of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. In this context, the chapter examines 
the constitution of the foreign press corps from a professional perspective as well as the 
correspondents’ career paths and working routines. 
The final two chapters are dedicated to political aspects of the work of the foreign press 
corps in Francoist Spain and the regime’s policy towards the foreign correspondents. 
Chapter 5 examines the general access to foreign media within Spain and the Franco 
regime’s attempts to control this access. At the same time, the chapter also discusses the 
particular importance of the foreign press for Spanish society in general and the political 
opposition in particular. The last chapter of the thesis discusses the Franco regime’s policy 
towards the foreign press including the regime’s attempts to control and influence foreign 
correspondents. The examination of the regime’s institutions and laws for the foreign press 
corps and its policy towards foreign correspondents will therefore constitute the frame for 
this examination of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. 
 
Sources 
In order to examine the foreign press corps in Spain from different perspectives, I had to 
utilize a variety of source material. The thesis is based on multi-national and multi-archival 
research. In addition, I conducted 22 interviews with former correspondents and four 
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interviews with Spanish journalists and ‘local hands’. Moreover, I used additional material 
such as officially published accreditation lists and publications by former correspondents. 
A number of Spanish archives including, most importantly, the Archivo General de la 
Administración (AGA), were at the centre of the research. The AGA centrally holds the 
documentation on the Francoist administration, including the Ministry of Information and 
Tourism, which was the Francoist institution responsible for the foreign press. Further 
thorough archival research was conducted in the archives of the Spanish Foreign Ministry, 
the Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación (AMAE), which was of 
particular importance for understanding of political role of correspondents. Due to the 
Spanish regulation for the protection of personal data, which allows access only with the 
explicit consent of the person in question or 25 years after his or her death82, some 
documents in both archives only could be obtained with personal authorizations of the 
interviewed correspondents or their bereaved family members.  
These authorizations were also of particular importance for access to archival material in 
the archives of the Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior (AGMI) and the Archivo 
Central del Ministerio de la Presidencia (ACMP). The former holds police records which 
are valuable sources for understanding the surveillance of foreign correspondents. While 
very few such reports could be found, the extensive documentation on the Le Monde 
correspondent José Antonio Novais, which could be obtained with the authorization of his 
son, was of particular importance. 
Through the ACMP, a number of accreditations of former correspondents, which often 
contained additional material, were accessed, although only after lengthy negotiations. 
While most of the accreditations of correspondents are kept in the AGA, those of journalists 
who remained in Spain after the dissolution of the Ministry of Information and Tourism 
during the Spanish transition were transferred to the new institutions responsible for the 
foreign press. Eventually, in 1979 this became the Secretary of State for Information, one 
of the secretaries directly subordinated to the Ministry of the Presidency. These documents 
are still located in the basement of the secretary’s institutional successor, the Secretary of 
State for Communication and are not directly accessible. Upon request, drawing on the 
personal authorisations of foreign correspondents, a number of these extremely useful 
accreditations were transferred to the ACMP and could be examined there. Furthermore, 
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the extremely helpful employees of the Secretary of State for Communication also had the 
courtesy to pass the books in which all correspondents ever accredited during the Franco 
regime were registered, on to this archive. Although these registers were discontinued in 
1981, they were at that time still in the possession of the Secretary of State for 
Communication. 
Besides these archives of state institutions, archival material was also accessed in a number 
of other archives and institutions. These included the Archivo Fundación Nacional 
Franciosco Franco (AFNFF), and, in order to examine the relations of the foreign press 
corps with the Spanish opposition, the archives of the Fundación Francisco Largo 
Caballero (FFLC) and the Fundación Pablo Iglesias (FPI) as well as the Archivo Histórico 
del Partido Comunista de España (AHPC). While some valuable documents could be 
obtained through the AFNFF, the access to the latter did not yield many relevant results. 
The same also applied to the visits to the still existing correspondents’ organizations in 
Madrid and their institutional successors. While helpful material such as yearbooks could 
be obtained primarily through the CIP, its archive vanished some years ago.83 Despite these 
disappointments regarding access or accessible sources, the material examined in the other 
Spanish archives, the information and additional material obtained through interviews 
proved to be sufficient in order to examine the correspondent’s institutions and their 
relations with the political opposition.  
The research conducted in Spanish archives was accompanied by research in German, 
British, and French archives. It was the aim of this multi-national approach to investigate 
the possible political agency of correspondents and its impact on the Franco regime’s 
diplomatic relations. Therefore, the focus was on the archival material of the respective 
foreign ministries. In France, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques in Nantes (CADN), in 
Great Britain, the National Archives (NA), which holds the Foreign Office, and in 
Germany, the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PAAA) in Berlin as well as the 
Bundesarchiv (BA) in Coblenz. 
I deliberately excluded from this multi-archival research the archives of particular media. 
This exclusion was for two main reasons. First, the focus of this thesis is on the foreign 
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press corps as a whole and not on the correspondents of one or several particular media. 
Second, and more importantly, very few media actually have proper archives to begin with. 
Nevertheless, there were two exceptions. In Britain, the BBC Written Archive (BBCWA) 
was consulted. The major international broadcaster the BBC, throughout the Franco regime 
produced programmes in Spanish including foreign news summaries on Spain. 
Furthermore, the BBC also conducted polls among its Spanish audience. The documents 
examined in the BBCWA were therefore valuable sources for the discussion of the access 
and perception of foreign news by the Spanish public.  
The other exception was documents on the The New York Times mission in Francoist Spain, 
which are held in the New York Public Library (NYPL). Archival research in Spain has 
shown that the relations with the highly critical correspondents of the liberal The New York 
Times were particularly problematic for the Francoist regime. While personal access to the 
NYPL was not possible due to lack of financial resources, more than 500 pages of 
documents on The New York Times’ office in Madrid could be ordered from distance.  
Besides the limitation to these two media archives, both Spanish and foreign media will be 
used as sources throughout this thesis. The respective articles were mostly found during the 
archival research in Spain. For the discussion of particular circumstances, the digital 
archives of newspapers and magazines, mainly of the French newspaper Le Monde and the 
Spanish newspaper ABC, were also consulted. 
Finally, a small number of copies were ordered from the Newsberry Library (NL) in 
Chicago since, during the course of my research, I accidentally discovered that the NL holds 
the papers of Richard S. Mowrer, who was the longest-serving correspondent in Francoist 
Spain.  
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1. Administering the foreign press in Francoist Spain 
This chapter will analyse the institutional and legal framework in Spain regarding the 
foreign press and correspondents between the end of the Second World War and the end of 
the Franco regime. The chapter will explore which state institutions dealt with foreign 
correspondents, how their competences were divided and what their position was within 
the regime as a whole. This chapter will also set out the changing legal conditions under 
which foreign correspondents worked. The chapter will demonstrate how changes in the 
institutional and legal framework reflected those in the regime as a whole as well as, to 
some extent, in Spain’s international relations.  
As was the case for the Francoist regime in general, the institutions and laws for foreign 
correspondents also had their roots in the Spanish Civil War. A brief sketch of the evolution 
of the Francoist institutional arrangement up until 1945 will therefore form the starting 
point of this chapter. The aim of this short overview is, however, not to introduce the origins 
of the institutional structure of the Francoist state, which emerged after the Spanish Civil 
War, as a whole. Instead, a short examination of this period is of central importance to 
understand the distribution of competences regarding the foreign press and the institutional 
conflicts which resulted from this allocation of responsibilities.  
 
From the Civil War to the end of the Second World War  
The institutional foundations of the Francoist regime can be traced back to the Spanish 
Civil War (1936-39).84 Already, shortly after the uprising against the Second Republic 
which began on 17 July 1936,85 provisional institutions were created at the headquarters of 
the Rebel troops in Salamanca in order to ‘administer the embryonic state’86 which took 
                                                          
84 For a brief overview of the institutional development of the Francoist state since the Spanish Civil War 
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shape in the conquered territories. One year later, on 19 April 1937, the fragmented camp 
of Franco’s political followers – and especially the Falange and the monarchist groups – 
were united by decree in a new single party named the Traditionalist Spanish Falange of 
the Committees of the National Syndicalist Offensive – ‘a very clumsy title reflecting its 
eclectic composition’87. Once victory over the Republic seemed likely, a more stable and 
fully functional – but still provisional – state apparatus was set up in January 1938 as an 
‘alternative to the Republican state’88. Although still at war, this first government, of which 
Franco was officially appointed head of the state, constituted a fully functional 
administration including a National Spanish State Tourist Department.89  
Following the end of the Civil War in 1939, this first government formed the basis for the 
creation of the Nuevo Estado (New State) in Spain. These, and the following institutional 
and legal reforms during the so-called ‘first Francoism’90 period from 1939 until 1945, must 
be seen against the background of the shifting balance of power within the heterogeneous 
camp of Franco’s followers, grouped in different political ‘families’, and the international 
context of the time. 
The institutions and legal framework for the foreign press and correspondents were set up 
in this context. The treatment of the press in general and the foreign press in particular, 
however, became of special importance for both sides during the Spanish Civil War, both 
inside and outside of Spain.91 The great importance of the foreign perception of the Spanish 
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Civil War had its causes in the nature of the conflict itself and the international setting in 
which it took place. Although it must be considered in its origins as a fundamentally internal 
conflict, ‘foreign powers dictated both the course and the outcome of the Civil War’92. This 
external influence found its most direct expression in the conflicting international politics 
of (non-)intervention. While the Western powers followed the international Non-
Intervention Agreement, which was signed in August 1936, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany 
soon unofficially supported the course of the Rebels. This ‘gave the Spanish crisis a 
decisive importance in the diplomatic scene preceding the Second World War and led to 
passionate debate which convulsed European and international public opinion of the 
time’93.  
For the opponents in the Civil War, the importance of international support resulted in the 
need to extend the conflict to the field of international propaganda.94 The Republican 
government, which continued to hope for a policy change in the Western democracies until 
the end,95 lobbied intensely for lifting the non-intervention policy and giving international 
support for its cause. The Rebels on the other hand initially regarded foreign and domestic 
propaganda as less important as they anticipated a rapid victory.96 But as the war turned out 
to be more protracted than expected they also developed coordinated propagandistic 
measures. In order to secure the status quo of the international non-intervention policy, the 
Rebels’ propaganda aimed at legitimising the coup d’état against the Republic by framing 
the military rebellion for international audiences as a heroic Catholic and anti-communist 
crusade against the supposedly communist-controlled and atheist Republican government. 
At the same time, atrocities by the Republican forces were highly exaggerated or even 
falsified. The attempted propagandistic framing of the bombing of the Basque town of 
Guernica by the German Legion Condor as having been conducted by the Republican 
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forces is a striking example of this external propaganda.97 The propagandistic exploitation 
of the siege of the Alácazar of Toledo by Republican forces is another.98  
Thus, the establishment of institutions within the Rebel zone responsible for the press in 
general and the foreign press in particular became a necessity early on.99 Justino Sinova100 
and Moreno Cantano101 have identified three phases for the general development of these 
press institutions between 1936 and 1945. During the first phase (August 1936 to January 
1938) and against the background of the Spanish Civil War, the military had a predominant 
role in matters concerning the press and propaganda. The first institution for the control of 
the press was already formed one month after the beginning of the Civil War in August 
1936 with the creation of a Press Cabinet in the Junta for National Defence.102 In January 
1937 – and following some intermediate reforms – all responsibilities over the control of 
press and propaganda in the Rebel camp were transferred to a new institution in Salamanca, 
the Delegation of the State for Press and Propaganda.103  
While these institutions were mainly concerned with the domestic press and propagandistic 
matters, a separate military institution practiced the official control of the foreign press and 
correspondents in the Rebel zone, the Press Office of the Quarter of General Franco headed 
by Luis Antonio Bolín.104 Under its supervision, the actual control of the foreign 
correspondents in the various Rebel territories was in the hands of officials dressed in 
uniforms, the so-called Press Officials.105 They strictly controlled all matters concerning 
the foreign press. After coming to Spain, the correspondents had to choose between the 
accreditation in the Republican or in the Rebel territories. In the Rebels’ camp, the 
accreditation of foreign correspondents was subject to political-ideological considerations 
concerning their attitude towards the Rebels’ cause. Furthermore, the Rebel authorities 
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subjected the correspondents to an intensive control. With the exception of the 
correspondents from the Axis powers, Nazi Germany and Italy, all correspondents had to 
submit their despatches for authorization. The censorship of the despatches and telegrams 
of foreign correspondents remained intact until 1945. The control of the foreign 
correspondents during the Civil War also included intimidation, punishment and 
imprisonment in cases of assumed misbehaviour. Preston has researched a number of such 
cases of repression against correspondents by the Rebels. In 1936, for instance, the Rebel 
authorities imprisoned the British correspondent Denis Weaver, who had an accreditation 
from the Republican forces. While travelling the front line together with other journalists, 
Rebel forces arrested, mishandled and imprisoned the group. After a few days in prison, 
the Rebel authorities expelled the journalists to France.106  
In the course of the war and in the face of the increasing number of foreign correspondents 
coming to Spain, access to new accreditations became more restricted.107 From 1937 
onwards, the Rebel institutions started to collect material in personal files on all 
correspondents who were accredited in Rebel Spain. These personal files were later passed 
on to the successor institutions responsible for foreign correspondents after the war.108  
This control of the foreign press within Spain was accompanied by active propaganda 
efforts outside of Spain. For this purpose, the Rebels set up a number of new official 
representations and made use of sympathisers in the existing embassies of the Republic.109 
At the same time, however, the Carlist and Falangist supporters of the Rebel camp as well 
as the pro-Franco Lliga Catalana had initially set up their own press institutions and also 
promoted the Rebel’s uprising outside of Spain independent of the military.110 With the 
creation of the new single party FET y de las JONS in April 1937, the separate propaganda 
activities of the Carlists and the Falange were unified under the leadership of the latter.111  
The merger of these previously separate institutions marked the first consolidation of the 
competences over foreign press and propaganda during the Civil War.112 In a second phase, 
the control over the foreign press was institutionalized within the first Francoist government 
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formed in January 1938. Within the new governmental structure, the competences for press 
and propaganda were passed to the Ministry of the Interior in August 1938.113 At the same 
time, and against the background of the new regime’s ideological and political proximity 
to Nazi Germany and Italy, the pro-fascist Falange - within the FET y de las JONS - gained 
further control over propaganda and the press. In terms of personal politics, the dominant 
role of the Falange manifested itself in the appointment of Ramón Serrano Súñer, a 
Falangist and Franco’s brother-in-law, as minister. While Spain was still at war, Serrano 
Súñer also issued a new and very restrictive press law for Franco’s New State. The press 
law from 1938 remained intact until 1966 though it was changed several times by decree. 
This press law, formulated in coherence with the pro-fascist ideology of the Falange and 
highly influenced by Portuguese regulations,114 did not yet contain specific regulations for 
the foreign correspondents. The Ministry of the Interior only issued such regulations in 
February 1941. Although mainly directed at Spanish journalists abroad, the new regulations 
also limited the possibilities of employment for foreign media.115 While the decree declared 
that Spanish nationals could not become accredited as correspondents for foreign news 
agencies within Spain, it did not, however, regulate the employment for other foreign 
media.  
From May 1941 to July 1945, the institutional control of the domestic and foreign press 
underwent another reorganization. On the one hand, all competences were passed to a 
newly created institution, the quasi-ministerial Vice Secretary for Popular Education 
(VSEP).116 Inspired by similar institutions in the Axis powers like Nazi Germany’s Reich 
Propaganda Ministry,117 the control over press and propaganda was now passed on to the 
Spanish fascist party and the VSEP became ‘a “ministry” in the hands of the Falange’118. 
Within the four National Delegations of the VSEP, the Section for Foreign Press was 
situated in the National Delegation for the Press. Internally, the Section for Foreign Press 
was structured into four departments, which closely reflected its responsibilities: Agencies, 
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Correspondents, Censorship and Translation.119 The Agencies department was mainly 
responsible for contact with and administration of the press attachés in the Spanish 
embassies abroad. Correspondents, the second sub-department, was the central 
administrative institution for all matters concerning the foreign correspondents – from the 
accreditation of correspondents to the collection of information on specific journalists. 
From 1942 until 1945, the Correspondents department also distributed the newsletter 
Memorandum, edited by the National Delegation for the Press, in order to inform the 
correspondents about the ‘official version of the situation in Spain’120. The last two 
departments, Translation and Censorship, were responsible for the monitoring of the 
foreign press and the control of its distribution within Spain. 
The control over the foreign press in general and foreign correspondents in particular 
became the subject of an intense struggle over competences among Francoist institutions, 
especially the VSEP and the Foreign Ministry. On the one hand, the conflict evolved around 
the VSEP’s attempts to gain control over the press attachés in Spain’s foreign embassies, 
which formally came under the authority of the Foreign Ministry. On the other hand, 
Serrano Súñer, who became Foreign Minister in 1941, repeatedly attempted to transfer his 
previous competences over the press and especially over the foreign press and 
correspondents from the VSEP to the Foreign Ministry. The proposed reorganization of the 
control of the international press matters, however, eventually failed, not least due to 
Serrano Súñer’s dismissal as Foreign Minister already in 1942.121  
The struggle over competences between the two institutions continued but centred on the 
coverage of international affairs in the Spanish press. Following the course of the Second 
World War and the decline of the Axis powers, the Falange and the VSEP continuously 
lost influence. Especially since 1943, and with Spain’s official return from non-belligerence 
to neutrality in October, out of strategic considerations and enforced by the Allies’ 
embargo, the pro-axis propaganda in the Spanish press was increasingly seen as 
problematic. Besides the continuing rollback of the influence of the Falange, the VSEP 
nevertheless remained in charge of all matters concerning the control of the domestic and 
foreign press. In terms of the foreign press, Franco’s strategic change in attitude also 
affected the foreign correspondents stationed in Madrid. From 1944 onwards, the VSEP 
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also subjected the despatches of the German correspondents to censorship and terminated 
the correspondents’ - until then unrestricted - possibilities to use telephone and telegraphic 
facilities.122 
 
International isolation, 1945-1951 
The end of the Second World War fundamentally changed Spain’s international position. 
The regime’s former proximity to the Axis powers – Spain’s ‘Axis stigma’123, as David W. 
Pike has termed it - became a heavy burden for Spain’s international perception. In order 
to secure the regime’s survival in the new world order, Franco initiated what has been 
termed a ‘policy of gesture’124. While the regime’s propagandists camouflaged fascist 
elements, they simultaneously highlighted Spain’s Catholicism and anti-communism ‘for 
foreign consumption’125. On the level of the regime’s domestic policy, this attempt resulted 
in a further disempowerment of the FET y de las JONS, which became known as the 
National Movement.126 Nevertheless, the single party was not dissolved ‘and no rival 
political organizations would be tolerated’127.  
In terms of the regime’s attitude towards the international community, the foreign 
propaganda and the change of attitude of the domestic press reflected the new situation. 
With respect to the foreign press, the special concern with the international perception of 
the regime resulted in a rather abrupt practical ‘gesture’: the censorship of foreign 
correspondents was ended in April 1945.128 The political decision behind this step, which 
was taken by the Foreign Ministry instead of the formally responsible VSEP, reflected the 
changed situation.129  
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Fully accredited correspondents could thereafter send their despatches from any of the 
public so-called Telegraph Offices. This was a considerable practical improvement for the 
correspondents since before this new regulation they always had to send their despatches 
from the facilities of the VSEP.130 For some of the correspondents who arrived later on in 
Spain, the non-existence of censorship was an unexpected situation. The New York Times 
correspondent Benjamin Welles, who came to Spain during the 1950s, for instance, noted: 
‘Paradoxically, the foreign correspondent is free of censorship. In my six years’ experience, 
not a word I wrote was subject to censorship […]’131.  
In addition to the relaxed control over the foreign press corps, the regime also included the 
distribution of foreign press in its ‘politics of gestures’ in order to improve its international 
perception. In contrast to the previous years, during which the Francoist authorities did not 
allow the distribution of any foreign media other than those of the Axis Powers and Portugal 
within Spain, they fundamentally revised this policy in the first half of 1945. In June 1945, 
the Franco regime allowed the distribution of all British newspapers with the exception of 
the Daily Worker, the newspaper of the Communist Party of Great Britain.132 French and 
publications from other countries soon followed (further discussed in Chapter 5).133  
These legal changes were accompanied by more general institutional reforms following a 
fundamental governmental crisis in July 1945. This crisis was caused both by the external 
situation and internal demands for the re-installation of the Spanish monarchy.134 As a 
consequence, Franco dissolved the Spanish government. In the new government, he 
strongly increased the importance of Catholics at the expense of Falangists.135 Shortly 
thereafter, the Falange-controlled VSEP, as the central institution responsible for the 
control of the domestic and foreign press and important source of influence of the Falange, 
was dissolved entirely. The competences of the VSEP were transferred to the newly 
founded Ministry of National Education under the Catholic José Ibáñez Martín. Although 
a governmental decree announced this institutional reform already in July 1945, it was only 
implemented in January 1946.  
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The new ministry organized all competences concerned with domestic and foreign 
propaganda as well as the press through the creation of specialized Directorate Generals 
under the so-called Sub-secretary of National Education. The Directorate General for 
Propaganda was responsible for foreign propaganda and the censorship of foreign books. 
The former included, among others, the publication Noticiero Español, of the Directorate 
General for Propaganda, also produced since 1946 in an English (Spanish Newsreel) and 
French (Nouvelles d’Espagne) version.136  
The competences for the foreign press in Spain were bundled within the Directorate 
General for the Press (DG for the Press) in the Section for Foreign Press under leadership 
of the journalist Juan Servert. The internal structure of the Section for Foreign Press, as 
well as its responsibilities, closely followed that of the VSEP. This organizational 
continuity was also reflected in the personnel of the new organization to a certain extent. 
Within the Section for Foreign Press, for instance, the censorship of the foreign publications 
remained in the hands of Evald and Juan Altín Stamberg. Both German-speaking brothers 
had already worked as translators for the Francoist institutions during the Spanish Civil 
War and continued to do so in the VSEP.137  
Sinova points out that the newly appointed Foreign Minister, Alberto Martín Artajo, was 
behind this institutional reform.138 Artajo was ‘one of the outstanding figures of political 
Catholicism at home’139 and a powerful advocate of ‘eradicating all external signs which 
could identify Franco’s Spain with the world war’140 in order to improve Spain’s 
international standing after 1945. For the new minister, the domestic and foreign press in 
particular became important strategic means to this end. Artajo, therefore, became strongly 
interested in the competences formally held by the Ministry of National Education. Thus, 
conflicts between the foreign ministry and the now reformed institution responsible for the 
domestic control of the press continued.  
Artajo made his intentions clear early on. Almost parallel to the creation of the Ministry of 
National Education, the Foreign Minister tried to initiate a liberalization of the Spanish 
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press law from 1938.141 Although he did not succeed with this, the Foreign Minister 
nevertheless secured his personal influence over press policy by installing as under-
secretary of the new Ministry of National Education (Luis Ortiz) and the head of its DG for 
the Press (Tomás Cerro Corrochano) ‘men of his confidence’142. Besides this informal 
influence over the new ministry’s press policy, Artajo also strengthened the Foreign 
Ministry’s direct competences in this field. As Juan Manuel Frenández Fernández-Cuesta 
has shown, the creation of a specialized sub-unit within the Foreign Ministry became of 
central importance in this context: the Office for Diplomatic Information (OID).143 Created 
in December 1945, the OID was officially designed to collect information on international 
affairs of interest for the Foreign Ministry and its diplomats.144 In practice, the OID became 
primarily an instrument ‘of counter-propaganda, in defence of the external image of 
Spain’145 and the improvement of the regime’s international reputation.  
One of the main duties of the OID was the supply of Spain’s diplomatic representations 
with a steady flow of material in order to counter-act negative news reports on the Franco 
regime. At the same time, the OID was also in charge of the central collection of 
information on foreign publications, media and journalists abroad, which the Spanish 
embassies provided. Against the background of Artajo’s attempt to improve the regime’s 
foreign image, the OID furthermore assumed responsibilities over the foreign 
correspondents in Spain. This resulted in a rather ambiguous distribution of competences 
on this matter between the Foreign Ministry’s OID and the Ministry of National 
Education’s DG for the Press and especially its Section for Foreign Press. Indeed, a 
retrospective OID report on the administration of the foreign press in Spain from 1953 
shows that, with the solemn exception of the accreditation of the foreign correspondents, 
all direct contacts with foreign journalists in the years after 1945 were one of the core 
responsibilities of the OID.146 In this way, the powerful new Foreign Minister Artajo 
eventually decided the competence battle over the foreign press corps for the Foreign 
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Ministry. This victory, as will be shown later on, remained only temporarily, however. It 
reflected not least the strong influence of the Foreign Ministry in the Franco regime’s post-
war attempts to improve its foreign image.  
The Foreign Ministry’s successful striving for competences over the foreign press after 
1945 also became visible regarding the press attachés in the Spanish embassies. As outlined 
above, the control over the press attachés had already been a source of conflict between the 
VSEP and the Foreign Ministry during the Second World War. The problematic situation 
of the press attachés becomes clear in a correspondence between the Spanish press attaché 
in Lisbon with the, by then, still in charge, National Delegate for the Press of the VSEP 
from the beginning of 1945. Faced with the need to adapt to the structure of the embassy, 
which was under the Foreign Ministry’s authority, and the parallel responsibility to follow 
the instructions of his actual employee, the VSEP, the press attaché of the Spanish embassy 
in Lisbon had asked his superior for an official clarification of his duties. The response by 
the National Delegate for the Press was not very helpful but rather contributed to the press 
attaché’s complicated situation. Nevertheless, it does facilitate the understanding of the 
press attachés’ duties from the point of view of the VSEP. The National Delegate for the 
Press highlighted that while the press attaché had to work within the Spanish embassy, he 
was 
not a diplomat, although he should act like one; his fields of activity are not 
those of diplomatic circles, but those of journalists, in which […] he should live 
like a journalist himself […] of the country where he is based, although with 
great sympathy for the country he represents.147  
Explanations regarding the press attachés’ duties vis-à-vis journalists are especially 
interesting. The DG for the Press outlined, that the work of the press attaché did not 
primarily consist of the mere collection of information. Instead, he was to make the Spanish 
point of view known among the journalists of his host country. Good personal relations 
with journalists, therefore, were one of his central obligations, because ‘when one has won 
a friend, one does not sell him’148.  
In the context of the dissolution of the VSEP and Artajo gaining power, the Foreign 
Ministry once more tried to bring the press attachés fully under its control too. However, 
as the retrospective OID report from 1953 shows, instead of a clear solution, the situation 
became even more complicated. The Ministry of National Education was clearly unwilling 
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to give up its competences over the press attachés. While the DG for the Press therefore 
remained responsible for the press attachés, the Foreign Ministry’s OID reacted by 
installing within some embassies its own so-called press delegates. The situation that the 
press attaché in Lisbon complained about in 1945, therefore, remained fundamentally 
unchanged. 
The regime’s attempts to improve its international image after the defeat of the Axis 
powers, reflected in its policy towards the foreign press corps, were hardly successful, 
however. Despite all efforts, the Allies continued to treat the Franco regime ‘as a relic of 
Fascist Europe’149. The Allied hostility towards the Franco regime resulted, in March 1946, 
in a joint condemnation of the Franco regime by Great Britain, France and the US. In 
December of the same year, the UN eventually banned the Spanish government as ‘fascist, 
unrepresentative and morally repugnant’150. Consequently, Western states withdrew their 
ambassadors from Madrid. As Javier Tusell points out, this action had ‘little impact in 
practical terms since Franco’s Spain was already virtually isolated’151.  
However, the regime survived and from the end of the 1940s onwards, its situation started 
to improve again. Although resulting less from Artajo’s initiatives and much more from the 
changing geopolitical situation and the beginning of the Cold War, Spain returned – 
although slowly and never fully – to the international community. The conflict between the 
US and the Soviet Union by the 1950s turned into ‘a battle of global alliance[s] and of 
political ideas’152. The revision of the US’s stance towards the strongly anti-communist and 
strategically important Spain seemed to be a suitable compromise in these changing 
circumstances.153 The changing US attitude eventually contributed to the termination of the 
UN resolution in 1950 and the return of ambassadors to Madrid. At the same time, Spain 
was also accepted into international organizations like the UN’s Food and Agriculture 
Organization based in Rome. 154  
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Against the background of this fast changing international context, the regime’s treatment 
of the foreign press corps within Spain once more became the subject of debate. In contrast 
to the previous changes, which were initiated by the Spanish administration, by now the 
correspondents themselves asked for reforms in the regime’s informational policy towards 
the foreign press. Thus, Henry F. Buckley, the correspondent of the British news agency 
Reuters, asked for a more liberal information policy on the part of the regime in March 
1950.155 Buckley had already covered the Spanish Civil War. Thereafter, he had written the 
book Life and Death of the Second Republic,156 according to Preston a ‘unique account of 
Spanish politics throughout the entire life of the Second Republic’157. At the time, he was 
probably one of the best known and informed correspondents in Spain.158  
Buckley’s request, however, not only reflected Spain’s changing international situation, but 
also the changed internal administrative structure for how to deal with the correspondents. 
The journalist directed his demand exclusively to the OID, and the respective report did not 
mention the DG for the Press at all. Seemingly, Artajo was successful with his attempt to 
move all direct contacts with the correspondents to the Foreign Ministry. 
Artjao continued to press for further reforms by directly connecting the issue of the 
information for foreign correspondents with his quest for the liberalization of the domestic 
press. For Sinova, Artajo’s insistence on the relaxation of the regime’s press policy thereby 
was also a reflection of his unsuccessful but continuing insistence on general liberalization 
of the Spanish press law. Liberalizing information policy regarding foreign correspondents 
seemed more promising and less damaging to his eroding power base.159 In 1951, he 
pointed out to Franco personally that the negative attitude of the foreign press at least partly 
resulted from the strict censorship of the domestic press. This resulted simply from foreign 
correspondents’ tendency to publish censored information within Spain: ‘As soon as it has 
been published in Spain, it is of no interest anymore for abroad’160. 
However, Artajo not only tried to improve Spain’s international image through liberal 
reforms, but also through indirect and less provocative means of control over the reports on 
Spain published by correspondents. In the second half of the 1940s, the Foreign Ministry 
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introduced a new ‘additional visa application form for journalists’161, which correspondents 
had to submit to the respective Spanish embassies. In this form, the correspondents were 
obliged to provide information on their professional background. But the form also 
included a paragraph, which stated that although ‘correspondents are not subject to 
censorship while in Spain’, the Spanish embassy requested ‘a letter from your publisher 
stating their willingness to print the Embassy’s correction to errors of fact which might 
appear in your published articles.’162 The available evidence suggests, however, that this 
remained a fruitless and half-hearted attempt to force foreign publishers to print corrections. 
When confronted with a complaint about the regulation by The New York Times, the press 
attaché in the Spanish embassy in Washington was eager to downplay the issue. He argued 
that the form should not be understood as a means of control, but as some kind of ‘welcome 
courtesy’ and that ‘to make it a condition sine qua non in granting visas to the journalists, 
is not the intention of my government.’163 In fact, the press attaché even explicitly 
highlighted that ‘there has been, to the best of my knowledge, not a single case where the 
American correspondents have been refused visas for Spain for not having submitted the 
letter of their publishers […].’164 The Francoist authorities seemingly dropped the form 
entirely shortly thereafter and the total absence of any further discussions about this matter. 
Like this minor attempt to regain control over the foreign press, Artajo’s plans for a reform 
of the general press policy also remained unsuccessful. The regime faced another 
government crisis in 1951, which resulted in the dismissal of the existing government and 
the formation of a new one. In the context of Spain’s improved international situation, 
Franco re-balanced the internal power structure by including Falangists once more in the 
government.165 In this way, he put an end to the increasingly isolated Foreign Minister’s 
attempts to liberalize the Spanish press policy: ‘The answer of Franco to Artajo was, in any 
case, negative’166. 
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The Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1951-1962  
The years up to 1951 were marked by the regime’s strive for survival in a hostile 
international context. This slowly started to change from the beginning of the 1950s. 
Following the lifting of the UN ban and the return of Western ambassadors, the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) accepted Spain as a 
member in 1952. Subsequently, the year 1953 marked the real turning point for the Franco 
regime’s international relations. In this year, Spain not only signed a Concordat with the 
Vatican, which was important for its propaganda, but also, more importantly, the Madrid 
Agreements with the US. In exchange for granting the of US military bases in Spain, the 
Franco regime received military and economic aid. Aside from urgently needed economic 
help, what was crucial for the Franco regime was, according to Boris N. Liedtke, ‘the fact 
that through these agreements Spain was welcomed back to the international 
community’167. Other Western powers signed military cooperation agreements with Spain 
as well, while further credits were given to Spanish industry. This return of Spain into the 
international community culminated when Spain was admitted to the UN as a full member 
in 1955 – a ‘glorious moment’168 for the Franco regime.  
After the initial rapprochement between Spain and the US in 1951 and before the further 
improvement in the regime’s external relations, Franco initiated the internal stabilization 
and consolidation of the regime.169 In the context of the existing government’s inability to 
handle social unrest in Barcelona and against the background of the more relaxed 
international situation, Franco reshuffled the government. As we have seen above, Franco 
partly revised the ‘cosmetic change’170 of the post-war years by bringing Falangists back 
into high-ranking positions.  
The changed political equilibrium was also reflected in the creation of a new ministry in 
1951, which was to become the solely responsible institution for all matters concerning the 
control of foreign and domestic press until the end of the Franco regime: the Ministry of 
Information and Tourism (MIT). With Arias-Salgado , who from 1941-45 had already been 
head of the Vice-Secretary for Popular Education, a Falangist became the new minister. 
The same applies for Juan Aparicio López as the new head of the DG for the Press, who 
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had already held an identical position in the VSEP. This return of Falangists from the pro-
fascist period during the Second World War was ‘a change in the internal politics of the 
regime, which would have been hardly acceptable at the end of the World War’171. Within 
the new government, this shift of power was only partly balanced by the appointment of 
the more liberal Catholic Joaquín Ruiz Giménez as new Minister of Education. 
The creation of the new ministry was officially justified by the rapidly growing amount of 
administrative work in connection with the press, theatre, cinema and radio.172 Francisco 
Sevillano Calero points out that the creation of the MIT must be seen against the 
background of the growing resistance against the more liberal press policy of the Catholics 
Ibáñez Martín and Artajo.173 The Falangist control over the MIT, therefore, was a strong 
corrective to these developments. In this sense, the government reshuffle and the creation 
of the MIT marked the failure of Artajo’s attempts to liberalize the Spanish press policy. 
In terms of its scope and responsibilities, the MIT took over all competences for the press, 
theatre, cinema, radio. It also became responsible for censorship previously located at the 
Ministry of National Education, and tourism which was moved over from the Ministry of 
the Interior. Its creation reflected not only the institutional concentration and specialization 
of the regime’s press policy; instead, it also marked a change in the focus of the regime’s 
press policy. While its institutional predecessor after 1945 explicitly concentrated on 
Spain’s domestic situation, the MIT had more broadly defined aims. In fact, the MIT’s 
founding decree explicitly highlighted the ministry’s international orientation: 
From the point of view of the state, information is one of the public 
services with the most profound and delicate content, and which should 
be subjected to the obligation to promote the public welfare in order to 
form healthy criteria for public opinion and to diffuse the most authentic 
image of our homeland and its situation, both at home and abroad.174 
In terms of its administrative structure, the MIT had a similar organization like its 
predecessors in DGs.175 Consequently, the Section for Foreign Press was situated within 
the DG for the Press. The Section for Foreign Press remained structured into four sub-
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departments with altogether 22 employees in 1952: Censorship, Correspondents, 
Newsletters and Press Attachés.176 
The accreditation of new correspondents and the renewal or decline of existing 
accreditations remained one of the main duties of the Section for Foreign Press. Similar to 
its predecessor, these functions were administered in a specialized sub-department, which 
was considered in an internal MIT report as being of ‘extraordinary importance’177. The 
Section for Foreign Press also inherited the personal files on correspondents, which the 
VSEP had already started to compile during the Second World War. The new department 
continued the centralized collection of information on the correspondents accredited in 
Spain until the end of the Franco regime.  
Apart from these continuities in the structure of the Section for Foreign Press, the new 
ministry also implemented noticeable reforms. This applied in particular to the information 
policy towards the foreign press corps. Following the signing of the Madrid agreements 
with the US in 1953, an information bureau was founded a year later within the Section for 
Foreign Press with the aim to ‘provide the foreign correspondents with informational 
material’ both in terms of current events and ‘national life’ in general178. In administrative 
terms, this new bureau acquired the status of new sub-department of the Section for Foreign 
Press.  
The decision to extend the competences of the Section for Foreign Press beyond mere 
administrative tasks must be seen both against the background of Spain’s changing 
international situation and the Franco regime’s internal restructuring. One the one hand, the 
improvements in official information policy towards the foreign correspondents 
represented the late implementation of Artajo’s earlier suggestions. On the other hand, the 
creation of the information bureau was most likely an attempt by the Falange-controlled 
new ministry to re-claim some of the competences over the foreign press, which the Foreign 
Ministry’s OID had previously taken over. This seems a plausible interpretation against the 
background of the timing of the installation of the new information service. Indeed, the 
previously quoted OID report on the division of the competences concerning the foreign 
press corps highlighted that, until then, all matters concerning direct contact with 
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correspondents ‘have been in the hands of the Office for Diplomatic Information’179 and 
should remain so in the future mainly for practical reasons. The report can be dated to the 
years 1952-1953 and therefore shortly after the creation of the MIT but before the 
installation of the information bureau in 1954. Faced with the creation of the MIT, 
therefore, the OID tried to remain in charge over the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain.  
Against the background of the creation of the information bureau in the MIT, this informal 
attempt to come to an agreement on this matter proved largely unsuccessful, however. 
Instead, the MIT and the Foreign Ministry established a double-competency in terms of 
direct contact with and official information for the foreign correspondents. A report from 
1955, which estimates roughly ten informational queries by correspondents every day, 
shows that the Section for Foreign Press indeed put considerable effort into keeping up with 
its administrative rival.180  
Besides these organizational changes, the MIT’s reclaiming of authority over the foreign 
press also became visible in investments in its technical equipment. Until 1954, the MIT 
was using equipment such as telegraphic machines for the reception of reports by news 
agencies. These machines were totally outdated because the Section for Foreign Press still 
used Morse receivers. Seemingly frustrated with the situation, the Director General for the 
Press outlined in a report that no Western, but only East European news agencies like the 
Soviet TASS and the Yugoslavian Tanjug still used such technology.181 The updated service 
for the monitoring of foreign new agencies was installed within the Section for Foreign 
Press’ sub-department for the editing of newsletters and reports.182 The central 
responsibility of this sub-department was collection, translation and evaluation of news 
published about Spain abroad. The sub-department published the results of these analyses 
in daily news bulletins for the Minister of Information and Tourism and weekly summaries 
for cabinet meetings. In contrast to previous regulations, these reports also included 
information on the publications of the large communities of Spanish exiles that had left 
Spain after the end of the Spanish Civil War.183  
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The third sub-department of the Section for Foreign Press, Censorship, remained 
unchanged in terms of its duties and competences and in charge of the censorship and the 
authorization of imported foreign publications.184 Remarkably, this also applied to its 
personnel to a certain extent. The Stamberg brothers, who had already worked as censors 
in the VSEP and the Ministry for National Education, continued to work in the sub-
department185 –once again under their old and new boss Juan Aparicio as Director General 
for the Press.  
Besides the administrative and personnel similarities, the practical work of the Censorship 
department had by the 1950s become considerably more complicated. The increased 
authorization of foreign publications for distribution in Spain had a fundamental impact on 
the daily workload of the Spanish censors. At the same time, the coordination of the 
distribution of the foreign press in the Spanish regions became a pressing matter. Indeed, 
in the beginning of the decade the OID had complained (although with respect to press 
censorship in general) that while ‘the service in Madrid is quite well set up, it was by 
contrast extremely defective in the provinces’186. The MIT soon attempted to cope with this 
problem by improving the coordination between the centre in Madrid and the ministry’s 
so-called Provincial Delegates in the Spanish regions. This attempt was reflected in new 
guidelines for the distribution of foreign press, which the MIT issued in 1954. The 
guidelines clarified that only the central Section for Foreign Press had the competence to 
authorize the import of new publications. Furthermore, the Provincial Delegates also had 
to follow the daily lists of authorized and non-authorized foreign publications distributed 
by the centre in Madrid.187 Nevertheless, for publications in principle authorized but not 
included in the daily censorship lists, the decision about distribution or non-distribution 
remained with the Provincial Delegates.  
The fourth sub-department of the Section of Foreign Press was in charge of the press 
attachés at the Spanish embassies abroad. When the MIT took over the competences over 
the press attachés, the previous compromises with the Foreign Ministry had led to an even 
more complicated situation of the press attachés, which needed a swift resolution. This 
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became clear from the already quoted OID report from the beginning of the 1950s.188 The 
OID outlined that while attachés of the MIT were stationed in some embassies, others had 
press delegates which were installed and employed by the OID and who had no direct 
obligations to the MIT. Finally, in some cases, these two were even the same person and 
therefore came under the competence of both the MIT and the Foreign Ministry. Against 
this background, the OID presented a proposal, which was eventually adopted and 
implemented and seemingly resulted in a strengthening of the MITs competences. While 
the OID was to give up their own press personnel in the embassies, the Ministry of 
Information and Tourism was to become the only institution that could appoint press 
attachés. These ‘attachés or counsellors for press and diplomatic information’189 were to 
have the double function of reporting to the OID and the MIT, however. At the same time, 
they were also supposed to fulfil tasks within the embassies and provide the ambassadors 
with relevant information. While the new solution put an end to the double appointment of 
press personnel at the embassies, the press attachés nevertheless became responsible to both 
the Foreign Ministry and the OID. Finally, within the MIT the competences over press 
attachés were also divided: while the administrative control of the press attachés lay with 
one of the so-called Central Services of the MIT,190 the Section for Foreign Press’ sub-
department remained responsible for all direct contacts with the press attachés.191  
In contrast to the previous institutions, the Ministry of Information and Tourism created a 
final institutional setting for all matters concerned with the domestic and foreign press in 
1951. This institutional re-structuring was accompanied by a reform of the legal framework 
for the foreign press corps. In 1954, the MIT issued new accreditation guidelines. This was 
the first reform of the existing regulations for foreign correspondents, which the Francoist 
authorities had issued during the Spanish Civil War. The new regulations distinguished 
between three types of foreign correspondents: full-time staff correspondents fell into the 
category Foreign Correspondents and stringers were termed Foreign Contributors. The last 
category was for foreign journalists only visiting or passing through Spain.192 The press 
cards for the first two types of correspondents were issued by the Section for Foreign Press 
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for one to six months and could be renewed without limitation. Visiting correspondents 
received press cards for one month only. 
With respect to the foreign press, the creation of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, 
therefore, resulted in the stabilization and professionalization of the institutional and legal 
structure. The MIT officials accompanied these institutional reforms with the attempt to 
extend their competences beyond the mere administration of the press corps. The creation 
of the Information Bureau within the Section for Foreign Press reflected this development. 
At the same time, as the thesis will examine in detail in the following chapters, the MIT 
also tried to improve relations with the foreign correspondents. The rapprochement between 
the Spanish authorities and the foreign press corps included in particular the foundation of 
an international press club and the official approval for the creation of correspondents’ 
associations in Spain. These developments took place in the context of Spain’s return to the 
international community and the internal strengthening of the new ministry’s competences 
over the foreign press after the dominant role of the Foreign Ministry during the 1940s.  
The internal situation of the Franco regime fundamentally changed towards the end of the 
1950s. A government reshuffle in 1957 brought the so-called technocrats into government. 
This well-educated elite, many of them members of the influential Catholic organization 
Opus Dei,193 initiated, through the First Stabilization Plan in 1959, Spain’s rapid economic 
recovery in the 1960s.194  
While Arias-Salgado remained Minister of Information and Tourism in the new 
government, the Falangist Aparicio was dismissed as Director General for the Press. After 
a brief period which saw Juan Beneyto Pérez at the top of the DG for the Press, Arias-
Salgado eventually gave this post to a ‘devoted admirer of Franco’195, Adolfo Muñoz 
Alonso.  
The governmental reshuffle also had an impact on the regime’s relations with the foreign 
press. The replacement of Artajo as Foreign Minister with Fernando María de Castiella 
Maíz instigated these changes. Castiella was very much concerned about Spain’s 
international image as an obstacle to the further improvement of Spain’s international 
relations. In order to cope with this problem, Castiella initiated a reform and modernization 
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of the OID as a ‘central instrument in order to arm and disarm campaigns of international 
opinion’196. Beside the improvement of the OID’s technical equipment, Castiella also 
transferred more competences and specialized personnel to the OID.197 Castiella’s interest 
in Spain’s international image led to an ‘immediate clash with the one responsible for the 
Information, Arias Salagado’198. As Rosa María Pardo Sanz highlights, although without 
providing evidence, the Ministry of Information and Tourism’s attitude towards the foreign 
press acquired particular importance in this context.199 The resulting conflicts, as the 
following chapter will show, mostly centred on Arias-Salgado’s policy towards the foreign 
press. They were only resolved with the minister’s replacement with Manuel Fraga Iribarne 
in 1962. 
 
Manuel Fraga 1962-69: Between control and liberalization  
Since its return to the international stage and in particular during the course of its economic 
recovery since the end of the 1950s, the Francoist regime steadily improved its international 
image. One of Castiella’s initiatives reflected this growing confidence in Spain’s 
international standing. The Foreign Minister moved the Franco regime’s foreign policy 
focus increasingly from the US towards Europe, especially in February 1962 when Spain 
lodged its application for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). 
While this move reflected ‘the regime’s growing interest in international acceptance’200, its 
failure also provided strong proof of the limits of this strategy. The application was not only 
opposed by European socialist parties and left-wing organizations.201 The Franco regime 
was also ‘badly hit’202 by a meeting of opposition groups from within and outside of Spain 
in Munich in June 1962 under the patronage of the European Movement. The political 
groups participating in this meeting ranged from the moderate opposition like monarchists 
and Catholics, to Basque and Catalan nationalists, Spanish socialists and Republicans. 
Within Spain, the meeting resulted in a massive press campaign against the so-called 
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Munich Conspiracy. On the international level, the meeting ‘dramatically increased the 
unpopularity of the Franco regime in Europe’203.  
Against this background, the regime tried to ‘give the impression of political evolution’204 
with another government reshuffle in 1962. Arias-Salgado  was dismissed together with six 
other ministers. At the top of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, Manuel Fraga 
Iribarne was supposed to be the new liberal face of the regime. Born in 1922, Fraga 
belonged to the first generation of the regime’s political elite, which had not gained its 
merits in the Spanish Civil War. Instead, he was an ambitious academic with a doctorate in 
Law, who had joined the state administration in 1951. Shortly after his appointment as new 
head of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, he began to establish himself as a 
reformer both at home and abroad.205 This included the almost entire dismissal of Arias-
Salgado’s staff.206 The director of the Catholic Spanish news agency Logos, Manuel 
Jiménez Quílez, became the new head of the DG for the Press.207  
Fraga became one of the most prominent advocates of the regime’s ‘apertura’ (opening) 
during the 1960s, a careful attempt to cope with the social and economic changes in Spain 
by implementing reforms. Nevertheless, Fraga, who ‘had carefully dissociated himself 
from anti-regime positions’208 earlier on, by no means promoted a general political 
liberalization. Instead, his insistence on reforms was rather a pragmatic necessity in order 
to ensure the survival of the Franco regime. 
Prompted by the need to facilitate Spain’s economic growth and tourism as a major income 
source, the MIT under Fraga made considerable efforts to improve Spain’s image abroad. 
Indeed, the transformation of Spain into a destination for mass tourism became one of 
Fraga’s main achievements.209 As a result, for Fraga relations with the foreign press were 
of particular importance or, as the director of the private Spanish news agency Europa 
Press put it, ‘Fraga was obsessed with the foreign press’210. This obsession mostly 
manifested itself in Fraga’s policy towards the foreign press, in close cooperation with 
Castiella. In contrast to Salgado, this policy was based on close cooperation with the 
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Foreign Minister, with whom Fraga maintained good relations.211 While Chapter 6 will 
examine this policy change towards the foreign press in detail, Fraga’s striving for the 
improvement of Spain’s international image was soon reflected in legal and institutional 
reforms. This was especially true of the creation of the International Press Club in Madrid 
a few months after Fraga’s appointment to be discussed in the next chapter. 
Despite Fraga’s liberal image, his institutional and legal reforms rather reflected the attempt 
to improve the MIT’s performance in terms of the control and monitoring of the foreign 
press. This also applied to the press attachés, to which Fraga directed his first reforms. The 
new minister started with the reorganization and centralization of the competences over the 
press attachés, which he bundled in to the department Foreign Service.212 Although this 
department had existed since the foundation of the MIT, it was originally only responsible 
for the administration of the press attachés. The Section for Foreign Press had all other 
competences like the collection and evaluation of the information provided by the press 
attachés. Through this centralization of competences in Foreign Services, Fraga facilitated 
cooperation with the OID. 
Shortly after this centralization, the new minister also tightened the control over the press 
attachés themselves. Fraga ordered by ministerial decree the absolute incompatibility of 
any kind of journalistic publication by press attachés with their professional duties.213 This 
decision was caused by the publication of a number of articles by the Spanish press attaché 
in London in the first half of 1963.214 Other than this, Fraga’s attempt to improve the MIT’s 
control over the foreign press was most clearly reflected in the creation of a new department 
with the ministry, the so-called Liaison Office.215 The MIT justified the need for the 
creation of this new department with:  
the continuing increase of the relations of this Ministry with other departments 
of the Spanish administration as well as various foreign centres of information 
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and the necessity to canalise specific aspects of this information via one single 
coordinative centre [ ...].216 
The Liaison Office had two major functions. First, a specific subdivision within the Liaison 
Office, a ‘department for the investigation of communism and other subversive 
activities’217, was responsible for the collection, analysis, translation and distribution of 
information. Following an undated report218 from around 1975-77 and a brief academic 
analysis of the function of the Liaison Office,219 this ‘information’ consisted of the 
following: first, information about the internal social and political situation in Spain with 
respect to religion, students, the workers’ movement, general subversive actions and 
propaganda as well as general clandestine activities; second, collection of information 
related to Spain from foreign radio stations and news agencies of communist origin as well 
as with an importance for Western Europe; third, selection of the general information 
received by the Ministry of Information and Tourism; and fourth, general information on 
public order. 
Thus, one of the central tasks of the Liaison Office was monitoring the numerous 
communist broadcasts towards Spain such as the programmes of Radio Moscow, Radio 
Prague and Radio Budapest. The programmes of these radio stations were produced by 
Spanish exiles. These broadcasts in fact became an important source of employment for 
Spanish communist refugees in Eastern Europe.220 Many of these radio stations not only 
broadcast in Spanish, but also, at least for a time, in regional languages like Catalan.221 Best 
known among these communist radio broadcasts was Radio España Independiente of the 
Spanish Communist Party. According to its own slogan it was ‘the only Spanish broadcaster 
not censored by Franco’222. Popularly known as La Pirenaica because it was believed to be 
broadcasting from the French Pyrenees, the broadcaster had been founded in Moscow in 
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1941. In 1955, it moved to Bucharest, from where it broadcasted throughout the entire 
existence of the Franco regime until 1977.223  
Besides the surveillance of these Communist broadcasters, the Liaison Office monitored 
the Spanish programmes of Western international broadcasters and in particular the BBC 
and Radio Paris (discussed in Chapter 5) as well as practically all foreign news agencies.224 
In addition to this information, the Liaison Office received the reports on the foreign media 
coverage of Spain from the Section for Foreign Press and the Spanish press attachés. 
Furthermore, the new department also had its own external collaborators, some of them 
based at Spanish embassies abroad who were mainly responsible for delivering information 
on specific matters. Since its foundation in 1962, the Liaison Office therefore became the 
central government institution within the Spanish administration for the collection of 
information on the foreign press.  
The Liaison Office stored the collected information in its own archive, including a wide-
ranging selection of personal dossiers. More importantly, however, the Liaison Office’s 
second central task was from the beginning the analysis of relevant material and the issuing 
of daily newsletters for other administrative bodies. These newsletters were distributed 
among the Francoist administration in a number of issues with varying degrees of 
confidentiality and content. In the mid-1970s, the Liaison Office distributed 42 highly 
restricted newsletters on the general political and social situation within Spain, 30 ‘very 
restricted’ daily reports with translations of the original texts of foreign radio and news 
agencies and 84 newsletters with a general analysis of the foreign radios and news 
agencies.225 Finally, the MIT’s Liaison Office also distributed a selection of other 
information received by the inter-ministerial Liaison Offices and other official bodies. The 
Liaison Office distributed further information. 
The internal structure of the Liaison Office reflected its intermediate function as an 
information service for the Spanish administration. Alongside the aforementioned 
department for investigation, the MIT Liaison Office was also home to a Council of 
Liaison, consisting of 14 representatives from other ministries and administrative bodes. 
The Council met weekly in order to ‘study and coordinate specific informational 
material’226.  
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Within his first year in office, Fraga not only re-structured the administration of the Spanish 
press attachés, but also founded an International Press Club. Most importantly, he created 
a central department for the evaluation and distribution of foreign news reports on the 
Franco regime. Fraga’s subsequent reform of the accreditation guidelines for foreign 
correspondents continued this development. In the context of a general reform of the 
regulations for Spanish journalists,227 the MIT published new regulations for the 
accreditation of foreign correspondents in 1963.228 These guidelines established new terms 
for the accreditation of correspondents such as Special Envoys for visiting journalists. 
Instead, and more importantly, the new regulations were clearly separated between two 
types of staff correspondents, the so-called chief correspondents and editor correspondents. 
229 Chief correspondents were foreign journalists who either reported on ‘all aspects of 
Spanish life’230 or worked for specialized publications such as fashion or sports magazines. 
Editor correspondents only wrote on particular aspects such as economics for more general 
media or worked under the supervision of chief correspondents. The latter mostly applied 
to news agency staff. Finally, stringers could also qualify as editor correspondents. With 
the changed classification of correspondents, the regulations also adapted the duration of 
the accreditations. Press cards for chief correspondents now were valid for one year instead 
of six months, for editor correspondents six months and for the special correspondents two 
months. This new definition of accreditation types reflected the MIT’s attempt to gain a 
better understanding of the constitution of the foreign press corps in Spain. As chapter four 
will show, the reform of the accreditation guidelines was also a reaction to the growing 
numbers of correspondents coming to Spain since the beginning of the 1960s. 
Shortly before the drafting of these new guidelines for the accreditation of foreign 
correspondents in Spain, the MIT also renewed the regulations for Spaniards working as 
foreign correspondents. Previously, when they were only few in number, the Section for 
Foreign Press had granted accreditations to Spanish nationals without many problems.231 
This practice was of particular importance for news agencies, which frequently employed 
Spaniards in the Spanish offices. However, under Salgado and shortly before Fraga’s 
appointment, the MIT tried to tighten the regulations for the accreditation of Spanish 
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nationals. From then on, the MIT only allowed Spaniards who registered in advance with 
the DG for the Press’ Official Register for (Spanish) Journalists to work for foreign media 
as correspondents.232 Under Fraga, this regulation became part of the new accreditation 
guidelines.233 Therefore, the MIT established an official instrument to which it could refer 
in order to decline applications by Spaniards as foreign correspondents. Simply rejecting 
applications without a proper justification did not seem opportune in order to avoid 
provoking foreign media. Chapter 6 will demonstrate that the MIT actually revised the 
accreditation guidelines against the background of the highly critical reports, which the 
Spaniard José Antonio Novais was writing at the time for the French newspaper Le Monde.  
The MIT’s attempt to formalize the accreditation of correspondents without giving up the 
final decision-making powers was strongly reflected in Article 8 of the new accreditation 
guidelines:  
As an exception and based on the personality of the person in question and the 
merits of his informational work, foreigners living in Spain can be accredited 
as chief correspondents or editor correspondents, whether journalist 
professionals or not, which do meet in the opinion of the Director General for 
the Press […] these criteria.234  
Who was or was not accredited as a foreign correspondent thus remained to some extent an 
individual and potentially arbitrary decision by the DG for the Press. Indeed, the MIT 
accredited almost 20 foreign journalists who mostly supported the regime as honorary 
correspondents until the end of the 1960s.235  
These new regulations only remained valid for 3 years, however. In 1966, Fraga eventually 
realised a project which had occupied him since his appointment and in which Artajo had 
unsuccessfully tried to implement 20 years earlier: the replacement of the general press law 
from 1938 with a new one. The central outcome of the new law was abandoning censorship 
of all Spanish publications, which had been in practice since the Spanish Civil War. 
Although other means of censorship still remained intact and were applied, the end of the 
control of media reports before their publications nevertheless fundamentally changed the 
Spanish media landscape.236  
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Partly in contrast to this limited liberalization for the Spanish press, the new law also 
included a short part on the accreditation of foreign correspondents. The most noticeable 
change induced by this new reform was, however, not concerned with the accreditation of 
new, but the cancellation of existing accreditations: ‘The Ministry of Information and 
Tourism can cancel the accreditation of correspondents whose information is wrong or 
proven to be tendentious’237. Chapter 6 will show that this new regulation did not 
fundamentally change the actual practice of the regime. The Francoist authorities cancelled 
accreditations of correspondents it disliked throughout the existence of the regime. 
Nevertheless, the MIT and its predecessors expelled correspondents on an ad-hoc basis 
before 1966. The new guidelines put this practice on a regular legal basis.  
In addition to this new regulation, the MIT also reformed the accreditation guidelines for 
correspondents in a decree from 1966238 and an additional order from 1967.239 Now the 
MIT reversed the former distinction between chief correspondents and editor-
correspondents. In the context of rising numbers of correspondents coming to Spain during 
the 1960s, the distinction had proven to be impractical. Instead, the new guidelines once 
more separated between full-time, freelancers and special correspondents. A new practical 
measure was the creation of an official register for all foreign correspondents accredited in 
Spain. The regulations for the accreditation of Spaniards as correspondents and for the 
nomination of honorary correspondents remained unchanged. 
Besides these specifications, the new accreditation guidelines included a new passage 
which granted fully accredited staff correspondents ‘benefits, authorizations and 
permissions […] [which are] necessary for the execution of their informative activities’240. 
This was the first time that any kind of ‘benefits’ were mentioned in the accreditation 
guidelines. Neither the available archival evidence nor the interviews allow for conclusions 
as to whether or not the MIT had granted ‘benefits’ to correspondents before. At least since 
this reform, however, Fraga tried to improve the relations with the foreign press corps with 
a number of privileges for fully accredited correspondents. The MIT continued this practice 
until the end of the regime. A list from 1974 included special prices for sending telegraphs, 
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discounts for 1st class train tickets, state-owned restaurants and hotels as well as the right 
to purchase 200 litres of gasoline per month at a reduced price.241 The correspondents 
thereby received similar privileges like foreign diplomats in Spain.242 Manfred von Conta, 
the Spain correspondent for the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung from 1969 until 
1972, highlighted that the most crucial benefit available to correspondents was the 
exemption from import taxes:  
The most important [privilege] was the right to import or buy free of taxes any 
car of your choice – that’s why [the correspondent] Walter Haubrich and I 
myself drove around in so called “Volksporsches”243, a car I would never have 
had a chance to own when paying import-taxes.244 
During the second half of the 1960s, however, not only the legal administration of the 
Spanish press underwent fundamental changes. In fact, shortly after Fraga’s successful 
modification of the old press law, a new basic law, the so-called Organic Law, was passed 
in 1967. Although liberal elements within the regime as well as the growing societal 
opposition hoped for a general liberalization of the institutional and legal structure of the 
regime, the Organic Law in fact cemented the status quo. Officially, the regime presented 
the Organic Law as a step towards a somewhat unclearly defined organic democracy. In 
conjunction with the already existing basic laws, the Organic Law, however, primarily 
finalized the legal codification of the regime’s institutional apparatus. As Stanley Payne 
argues by taking into account the hopes for greater liberalization, which Fraga’s press law 
had stirred up: ‘He [Franco] fully realized that it was one thing to liberalize policy and quite 
another to liberalize the basic structure of the authoritarian system, which would then 
rapidly erode altogether’245.  
Although no more than a footnote in comparison to the general political developments of 
the second half of the 1960s, Fraga’s new regulations for the accreditation of the foreign 
correspondents in Spain nevertheless has to be seen in this context. While modernizing and 
updating the existing legal structure, the regime also legally codified its competences to be 
able to expel any correspondent from Spain at any time. 
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The last step towards preparing for the regime’s survival after Franco’s expected death was 
taken two years later when the Law of Succession was passed. Bypassing the actual heir to 
the Spanish crown, Franco named Juan Carlos, the son of Don Juan de Borbón, as his 
successor and future head of state.  
 
The decay of the regime, 1969-1975 
Researchers have used a variety of terms for the last years of the Franco dictatorship: 
‘twilight of the regime’246, ‘death of the regime’247, or the ‘crisis and agony of the 
dictatorship’248. These terms commonly highlight the contrast between the economic and 
social changes, which took place in Spain in the 1960s, and the regime’s inability to 
implement fundamental liberal reforms. Researchers usually date the beginning of this last 
phase of the Franco dictatorship with the government reshuffle in 1969. Only three months 
after the declaration of Juan Carlos as Franco’s successor, the Matesa affair shattered the 
Spanish government.249 The affair evolved around financial irregularities in connection 
with the company Matesa that received immense press coverage and ‘brought existing 
political tensions to a head.’250 While Franco always used government reshuffles as an 
instrument for keeping the complicated power structure in balance, the outcome of the 1969 
reshuffle was different. Instead of reflecting the heterogeneous camp of Franco’s 
supporters, the new government became known as the ‘mono-colour government’. 
Practically the entire government had links in one way or another to the Opus Dei or the 
camp of political Catholicism, dedicated to secure the survival of the regime. In terms of 
political power, the reaffirmed vice-president and Francoist hardliner Luis Carrero Blanco 
came to represent the ‘continuation of the regime’. The re-shuffle also included the Ministry 
of Information and Tourism, where the ‘ultra-right-wing Catholic’251 Alfredo Sánchez 
Bella replaced Manuel Fraga. 
Fraga’s dismissal did not come as a surprise. Indeed, the hardliner Carrero Blanco 
welcomed the Matesa affair to dismiss a number of ministers including Fraga. Elisa Chuliá 
has pointed out that by the end of the 1960s the Ministry of Information and Tourism had 
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turned into an institution that was very much criticized both by the hardliners of the regime 
and the reform-orientated ‘aperturistas’. While for the former, the liberalization of the press 
law went too far, the latter criticized it as not going far enough – and ‘Fraga had tried to 
reach an equidistant path between the two, without satisfying either’252. Furthermore, the 
partial liberalization of the press law increased open criticism of the regime, which came 
from media close to the Falange and monarchist groups. Carrero Blanco, as the powerful 
advocate of a non-reformist line, used the Matesa affair, which Francoist hardliners framed 
as a press problem, to push for the replacement of Fraga by somebody who was more 
capable of keeping the press in line.253 At the same time, Carrero Blanco himself took an 
increasing interest in the regime’s press policy. The government reshuffle thus marked the 
end of the brief and limited period of the regime’s ‘opening’. 
The following chapters will show that the new Minister of Information and Tourism, whom 
some correspondents perceived as ‘pure fascist’254, also tried to intensify the control over 
the foreign press corps. Sánchez Bella left the institutional and legal framework created by 
his predecessor mostly untouched. Nevertheless, the MIT also implemented a limited 
number of modifications to the existing regulations. But these modifications did not reflect 
any particular policy change by the new minister, but rather the Franco regime’s changing 
foreign relations by creating new regulations for the accreditation of foreign correspondents 
from communist countries. Previously, the strictly anti-communist regime did not allow the 
accreditation of any correspondents from communist countries. This changed during the 
last years of the regime in the context of Spain’s own (economic) ‘Ostpolitik’, or policy 
towards Eastern Europe. The Franco regime had already established economic contacts 
with Poland at the end of the 1950s and further economic agreements followed throughout 
the 1960s.255 By 1973 and in the context of the lifting of the West German Hallstein 
doctrine, Spain even established diplomatic contacts with the East German Democratic 
Republic.256 The general normalization of diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe only 
took place after the death of Franco, however. Nevertheless, the economic rapprochement 
of Spain and Eastern Europe resulted in an exchange of correspondents on a strictly 
reciprocal basis. In 1970, for instance, the Spanish news agency EFE and the Soviet news 
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agency TASS signed an agreement for the exchange of correspondents (further discussed in 
Chapter 3).  
In principle, correspondents from communist media were subject to the same regulations 
as any other foreign correspondent in Spain. However, the MIT also established a number 
of specific rules for these journalists, which were mainly concerned with the 
correspondents’ mobility. In practice, the Francoist authorities only allowed correspondents 
from communist countries to move within a radius of 40 kilometres from the centre of 
Madrid with the exception of trips to some surrounding destinations on specified routes.257 
The Section for Foreign Press had to approve any travel beyond that circle at least 48 hours 
in advance.  
In the context of the arrival of the first TASS correspondents in Madrid, the Francoist 
authorities implemented these regulations based on their conviction that ‘in many cases, 
the work of the correspondents extends beyond their professional occupation and crosses 
into the work of the secret services’258. Thus, Spanish policy was, as Dina Fainberg has 
shown, not so different from the treatment of Soviet correspondents in the US. Soviet 
journalists in Washington had to reside within a 40-mile radius of the White House.259 At 
the same time, the Francoist authorities established the travel restrictions for correspondents 
from communist countries simply as a reaction to similar restrictions for Western 
correspondents in the Soviet Union.260 Therefore, the MIT put not only the accreditation, 
but also the treatment of this new group of correspondents on a strictly reciprocal basis.  
Alongside the evolving relations with communist Eastern Europe, in 1970 the Spanish 
dictatorship finally succeeded in fundamentally improving its relations with the European 
Communities (EC) by signing a preferential agreement.261 A further important success of 
the regime’s foreign policy was Spain’s participation in the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki from 1973 to 1975. The presence in Helsinki not only 
facilitated the further rapprochement with the Soviet Union, it also culminated in Spain’s 
                                                          
257 AGA, (03) 107.002, 42.09052, Folder 12: Sección de Prensa Extranjera to TASS correspondent Anatoli 
Medvenko, 2 August 1976; AMAE, 12184, Folder 14: Corresponsales Extranjeros en España, 18 February 
1974.  
258 Ibid. Interestingly, the KGB was not directly mentioned in this context. Instead, the report refers to the 
CIA as well as the alleged employment of many German correspondents by the German Federal 
Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst). 
259 Fainberg, “Unmasking the wolf in sheep's clothing,” 13. 
260 AMAE, 12184, Folder 14: Corresponsales Extranjeros en España, 18 February 1974. 
261 Díaz, “España y la cuestión alemana bajo el franquismo, 1945-1973,” 88-93. 
 73 
signing of the Helsinki Final Act as the last international success of the disintegrating 
regime in 1975.262 
These successes on the international stage and societal changes within Spain contrasted 
sharply with the regime’s unwillingness and inability to initiate political reforms. Instead, 
faced with growing political opposition, the regime tried to stay in control through 
increased repression. This became most visible in a number of trials against alleged and 
namely the Burgos trial against ETA members in 1970 and the execution of the Catalan 
anarchist Salvador Puig Antich in 1973, which also had a profoundly negative impact on 
the regime’s international image during the first half of the 1970s (further discussed in 
Chapter 5).  
The harsher political repression was also reflected in the regime’s press policies. The 
closing of the critical newspaper Madrid by the MIT in 1973 became symbolic for the 
inability of the political apparatus to reform.263 This measure, however, backfired on the 
Minister of Information and Tourism. The closure of Madrid, which was tied to more liberal 
and pro-democratic sections of the Opus Dei, resulted in strong internal and external 
protests. In order to calm down the public, Carrero Blanco replaced Sánchez Bella with 
Fernando Liñán y Zofío. The new Minister of Information and Tourism did not remain in 
office long enough to implement any fundamental changes. Following the assassination of 
Carrero Blanco by ETA in December 1973, his successor as president of the Council of 
Ministers, Carlos Arias Navarro, replaced Liñán y Zofío shortly thereafter. One of the main 
reasons for his dismissal was his inability to control the press following the ETA attack. In 
December 1973, Arias Navarro replaced him with Pío Cabanillas Gallas. In contrast to 
Sánchez Bella, Cabanillas intended to relax the situation with a more liberal press policy.264  
Regarding the MIT, the last years of the Franco regime were not only characterized by 
fluctuation at the top of the ministry. Instead, while neither Sánchez Bella nor Cabanillas 
changed the regulations for the accreditation of correspondents, both implemented a 
number of organizational changes in the administration of the foreign press corps. At the 
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same time, the implementation of these organizational changes also reflected the general 
uncertainty about how to cope with the press in general during these years. Sánchez Bella 
began with an institutional promotion of the Section for Foreign Press into a Sub-
Directorate General of the DG for the Press in 1973.265 A few months later, Cabanillas 
created a new DG for the Legal Regime of the Press in the beginning of 1974. This new 
DG took over all administrative functions ‘in relations with the press, news agencies and 
informational professionals’266. It replaced the old DG for the Press, which was 
downgraded to one of the new institution’s Sub-Directorate Generals. At the same time, the 
Sub-Directorate General for Foreign Press also became one of three Sub-DGs of the new 
institution. In organizational terms, therefore, Cabanillas not only clearly separated the 
administration of the foreign press from the administration of the national press but put the 
two Sub-DGs on the same level. 
This new administrative set-up was rather short-lived, however. Already in February 1974, 
Cabanillas transferred all ‘relations with the foreign correspondents accredited in Spain’267 
to the Foreign Service, which had been renamed the Cabinet for Foreign Service in 
February 1974. While the Cabinet for Foreign Service also remained responsible for the 
press attachés and the contacts with the Foreign Ministry, Cabanillas strengthened the unit’s 
role as the MIT’s central service responsible for foreign relations. Following this 
centralization of competences in the Cabinet for Foreign Service, the Sub-DG for Foreign 
Press, which had only been created shortly before, was dissolved again.268 Instead, 
Cabanillas once more created a Section for Foreign Press as a sub-department in February 
1974.269 In terms of the general administrative structure, Cabanillas therefore largely re-
established the previous set-up. 
Nevertheless, this return to the old structure did not apply for the division of competences 
over the foreign press. While the Section for Foreign Press was, as before, responsible for 
the control and distribution of the foreign press in Spain as well as for the accreditation of 
the foreign correspondents, it was to fulfil these tasks ‘without interfering with the 
                                                          
265 BOE, Decreto 2509/1973, de 11 de octobre, por el que se reorganizan deterninadas Servicios del 
Ministerio de Información y Turismo, no 246, 13 October 1973, 19813-19815. 
266 BOE, Decreto 28/1974, de 11 de enero, por el que se modifica el de 11 de octubre de 1973 por el que se 
reorganizan determinados Servicios del Departamento, no. 11, 12 January 1974, 685-686. 
267 BOE, DECRETO 179/1974, de 1 de Febrero, por el que se reorganizan determinados Servicios del 
Ministerio de Informacíón y Turismo, no. 30, 4 February 1974, 2111. 
268 Ibid. 
269 BOE, 4578 - Orden por la que se establece la estructura orgánica de la Dirección General de Régimen 
Jurídico de la Prensa, no. 53, 2 March 1974, 4309-4310. 
 75 
competence granted to the Cabinet for Foreign Services’270. Cabanillas therefore 
downgraded the Section for Foreign Press to a purely administrative unit, which was 
reflected in the department’s reduction to only two sub-units. All ‘informational relations 
with the foreign correspondents accredited in Spain and foreign media’271 remained with 
the Cabinet for Foreign Service. The enhanced status of the Cabinet for Foreign Service 
also became visible in its new internal structure. Altogether, the Cabinet consisted of three 
specialized sub-sections: Foreign Information, Communication Media, and Administration. 
The first sub-section was responsible for the contact and supervision of the official 
Information Offices (the press attachés at the embassies) and the MIT’s Tourism Offices. 
The section for Communication Media, structured into the sub-departments Journalists and 
Press, Radio and Television took over the responsibilities over foreign correspondents and 
media. 
This administrative structure as well as Fraga’s regulations for the accreditation of 
correspondents remained unchanged throughout the last years of the dictatorship. However, 
in contrast to Sánechez Bella, Cabanillas implemented a far more liberal policy towards 
both the domestic and the foreign press. The following chapters will show that he not only 
noticeably relaxed the censorship of foreign media and the control of foreign 
correspondents. Instead, the Minister of Information and Tourism also allowed the 
increased independence of the foreign correspondents’ institutions from state control. 
However, this more liberal stance towards the control of the foreign press earned Cabanillas 
the increasing criticism by Francoist hardliners, who began to push for his dismissal.272 The 
Falangist ex-Minister José Antonio Girón de Velasco, for instance, complained during the 
Portuguese Carnation revolution that Spaniards could ‘find in the newsstands of Spain, with 
the necessary official authorization, foreign newspapers which ridicule the famous and 
respectable figure of Francisco Franco, or which offend the Regime of the 18th of July’273. 
Eventually, the Francoist hardliners succeeded and Cabanillas’ liberal attitude towards 
censorship led to his dismissal at the end of 1974. León Herrera Esteban, who had already 
served under Manuel Fraga as DG for the Press became the new Minister of Information 
and Tourism. In Herrera Esteban’s own words, with Cabanillas the ‘flag of aperturista’274 
had left the MIT. However, not unlike his predecessors, the new minister did not remain in 
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his post for long. Following the death of Franco on 20th November 1975, Herrera Esteban 
was replaced in December 1975.  
The introduction to this thesis already briefly highlighted that sections of the Spanish press, 
as a ‘parliament of paper’, played a central role in the transition to democracy. However, 
due to the character of the transition as a negotiated process between the reform-orientated 
elites of the old regime and the political opposition, it took until 1977 before the Spanish 
authorities ended the censorship of the press. In the same year, the Ministry of Information 
and Tourism was dissolved and all competences for the domestic and foreign press were 
passed to the newly created Ministry of Culture and its ministry’s Sub-Directorate for 
Communication Media. Two years later, in 1979, these competences were transferred once 
more to the State Secretary for Information within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Until 
1977, however, the administrative structure of the control of the domestic and foreign press 
remained intact. This included, despite temporary interruptions in this politically 
tumultuous time,275 the Liaison Office and its monitoring of foreign media as well as 
Cabinet for Foreign Service.276 The regulations for the accreditation even remained 
functional thereafter and were only changed by the Socialist government elected in 1982 – 
including the deletion of the notorious paragraph allowing for the cancellation of 
accreditations.277  
 
Conclusions 
The examination of the evolution of the Francoist legal and administrative structure for the 
foreign press allows a number of intermediate observations. On the most superficial level, 
the chapter has shown that this structure evolved in the context of general reforms of the 
administration of the press within Spain. This applies in particular to the full administrative 
reorganization following the creation of the Ministry of Information and Tourism in 1951. 
At the same time, however, the chapter has also demonstrated that the legal and 
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administrative structure for the foreign press was in part reformed outside of this general 
pattern. The Francoist regime’s foreign policy was a crucial factor in this context. The 
impact of the international situation on the regime’s administration of the foreign press first 
became visible in the aftermath of the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945. Faced with what 
for Spain was an increasingly hostile international situation, the Francoist authorities tried 
to improve its international image. For the foreign correspondents, this resulted in a sudden 
end of the previous censorship of their despatches. Spain’s rapprochement with communist 
Eastern Europe from the end of the 1960 was similarly accompanied by legal reforms for 
the new group of correspondents, who were now accredited in the Franco regime.  
While reacting to Spain’s international relations, the regime’s administration of the foreign 
press was also subject to intense internal competence struggles within the regime. Formally, 
the administration of the foreign press was the domain of the institutions responsible for 
the domestic press throughout the Francoist regime. Despite variations, which depended to 
some extent on who was in charge, the domestic institutions generally followed a rather 
restrictive policy towards the foreign press. At the same time, however, the Spanish Foreign 
Ministry had a vital interest in the improvement of Spain’s international reputation. This 
not only led to pressure by the foreign ministry to change the regime’s administration of 
the foreign press. Foreign Minister Artajo even attempted to transfer all competences over 
the foreign press to the Foreign Ministry in the beginning of the 1950s. While this attempt 
failed, the Foreign Ministry and in particular its specialised Office for Diplomatic 
Information became and remained a central institution for the foreign press in Francoist 
Spain. 
Finally, the chapter has also shown that despite all administrative changes analysed here, 
the legal and administrative structure for the foreign press remained remarkably stable in 
key respects. This is especially true, despite all struggles with the Foreign Ministry, for the 
continued administration of the foreign press by a specialized sub-department. The set-up 
of this Section for Foreign Press within the general administration of the Spanish press 
remained intact across fundamental ministerial reforms such as the creation of the MIT in 
1951. At the same time, not only the department itself, but also its officials changed 
remarkably little, especially until the 1950s. 
Against the background of these findings and the outlined general development of the 
Francoist regime, the next chapter will examine another group of institutions with central 
importance for the foreign press corps: organizations for correspondents. The Francoist 
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authorities both initiated organizations for correspondents and tolerated the creation of 
independent organizations by foreign journalists. The chapter will examine how these 
organizations reflected the general development of the regime and its policy towards the 
foreign press corps. 
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2. Representing Foreign Correspondents in FrancoistSpain: 
Organizations of Journalists 
When the Francoist forces came to power at the end of the Civil War, the new rulers 
dissolved the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents (Asociación de Corresponsales 
de Prensa Extranjera, ACPE), the only existing organization for foreign correspondents in 
Spain. It took until the 1950s before the Francoist authorities granted permission for the 
creation of a new organization for foreign correspondents. At the end of the 1950s and the 
beginning of the 1960s, the Ministry of Information and Tourism permitted the formation 
of two such associations for foreign correspondents as well as a International Press Club 
(Club Internacional de Prensa, CIP) in Madrid. 
This chapter will analyse the conditions for the creation of the different press organizations 
for foreign correspondents in Spain and will examine the relations between the journalists’ 
organizations and the Franco regime in particular. The chapter argues that the Franco 
regime initially treated any form of association for foreign correspondents with great 
suspicion. This only changed, – and even then very slowly - with Spain’s return to the 
international stage. However, even after the creation of the journalists’ organizations, the 
MIT kept tight control over such groups and especially over the CIP. Towards the end of 
the regime, this approach increasingly led to conflicts between foreign journalists and 
Spanish officials. 
By examining the evolution of these organizations, this chapter will shed light on a 
particular aspect of the regime’s relations with the foreign press. At the same time, it 
provides insights into the importance of the journalists’ organizations for the work of 
foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain. 
 
The Agrupación de Corresponsales de Prensa Extranjera  
Before the Spanish Civil War, foreign correspondents in Madrid were organized in the 
Association of Foreign Press Correspondents (1923 onwards). Long-term president of the 
association was Julio Álvarez del Vayo y Olloqui, the well-known Spanish journalist, 
foreign correspondent, diplomat, active member of the Spanish socialists and, with 
interruptions, Foreign Minister of the Second Republic during the Spanish Civil War.278 
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This association also continued to exist throughout the Civil War, though it only functioned 
in a rudimentary way. The total absence of any reference to the association in the existing 
research on foreign correspondents during the Civil War gives the impression that it was of 
little importance for journalists then.279 Following the victory of the Francoist troops, and 
in line with the new regimes restrictive policy towards the foreign press at the time, the new 
authorities closed the association shortly after the end of the Civil War.280 Serrano Suñer, 
the man at the top of the highly restrictive VSEP, also dismissed a 1941 initiative by the 
remaining correspondents to reinstate the association.281 The closedown of the ACPE also 
reflected the regime’s highly restrictive attitude towards any kind of associations. As 
Pamela Radcliffe highlights, ‘consistent with the “totalitarian” discourse of the regime [at 
the time], formal associations were largely limited to those integrated into the vertical 
hierarchy of the Church or the Movimiento.’282 The Francoist authorities only made a few 
exceptions for associations linked to the regime. In contrast to the ACPE, for instance, the 
Francoist authorities had already reorganized the Press Association of Madrid (Asociación 
de la Prensa de Madrid, APM) for Spanish journalists during the Civil War,283 with Franco 
as its honorary president and Serrano Suñer as its vice-president.284  
The Franco regime’s attitude towards the creation of an association for correspondents, 
however, changed in the context of the ‘politics of gesture’ after the Second World War. 
To the new government, the creation of some kind of organization for foreign 
correspondents seemed a useful tool to improve Spain’s international image. The initiative 
resulted in the half-hearted foundation of a press club for correspondents in 1945.  
However, while this and later press clubs for correspondents were basically state-controlled 
organizations, any kind of association of journalists by definition had to be autonomous 
and self-organized institutions. The Francoist authorities were just as reluctant to allow 
such an association come into being as the correspondents were to accept a state-controlled 
organization for themselves. The conflict became obvious at the beginning of the 1950s 
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when the Foreign Ministry under Artajo tried to create a new association for foreign 
journalists. The Foreign Ministry’s OID gauged the prospects of this plan and the attitude 
of the foreign correspondents towards it. An OID report from March 1950 came to the 
conclusion, however, that the correspondents would consider ‘an intervention [from the 
Spanish government] too official and would not accept it […]’285. The official involvement 
was not the only reason for the correspondents to oppose the idea, however. In addition, 
the British and American journalists actually preferred the creation of their own association, 
which would exclude correspondents of other nationalities.286 As a result of the limited 
enthusiasm for its idea, the OID representative came to the conclusion in 1950 that ‘it is 
necessary that the idea [to create an association] ripens and at the moment I think it would 
[be] counterproductive to talk about material offers such as a locality for the constitution 
of the Association for Foreign Press.’287  
It took until 1957 before the time finally seemed ripe for the creation of an association for 
foreign correspondents. A group of foreign correspondents overcame its internal divisions 
and submitted a formal application for the foundation of an Agrupación de Corresponsales 
de Prensa Extranjera to the Ministry of Information and Tourism in 1957.288 The slight, 
but difficult to translate, difference in the title of the new ‘agrupación’ characterized it as 
less formal and was therefore a compromise with the still strict Francoist policy. The short-
term head of the DG for the Press Juan Benyeto supported the project. 289 At the beginning 
of 1958, the Francoist authorities officially registered the new association.290 
The MIT accepted this proposal in the context of the preceding governmental reshuffle and 
the regime’s improved international situation. For the correspondents, these changed 
circumstances created fertile ground for the formation of a self-controlled association. The 
personalities of the proponents of the plan were important too. The statutes of the 
association, submitted together with the proposal, were signed by the correspondents 
Cesare Gullino of the Italian news agency ANSA, the correspondent for The Times, William 
Stuttard, and the correspondent for the The North American News Alliance, Ralph Forte. 
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These three journalists had been in Spain at least since the 1940s and, in the case of Stuttard 
and Gullino, had even covered the Spanish Civil War. Moreover, these correspondents 
maintained particularly good relations with the Franco regime. This applied, above all, to 
the Italian Gullino. 
Following posts as correspondent for various Italian newspapers, Gullino had lived in Spain 
since 1919291. There, Gullino first worked for the newspaper Corriere della Sera before 
switching to the news agency Stefani, for which he also covered the Spanish Civil War. 
From 1932 until its dissolution in 1940, Gullino also was the secretary and, during the Civil 
War, the president of the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents. After the end of the 
Civil War, Gullino remained in Spain and continued his journalistic activities. Following 
the closure of Stefani in 1945, he worked for the Italian news agency ANSA and for some 
time also for the Italian broadcaster RAI until his death in 1969. Due to his long and 
uninterrupted accreditation, the MIT considered Gullino as ‘the mentor of almost all Italian 
colleagues who come to Madrid as correspondents or special envoys’292. 
Researchers have highlighted that Gullino maintained close ties to the Fascist regime in 
Italy. Stanley Payne, who interviewed Gullino in Madrid during the 1950s, describes him 
as a ‘Fascist agent’293 for Mussolini and Preston argues that the journalist ‘had originally 
been sent to Spain’294 by the Italian dictator. While no further evidence of these claims 
could be found,295 Gullino certainly sympathized with the Franco regime. The MIT valued 
his ‘deeply rooted sympathy for the country and his respect for the regime’296 and awarded 
him with an honorary accreditation in 1967.297 
The MIT held a similarly sympathetic view towards Ralph Forte. Between 1940 and 1956, 
Forte worked for the US news agency United Press (UP) in Madrid. Thereafter, he was 
accredited for both The North American News Alliance and the US publication, The 
News.298 The MIT valued in particular Forte’s ‘always correct’ reporting for UP, which 
reflected his ‘great friendship with Spain’299. For his service to the Franco regime, the 
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Spanish authorities even decorated the correspondent with the prestigious Enconmienda de 
Isabel la Católica in 1954.300 In 1967, Forte also received an honorary accreditation.301 
William ‘Guillermo’ Stuttard, finally, had been correspondent for the British Morning Post 
during the Second Republic. Throughout the Spanish Civil War, Stuttard was one of the 
few correspondents who reported both from the Republican and Rebel zones. The Francoist 
authorities valued what they regarded as his ‘truthful’302 reports. After the end of the Civil 
War, Stuttard remained in Spain and started to work for The Times in 1940 and also, from 
the mid-1950s, for the Evening Standard.303  
The sympathetic attitude of these correspondents towards the regime certainly facilitated 
the recreation of the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents. According to the 
association’s bylaws, it was created in order to ‘facilitate the journalistic mission of its 
members, to intensify their relations among each other as well as with Spanish colleagues, 
professional corporations, official entities […].’304 The ACPE was headed by a president 
chairing a board of directors composed of eight foreign correspondents. As specified in 
1959, this board of directors was ideally supposed to consist of four representatives from 
news agencies and four individual correspondents.305 The entire board of directors was to 
be composed as internationally as possible and therefore should not include more than two 
members of the same nationality.306 The members of the association elected both the board 
of directors and the president of the ACPE annually. The president could be re-elected 
without any specific limitations. In practical terms, the ACPE was also to represent the 
interests of the foreign correspondents towards the Francoist authorities, including cases of 
denied or cancelled accreditations (further discussed in Chapter 6). Although it did so only 
occasionally, the DG for the Press used the ACPE to gather information on the professional 
background of particular correspondents.  
However, the Spanish authorities had no direct means of control over the internal structure 
or the composition of the ACPE’s board of directors. Furthermore, the ACPE also remained 
largely independent from official sources for its funding. While initially situated in the 
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building of the news agency ANSA,307 the ACPE exclusively depended on membership fees. 
At the start of 1962, however, it moved into the building of the newly created International 
Press Club, which the Ministry of Information and Tourism owned and maintained. 
Nevertheless, the membership fees remained the ACPE’s central source of income.  
While the MIT accepted the creation of the ACPE, the constitution of the association’s 
membership soon resulted in debates with the Francoist authorities. The ACPE had two 
types of membership, full and associate. Accredited staff correspondents could become full 
members, while stringers were only eligible for an associate membership. While these 
regulations followed the MIT’s regulations for the accreditation of correspondents, this was 
not the case for two further specifications. The original proposal for the bylaws of the ACPE 
also considered the journalists’ foreign, non-Spanish nationality as one of the preconditions 
for membership (Art. 3). Furthermore, the board of directors was also supposed to have the 
right to refuse applications for membership on the grounds of the lack of professional 
qualifications of applicants (Art. 2), independent of their official accreditation status.  
In any case, the DG for the Press, Juan Benyeto, disagreed with both of the proposed 
articles, 2 and 3.308 From his point of view, the DG for the Press’ Section for Foreign Press 
was responsible for checking the professional status of foreign correspondents. The MIT 
also did not yet perceive the nationality of the foreign correspondent as problematic during 
the 1950s. Accordingly, Benyeto pointed out that Spaniards could be correspondents for 
foreign media and the ACPE therefore should not refuse them. Nevertheless, and despite 
the presidency of the Spaniard Àlvarez del Vayo over the ACPE predecessor, the new 
association insisted on the implementation of both articles and the MIT eventually accepted 
the independent management of its membership. Later on, the MIT itself actually adopted 
a more restrictive approach towards Spanish correspondents.  
The ACPE, therefore, accepted prominent Spanish correspondents, such as the Le Monde 
correspondent José Antonio Novais Tomé, as associate members only. The ACPE’s attitude 
towards the inclusion of Spanish foreign correspondents started to change under the 
presidency of the French correspondent Édouard de Blaye in 1970, however. De Blaye was 
highly critical of Franco and the MIT considered him as ‘anti-regime’, ‘provocative in his 
anti-Spanish statements’, and a ‘classical Marxist correspondent’309. The French 
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correspondent not only publicized his criticism of the Franco regime in newspaper articles 
and radio broadcasts for the French broadcaster RTL, but also in a 1974 book on the 
regime.310 As president of the ACPE, he repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to change the 
regulations in favour of the inclusion of Spaniards and especially of the strongly anti-
Franco Novais as a full member.311 It took until 1972, however, before the ACPE’s 
regulations were reformed by de Blaye’s successor as president, the correspondent of the 
French news agency Agence France-Presse (AFP), Jean Louis Arnaud. At this time, the 
Spaniard Novais not only became a full member, but even became a member of the ACPE’s 
board of directors.312 During and after the Spanish transition, Novais became vice-
president313 and secretary of the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents.314  
 
The Asociación de Corresponsales de la Prensa Iberoamericana 
In 1961, while Arias-Salgado was still Minister of Information and Tourism, foreign 
correspondents in Spain created another association, which had no direct predecessor in 
pre-Civil War Spain: the Association of Ibero-American Press Correspondents (Asociación 
de Corresponsales de la Prensa Iberoamericana, ACPI).315 In contrast to the ACPE, which 
was open to all nationalities except Spaniards, the ACPI was more exclusive. The 
association was created in order to ‘bring together all correspondents and part-time 
correspondents who are collecting information in Spain for the press, radio and television 
of the American continent’316.  
Despite the focus on correspondents for Latin American media, the ACPI also accepted 
journalists merely based on their nationality. The long-term president of the ACPI, the 
former Cuban diplomat José R. Chelala López, for instance, worked most of the time for 
the Swiss-based publication Common Market Business Reports.317 Another long-term 
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member of the ACPI’s board of directors, Francisco Somoggi de Perlac, was a 
correspondent for various Arabic newspapers and news agencies.318 At the same time, the 
ACPE did not actually exclude Latin American correspondents from membership. The 
Argentine journalist Armando Puente, a correspondent for AFP and later for other French 
and Argentinian publications, became a member of the ACPE and even the president of the 
International Press Club (1971-72).319 Furthermore, the correspondent of the news agency 
United Press International (UPI)320 Antonio Navarro, due to his Latin American origin, 
was a member of both the board of directors of the ACPE and ACPI in the early 1970s321. 
Nevertheless, the ACPI had a clear geographical focus. It also differed from the ACPE in 
terms of its creation. While the ACPE was initiated by correspondents, the ACPI was 
founded by two correspondents, Henry Cervantes and Rafael Miralles Bravo, with the 
support of the Francoist authorities and in particular, the Service for Foreign Relations of 
the National Delegation of Syndicates. Miralles became the first president of the new 
association. This official support for the association was reflected in its formal status as 
‘asociación’ instead of ‘agrupación’ still three years before the reform of the regime’s 
policy with the Law of Associations from 1964.322 As in the case of the APM, therefore, 
the Francoists made for the ACPI an exception to its generally restrictive attitude towards 
association.  
The Cuban Miralles had an eventful past. He had first come to Spain in the beginning of 
the 1930s and, as a dedicated socialist, fought against the Rebels in the Spanish Civil War. 
Following Franco’s victory, Miralles flew back to Cuba, where he became active in the 
Cuban communist movement. After initially making a living as journalist, Miralles became 
press attaché in the Cuban embassy in Moscow in 1944. His experience in the Soviet capital 
had a profound impact on his political views and he left as a fierce anti-communist.323 After 
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a brief stay in Mexico, he returned to Spain as correspondent for the Mexican news agency 
Plus Ultra in 1948 and ‘dedicated himself to anti-communist propaganda’324. Besides his 
journalistic work, Miralles also worked for the syndicate’s Foreign Service and thus 
facilitated the support for the foundation of the ACPI.325 
Although not directly employed by it, Cervantes also maintained close ties with the 
Francoist institution.326 Furthermore, Cervantes was an avid supporter of the Franco 
regime. He had studied medicine in the US and remained there for some years after the end 
of his studies. In order to counterbalance anti-Francoist publications by Republican exiles, 
Cervantes, who considered himself ‘the only US-American Falangist’327, co-founded the 
strongly pro-Franco Spanish language newspaper Diario de Nueva York in 1948.328 In 
1956, he returned to Spain and initially became the correspondent for the Diario de Nueva 
York. However, following a change in the pro-Franco attitude of the newspaper and its later 
fusion with La Prensa in 1962,329 Cervantes engaged in remarkable journalistic activities 
in Spain in order to make a living. Besides taking on the correspondence for another New 
York-based Spanish newspaper (El Mundo), he founded the Inter-American Press Agency, 
which distributed news on Spain in the US, including a journal for English speaking tourists 
in Spain.330  
Besides the ACPI founders’ links to the Franco regime, the foundation of the new 
organization also reflected the Franco regime’s special relations with Latin America. After 
1945, faced with international isolation, the Franco regime actively sought to strengthen its 
relations with Latin America based on Spain’s historical and cultural ties with the region. 
With these ‘politics of substitution’331 towards Latin America, the Franco regime hoped to 
improve its international prestige and, in more practical terms, collect votes in the UN. 
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Indeed, three Latin American countries - El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and most 
importantly, Argentina, were among the few nations which had maintained diplomatic 
relations with Spain after the Franco regime’s international ostracism. Argentina, whose 
dictator Juan Domingo Perón Sosa found exile in Spain during the 1960s, also supported 
Spain economically at the end of the 1940s. Spain also continued its close relations to Latin 
America after the end of her international isolation. Under Foreign Minister Castiella 
during the 1960s, the Franco regime tried to strengthen its influence in the region through 
the promotion of the Spanish authoritarian model for economic development.332 
Ideologically, these special relations were based on the concept of Hispanidad, which was 
to create ‘an indestructible spiritual community, bond of spirit and blood between the 
people on both shores of the Atlantic’333. The Franco regime and in particular the Institute 
for Hispanic Culture, promoted this ‘spiritual community’ through cultural policy directed 
at Latin America. Thus, Latin American correspondents were invited to Spain, newsletters, 
journals and informational brochures were produced for the Latin American market, and 
from 1951 onwards a specialized course for Latin American journalists was created in the 
recently founded Official School of Journalism. While the Spanish public broadcaster 
produced programmes for Latin America,334 the Spanish news agency EFE became an 
important intermediary for the distribution of international news in Latin America and vice 
versa335. In the beginning of the 1970s, the MIT even created the annual Miguel de 
Cervantes Award for the published article that best reflected ‘the common values of the 
Hispanic world’336. The MIT almost exclusively awarded the prize to Latin American 
correspondents in Spain. As Chapter 3 will show, these special relations with Latin America 
were also reflected in the large Latin American press corps in Francoist Spain. 
The creation of a specialized association for Latin American correspondents with official 
support has to be seen against the background of this general policy. This was also reflected 
in the ACPI’s official mission. Besides its function as a meeting point for Latin American 
journalists, the ACPI was also designed to promote ‘a better and closer rapprochement 
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between Spain and the press of the New World’ by helping to produce a ‘better 
documentation about the Spanish life and its reflection’337 in the South American press.  
For a particular group among its members, those from Cuba, this political function went 
beyond the promotion of good relations between Spain and Latin America. Following 
Castro’s revolution, the anti-communist Franco regime became the destination of choice 
for a number of Cubans who started to work as correspondents. During the 1960s, for 
instance, the Cuban ex-ambassador to Puerto Rico and China, Rosendo Canto Hernández, 
repeatedly used the ACPI for press conferences on the ‘situation of Cuba’ and the ‘unity of 
Cuban exiles’338. Canto, who the MIT described as ‘very attached to the North Americans 
and, on the other side, to the Spanish regime’339, was accredited in Spain as founder and 
director of the publication Acción Cubana. The bi-monthly journal was, in its own words, 
the ‘only newspaper edited in Europe opposed to the communist Cuban government’340. 
Other Cuban ACPI members included the founder and president of the association, Rafael 
Miralles Bravo341. In fact, Miralles even used Acción Cubanain order to publish 
information on the ACPI’s activities.342 
Because of this ideological proximity to the regime and the political activities of some of 
its members, Western correspondents viewed the ACPI with suspicion. For the former 
president of the ACPE, Walter Haubrich of the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, for instance, the distinction between the two associations was therefore not 
geographical, but professional.343  
 
Towards a Club Internacional de Prensa 
In his analysis of Francoist Spain’s cultural diplomacy towards the US, historian Neal 
Rosendorf stresses that it was one of the first acts by Manuel Fraga after his appointment 
as Minister of Information and Tourism to establish the International Press Club.344 This 
press club opened in 1962, and Rosendorf is certainly right in interpreting its establishment 
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as an attempt to improve the regime’s relations with the foreign press corps. This initiative 
was neither originally the idea of Fraga nor the first attempt to set up such an institution in 
Madrid, however. In fact, as will be shown in the following, the Francoist authorities had 
already created similar institutions from the end of the Second World War onwards. 
Following the defeat of the Axis powers, the VSEP not only tried to improve relations with 
the foreign correspondents by ending censorship, but also by initiating a press club in May 
1945. This new institution was supposed to bring together ‘writers, journalists and artists’345 
from different countries, as the VSEP’s National Delegate for the Press, Juan Aparicio, 
described the initiative in a letter to the US embassy. Aparicio had already developed this 
idea in previous correspondence with the press attaché in Lisbon, Javier Martínez de 
Bedoya. While this correspondence from the beginning of 1945 was mainly concerned with 
the duties of the Spanish press attachés, Aparicio also outlined the necessity of a new policy 
towards the foreign press. He highlighted inter alia that a ‘club’ was missing in Spain, 
‘where the foreign correspondents can have easy access to […] information about Spain, 
from a Spanish point of view’346. In the context of the changed international situation after 
1945, the VSEP worked hard to set this press club up, hence Aparicio’s attempt to promote 
the plan in his contacts with the US embassy. The eventual opening of the club in July 1945 
took place after the VSEP’s dissolution and under the responsibility of the new Ministry of 
Popular Education, however. The club was officially created on Piñar 5, a street in the 
centre of Madrid, within walking distance from the US embassy. The club was named after 
the 19th century Catalan priest, publicist and philosopher Jaime Balmes y Urpiá, who 
strongly defended Spain’s Catholic mission as making it distinctive compared to the rest of 
Europe.347 In terms of its scope, the so-called Jaime Balmes Circle was created as a club 
for ‘journalism, art and literature’348 with the specific aim to increase the ‘social and 
cultural’349 contacts between Spanish and foreign journalists in a ‘professional and 
friendly’350 atmosphere. The creation of the Jaime Balmes Circle as part of the regime’s 
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attempts to improve its image after 1945 was reflected in the Ministry of Popular 
Education’s active promotion of the club’s foundation among the foreign diplomatic 
representations in Madrid.351 In terms of its internal structure, the Jaime Balmes Circle was 
predominantly an institution of the Ministry of Popular Education. The ministry’s DG for 
the Press himself headed the club’s board of directors, and the under-secretary of the 
ministry was the honorary president.352 The board of directors also had full control over the 
club’s membership. In a first stage, it directly appointed the members. Later on, however, 
interested journalists also could apply for membership.  
In the context of Spain’s international isolation after 1946, however, the government-
controlled Jaime Balmes Circle was met with little interest by the foreign press corps in 
Spain. As a result, the government tried to revitalize the club in 1952. In the context of 
Spain beginning to return into the international community, a group of foreign 
correspondents and the alumni association of the Official School for Journalism 
inaugurated within the still existing Jaime Balmes Circle a new Jaime Balmes Press Club.353 
Created with the approval and support of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, this 
new initiative to create a press club should be seen as an attempt by the new ministry to 
improve relations with the foreign press. At the same time, it also can be considered as 
compensation for the unsuccessful attempt (discussed above) by the OID to create an 
association for foreign correspondents in the same year.  
Indeed, in contrast to the cultural orientation of its predecessor, the new Jaime Balmes Press 
Club was explicitly orientated towards both Spanish and foreign journalists.354 In order to 
promote the new institution, it also received, at least initially, considerable attention from 
the Francoist authorities. Thus, Spanish officials attended the club’s inauguration. The 
Minister of Information and Tourism, the Minister of Education, as well as the 
representatives of practically all relevant DGs (press, radio, propaganda, tourism etc.) and 
various directors of Spanish newspapers and press agencies, came to the opening.355 
Francoist officials also gave various press conferences and attended other events in the club 
throughout the following years.  
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In contrast to the earlier press club, the MIT also granted correspondents a more active role 
in the club’s organizational structure. The new board of directors was now constituted 
without direct involvement of MIT officials. Headed by the director of the Spanish 
newspaper Madrid, Juan Pujol Martínez, as president, three vice-presidents were 
appointed: one foreign correspondent, one representative of the national press and one 
representative of the Official Journalism School’s alumni association. On the part of the 
foreign correspondents, the director of the US news agency UPI and later co-founder of the 
ACPE, Ralph Forte, was appointed as one these three vice-presidents while other 
correspondents became official advisers.356 In April 1953, a separate section for foreign 
correspondents was even founded within the press club357, although this remained a short-
lived initiative.358  
The organization nevertheless remained an institution of the MIT. The MIT owned the 
building, where the club was situated, and financed the club and its activities. Nevertheless, 
the new Jaime Balmes Press Club was a remarkable early experiment by the Francoist 
authorities with the self-organization of journalists. Throughout the following years, the 
MIT did actually leave the functioning and administration of the Jaime Balmes Press Club 
to its members. The experiment with self-organization remained short–lived, however. 
Only three years after the club’s foundation, in 1955, the MIT and its DG for the Press 
tightened its control over the press club once more.359 A new executive committee for the 
press club’s umbrella organization, the still existing Jaime Balmes Circle, was established 
and totally dominated by representatives of the MIT.360 Representatives of the existing 
organizations within the Circle, like the press club, were ‘freely selected’361 by the Director 
General for the Press as further members of the executive committee. This new board of 
directors inter alia was responsible for accepting new associations and clubs within the 
Circle. Most importantly, the clubs within the Jaime Balmes Circle were also obliged to 
include within their board of directors one representative of the MIT.362 Finally, the MIT 
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further increased its control over the press club through a new administrative committee, 
which was responsible for the more practical day-to-day administration of the Circle. The 
Director General for the Press headed the committee while Spanish officials mainly 
constituted its board. The associations within the Circle were only represented by one 
delegate each.363 These new regulations, therefore, ended the short period of the press 
club’s de facto self-organization.  
It seems clear that the press institution also was not a particular success, hence Fraga’s 
initiative to once more revitalize the idea of a press club only five months after his 
appointment in 1962. Formally still within the Jaime Balmes Circle, the new International 
Press Club was inaugurated in the same building used by its predecessors, Piñar 5, on 15 
November 1962. In contrast to the older press clubs, however, Fraga’s new institution 
became more successful and remained functional throughout the existence of the Franco 
regime. In fact, the CIP still exists in Madrid today.364 
Fraga’s new institution, however, did not only differ from the previous approaches in terms 
of its longevity and stability; rather, the CIP was far more explicitly created for foreign 
correspondents. Accordingly, Fraga highlighted the institution’s purpose in his opening 
speech for the inauguration of the club: 
[…] I understand that the International Press Club fills an important function 
by putting into contact those whose mission it is to inform all newspapers of 
the world about Spanish life, by getting them to know their Spanish colleagues, 
by offering them occasions to socialize with Spanish officials who are entrusted 
precisely with attending to foreign journalists. And all of this in an environment 
of cordiality and personal relation very different from the one derived from the 
mere dealing with any administration.365 
The first article of the CIP’s bylaws further specified the club’s purpose as a ‘centre for 
meetings, relations, information and work’366 for the foreign press. At the same time and 
without further specifying the parallel functions of the correspondents’ associations, the 
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CIP could communicate with the Spanish authorities in cases where ‘[…] support, help and 
cooperation can facilitate the task of the foreign correspondents in Spain.’367 
The membership regulations of the club reflected this new approach. While the CIP 
welcomed all foreign correspondents as its members, Spanish journalists could only 
become members if they were either members of the board of directors of the Spanish 
Journalist Association or the directors of Spanish newspapers, radio and TV stations. 
Furthermore, press attachés from the foreign embassies in Madrid, the heads of the press 
offices of Spanish ministries and official institutions were also accepted. Only if the board 
of directors of the new club wished to do so could other persons falling outside of these 
categories become members.368  
In line with this focus on foreign correspondents, the MIT granted foreign journalists a 
central influence in the CIP’s board of directors. Seven- or one half - of the members of the 
CIP’s board of directors were foreign correspondents. The board of directors of the ACPE 
and the ACPI each nominated three correspondents, while the seventh journalist was not 
supposed to be a member of any of the two organizations and was elected by the foreign 
press corps in Madrid. A further three members on the CIP’s board were Spanish journalists 
nominated by the Press Association of Madrid. The remaining four members came from 
Francoist institutions, namely the MIT’s DG for the press (two), the OID (one) and the 
Institute for Hispanic Culture (one).369  
While the MIT thus granted the foreign correspondents a central role in the governing the 
club, Fraga was unwilling to give up all control over the newly founded organization. In 
the end, the CIP remained a facility owned and financed by the MIT. This was explicitly 
highlighted in the last paragraph of the CIP’s bylaws, which reserved the right for the 
Ministry of Information and Tourism to use the facilities of the CIP for any of its own 
informational purposes ‘in extraordinary cases’370. Furthermore, through the CIP’s board 
of directors the Francoist authorities could directly control the club’s activities. In the end, 
half of the board were none-correspondents with either direct or close ties to the regime. In 
practical terms, this gave the regime a decisive role in the management of the club and in 
particular in the annual election of its presidents by a simple majority of the board. 
Nevertheless, as a further reflection of the CIP’s aim, the president of the club always had 
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to be a foreign correspondent.371 Although not explicitly specified in the bylaws of the CIP, 
it became common practice that the president was always a member of the ACPE, while 
the vice-president was a member of the ACPI and the secretary general a Spanish journalist 
and member of the APM.372  
The Francoist authorities did not only exercise direct influence on the CIP’s board of 
directors through its particular composition; they could also count on the support of some 
foreign correspondents, especially from Latin America. This is especially true for Jose 
Chelala López, who was vice-president of CIP from 1964 to 1972.  
As a result, parts of the foreign press corps in Spain saw the CIP with mixed feelings. 
Journalists critical of Franco were keenly aware and suspicious of the Francoist authorities’ 
involvement in the CIP. Thus, Harry Debelius, who worked as a stringer for British and US 
media before becoming accredited as staff correspondent for UPI373 and the US broadcaster 
ABC374 during the 1960s, and then Spain correspondent for The Times,375 retrospectively 
wrote about the general attitude among the correspondents towards the new press club:  
in this epoch, one did accept well the [foundation of the CIP] since it were other 
times, although it was clear – and we were aware about this – that certain people 
could not be taken there. But it was a place to come together on which we 
counted from then on.376  
Obviously, by referring to ‘certain people’, Debelius meant those critical of the regime, 
who did not consider the CIP as a suitable place to meet. The German correspondents 
Manfred von Conta (Süddeutsche Zeitung) and Walter Haubrich (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung), who was the president of the CIP from 1973-80, both considered the CIP as an 
institution created for the control of the foreign press in Spain.377 At the same time, von 
Conta also highlighted what he regarded as a fundamental difference between the CIP and 
the ACPE: ‘Contrary to the CIP, which I understood as a tool to control or influence our 
independence, the Agrupación de Corresponsales was an organization to express and 
protect our collective professional interests.’378 Spanish journalists also shared this 
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assessment of the CIP. The long-term president of the private Spanish news agency Europa 
Press, José Mario Armero, for instance, wrote about the foundation of the CIP: ‘He [Fraga] 
had much information about was written abroad. I think that this [the CIP] was an operation 
in order to control it’.379 
Indeed, the foundation of the CIP must be seen in the context of Fraga’s general 
administrative reforms and policy approach (discussed in Chapter 6), which he used to 
improve Spain’s international image. Nevertheless, despite the suspicion of the 
correspondents, the CIP became an accepted place to meet for foreign and Spanish 
journalists. This was not least due to generous subsidies, with which the CIP was supported 
by the DG for the Press and which it in part invested in very affordable prices of the CIP’s 
own restaurant which became popular among the correspondents.380  
Fraga invested substantial time in working with the CIP. In 1965 alone, the Minister of 
Information and Tourism gave eight press conferences there. Other high-ranking Spanish 
officials from the Commissioner General of the Development Plan to the Vice-Secretary of 
the Movement and the Mayor of Madrid frequently answered the questions of 
correspondents in the CIP.381 As Chapter 6 will show, these frequent press conferences by 
Francoist officials marked a significant change in the regime’s attitude towards the foreign 
press and the CIP had an important function in this development. 
Following Fraga’s dismissal in 1969 however, the MIT’s attitude to the CIP changed 
noticeably. Under the new minister, Alfredo Sánchez Bella, the Francoist authorities 
became far less willing to confront the foreign press. From a professional point of view, the 
CIP thus became less important for the foreign press corps. The German correspondent 
Walter Haubrich, who started to work in Spain in 1968, for instance, recalls that the CIP 
increasingly turned into a place for social reunions only:  
in the opinion of the majority of the members of the Association [of Foreign 
Correspondents], the events in the Club during this time had little to do with 
the professional work of the journalists: events like fashion shows, social 
reunions and presentations of commercial products which had nothing to do 
with press work.382 
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The CIP’s decreasing professional value contributed to a growing dissatisfaction of a new 
generation of correspondents like Haubrich and others, who were less willing to accept the 
continued official control over the press club. The resulting conflict broke out for the first 
time in the context of the election of the German correspondent Karl Tichmann as president 
of the CIP in 1970. Tichmann was one of many German correspondents with a professional 
past in Nazi Germany, who had remained in Spain after 1945. He had come to Spain in 
order to cover the Spanish Civil War from the Rebel territories for the official news agency 
of Nazi Germany, the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro. During the Second World War, 
Tichmann worked for the press office of the German embassy in Madrid.383 After the defeat 
of the Axis powers, the German journalist made his living as a correspondent for various 
German media.384 
Tichmann supported the Franco regime and the Francoist authorities had already supported 
his presidency of the CIP in 1963-64.385 By 1970, however, the situation had changed and 
Tichmann’s second election as president was strongly opposed by parts of the foreign press 
corps. As the representative of the OID reported, British and American correspondents in 
particular not only questioned Tichmann’s professionalism - considering him an 
‘occasional journalist’ - but also saw in Tichmann’s election an attempt by the Francoist 
authorities to strengthen their influence over the CIP since the German journalist was 
considered ‘much more controllable than any Anglo-Saxon correspondents’386.  
The growing tension between the foreign press corps and the MIT became even more 
virulent during an almost parallel visit of the members of the CIP’s board of directors to 
the minister Sánchez Bella. The new minister strongly complained about the bad image of 
the new government in the foreign press. Indeed, Sánchez Bella even directly threatened 
the CIP delegation with the suspension of the CIP if he could not ‘observe a favourable 
reaction among the foreign correspondents.’387 The correspondents on the board of 
directors reacted in a similar way as to the election of Tichmann. Instead of giving in to the 
minister’s demands, they openly considered the possibility of ‘making the Club 
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independent from all official connections’388. For the moment, however, they choose less 
drastic measures to show their dissatisfaction both with the MIT’s attitude towards the CIP 
and the lack of willingness on the part of the Francoist official to participate in press 
conferences. The correspondents on the board of directors instead invited representatives 
of the political opposition.389 
This episode was symptomatic of Sánchez Bella’s attitude towards the foreign press and 
the growing resistance of parts of the foreign press corps towards the MIT’s involvement. 
It also sheds light on the once more growing conflict between the MIT and the Foreign 
Ministry at the time regarding policy towards the foreign press. Indeed, the OID 
representative in the CIP strongly argued that a correction of the MIT’s position towards 
the CIP was urgently necessary in order to avoid a further worsening of relations with the 
foreign press.390 Eventually, the MIT gave in. The DG for the Press followed the OID’s 
recommendation by officially apologizing to the CIP’s board of directors in the name of 
the Minister for Information and Tourism. In fact, the DG for the Press reaffirmed ‘the total 
support of the Ministry of Information and Tourism for the Club’.391 This support was 
subsequently reflected in the sudden willingness of several ministers to give press 
conferences at the CIP. 
Although the MIT’s apology calmed the situation for the time being, it did not bring a 
permanent solution to the underlying problems regarding either the general professional 
orientation of the CIP or its control by the Francoist authorities. Both issues came back on 
the agenda in 1973. In the last months of Sánchez Bella’s term in office, the CIP’s board 
of directors, with the support of the OID, elected Haubrich, who was highly critical of the 
Franco regime, as its new president.392 Shortly afterwards, the new president initiated the 
creation of a commission, exclusively composed of members of the ACPE, to discuss and 
suggest means for the ‘renewal and reorganization’393 of the CIP. The commission 
submitted its recommendations to the DG for the Press shortly afterwards. In sum, the CIP’s 
commission suggested three key measures: the strengthening of the influence of the ACPE 
over the activities of the CIP, the general focus of the club towards the needs of journalists, 
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and most importantly, limiting the influence of the Spanish authorities over the club’s 
activities. 394  
With the support of the OID and against the background of the appointment of the more 
liberal Cabanillas as Minister for Information and Tourism 1974, the correspondents 
succeeded with their key demand, to establish the CIP’s independence from any official 
control, before the death of Franco in 1975.395 In May 1975, the MIT formally accepted 
that the president of the ACPE, elected by the association’s members, would automatically 
become president of the CIP.396 While the representatives of the Francoist institutions 
remained members of the CIP’s board of directors, they lost all influence on the 
appointment of the club’s president. The CIP, therefore, became ‘totally controlled by the 
Association of Foreign Press Correspondents’397. In practice, the course of events in 1975 
made the actual implementation of the new regulation less important. Following the death 
of Franco in November 1975, Harry Debelius became the president of the ACPE, while 
Walter Haubrich remained the CIP’s president throughout the transition to democracy until 
1980.398  
The MIT’s concession to the demands made by the ACPE commission resulted from the 
conclusion that while it should be ‘considered useful to maintain […] the patronage over 
[…] [the CIP], it seems necessary to continue rethinking this [...], to have an adequate and 
useful revitalization of the Club’399. This willingness to give in to the foreign 
correspondents in order to revitalize the CIP was also reflected in the MIT’s reaction to the 
second central demand by the ACPE commission: the increase of professional (in addition 
to social and other) activities in the CIP.  
At the time, the CIP continued to be used mainly for social, cultural and commercial 
activities. Largely inactive in journalistic matters, the representative of the Institute for 
Hispanic Culture on the CIP’s board of directors, for instance, saw his main role in using 
the CIP for exhibitions for Spanish painters and other cultural events.400 Furthermore, some 
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Latin American stringers in particular, who also had other business interests in Spain, used 
the CIP for the presentation of products.401 Against this background, the ACPE commission 
included in its suggestions for the reform of the CIP the demand that club should only be 
used for events of professional interest. In order to guarantee the professional value, only 
the journalistic member organizations (APM, ACPE and ACPI), not individuals, should 
have the right to organize events in the CIP.402 In the meantime, Haubrich assured the CIP’s 
board of directors that ‘all measures have been taken in order to guarantee that none of the 
activities realized in the club can involve hidden commercial aims’403. Haubrich 
accompanied this restriction of non-professional activities with the demand for more press 
conferences by government officials in the CIP.404 The MIT’s representative on the board 
of directors supported these demands by concluding that the current ‘absence of the foreign 
correspondents [in the CIP] [resulted] […] from a general lack of attention by the Ministry 
of Information and Tourism’405. He supported this point by highlighting that ‘in the Club 
they are longing for the activities which were carried in the time of Fraga’406. 
In order to find a lasting solution for the CIP, the MIT took the unusual step of studying 
international press clubs in other European countries, in particular those in Italy and 
Belgium.407 Shortly before the dismissal of Cabanillas as Minister for Information and 
Tourism, this resulted in a new willingness to try new and unusually liberal means in order 
to come to terms with the expectations of the foreign press corps and to improve the 
functioning of the CIP. The MIT’s Cabinet for Foreign Service concluded that ‘with all the 
risks involved it is unquestionably the case that calling for a General Assembly – ordinary 
or extraordinary – would increase the interest of members in the life of an association’408.  
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Despite his generally more restrictive attitude, Cabanillas’ successor Herrera, who became 
Minister of Information and Tourism in the end of 1974, also accepted the need to loosen 
the control over the CIP. A General Assembly was introduced in 1975.409 Furthermore, the 
MIT’s Cabinet for Foreign Services followed the correspondents’ demands and suggested 
a noticeable increase of press conferences by Francoist officials. These press conferences 
were not going to be accessible to all members of the CIP but only fully accredited staff 
correspondents.410 In this way, the Cabinet for Foreign Service complied with another key 
demand by the correspondents for professionalizing the CIP.411 
Throughout the first half of the 1970s, therefore, the nature of the CIP changed 
fundamentally. While the influence of the Francoist authorities on the CIP’s internal affairs 
was rolled back, the members of the Association for Foreign Press became the central actors 
in the management of the CIP. Nevertheless, the CIP still formally remained an institution 
of the Ministry of Information and Tourism. Finally, the last articles of the CIP’s bylaws, 
which granted the MIT the right to use the club for its own purposes, remained unchanged.  
In fact, the formal right to shut down the CIP saw the last clash between the correspondents 
in the CIP and the Francoist authorities shortly after the death of Franco on 20 November 
1975. The correspondents, in particular Haubrich, had planned to invite the leader of the 
still illegal Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) 
and later Prime Minister after 1982, Felipe González, to give a press conference at the CIP. 
The MIT saw this plan as an open provocation, which it was in fact intended as, and closed 
the CIP down for five days with the official justification that its personnel was needed 
elsewhere. This false pretext resulted in international reports about the ‘prohibition for one 
of the socialist leaders of the opposition to speak before the foreign press’ as a ‘first 
important example of press restrictions under the reign of Juan Carlos I.’412. For the 
president of the CIP it was clear that the closure of the club was an ‘initiative in order to 
ensure that they do not hold the conference before the ceremonies’413 for the coronation of 
Juan Carlos I. as new head of the state planned for 22 November 1975. In practical terms, 
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however, the intervention of the MIT had little impact. The correspondents simply moved 
the press conference with González to the Palace Hotel across the street.414  
This intervention remained the last attempt by the Spanish government to control the CIP. 
Nevertheless, it still took until 1979/80 for the internal organization of the CIP to be 
formally adapted to the changed political situation. The changes then implemented by the 
new authority responsible for the foreign press and formal owner of the CIP, the State 
Secretary for Information, strongly reflected the previous debates. The ACPE, respectively 
its board of directors, from then on became directly responsible for the CIP and its 
‘reorganization’ as well as for its ‘democratic and professional’415 future functioning. 
Shortly thereafter, the ACPE drafted new bylaws for the CIP,416 which were approved in 
July 1980.417 The new bylaws formally ended all state influence on the CIP’s board of 
directors and the State Secretary for Information was only to appoint an administrative 
Secretary. Instead, the ACPE became the central institution for the control of the board. 
The president, the vice-president and seven board members had to be full members of the 
CIP and of the ACPE, while three seats were reserved for associate members of the 
Association of Foreign Press Correspondents. All of these seats were filled by the board of 
directors of the ACPE, which was elected by secret ballot among its members. Spanish 
journalists and Spanish officials with direct links to the press such as the heads of 
governmental press departments were represented on the CIP’s board of directors with two 
members each. Thus, the professional foreign correspondents gained full control over the 
CIP.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that the foundation and functioning of organizations for foreign 
correspondents was a highly political issue in Francoist Spain, as should be expected in 
cases of authoritarian regimes. At the same time, the chapter has also shown that the 
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examination of the organizations for foreign correspondents allows for insights into the 
changing attitude of the Franco regime towards the foreign press after 1945.  
Initially, the Francoist authorities were highly reluctant to accept any kind of organization 
for correspondents and closed down the existing association for foreign correspondents 
shortly after the end of the Civil War. Following the defeat of the Axis powers, the regime 
started to change its attitude in the context of its attempts to improve its image abroad. 
However, the Franco regime was not willing to accept any kind of self-organization by 
correspondents. The press clubs for the foreign press created during the 1940s and early 
1950s, therefore, were fully state-controlled institutions. These clubs proved to be 
unattractive to foreign correspondents, who did not accept official control. At the same 
time, the Franco regime did not initiate these clubs as exclusively professional 
organizations but also as cultural institutions.  
Following the end of Spain’s international isolation and governmental reforms, the attitude 
of the Francoist authorities changed during the second half of the 1950s. This resulted in 
the re-foundation of an ACPE in 1957, initiated and controlled exclusively by foreign 
correspondents. The association’s founders’ sympathies for the regime helped them gain 
the Ministry of Information and Tourism’s approval. Personal ties and attitudes towards the 
Franco regime were even more important for the foundation of the second association for 
foreign correspondents, the ACPI, at the beginning of the 1960s. Its creation reflected the 
regime’s alleged special relationship with Latin America and in part served a foreign policy 
purpose. This special relationship was also reflected in the official support the founders of 
the association received from the Franco regime. The correspondents from Western 
democracies, who were predominantly organized in the ACPE, considered the ACPI as an 
association of limited professional integrity.  
While both associations were self-controlled in principle, this did not apply to the CIP 
founded by Manuel Fraga in 1962. Although more directly orientated towards the foreign 
press corps, the Francoist authorities maintained control over the internal functioning of the 
press club through its representatives in the club’s board of directors. The creation of the 
press club was a reflection of Fraga’s attempts to improve Spain’s image abroad. This 
rationale was also reflected in the frequency, with which Francoist officials gave press 
conferences in the CIP throughout the 1960s. 
However, following Fraga’s dismissal as Minister of Information and Tourism in 1969, his 
successor, Sánchez Bella, adopted a more restrictive attitude towards the foreign press. This 
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resulted in decreasing official attention for the CIP. Instead, the club became increasingly 
used for cultural and commercial activities, which fundamentally undermined its 
professional value for foreign correspondents. At the same time, parts of the foreign press 
corps, especially the members of the ACPE started to resist the official control over the 
CIP’s activities. Both developments resulted in conflicts between the foreign press corps 
and the Ministry of Information and Tourism at the start of the 1970s. The Foreign Ministry 
partly supported the correspondent’s strive for greater independence in order to avoid a 
worsening of the regime’s relations with the foreign press. In this way, the conflict about 
the CIP also reflected the conflict of competences regarding the foreign press between the 
MIT and the Foreign Ministry (discussed in Chapter 1). The conflicts between the 
journalists’ organizations fit into a general development in Spain. Radcliff has argued that 
associations became vital for the growing resistance against the Franco regime since the 
1960s and thereby became instrumental for the ‘citizen movement’ during the Spanish 
transition.418 Although the CIP and the ACPE were very particular organizations and the 
correspondents were in a strong position for negotiations, their growing resistance against 
the MIT, therefore, nevertheless reflected a general development. In contrast to the Spanish 
opposition, however, the foreign correspondents could already resolve their conflicts with 
the regime before the transition to democracy. Under the more liberal leadership of 
Cabanillas, the MIT eventually gave in to the demands of the foreign correspondents. It 
was only just before the death of Franco that the CIP finally reached full independence from 
state control in the organization of its internal affairs.  
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3. Foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain 
During the Civil War, Spain was a hotspot for international media. Approximately 1000 
correspondents covered the events in Spain at one time or another between 1936 and 
1939.419 In contrast, the dictatorship established at the end of the war had far less appeal for 
the international press corps. The Franco regime not only established a very restrictive 
policy towards foreign correspondents but also the international media interest was drawn 
onto the battlefields of the Second World War after 1939. Even before the UN politically 
ostracized Spain in 1946, therefore, the Franco regime was already isolated in terms of 
international media interest. By 1945, only 13 full-time correspondents and stringers were 
accredited for international news agencies in Spain. Major international agencies like 
Reuters maintained only a minimal service with two accredited staff correspondents.420  
Although some former Spain correspondents like Buckley returned to Madrid after their 
postings during the Second World War,421 the international media interest in Franco’s Spain 
remained limited. This only started to change with Spain’s gradual return onto the 
international stage from the beginning of the 1950s. Against this background, this chapter 
will examine the development of the foreign press corps in Spain from the 1950s until the 
death of Franco in 1975. By examining the presence of foreign correspondents using both 
a quantitative and qualitative approach, this chapter will not only provide an understanding 
of the changing constitution of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. Rather, the study 
of the size and composition of foreign press corps allows for further insights. First, building 
on work by researchers like Cohen, the chapter examines the numerical presence of 
correspondents in Spain until 1975 as a general indicator for international media interest in 
Francoist Spain.422 The chapter will analyse the numbers of correspondents as well as the 
media for which they worked (TV and radio, print media, and news agencies).  
Second, the chapter will examine the geographical origin of the journalists and the media 
for which they were accredited. Thus, the chapter will demonstrate that the Franco regime’s 
active striving for international recognition as well as its changing international position 
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after 1950 was reflected in the composition of the foreign press corps in Madrid. With this 
perspective, the chapter builds on and develops insights by communication researchers, 
who have examined the geographical distribution of foreign correspondents as a reflection 
of particular bilateral relations. This perspective proves to be particularly valuable for the 
understanding of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. The chapter will show that the 
composition of the foreign press corps reflected Spain’s cultural and historical ties as well 
as its changing political and economic relations. In particular, the consequences of the 
Spanish Civil War as well as Francoist Spain’s former ties with the Axis Powers will be 
shown to have had a direct impact on the foreign press corps. 
 
Foreign Correspondents in Franco’s Spain 1945-1975: An Overview 
The previous chapter outlined that the Franco regime tried to improve and professionalize 
its relations with the foreign press corps after 1945. This applied in particular to the newly 
founded MIT from the beginning of the 1950s. However, the MIT not only reformed the 
administration of the foreign press corps, but also directed its reforms at a growing number 
of correspondents who were coming to Spain at the end of the Franco regime’s international 
isolation. On the eve of Spain’s return into the international community in 1953/54, the 
MIT had already accredited 24 correspondents for foreign news agencies.423 Following the 
end of the UN ban on the Franco regime in 1955, this number rose to 34 correspondents a 
year later.424 In 1955, the MIT, in its Anuario de la Prensa Española, published not only 
the names of the accredited journalists for foreign news agencies as usual, but also a full 
list of all accredited foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain. While in itself a reflection 
of the MIT’s growing attention for the foreign press corps, this and the annual lists that 
followed also provide the basis for a detailed examination of the foreign press corps in 
Francoist Spain from the mid-1950s. 
The growing number of correspondents for news agencies reflected a growing presence of 
foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain more generally by the mid-1950s. Figure 1 shows 
that 96 full-time staff correspondents and 61 part-time journalists were accredited in 1955. 
Throughout the following two decades, the size of the foreign press corps continued to 
develop in parallel with Spain’s improving political and also economic situation. In 1960, 
shortly after the regime had laid the ground for the subsequent economic boom with the 
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implementation of the Plan for Economic Stabilization, the MIT could count 131 
correspondents and 68 accredited part-time journalists in its ranks, almost 200 accredited 
correspondents in total.425 Compared with the mid-1950s, this was a remarkable increase 
of foreign correspondents by 27 % within only five years.  
While Spain was still no hot spot for international news at the beginning of the 1960s, it 
was no no-man’s land either. Foreign correspondents accredited in Spain at the time noticed 
this development. Benjamin Welles, Spain correspondents for The New York Times from 
1956 to 1962, for instance, stressed that  
Spain is not really news. However, interest is growing. […] yet for the average 
news editor, Spain only becomes news when the regime is menaced by strikes, 
by political disorders, by natural disasters, or by rumours of Franco’s ill 
health.426 
 
Figure 1: Foreign Correspondents in Spain, 1955-75427 
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When Manuel Fraga became Minister of Information and Tourism, he actively tried to 
strengthen this growing media interest. Thus, the MIT organized programmes for tourism 
journalists in order promote Spain as a destination for Western European and American 
holidaymakers.428 However, while Fraga’s tourist campaign was a success, it had little 
impact on the total number of accredited correspondents. Instead, as Figure 1 shows, the 
overall size of the foreign press corps remained stable until the mid-1960s and even slightly 
decreased thereafter. Nevertheless, this general figure is partially misleading. In fact, while 
the overall number of accreditations remained stable and even decreased after 1960, the 
composition of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain profoundly changed. 
Figure 2 shows that these changes applied first and foremost to the types of media that 
correspondents were accredited to in Francoist Spain. In the 1950s, practically the entire 
foreign press corps worked either for print media or for news agencies. In fact, the 
correspondents for print media, with 75%, represented the vast majority of all accredited 
correspondents in 1955, while foreign television and radio stations had practically no 
correspondents in Spain. This situation started to change during the 1960s. Together with 
the accreditation of more correspondents for news agencies and print media, twelve 
journalists for TV and radio were accredited by 1965.429 Compared with 1955, this 
represented an increase of 500%.  
 
Figure 2: Media with correspondents in Spain and correspondents accredited per media, 1955-
75430 
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The tendency towards a further diversification of the foreign press corps intensified 
throughout the last years of the regime, not just in total numbers but also proportionally. 
While remaining the most important group of correspondents, the presence of print 
journalists noticeably decreased from the end of the 1960s. In fact, compared with 1965, 
the number of foreign print journalists dropped by 20 in 1975 and again reached the level 
of the 1950s. At the same time, foreign and especially German TV and radio broadcasters 
not only continued to send further correspondents to Spain (16 in total in 1975) but foreign 
broadcasters also started to open fully staffed offices in Madrid. While in the mid-1960s 
twelve accredited journalists were working for twelve different broadcasters, the German 
public broadcaster ZDF alone employed four journalists in Madrid by 1975.431 Indeed, ZDF 
was one of the first foreign TV stations to open a permanent bureau in Spain. Around the 
same time, the second German public broadcaster ARD accredited Horst Hano as its first 
correspondent in Madrid.432  
This increased presence of TV correspondents in Madrid naturally reflected the general 
expansion of television.433 Nevertheless, the opening of fully staffed bureaus marked a 
considerable financial commitment for foreign broadcasters and thus reflected a growing 
media interest. As we see in Figure 1, the number of accredited staff correspondents 
actually remained stable after 1960. The changing numbers in 1965, the result of the 
previously discussed introduction of two categories of staff correspondents, do not 
contradict this observation. At the same time, Figure 1 also shows that the overall decrease 
in accredited correspondents after 1965 was mainly caused by the departure of accredited 
part-time journalists. This development was not the result of a lack of international media 
interest in Spain. Instead, it was the result of the changing accreditation policy by the 
Francoist authorities during the 1960s.  
The previous chapter briefly discussed that the accreditation as staff correspondents came 
with a number of benefits. While the MIT intended for this policy to improve the relations 
with foreign correspondents, it had the unintended consequence of making the accreditation 
status of staff correspondents highly attractive. Manfred von Conta, correspondent of the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, vividly remembered the consequences:  
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These privileges made it very desirable to be registered as a foreign 
correspondent, a fact that seduced non-professionals living in Spain for many 
other reasons than journalistic activities to look in the countries of their origin 
for any kind of periodical publication that could be talked into signing an 
application for accreditation. Even the smallest or most humble periodical that 
never would have dreamt of financially maintaining a correspondent in Madrid 
would serve. Magazines for knitting fashions or culinaria from provincial 
France could be represented in Madrid by special “Correspondents” and even 
the seriousness of the representative of the widely unknown “Hamburger Brief” 
could have been doubted.434 
The Francoist authorities facilitated the misuse of the accreditation status. In the regime’s 
striving for international acceptance, the Section for Foreign Press was very gracious in 
granting and renewing the accreditations for a considerable number of individuals with 
doubtful professional credentials.  
Under Manuel Fraga, this practice was initially continued. In fact, the reform of the 
accreditation laws under Fraga in 1963, which ended the status of part-time journalists and 
instead introduced the new categories of chief correspondents and editors, both formally 
staff correspondents, opened the door to more abuse of the accreditation status. Fraga 
further increased the overall number of officially accredited correspondents by granting 18 
exceptional honorary accreditations altogether.435 As the previous chapter has argued with 
regard to the founders of the ACPI, the MIT granted this accreditation status mainly for 
journalistic support of the Franco regime. The Franco regime’s accreditation policy, 
therefore, partly accounts for the growing number of correspondents during the first half of 
the 1960s overall. 
By the mid-1960s, the growing number of correspondents brought the Section for Foreign 
Press of the MIT to the limits of its working capacity and the head of the section asked for 
additional staff.436 Against this background, the MIT seemingly started to question the 
actual value of its accreditation policy. The re-introduction of the former categories of staff 
correspondents and part-time correspondents with the reform of the accreditation guidelines 
in 1966 and 1967 outlined in the previous chapter reflected this policy change. More 
importantly, in contrast to the previous years, the Section for Foreign Press started to apply 
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the accreditation guidelines with greater rigour after 1967. Although an official order to 
effect this policy change could not be found in the archives, numerous identical reports 
point to a thorough inquiry into the actual professionalism of the accredited correspondents. 
Based on this information, the Section for Foreign Press re-evaluated the submissions for 
the yearly renewal of the accreditation of staff correspondents. The Francoist officials 
declined or downgraded a considerable number of these applications to the status of part-
time journalist, which came without any economic benefits. 
The Section for Foreign Press implemented this new policy with a remarkable thoroughness 
and declined even the applications of correspondents who were very much in favour of the 
regime (and of their beneficial status as full-time correspondents). The Austrian Harold 
Weinzetl, for instance, was already accredited as a staff correspondent from 1953 before 
the Francoist officials declined the renewal of his accreditation because he was unable to 
present any recent journalistic work. The submitted manuscript ‘A peculiar Dictator – 
Franco’, in which Weinzetl described Spain as a peaceful quasi-democracy,437 was not 
enough to convince the Section of Foreign Press of his journalistic professionalism. In 
contrast to previous years, Weinzetl’s other forms of service for the Franco regime, which 
he outlined thoroughly, did not help. During the Civil War, Weinzetl had been the Austrian 
observer and head of the press office of the Non-Intervention Committee in London – a 
function which, in his own words, gave ‘help and support to the Rebel’s cause’438. After 
the end of the Civil War, Weinzetl was an important actor in the Nazi party organization in 
Madrid.439 Following the defeat of the Axis Powers, Weinzetl remained in Spain and was 
accredited in the 1950s for the Austrian newspaper of the conservative Austrian People's 
Party, Volksblatt.440 Furthermore, Weinzetl was the president of the Austrian Association 
in Madrid, which did ‘everything possible for the formation of the mutual friendship and 
understanding between Spain and Austria’441.  
Although Weinzetl produced practically no journalistic work, these merits secured the 
yearly renewal of his accreditation. By 1967, however, the Section for Foreign Press 
declined his application. Weinzetl refused the offered accreditation as a part-time journalist 
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since this status came with no economic benefits. Other ‘correspondents’, who were not 
able to gain an accreditation as staff-correspondents, did the same. 
Under Fraga, the ideological aspects of accreditations had become less important for 
receiving an accreditation as a full-time correspondent than actual journalistic 
professionalism. The decline of the overall number of mainly part-time accreditations 
between 1965 and 1970, therefore, was partly caused by the policy change for the 
accreditations of full-time correspondents and not by a declining international media 
interest.  
This examination of the changing size of the foreign press corps gives a broad impression 
of the general development of international media interest in Francoist Spain. Examining 
the geographical distribution of the media with correspondents in Spain, this chapter will 
provide further insights into both the development of international media interest in Spain 
and the changing composition of the foreign press corps.  
Figure 3 shows that the examination of the geographical distribution of the media with 
correspondents in Spain leaves an unambiguous picture. European correspondents 
represented approximately half of all foreign correspondents accredited in Francoist Spain 
at any one time. The rest of the foreign press corps were composed almost exclusively and 
in equal parts by journalists working for US and Latin American media. While this general 
distribution remained roughly stable from the 1950s, some changes stand out. Figure 3 
shows that mostly European part-time journalist left after the change of the accreditation 
policy in 1967. Thereafter, however, the presence of European correspondents increased 
again and by 1975 reached the level of the beginning of the 1960s. US correspondents 
noticeably increased to 50 correspondents by 1965, but continuously dropped thereafter 
and the US media only had 32 accredited correspondents in Spain by 1975. The Latin 
American press corps also steadily grew throughout the 1960s. In fact, Latin American 
correspondents were the only group which did not decline in numbers in 1970s. In 1975, 
the Francoist authorities had accredited practically the same number of Latin American 
journalists as in 1955.  
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Figure 3: Foreign Media in Spain 1955-75: Geographical Regions442 
This changing proportional composition of the foreign press corps is not surprising. It 
reflects Spain’s societal, political, economic and cultural relations, which resulted in 
increased public and media attention for Spain in certain regions of the world. Spain’s 
geographical location in Europe, the leading political role of the US as well as their large 
international media market and Spain’s traditional links with Latin America, which 
intensified during the Franco era, are key explanatory factors. At the same time, some 
Western media also used Spain as the basis for their correspondents to cover neighbouring 
countries and regions, especially Portugal and the Maghreb. The Swiss correspondent 
Arnold Hottinger, for instance, covered the Arab world for the newspaper Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung from 1961 before coming to Madrid in 1968. From Spain, Hottinger continued to 
travel to and report from the Arab world.443 Until 1978, The Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung also relied for reports on the Maghreb and Portugal from their Spain 
correspondents.444 To a certain extent, therefore, Madrid was a ‘news centre’ for Portugal 
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and the Maghreb similar to that of Vienna for Eastern Europe during the Cold War.445 The 
impact of this function as ‘news centre’ on the size of the foreign press corps is impossible 
to measure, however. It can only be assumed that Spain’s geographical location might have 
been an additional factor for some media to place a correspondent in Madrid. In the 
following, therefore, this chapter will concentrate on the connection between Spain’s 
foreign relations and the presence of foreign correspondents. It turns out that the 
international political context, as well as Spain’s historical ties, was of particular 
importance in accounting for the composition of the foreign press corps during the right-
wing Franco dictatorship.  
 
US correspondents in Francoist Spain 
The historian Javier Tusell Gómez has written about the relationship between US-Spanish 
political relations and the perception of the Franco regime by the American public: ‘As far 
as the Americans were concerned, Franco’s Spain was a far off land whose development 
was not a subject on which for the most part the general public was kept informed since its 
only importance for the United States was strategic.’446 Indeed, there is no question about 
the strategic interest behind the US’ policy towards Spain. During the last months of the 
Second World War and after, the Democratic US Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and his 
successor Harry S. Truman made no secret of their hostility towards the Franco regime.447 
With the outbreak of the Cold War, the situation changed. Spain’s strategic importance for 
the US military and the reliability of a stable anti-communist regime in Spain pushed 
previous ideological concerns aside. After Truman re-established diplomatic relations with 
Spain in 1950,448 his Republican successor Eisenhower completed this policy change. The 
outcome of this Spanish-US rapprochement was the Pacts of Madrid in 1953, which granted 
Spain economic help in exchange for military bases on Spanish soil.449 US credits had a 
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fundamental impact on the Spanish economy. More important, however, was the political 
acceptance of Spain by the US, which opened the way out of international isolation for the 
Franco regime. In exchange for serving US military and strategic interests, Spain received 
the boost in international reputation that the regime had longed for which culminated in 
Eisenhower’s visit to Madrid in 1959. The ‘American friend’ also remained thereafter as 
the key orientation point of Spain’s foreign policy throughout the existence of the 
dictatorship.450 The US became ‘a stakeholder in the political stability of Spain’451. At the 
same time, the US also secured an important position for Spain’s economy. In the mid-
1950s, almost 20% of Spanish imports came from the US,452 while Spain sent 10% of her 
exports with the US.453  
The second part of Tusell’s observation is in need of revision, however. Spain was certainly 
not a priority for the US media. Major US media like The Washington Post454 and the Los 
Angeles Times455 never, or only briefly, had full-time correspondents in Spain before 1975. 
However, as Figure 3 shows, the Franco regime was not a ‘far off land’ without any interest 
for the American public either. The number of correspondents present in Spain since the 
mid-1950s suggests that the American public received regular news on the Franco regime. 
In the 1950s, the major US news agencies Associated Press (AP) and UP (respectively UPI 
after its merger with International News Service in 1958) already had the largest offices in 
Madrid.456 Furthermore, major publications such as The New York Times maintained an 
office in Madrid throughout the entire Franco period, as did the news magazine Time. Other 
major publications, such as Newsweek and the Chicago Tribune, also had permanent 
correspondents in Madrid since the 1950s.457 Furthermore, a small number of American 
radio stations were already represented in Spain during the 1950s.458 The major 
broadcasters CBS and NBC had staff correspondents in Spain.459 Particularly active was the 
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long-time CBS correspondent Edmund Gress, who also worked for Newsweek until 1970.460 
Other US media without staff correspondents in Spain nevertheless received reports from 
a considerable number of stringers among the American correspondents (further discussed 
in Chapter 4).  
As this chapter has already shown, the US media interest increased considerably during the 
1960s. By 1965, the presence of US journalists reached a peak of 50 accredited 
correspondents. In contrast to the previous decade, however, this development did not take 
place in the context of improved political relations between Spain and the US. On the 
contrary, although the strategic partnership between Spain and the US remained intact, 
diplomatic relations considerably cooled down considerably under Eisenhower’s 
Democratic successor, Kennedy.461 Economically, however, relations between Spain and 
the US remained strong. Between 1961 and 1965, 18% of Spain’s imports came from the 
US.462 Besides the US’ economic interest, however, the chapter will argue that the increased 
presence of US correspondents as a reflection of US media interest was the result of a 
successful rebranding of Spain’s image in the US.  
By the end of the Second World War, the American public did not perceive Spain as some 
far-off land thanks to the reports of a still small number of correspondents. Instead, 
Americans were very well aware of the Franco regime’s existence, but less because its 
liaison with the Axis Powers than the public memory of the Spanish Civil War. The 
researcher Allen Guttmann, in his pioneering study of the impact of the Spanish Civil War 
on the American public, has concluded that ‘no public event of the years between 1919 and 
1939 – excepting the Great Depression itself – moved Americans as did this Spanish 
conflict’463. While the liberal American public strongly supported the Republic, mainly 
Catholic groups defended the cause of the Rebels. Preston has shown that this conflict was 
in some cases even taking place between editors (or newspaper owners) in the US and their 
correspondents in Spain.464 After 1939, the Civil War remained, so the title of Guttmann’s 
book, a ‘wound in the heart’465 of liberal democratic America. Veterans of the Abraham 
Lincoln Brigade kept the memory of their role in the civil war alive through 
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commemorative activities, starting directly after the war.466 The success of Hemingway’s 
1940 Civil War novel, For Whom the Bell Tolls, was both a reflection of and contribution 
to the lasting impact the Civil War had on the American public.  
The image of the Civil War as a heroic battle against the evil Fascists, transmitted by 
famous American correspondents like Hemingway, John Dos Passos and others, had a 
lasting impact on generations of American journalists. This becomes visible, for instance, 
in the memoirs of Malcolm M. Browne, born in 1931. Browne came to Spain as a special 
correspondent in 1975 in order to cover Franco’s death. Although without any direct 
experience of the Spanish Civil War, he came to Spain with strong feelings about the origins 
of the Franco regime:  
[…] one of the best wars of the twentieth century. A lot of Americans who 
thought they hated war […] saw Spain as a true contest between good and evil: 
the satanic fascists on one side and the defenders of liberty on the other. […] 
He [Franco], of course, was the archetypical bad guy; he was the head of the 
Falangists. He managed to extinguish by rather dirty means his enemies in 
Spain, and after he succeeded in 1939, he massacred anybody who had opposed 
him.467  
In order to counteract this perception of the Franco regime, the Spanish authorities initiated 
after 1945, what Neal Rosendorf described as, a ‘massive, quarter-century effort to 
fundamentally recast Spain’s reputation in the US’468. Since the beginning, the Francoist 
authorities also directed these efforts towards US correspondents in Spain. The most 
prominent measure was Franco’s interview with AP correspondent DeWitt Mackenzie in 
1945, in which the Spanish dictator praised an imagined Spanish-American friendship.469 
The initiatives to create a press club for correspondents also need to be seen in this context. 
The Francoist authorities set up the Circulo Jaime Balmes close to the US embassy in 
Madrid and the National Delegate for the Press, Juan Aparicio, immediately informed the 
embassy about the planned initiative in order to show the regime’s new openness.470 Also 
noteworthy was an initiative by the MIT at the beginning of the 1950s. The MIT included 
in its relaunched publication, Gaceta de la Prensa, a new section for Spanish media 
professionals entitled How are the foreign correspondents working. This section portrayed 
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foreign correspondents in Spain and started with the correspondent of The New York Times, 
Sam Pope Brewer.471 
Following the end of Spain’s ostracization, attempts to improve Spain’s international image 
were intensified. Rosendorf has shown that the Franco regime used a number of parallel 
strategies in order to rebrand the image of the Francoist dictatorship and ultimately increase 
Spain’s diplomatic soft power. These strategies included PR campaigns in the US as well 
as the successful promotion of Spain as a location for Hollywood production and a centre 
of international fashion.472 Of special importance was the promotion of Spain as a 
destination for American tourists as a means to improve Spain’s image. Manuel Fraga 
intensified these efforts during the 1960s.473 Fraga’s massive external PR campaigns, like 
the $7 Million Spanish Pavilion at the 1964-65 New York World’s Fair, marked the climax 
of the ‘Franco regime’s comprehensive program of reputational outreach to the US’474. 
The changing US press corps in Spain reflected the success of these campaigns during the 
1960s with regard to both the growing numbers of correspondents and the media they 
represented. Indeed, the accreditation of correspondents for fashion, travel and life-style 
magazines was the main cause of the overall growth of the US press corps. One of the most 
illustrious among these new correspondents was Vogue correspondent Aline Griffith,475 
who after her marriage to a Spanish aristocrat, became better known as the Countess of 
Romanones. Griffith had had a previous career as a spy for the US in Madrid high society 
during the Second World War. Later on, Griffith became a well-known socialite and was 
to publish a series of books on her (highly exaggerated) adventures under titles such as The 
Spy Wore Red, The Spy Went Dancing and The Spy Wore Silk.476  
The most prominent case among the accredited US tourism correspondents was Temple 
Fielding, the most successful US travel writer of his time.477 Fielding already had a base in 
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Mallorca since the beginning of the 1950s before being accredited at the end of the 1950s 
for the influential Hall Syndicate. Far more influential than his newspaper columns was, 
however, the regularly updated bestseller, Fielding’s Travel Guide to Europe. Rosendorf 
shows that Fielding did his best in these guides to sell Spain as a holiday destination for 
wealthy US holiday makers: 
If you are Mr. William X. Jones, the typical American vacationer, political 
matters will never cross your path. Spain is under a dictatorship, with some of 
the trimmings, but you can go exactly where you wish, do exactly what you 
choose, and say exactly what you feel about the government or anything else. 
There are no shadows to frighten you, as in Yugoslavia or Vienna or in the 
Soviet Satellites.478 
For his sympathy towards the Franco regime, the MIT thanked Fielding with an honorary 
accreditation as correspondent after 1966.479 A rather peculiar case among the travel 
journalists in Spain was the correspondent of the widely read Holiday Magazine, for which 
the famous British novelist, poet and Classical scholar Robert Graves was accredited from 
1959 to 1977.480 Graves, who also lived on Mallorca, had little interest in travel writing. 
Among the very few pieces Graves contributed to the magazine was, for instance, an 
account of his personal psychedelic experiences with mushrooms.481 Nevertheless, the 
Holiday Magazine also contributed to Spain’s promotion as an international tourist 
destination and published in 1960 a well-meaning travel guide on Spain482. The prominent 
Graves was at the same time of propagandistic importance for the regime and also received 
an accreditation as honorary correspondent in 1967.483 
The increased accreditation for fashion and travel journalists, however, does not fully 
explain the rising number of US correspondents during the 1960s. Instead, another sub-
group of US correspondents contributed to this development: journalists for Spanish 
language US media. The MIT accredited twelve correspondents for US Spanish language 
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publications in Spain between 1960 and 1970.484 As we saw in the previous chapter, 
Enrique ‘Henry’ Cervantes became the Spain correspondent of the pro-Francoist New York 
based newspaper El Diario de Nueva York in 1961. El Diario de Nueva York was at the 
time only one of many Spanish language publications in the US. Robert Brand counted 
approximately 160 Spanish language magazines and newspapers in the US at the end of the 
1940s.485 Most of these media addressed the communities of immigrants from Latin 
America and Cuba, who constituted the vast majority of the Spanish speaking immigration 
into the US. Since the beginning of the 20th century, a considerable number of Spaniards - 
more than 70,000 between 1911 and 1920 - had crossed the Atlantic.486 After the Spanish 
Civil War, Republican exiles also went to the US. These exiles soon continued their fight 
against the Franco regime in existing and newly founded publications. The New York based 
newspaper España Libre, published until 1977, became the most influential and long-lived 
among these publications.487  
In contrast to the pro-Franco El Diario de Nueva York, which Cervantes co-founded as a 
counterweight to España Libre, it was politically impossible for these anti-Franco 
publications to officially employ correspondents in Spain. Nevertheless, the Spanish media 
market in the US was large enough to serve as a source of income for a considerable number 
of correspondents. Mostly Latin American journalists who were already in Spain, found a 
new or additional source of income in this way. The Ecuadorian long-time vice-president 
of the ACPI, Antonio Alomia Larrea, for instance, wrote for La Opinión, a major Spanish 
newspaper from Los Angeles.488 Besides Latin Americans, a third of accredited 
correspondents for Spanish language US media were Cuban emigrants in Spain. The Cuban 
Raul Miguel Rivero worked for the conservative, pro-Franco and strictly anti-communist 
Cuban newspaper Diario de la Marina, which Cuban exiles in the US published in Miami 
after Castro’s revolution.489 While Rivero only came to Spain after Castro’s revolution, the 
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Cuban Joaquin Aristigueta had already worked for the Cuban newspaper Prensa Libre since 
1950.490 Following the Cuban revolution, Aristigueta remained in Spain and started to write 
for a number of Spanish-language US newspapers like Popular (Miami), America Libre 
and La Prensa (both Los Angeles).491 The Spanish authorities welcomed the impact of these 
pro-Franco Cuban exiles on the Spanish community in the US. Like other Cuban exiles, 
Rivero and Aristigueta received honorary accreditations from the MIT.492  
 
European correspondents 
As Figure 3 has shown, journalists for European media represented the majority of all 
accredited correspondents in Spain between 1955 and 1975. Only in 1970, once the stricter 
application of the accreditation guidelines and the subsequent non-accreditation of 
European stringers had taken place, did a temporary decrease of the European share of the 
entire press corps to 46 % occur. But five years later this number had risen again to 57%.  
On the most general level, the strong presence of European correspondents confirms the 
hypothesis that economic relations and geographical proximity are crucial factors in 
explaining the size of foreign press corps. Despite the differences in political systems, Spain 
was a European country. Although the Franco regime in political terms was never fully re-
accepted, Spain nevertheless considerably improved and tightened its economic ties with 
European countries in particular.493 In fact, despite the unquestionable political and 
strategic importance of the US for Spain, the orientation towards Western Europe became 
the ‘true obsession’ of Spain’s foreign policy under Fernando Castiella during the 1960s.494 
Europe and EEC member states in particular were the most important partners for the 
booming Spanish economy during the 1960s. At the beginning of the 1960s, more than 
60% of Spain’s exports went to Western Europe. With the signing of the preferential trade 
agreement with the EEC in 1970, these economic relations were further improved.495 
Furthermore, during the 1960s Europe became the most important market for Spain’s 
tourist industry, which at the same time improved Spain’s economic and societal relations 
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with Western Europe still further. Almost 12 million European holidaymakers gained a 
first-hand experience of Francoist Spain in 1965 alone.496 At the same time, the 1960s saw 
an exodus of Spanish migrant workers. Between 1960 and 1967 almost 2 million Spaniards, 
mostly as migrant workers, left for Switzerland, France and Germany but also to the 
Netherlands, for example.497  
These general observations of the Franco regime’s geographical proximity, economic and 
and societal relations can serve as a partial explanation of the European media interest in 
Spain. This applies in particular to the general increase of some European press corps since 
the mid-1960s, namely British, German, French and Dutch correspondents. The collective 
experience on Spanish beaches for millions of Europeans as well as the presence of Spanish 
migrant workers in many European countries seemingly increased public interest. 
Furthermore, correspondents who came to Spain at the end of the 1960s and the beginning 
of the 1970s also pointed out that the general public attitude towards Spain had changed 
during the 1960s and with it the interest in the Franco regime. The left-wing ‘revolts of 
generations’498 across Europe in 1968 had stirred a growing discontent with the right-wing 
Franco dictatorship. A number of correspondents indeed pointed out that the societal 
changes had an impact on the perception of and interest in Spain.499 The massive 
international media coverage and protests surrounding the Burgos trials in 1970s, the 
execution of Salvador Puig Antich in 1973 and the execution of five ETA members in 1975 
were a reflection of the growing public discontent with the Franco regime.  
However, the detailed examination of the European press corps in Figure 4 also shows a 
number of irregularities. The media of the largest European countries with the greatest 
importance for the Spanish economy - Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy - had the 
most correspondents in Spain in total. But Figure 4 shows that media from these four 
countries were represented by correspondents in Francoist Spain to very differing degrees. 
Most obvious was the strong presence of German correspondents, which accounted for 
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between a fourth and a third of the entire foreign press corps from 1955 and 1975. Italian 
correspondents were, with the exception of a rapid and only temporary increase in the mid-
1960s, less numerous. Furthermore, while the presence of French correspondents remained 
more or less stable, the presence of British correspondents strongly increased after 1965 to 
24 correspondents in 1975.  
 
Figure 4: European Correspondents in Spain, 1955-75500 
Spain’s foreign trade also cannot explain this unevenness or the general composition of the 
press corps. Between 1961 and 1965, Spain traded approximately 15.5% of its exports and 
8.5% of its imports with Great Britain, followed by Germany (13.6% exports, 11.8 % 
imports), France (9.9 % exports and 10.7 % imports), Italy (7.4 % exports and 3.7 % 
imports) and Belgium (6.7% exports and 4.9 % imports).501 While Spain’s foreign trade 
correlates to a certain extent with the presence of British, French and, except for 1965, 
Italian correspondents, it does not account for the disproportionally strong German press 
corps. Switzerland only comes in sixth and Portugal in eighth.502 Tourism, as a strong pillar 
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of the Spanish economy, cannot account for the composition of the entire foreign press 
corps either. Throughout the entire examined time period, French tourists, often coming 
with day visas to northern Spain, were by the far the most numerous. In 1965 alone, almost 
6.5 million - and thereby more than half of all officially registered tourists coming to Spain 
- were French. German and British tourists, by far the largest groups besides the French, 
roughly accounted for one million tourist visits each in 1965.503  
Furthermore, the concentration on the total number of correspondents is also partly 
misleading when the presence of correspondents in Spain is put in relation to the population 
of the home countries. In fact, Swiss media had proportionally the strongest representation 
in Spain in 1965, followed by Germany, Portugal, Belgium and, temporarily, Italy. Great 
Britain was in seventh and France only in ninth.504 German correspondents, therefore, were 
not only in total numbers, but also in proportion to the relatively large German population, 
strongly represented in Francoist Spain. The relatively weak presence of French 
correspondents is also remarkable. French tourists not only came to Spain in great numbers, 
but Spaniards also in France. Before the Spanish migrant working workers, approximately 
450.000 Republican refugees had crossed the Spanish French border after the Spanish Civil 
War. Of these exiles, 250.000 remained in France and it thereby became the European 
centre of the Spanish exile.505 This was not reflected in a particular strong presence of 
French correspondents. However, Chapter 5 will show that the accredited French 
correspondents in Spain were of crucial importance nevertheless and that parts of the 
French media reported intensively from the Franco regime. 
Against the background of the, at that time, still rather small number of correspondents in 
Francoist Spain, not only the case of French correspondents shows that these statistical 
observations only have a limited validity. This becomes further evident in the case of the 
relatively large number of Swiss correspondents, which Moisés Prieto López also points 
out in his study on Swiss-Spanish relations from 1969 until 1982.506 Indeed, with its 
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approximately 5.5 million inhabitants, Switzerland also had strong relations with Spain in 
other respects, too. Only French and British tourists entered Spain in proportionally greater 
numbers in 1965, and more than 120,000 Spanish migrants lived in Switzerland 1970.507 
At the same time, Switzerland also had relatively strong economic ties with Spain as the 
destination for 3% of Spain’s exports and supplier of 2.6% of Spain’s imports from 1961-
65.508 Prieto highlights that these economic interests and the positive attitude of parts of the 
Swiss economic elite contributed to a rather favorable image of Spain in the Swiss press.509 
However, Prieto also shows how critical media coverage intensified during the last years 
of the Franco regime.510 At the same time, the Burgos trials were accompanied in 
Switzerland, like elsewhere, with public protests.511  
Nevertheless, the small number of Swiss correspondents should not be overestimated in 
their importance. In fact, the Swiss press corps had a rather particular composition. In 1965, 
half of the Swiss correspondents were working for specialised business media which 
increased to six out of seven accredited Swiss correspondents by 1970. This was only a 
partial reflection of the Swiss economic interest in Spain. Instead, the accreditation of 
correspondents for media such as Common Market Business Reports from Geneva, which 
were directed to an international audience, was also a reflection of Switzerland’s general 
importance for the internal business community. The correspondents working for these 
media in Spain, none of whom actually had Swiss nationality, also mirrored this 
international focus. Common Market Business Reports, for instance, worked with Chelala 
López as well as another Cuban exile as correspondents in Spain.512 Furthermore, Swiss 
news media also received their reports from a diverse group of correspondents, which 
included a considerable number of German journalists such as Sieglinde Herrmann. Since 
the beginning of the 1960s in Spain, Herrmann was officially accredited for German media 
and the Swiss newspaper Der Bund.513 In practice, however, Herrmann was working as a 
freelancer for a number of German and Swiss newspaper on a pay-per-article basis.514 In 
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fact, the only major Swiss newspaper which continuously had full-time staff correspondents 
in Spain, was the Neue Zürcher Zeitung. Until the end of the 1960s and before his 
replacement with the aforementioned Arnold Hottinger, the correspondent Silvio Schädler 
reported for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung from Madrid.515  
This brief examination of the Swiss press corps shows that the relatively small number of 
correspondents in Spain does not necessarily lead to valid arguments on particular national 
interests in Spain. At the same time, Figure 4 and the observations above also show that 
neither foreign trade nor the population of the respective home countries are sufficient 
categories for the examination of European press corps in Francoist Spain. Among the large 
groups of correspondents, the variables can only explain the presence of French and British 
correspondents. In fact, the British press corps in particular developed parallel to the 
continuously rising number of British tourists in Spain, from a mere 300,000 in 1960 to 1.8 
million in 1969.516 For other groups of correspondents, however, these criteria do not 
provide sufficient understanding. Instead, this chapter will argue in the following pages that 
Spain’s historical relations as well as the Franco regime’s ideological orientation are crucial 
for the understanding of the European press corps. Most obviously, this applied to the – in 
total numbers small but proportionally strong – presence of correspondents from the other 
Iberian dictatorship; the Salazar regime in Portugal. Both regimes had the same fate of 
existing and surviving on the political margins of Western Europe. In terms of bilateral 
relations, the two dictatorships maintained a close, but complicated relationship.  
Even before the end of the Civil War, the two dictatorships had signed, in 1939, a Treaty 
of Friendship and Non-Aggression. In the following years, the two regimes made plans to 
form an Iberian Bloc. During Spain’s international isolation, Salazar remained one of the 
few and most important supporters of the Franco regime.517 During the 1950s, relations 
remained close and (unfulfilled) plans were made to establish a common Iberian market, 
although Portugal remained of marginal economic importance for the Franco regime. At 
the beginning of the 1960s, the two regimes attempted to coordinate the mutual media 
reporting of each other with the explicit aim of avoiding any negative press reports about 
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each other.518 The impact of these plans on the press, however, remained marginal to non-
existent. The Spanish press-attaché in Lisbon identified the traditional anti-Spanish 
sentiments among parts of the Portuguese establishment early on as a possible obstacle to 
these plans519. Furthermore, this failure must also be seen against the background of the 
worsening of bilateral relations between Spain and Portugal since the mid-1960s because 
of Spain’s lack of support for Portugal’s colonial policy.520 
The Portuguese press corps in Spain reflected this complicated relationship and became, to 
a certain extent, the battlefield of the tensions between the two countries. While relatively 
small in total numbers and with the noticeable exception of the news agency ANI,521 
Portuguese media maintained throughout the existence of the Franco regime 
correspondents in its neighbouring country. Most notable among them were Alberto de 
Oliveira and Victor Homen Almeida. The Francoist authorities considered Oliveira, who 
had worked since the 1940s for a number of Portuguese newspapers and the national 
Portuguese broadcaster Emissora Nacional de Radiodifusão, explicitly as ‘our friend’522. 
This friendship was reflected in Oliveira’s election as president of the CIP in 1966, with 
the (at the time) still necessary support by the Francoist authorities.523 Around the same 
time, the other Portuguese journalist, Victor Homen Almeida, who had worked since the 
beginning of the 1950s for the economics paper O Comercio do Porto, was accredited by 
the MIT as Honorary Correspondent.524 
While both Almeida and de Oliveira were long-term supporters of the Franco regime, in 
the context of the rising tensions between Spain and Portugal, more critical Portuguese 
journalists came to Spain during the 1960s. Among them, the journalist Vasco Cardoso 
Cortes repeatedly caused tensions between the two countries. Cortes was accredited in 1966 
like de Oliveira for Emissora Nacional de Radiodifusão, but also wrote for a number of 
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newspapers.525 Cardoso’s reports on, for instance, Spain’s economic problems led to 
complaints by the Spanish press attaché in Lisbon to Portuguese officials.526 Even de 
Oliveira complained to the editors of Emissora Nacional de Radiodifusão, which had also 
broadcasted Cardoso’s critical reports.527 The Portuguese officials showed little willingness 
to become active in this matter and simply suggested that Spain should advise its Portugal 
correspondents to publish similarly critical reports.528 Following further critical reports on 
Spain, the Spanish press attaché in Lisbon concluded that ‘this press has instructions not to 
compromise too much with the Franco regime’529. Although the relations between the 
Franco regime and Portugal improved after 1968 because of the replacement of Salazar 
with the Spain-friendly Marcelo Caetano, this remained a short-lived development. 
Following the Carnation Revolution in 1974, the Portuguese press became highly critical 
towards the Franco regime and the Francoist authorities very suspicious of Portuguese 
correspondents.530  
The strong presence of Portuguese correspondents – which was in proportion to the 
country’s population - was, therefore, a reflection of the complex bilateral relations between 
the two dictatorships. To some extent, the same can be said about the most noticeable 
feature of the European press corps in Francoist Spain: the strong presence of German 
correspondents. The strong presence of German correspondents was only a partial 
reflection of the actual ties between Spain and Germany. It also reflected the former 
closeness between Franco’s Spain and Nazi Germany by turning the Francoist dictatorship 
into a preferred destination for former Nazis who made a living as correspondents.  
The majority of German correspondents were staff-correspondents. In contrast to many 
Latin American correspondents, the German press corps consisted to a large extent of 
professional journalists officially recognized by the Francoist authorities. Furthermore, 
German correspondents also represented more media than their colleagues in Spain. In 
1955, for instance, the 23 accredited German correspondents were working for 23 different 
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media.531 The eleven British journalists accredited in Spain at the same time only 
represented eight media; and the 28 American correspondents only 20 different media. This 
striking difference mainly resulted from the size of the bureaus of the respective news 
agencies. The major international British news agency Reuters and its US competitors on 
the global market AP and UPI employed at least three journalists each in Spain during the 
1950s.532 The German news agency Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa), however, only had 
one correspondent in Madrid in 1955.533 This situation did not change much during the 
following two decades: while no more than two (and often only one) correspondents were 
working at the same time for dpa in Madrid, Reuters had by 1975 a staff of five journalists. 
Hans Rahm, the head was, besides his secretary, at the same time the only employee of dpa 
in Madrid, covering the last phase of the regime single-handedly.534  
Against the background of this differing employment structure, the strong presence of 
German correspondents seems even more remarkable. The bilateral relations only serve as 
a partial explanation. The chapter has already shown that, although Germany was of 
considerable economic importance for Spain, the relations with Great Britain and France 
were more important. However, the Christian Democrat-led governments between 1949 
and 1966 also maintained mutually beneficial diplomatic relations with Spain, as Birgit 
Aschmann and Carlos Sanz Díaz have shown.535 While Spain supported German interests 
by arguing for a continued exclusion of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from the 
UN,536 the German government supported the closer economic association of Spain with 
the EEC.537 Nevertheless, the relations with Spain for Germany remained of second order. 
In fact, the Adenauer administration was careful not to provoke the Allies with too friendly 
a relationship with the right-wing Franco dictatorship, which might have triggered 
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memories of previous Spanish-German collaboration during the Civil War.538 After 1966, 
with the Social Democrats first as partners in grand coalition and then as governing party 
from 1969 to 1982, the official attitude towards the Franco regime became more distant. In 
fact, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 
SPD) and its Friedrich Ebert Foundation supported the Spanish opposition and the socialists 
especially from the second half of the 1960s.539 At the same time, SPD connected trade 
union Industrial Union of Metalworkers' (Industriegewerkschaft Metall, IG Metall) and its 
functionary Hans Matthöfer not only tightened their relations with Spanish trade unions but 
also, much to the annoyance of the Francoist authorities, initiated political educational 
programmes for Spanish migrant workers, including broadcasts and their own print 
media.540  
The economic and political ties between Spain and Germany, resulting in strong media 
interest in the Franco regime, cannot explain the continuously strong presence of German 
correspondents. Furthermore, while the comparatively strong German media landscape 
with its many regional newspapers provided more employment possibilities for 
correspondents, it only developed slowly after 1945. In occupied Germany, the Allies 
closed down the existing German media market due to its role in Nazi propaganda. 
Thereafter, the Allies licensed, besides the publication of its own newspapers, only selected 
new German publications by journalists and publishers who had passed the requirements 
of the Allied denazification policy. This policy ended in the course of the foundation of the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1949.541 In the following years, both new media as well as 
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pre-existing publications were slowly (re-)established. However, and as Figure 4 shows, by 
1955 more than a fourth of all European correspondents and twice as many as British 
journalists were working for German media in Spain. 
This strong early presence of German correspondents for the still young German media 
market is even more remarkable when actual accreditations are taken into account. Major 
German newspapers with a national distribution, which could indicate a strong public 
interest such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung or Die Welt, did 
not have full time-correspondents in Spain before the 1960s. While these major 
newspapers, therefore, did not see the need for full-time correspondents in Spain, the 
Francoist authorities granted accreditations to many German correspondents for minor 
publications during the 1950s and early 1960s. These included many local and regional 
papers like the Aachener Nachrichten and the Rhein-Zeitung, but also publications which 
would never normally have afforded a full-time correspondent in Spain. The hunting 
magazine Wild und Hund and a journal for sanitary engineering are only two examples of 
newspapers with correspondents in Francoist Spain.542  
Neither German-Spanish relations nor a strong public interest in Germany, therefore, 
substantially helps to explain the presence of numerous German correspondents in Spain. 
Instead, the explanation lies in the German press corps itself and the biographical 
background of many correspondents. After the Second World War, numerous German (and 
Austrian) Nazis found refuge in Spain.543 The Allies, who were well aware of Spain’s 
importance for fleeing Nazis, from 1944-58 even ran a specialized programme under the 
name of Operation Safehaven in order to roll back any German influence in third countries 
like the right-wing Franco regime, which might have served as a breeding ground for new 
Nazi activities.544 However, for the sake of the Realpolitik of the gradual re-establishment 
of diplomatic ties with Spain from the beginning of the 1950s, the Allies revoked the 
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previously imposed travel restrictions between Spain and Germany in 1948 and the list of 
104 Nazi ‘hard core cases’545 still wanted for repatriation became meaningless.  
This exodus of former Nazis to the right-wing Franco dictatorship explains the strong 
presence of German correspondents. Indeed, cases like the journalist Weinzetl during the 
1950s were not an exception but rather common among German correspondents who had 
a professional past in Nazi Germany and found a livelihood as correspondents in Spain. In 
fact, the search for employment by Nazis in Spain not only explains the presence of many 
correspondents for German media but also sheds light on the relatively numerous presence 
of seven Austrian correspondents in Madrid in the 1950s, including Weinzetl. 
Some of these correspondents already had a journalistic career in Nazi Germany and had 
previous experience in Spain. Once back in Spain, they could therefore re-activate pre-
existing networks both in Spain and in German newsrooms, where in spite of the Allied 
policy many journalists with a Nazi past continued their careers.546 The journalist Heinz 
Barth, for instance, was already a correspondent for the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in 
Rome before reporting from Spain from 1939-44.547 Following the end of the Second World 
War, Barth returned to Madrid in 1947. His personal networks soon secured him 
employment in the information service of the Falange. In 1948, he regained, with the 
support from the OID, once more an accreditation as correspondent for a number of German 
news outlets and a newspaper from South Tyrol.548 Another example is Barth’s colleague 
Werner Schulz, who also had been covering the Spanish Civil War from the Rebel 
territories and had remained thereafter in Madrid as part of Nazi Germany’s press corps in 
Spain.549 In the beginning of the 1950s, Schulz became accredited for a number of local 
German newspapers. The most significant case among not only the correspondents but the 
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Nazi refugees in Spain in general was the liberator of Mussolini after his capture by the 
Italian Resistance in 1943, Otto Skorzeny.550  
During the 1950s, Skorzeny became a well-known personality in Madrid high-society and 
a frequent topic of portraits in both Spanish and foreign media.551 Initially, Skorzeny 
attempted to re-activate contacts with the German military and to establish himself as a 
representative for German companies.552 In 1958, the former SS-Standartenführer (colonel) 
also was accredited as foreign correspondent for the small local newspaper Altenaer 
Kreisblatt and, from 1966, for the extreme right-wing Deutsche Wochenzeitung.553 Despite 
his limited journalistic output, Skorzeny was seemingly interested in maintaining his 
accreditation status (and the privileges that came with it) and informed the MIT about the 
rare occasions when he actually published something.554 Indeed, despite the fact that the 
MIT was well aware of Skorzeny’s limited journalistic output,555 the Francoist authorities 
renewed his accreditation annually until his death in 1975.556  
The accreditation of these - often only semi-professional - former Nazis as correspondents, 
however, was not only a reflection of the Franco regime’s accreditation policy or political 
contacts of these journalists but also of the journalists’ highly sympathetic attitude towards 
the Franco regime. In the case of semi-professionals like Skorzeny, whose rare publications 
the Spanish press attaché in Bonn considered ‘objective and favourable’557, these 
sympathies had practically no impact on the German public. For active correspondents like 
Barth and Schulz, however, the case was different. Aschmann and Lehmann have shown 
in their studies on Spanish-German relations, that these correspondents had a fundamental 
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impact on the Franco regime’s image in parts of the German press in the 1950s and early 
1960s.558  
Following his initial accreditation for a local German newspaper, Schulz became the 
correspondents for the major German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung around 
1960.559. Furthermore, he also established a so-called Bauchladen (sales tray) of 
newspapers from Germany and Austria, to which he sold his articles on a freelance-basis 
during the 1960s. The Spanish authorities very much welcomed the wide distribution of 
Schulz’s articles, which generally gave a favourable impression of Spain. Indeed, for the 
Spanish press attaché in Bonn Schulz produced ‘the most desirable and pleasant news of 
our politics and our country’560.  
No less favourable but far more widely distributed and thereby influential were the articles 
of Barth for a large number of German media. In fact, the ‘news company’561 Barth 
practically established a ‘monopoly in the formation of opinion and information about 
Spain’562 in Germany during the 1950s and early 1960s. In fact, both Aschmann and 
Lehmann even underestimate the distribution of Barth’s articles by counting only nine 
German newspapers for which Barth was working, often under different pseudonyms.563 
Instead, the German correspondent submitted a list of altogether 28 different publications, 
news agencies and radio stations to the MIT in 1951, for which he claimed to be reporting 
for at one point of another. Besides numerous German media, this list also included 
Austrian and Swiss media and even a Danish newspaper. Barth’s list was also not a 
misleading claim either. The Spanish press attaché in Germany counted 20 German 
newspapers alone, which had published Barth’s articles in the month of October 1955.564 
For the Francoist authorities, Barth’s journalistic influence and his ‘ambition to influence 
                                                          
558 Lehmann, Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren, 83-89; Aschmann, "Treue 
Freunde …"?, 143-144. 
559 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.385, Folder Otto Skorzeny: Untitled report by Agregado de Prensa at Spanish 
Embassy in Bonn, 7 February 1967. 
560 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.385, Folder Werner Schulz: Agregado de Prensa at the Spanish Embassy in 
Bonn to Director General de Prensa, 28 November 1963. 
561 Quoted in Lehmann, Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren, 89. 
562 Aschmann lists the following publications, for which Barth wrote under his name and its Spanish 
version, Enrique Barth, the acronyms H.B. respectively E.B., and the pseudonym Gottfried Grosse: 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Presse, Stuttgarter Nachrichten, Welt, Deutschen Zeitung und 
Wirtschaftszeitung, Weser Kurier, Hamburger Abendblatt and Westdeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung. 
Furthermore, Aschmann also highlights that Barth reported for German radio stations. Aschmann, "Treue 
Freunde …"?, 144. 
563 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.769, Folder Heinz Barth: Heinz Barth to Director General de Prensa, 15 
November 1951. 
564 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.769, Folder Heinz Barth: Agregado de Prensa at the Spanish Embassy in Bonn to 
Director General de Prensa, November 1955 [undated].  
 135 
the German politic towards Spain’565 was of great importance. This was not only reflected 
in his decoration with one of the most prestigious awards Francoist Spain had to offer, the 
Orden Imperial del Yugo y las Flechas, but Franco himself granted Barth a personal 
interview, which was widely distributed in Germany in 1950.566 Nine years later, Barth also 
interviewed Foreign Minister Castiella for German television.567 Besides these 
accomplishments, however, Lehmann has shown that Barth’s relations with the Franco 
regime were not without tensions,568 which will also be discussed in Chapter 6.  
The numerous accreditations of German correspondents initially reflected the need for 
employment by particular groups of Germans coming or remaining in Spain after 1945. 
Figure 4, however, also shows that the presence of German correspondents did not decrease 
but actually increased up to 1975. However, and as has already been argued above, this 
must be seen as a reflection of a general development in the international media interest in 
Spain since the end of the 1960s. In the case of Germany, this increased media interest 
simply came on top of the continued accreditation of many correspondents with a Nazi past. 
Besides the previously mentioned opening of fully staffed TV studios in Madrid by the 
public German broadcasters ZDF and ARD, major newspapers such as the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as well as magazines like Der Stern sent 
staff correspondents to Spain since the mid-1960s.569  
 
Special relations: Latin America and the Arab world 
The chapter on the ACPI has already briefly discussed the importance of relations with 
Latin America for the Franco regime. Figure 3 shows that the presence of Latin American 
correspondents in Spain reflected these special relations. By 1955, correspondents for Latin 
American media accounted for 20% of the entire press corps. With between 31 and 41 
accredited correspondents, their presence in Spain remained strong and stable throughout 
the following two decades.  
Foreign trade cannot account for the strong presence of Latin American correspondents in 
Spain alone. While Argentinian credits were important for the Franco regime’s survival 
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during its international isolation, economic relations with Latin America, however, 
remained far less important than Spain’s foreign trade with Europe. By 1961, only 6.2% of 
all Spanish exports were going to Latin America. In the course of Spain’s economic 
development and the strengthening of its economic ties with Latin America this figure rose 
to 17.6 % in 1966. Thereafter, however, Spain’s foreign trade with Latin America once 
more decreased to 10.1% of all Spanish exports by 1975, amounting to fewer exports than 
to Germany.570 Foreign trade, therefore, was at best of secondary importance to Spain’s 
relations with Latin America. Instead, the strong presence of Latin American 
correspondents in Spain was primarily a reflection of the Franco regime’s cultural, 
historical and political relations with the region, cumulating in the ideological concept of 
Hispanidad.  
Spain’s relations with the region, therefore, primarily served political aims, both on the 
international and national level. Besides the support for Spain’s foreign policy, Gómez-
Escalonilla has pointed out that the Franco regime exploited its relations with Latin 
America in order to strengthen public support for the regime by propagandizing Spain’s 
alleged international importance within Spain.571 At the same time, the Franco regime 
actively tried to promote the Spanish authoritarian model for economic growth in Latin 
America during the 1960s. The special attention which the Francoist authorities treated the 
Latin American press corps with reflected this approach. 
The Latin American press corps not only reflected Spain’s special relations with the region 
through its size, but also its composition. Figure 5 shows that correspondents from the 
Franco regime’s close ally Argentina were particularly numerous in Spain. At the same 
time and similar to the case of Switzerland, the total numbers of correspondents presented 
in Figure 5, however, are also misleading. Many Latin American correspondents in Spain 
were only semi-professionals. In 1960 and therefore even before the reform of the 
accreditation practice, for instance, 42.5% of all Latin American correspondents were only 
accredited as part-time journalists. This figure was almost 10% higher than the percentage 
of part-time journalists in the entire press corps. Following the revision of the accreditation 
guidelines in 1966, this percentage further increased. Indeed, in 1975 four out of the five 
accredited Argentinian correspondent were part-time journalists.  
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Figure 5: Latin American Correspondents in Spain, 1955-75572 
 
This observation leads to the conclusion that the actual Latin American media interest was 
in fact less strong than the number of accredited correspondents would suggest. Instead, the 
strong presence of Latin American correspondents was at least partly the outcome of 
Spain’s social and cultural ties with the region and the strong presence of Latin American’s 
in Spain. The Instituto de Cultura Hispánica scholarship programme for students alone 
brought 12,000 young Latin Americans to Spain during the 1970s.573 Some of these 
students stayed and sought employment as correspondents for the media of their respective 
home country. The Colombian Rafael Gomez Gonzalez, for instance, came in 1960 as a 
scholarship holder before working for ten years as a stringer for the Colombian journal El 
Espectador.574 In fact, the relatively strong Colombian press corps in Spain seemingly had 
a similar background like the presence of numerous German correspondents. Colombians 
already in Spain tried to become correspondents in order to take advantage of the privileges 
coming with accreditation status. This conclusion was drawn by the Spanish embassy in 
Bogota in the context of the evaluation of a new accreditation for a Colombian ‘journalist’ 
in 1966:  
A certain number of Colombian citizens residing in Spain – temporarily or 
permanently – have discovered the possibility to become correspondents for 
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publications of dubious or no importance in this country simply in order to gain 
material advantages during their stay in our homeland.575 
Indeed, following the stricter application of the accreditations after 1966, the number of 
accredited Colombian correspondents dropped. By 1975 only half of the Colombian 
correspondents in Spain had an accreditation as full-time correspondents. Furthermore, as 
in the case of US Spanish language media, Cuban exiles, who had found employment for 
Latin American media, further increased the Latin American press corps in Spain. This 
included, again, Chelala López, who was accredited as a correspondent for a Puerto Rican 
newspaper during the 1960s.576  
While the number of Latin American correspondents only leads to partial conclusions about 
the respective media interest in Spain, it nevertheless sheds light on Spain’s special 
relations with this geographical region. Besides the case of the Argentinian press corps, this 
applied especially to the Mexican correspondents in Spain. In fact, the relations with 
Mexico marked the other end of the spectrum of Spain’s relations with Latin America. 
Mexico had not only supported the Spanish Republic during the Civil War, but became 
thereafter of central importance for Spanish Republican exiles. Thousands of Spanish 
Republicans found a new home in Mexico, and it was also Mexico where Spanish 
Republicans founded the first Spanish Republican government in exile in 1945.577 The 
Mexican government’s hostility towards the Franco regime resulted in the suspension of 
official diplomatic relations with Spain after 1939.578 In 1945, Mexico also proposed an 
article to the UN in order to exclude any former ally of the Axis Powers from membership 
and thereby prepared the international isolation of the Franco regime that followed.579  
Beside this official hostility towards the Franco regime and although diplomatic relations 
were only re-established after the death of Franco in 1977, Mexico nevertheless maintained 
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informal relations. Following a governmental reshuffle in Mexico in 1946, Spain and 
Mexico signed a first commercial treaty a year later.580 The continuing presence of Mexican 
correspondents in Spain was not unlike the presence of Soviet correspondents since 1970 
in that it was a reflection of these informal relations, which have been entirely overlooked 
in research on the subject. Against the background of the official policy, it is also 
remarkable that it was the aforementioned correspondent of a Mexican news agency, Rafael 
Miralles Bravo, who played a prominent role in the organization for correspondents in 
Spain. Besides his presidency of ACPI, he was twice the vice-president of the CIP during 
the 1960s.581  
During the 1960s, the presence of Mexican correspondents also reflected a change in the 
Franco regime’s attitude towards Latin America to a certain extent. As Pedro Antonio 
Martínez Lillo points out: ‘Given the political instability of the region, one perceived the 
necessity to de-ideologize as much as possible the relations with these countries’582. This 
became especially visible in the course of Spain’s more economically driven, pragmatic 
foreign policy under the Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo from 1969-73. Parallel to Spain’s 
new ‘Ostpolitik’, Lopez Bravo tried to strengthen the economic ties with Latin America.583 
This also included Spain’s relations to Chile under Salvador Allende. The accreditation of 
correspondents for the Chilean media reflected this development. Indeed, Television 
Nacional de Chile became the only Latin American TV broadcaster with correspondents in 
Francoist Spain in the beginning of the 1970s.584 
 
The Middle East and the Maghreb  
Francoist Spain not only served as a base for some correspondents to cover both the Iberian 
Peninsula and parts of the Arab world but 15 correspondents from Arab countries also 
worked in Spain between 1955 and 1975. This presence of correspondents from the Arab 
world reflected the second, less important area of the Franco regime’s ‘politics of 
substitution’ after 1945. While still banned from the UN, until 1950 the Franco regime 
established not only diplomatic ties but also signed friendship and cultural agreements with 
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most countries of the Arab world. Indeed, the visit of the King of Jordan to Spain in 1949 
was the first visit by any foreign head of the state to Spain since the outbreak of the Spanish 
Civil War and thereby a key event for the internationally isolated Franco regime.585  
As in the case of Latin America, the Franco regime saw the establishment of closer relations 
with Arab countries in the Maghreb and the Middle East as an additional option to improve 
its international standing after 1945 by establishing itself as a mediator between the Arab 
world and the West. At the same time, the Franco regime hoped to collect further votes 
within the UN in order to overcome its international ostracization. The Arab countries, for 
their part, also had a vital interest in the relations with Francoist Spain. Besides the 
establishment of trade relations, the majority of countries were young politically and sought 
for as far-reaching diplomatic recognition as possible. Furthermore, following the 
foundation of Israel, Arabic countries hoped to profit from Spanish influence in Latin 
America in order to generate further international support in the Palestinian question.586  
The Franco-Arab rapprochement was partly based on pre-existing ties, which included 
Spain’s protectorate in Morocco. Furthermore, despite of the strong influence of 
Catholicism in Spain, the Franco regime based its relations with the Arab world on a 
number of real or propagandistically constructed commonalities, not unlike its relations 
with Latin America. Foreign Minister Artajo, for instance, stressed during a tour of the 
Middle East in 1952 the common culture, history and ‘blood’ between Spain and the Arab 
world. 587 That the authoritarian regimes in the majority of Arab countries strongly 
dismissed communism as well as Western liberalism, further facilitated the 
rapprochement.588  
Arab media actively promoted official friendship with Francoist Spain. Even during the 
Spanish Civil War, Syrian journalists had praised the Franco regime’s policy in Morocco. 
In 1959, the Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram printed a lengthy report under the title ‘The 
heroes that made History’ praising of Franco as ‘the prototype, in the present era, of the 
strong personality which has gained victory’589. The presence of correspondents for Arab 
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media in Spain, however, was limited. Almost all correspondents for Arab media only 
remained for relatively short time periods in Spain during the 1950s and early 1960s, and 
only five correspondents were accredited for Spain from the mid-1960s. The only case of 
a long-time accredited correspondent for Arab media was the Hungarian-born journalist 
Francesco Somoggi de Perlac, descendent of a Habsburg noble dynasty. Somoggi de Perlac 
worked for four different media from Libya, Iraq and Egypt after his first accreditation in 
1961.590 According to his son, he was also active in Spain’s official foreign economic 
relations.591 His central role within the Arab press corps in Madrid was reflected in his 
accreditation for the Arab League during the second half of the 1960s.592  
Sommogi de Perlac, however, remained an exception in the overall marginal presence of 
correspondents for Arab media in Spain. Besides the initial promotion of political 
proximity, relations with the Arab world soon lost importance for Spain once the regime 
overcame its international isolation and focused more on Western Europe.593. Furthermore, 
in contrast to the community of Latin American correspondents, nationals from Arab 
countries who might have taken up journalism while already in Spain, were far less 
numerous.  
Nevertheless, the brief discussion regarding the Arab correspondents further highlights the 
importance of political aspects for the understanding of the composition of the foreign press 
corps in Francoist Spain. This becomes even more visible with regard to another group of 
correspondents from the Middle East, whose presence in Spain was rather exceptional: 
journalists for Israeli media. Out of consideration for its relations with the Arab world, 
Francoist Spain never recognized Israel and the two countries only established diplomatic 
relations more than a decade after the death of Franco in 1986.594 Nevertheless, although 
the only staff correspondent for Israeli media, the Bulgarian-born Israeli citizen Josef Asiel, 
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reported from 1959 and throughout the existence of the Franco regime, from Spain.595 
During the mid-1960s, Richard S. Mowrer at times also wrote as a freelancer for two Israeli 
papers.596 
The presence of Asiel in Spain, therefore, was another exception from the rule that the MIT 
only accredited correspondents from countries with diplomatic relations with Spain. At the 
same time, the accreditation of an Israeli correspondent reflected the Franco regime’s 
particular relations with Israel in the context of its general policy towards the Middle East. 
Despite the official propaganda in favour of the Arabs’ position in the Palestinian question, 
Spain nevertheless used its good relations in the region in some cases for important 
initiatives to provide humanitarian help to Jews in Muslim countries. The Franco regime, 
for instance, assisted Jews in Morocco in the end of the 1950s and Egyptian Jews during 
the Six-Day-War to leave. At least partly, the Franco regime used humanitarian support as 
a PR initiative directed towards the European and US publics in order to improve Spain’s 
foreign image. At the same time, however, Spain’s agency in these occasions was also the 
result of a certain tradition of supporting Jewish communities in the region, which dated 
back to the Second World War.597 Besides the presence of Israeli correspondents, the MIT’s 
external offices in the Maghreb also reflected the Franco regime’s particular relationship 
with Israel. During the mid-1960s, for instance, the correspondent of a French Jewish 
journal, Armado Botbol, turned the Spanish tourist office in Tangier (with the approval of 
MIT employees) so much ‘into his office’ and an informational centre for other Jewish 
groups, that the MIT started to worry about political consequences.598 Finally, the presence 
of Asiel in Spain must also be seen against the background of the small but continuing 
presence of Jewish communities in Spain itself.  
 
Correspondents from Eastern Europe, Cuba and China  
The central importance of the political context and Spain’s formal and informal foreign 
relations for the understanding of the foreign press corps in Spain becomes most obvious 
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with regard to correspondents from communist countries. The previous chapter has shown 
that the MIT only accredited the first correspondents from Eastern Europe parallel to the 
improvement of economic relations since the end of the 1960s. However, when the first 
Soviet correspondents arrived in Spain, they not only met highly anti-communist Cuban 
exiles, but also official Cuban correspondents. After Castro’s revolution, Cuba became the 
only communist country with which Spain maintained economic and diplomatic relations 
and vice versa.599 The continued presence of Cuban correspondents in Spain reflected these 
official relations with the Castro regime.600 However, these correspondents mainly 
represented media like the business newspaper El Comercio during the 1960s.601 The first 
correspondent for the official Cuban news agency Prensa Latina, Carlos Herman Mora, 
however, was only accredited parallel to the exchange of correspondents between the 
Spanish news agency EFE and its Soviet counterpart TASS in 1970.602 It was only then that 
EFE signed a similar agreement with Prensa Latina. Before, the Spanish news agency had 
maintained a distanced relationship with Prensa Latina, which became visible in countries 
where both agencies maintained an office. In the beginning of 1970, for instance, Sanchez 
Bella ordered the transfer of the deputy chief of the EFE office in Mexico to Chile because 
of the journalist’s ‘intimate friendship’603 with the director of Prensa Latina in Mexico. 
In the context of the regime’s officially propagated anti-communism, it is remarkable that 
Mora became, in contrast to his Soviet colleagues, an important figure soon after his 
accreditation in December 1970. By 1973, Mora was elected as one of the speakers of the 
CIP604 and as vice-president of the ACPI.605 Mora was even included in a series of 
interviews with correspondents of major media, which the economic magazine Actualidad 
Economica published at the end of 1973.606 At the same time, however, the interview also 
showed through Mora’s careful answers that his presence in Francoist Spain was still a 
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sensitive issue. When, for instance, asked about his perspective on Spain, the Cuban 
correspondent answered diplomatically: ‘Well…expressing an opinion about questions 
related to Spanish politics would not be in accordance with premise of mutual respect which 
exists between Prensa Latina and EFE.’607  
That the presence of correspondents for Communist media in Spain was indeed a highly 
sensitive issue became also visible in the initiation of contact between EFE and its 
communist counterparts. In fact (and so far unnoticed by researchers), Soviet journalists 
had already approached EFE in a semi-diplomatic function years before the actual 
establishment of economic relations and the exchange of correspondents. Sergei Llossev, 
the head of TASS, made the first attempt to establish an exchange of correspondents in 
1968. During a stay in New York, Llossev approached the correspondent of the Spanish 
newspaper Arriba with his proposition, who forwarded the information to the Spanish 
embassy. In the following discussion of the details of the proposal with the head of the 
Office for Diplomatic Information, Ignacio Llossev stressed that, although unusual, it 
would not be the first time that TASS would place a correspondent in a country without 
previously established diplomatic relations. With a TASS correspondent in Kinshasa, the 
capital of Congo, the TASS correspondent presented another example of such agreement.608  
While the Spanish authorities declined this first offer, Soviet journalists tried a year later to 
once more intensify relations with Spain. That Spain at this time had already prepared for 
the establishment of contacts with the Soviet Union was reflected in the fact that 
negotiations were now continued within Spain. The Francoist authorities allowed the TASS 
correspondent in The Hague, Yuri Kornilov, to enter Spain with an official accreditation as 
special correspondent at the end of 1969. Officially, Kornilov travelled to Spain in order to 
collect information for a series of reports on the Civil War correspondents Earnest 
Hemingway and Mikhail Koltsov, among others. However, Kornilov also expressed the 
need to meet with Manuel Fraga and made clear that such a meeting would not serve his 
alleged journalistic mission, but should be understood ‘rather as a diplomatic 
negotiation’609. At the same time, Soviet correspondents attempted to speak with the 
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Foreign Minister explicitly in order to discuss the exchange of correspondents between 
TASS and EFE.610  
Only a few weeks after Kornilov, one of the most internationally prominent Soviet 
journalists, Victor Louis,611 came to Spain. Louis, whom The New York Times described as 
a ‘fascinating and enigmatic figure in the shady world of official Soviet journalism during 
the cold war’612, officially worked as a correspondent for a number of Anglo-Saxon 
newspapers in Moscow. Less officially, Louis served as a spin-doctor for the Kremlin in 
order to place news in Western media. He was also an unofficial emissary in international 
relations. Louis claimed to be visiting Spain as a tourist and in order to collect information 
for a rather surprising future project: a tourist guide for Soviet citizens to Francoist Spain.613 
However, Louis also met with various MIT officials in order to promote further contacts 
between Spain and the Soviet Union.614 
Soviet correspondents, therefore, informally played a central and semi-diplomatic role in 
the establishment of contacts between both Spain and the Soviet Union and TASS and EFE. 
Besides the parallel exchange of correspondents between EFE and Prensa Latina, the MIT 
also accredited correspondents from Poland in the following years.615 The exchange of 
correspondents with communist China, however, followed a very different mode but none 
the less also mirrored the Spain’s changing foreign policy.  
Following the Sino-American rapprochement, the UN accepted the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) as the solemn representative of China in 1971. Consequently, the Republic of 
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China on Taiwan (ROC) lost its UN membership.616 Spain followed the US’ lead and 
established diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1973. This policy change, however, brought 
Francoist Spain into a difficult position both diplomatically and with regard to her existing 
press relations with Taiwan. Based on the commonly shared anti-communism of its military 
rulers, Spain and Taiwan had developed friendly relations after the establishment of 
diplomatic contacts in 1953.617 This was not the least also reflected in the presence of a 
small number of correspondents from Taiwan in Spain. The first among them, Lorenzo 
Y.C. Wang, started to work in Spain for the official Taiwanese Central News Agency before 
the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1951.618 Upon his replacement by the 
correspondent Eduardo Sou-er Mo in 1966,619 the Spanish newspaper Ya published a 
portrait of Wang, who ‘became a Catholic here and married’ and who considered Spain ‘a 
great country […] because she keeps her spirit’620. When the Franco regime established 
diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, however, it had to break its ties 
with the Republic of China on Taiwan. This was a consequence of the PRC’s ‘One-China-
Policy’ that, similar to the West German Hallstein Doctrine with regard to the GDR, 
excluded third countries from diplomatic relations if they recognized Taiwan. In contrast 
to Germany, where the Hallstein Doctrine had no consequences on the accreditation of 
journalists, the Francoist authorities actually extended the break with Taiwan to the 
accreditation of correspondents. In order to avoid ‘difficulties with the Chinese embassy in 
Madrid’621, the MIT denied the renewal of Sou-er Mo’s accreditation in 1974. Shortly 
thereafter, the MIT accredited the first two correspondents for the Chinese news agency 
Xinhua in Madrid.622 
The cancellation of Sou-er Mo’s accreditation, however, was not the only consequence of 
the Franco regime’s rapprochement towards communist countries for the foreign press 
corps in Spain. Instead, this policy change also directly affected the exiles from communist 
countries among foreign correspondents. Before the improvement of relations with Eastern 
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Europe from the end of the 1960s onwards, the Francoist authorities continued relations 
with Cuba had (limited) consequences for the Cuban exiles working as correspondents. The 
previous chapter has shown that some Cuban members of the ACPI became active 
propagandists in Spain against the Castro regime. Of central importance to this 
propagandistic output was the previously mentioned journal Accíon Cubana, published by 
Rosenado Canto Hernández. However, the MIT under Fraga considered Canto’s anti-
Cuban propaganda increasingly problematic. A first clash resulted from the MIT’s 
censorship of a US critical article in Accíon Cubana, against which Canto fiercely, but 
unsuccessfully, protested.623 In 1963, Canto broke with the former Cuban dictator Batista 
and thereby with the main financial supporter of Accíon Cubana. In order to secure the 
journal’s survival, Canto applied to the MIT for additional funding. However, annoyed by 
the Cuban journalist, Fraga declined and Acción Cubana consequently closed down in 
1964. A year later Canto’s new attempt to regain his status as foreign correspondents 
remained unsuccessful due to his missing credentials. Nevertheless, come the end of 
Canto’s activities, the MIT continued to support Cuban exiles among the correspondents, 
as became visible in the continued granting of honorary accreditations in 1970.624  
Cubans, however, were not the only group of expatriates from a communist country that 
included accredited foreign correspondents. Instead, a considerable number of exiles from 
Eastern Europe also came to the anti-communist Franco regime after 1945.625 Matilde 
Eiroa, who has examined the development of these diaspora communities, highlights in 
particular their publicist activities.626 Eiora stresses, however, that these publications 
mainly found their audience within the diaspora communities in Spain. The exiles who 
wrote for these media were not correspondents and therefore not accredited as such. This 
also applies to the members of the exile community who worked for Spain’s own 
contributions to the international propaganda battle during the Cold War. Since the end of 
1949, Radio Nacional de España produced a series of programmes in Eastern European 
languages and broadcast these programmes beyond the Iron Curtain in order to ‘initiate the 
internal uprising against these governments’627. Like its American counterpart Radio Free 
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Europe (renamed in Radio Liberty in 1964) in Munich, exiles from communist countries 
were mainly responsible for producing these broadcasts. The Polish program, known in 
Poland as Radio Madrid, was particularly influential.628  
More directly connected to the foreign press corps were, however, Eastern European exiles 
who were working for larger publications of diaspora communities outside of Spain. At 
least three such correspondents were accredited between 1955 and 1975. Most active 
among them was the Hungarian Aurel Czilchert-Mayr,629 who had mainly been writing for 
Hungarian diaspora publications in Germany630 but also in Canada631 since the beginning 
of the 1960s. For his work, Czilchert-Mayr received a special accreditation as 
correspondent for the ‘Hungarian exile press’ in general in 1965.632 Finally, the three 
correspondents who were working for Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, which had 
transmitters in Spain since the end of the 1950s633, were mainly Eastern European emigrants 
and therefore belonged in this category. In contrast to the expatriates in Madrid who were 
contributing to the radio broadcasts of Radio Nacional de España, these journalists were 
fully accredited as correspondents.634  
Following Spain’s rapprochement with Eastern Europe, however, Spain stopped its 
propagandistic activities against communist countries and official relations with the 
respective governments in exile. The MIT decided that ‘the emissions directed to Eastern 
Europe will from now on only and exclusively refer to Spain, with under no circumstances 
any commentary on the politics, neither national nor international, of the receiving 
countries’635. Consequently, the MIT also did not renew any of the accreditations for 
correspondents writing for communist diaspora publications after the end of the 1960s.  
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Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the composition and development of the foreign press corps in 
Francoist Spain. The first part of the chapter has shown that the international media interest 
in Spain, as represented by accredited correspondents, had strongly increased by the 1960s. 
This general development reflected both the end of Spain’s international isolation during 
the 1950s and her economic development during the 1960s. At the same time, the chapter 
has also shown that the overall increase of correspondents was partially facilitated by the 
laissez-faire accreditation policy of the Francoist authorities. Furthermore, the economic 
privileges for staff correspondents made the accreditation as correspondent highly attractive 
for non- or semi-professional journalists. As a result, the revision of the accreditation policy 
in 1966 and 1967 was mainly responsible for the decrease in the number of accreditations. 
The chapter has shown that international media interest in Spain further increased from the 
end of the 1960s. This became visible in the accreditation of staff-correspondents for major 
media as well as in the opening of TV studios for foreign broadcasters. This development 
also partly reflected a growing interest of parts of the Western publics in the Franco regime, 
which resulted from increased discontent with the continued existence of his right-wing 
dictatorship on the margins of Western Europe. 
Furthermore, the chapter also has demonstrated that international media interest in Spain 
was by far the strongest in Western Europe. Correspondents for European media composed 
at any time approximately half of the foreign press corps in Spain. Correspondents for US 
and Latin American media composed in equal parts most of the remaining half of the 
foreign press corps in Spain.  
In the second part, the chapter examined the composition of press corps from these regions 
in detail. This examination was undertaken by building on the findings of communication 
researchers that bilateral relations and foreign trade in particular are central factors for the 
explanation of the size of press corps. The findings have partly confirmed these 
assumptions. The countries with the strongest economic relations with Spain, Europe and 
the US, also had the most correspondents in Spain. The strong presence of European 
correspondents was also a simple reflection of Spain’s geographical location. At the same 
time, however, the chapter has also shown that particular political and ideological aspects 
and historical ties are crucial for the understanding of the foreign press corps in the right-
wing Franco dictatorship. Most strongly, this applied to the disproportionally strong 
presence of German correspondents. Many of these correspondents were Nazis who had 
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fled to or remained in Spain after 1945. Furthermore, the strong Latin American press corps 
and the, albeit limited, presence of correspondents from Arab countries reflected the Franco 
regime’s special relations with these regions.  
Both economic and political aspects also played a central role in the accreditation of 
correspondents from Communist countries. The Franco regime accredited correspondents 
from these countries, as well as from Israel and Mexico, in the absence of diplomatic 
relations but in the context of informal and economic ties. The presence of correspondents 
from these countries itself was therefore a form of informal relations. In fact, regarding 
relations with the Soviet Union, the chapter has brought out that correspondents themselves 
were central, semi-diplomatic actors for the establishment of these relations.  
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4. Inside the community of foreign correspondents  
The previous chapter examined the composition and development of the foreign press corps 
within the international context of the Franco regime’s particular external political, societal, 
historical and economic external relations. In some exceptional cases, the chapter also 
discussed the biographical background of correspondents. In the main, however, the chapter 
focussed on an outside view of the foreign press corps in Spain.  
Based on these findings and drawing on the work of Hannerz, Morrison and Tumber,636 
this chapter will focus its view into the world of the foreign press corps in Spain as media 
professionals. The aims of this chapter are twofold. First, it will provide further insights 
into the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. Second, by methodologically building on 
the research about foreign correspondents by communication researchers and 
anthropologists, this chapter will explore the professional and social practices of foreign 
correspondents. 
The chapter is structured in three sections. The first section will examine the employment 
status and accreditation times of correspondents in Spain as well as exemplary career paths 
of selected correspondents. This section will therefore provide a better understanding of the 
foreign correspondents in Spain as media professionals. By examining the accreditation 
times of correspondents the section will provide a better understanding of the changing 
composition of the press corps and allow for assumptions about the general local 
knowledge about Spain among the foreign correspondents. At the same time, it will also 
allow for additional conclusions of the international media coverage of Francoist Spain and 
the importance with which foreign media treated the Franco regime.  
The second section focuses on two particular groups within the press corps in Francoist 
Spain; women correspondents and Spanish foreign correspondents. The importance of 
focussing on these two groups goes beyond a greater understanding of the press corps. The 
section will show that the focus on women correspondents also provides insights into the 
social structure of the press corps. Furthermore, the examination of Spaniards as 
correspondents will shed light on the particular importance of this group within the foreign 
press corps.  
Finally, the last section of this chapter will address the working conditions of 
correspondents in Spain. In this context, the chapter will not just examine the working 
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routines and the use of and access to informational sources by correspondents in the Franco 
regime. It will also highlight and examine the particular importance of informational 
networks among foreign correspondents.  
 
Accreditation times, employment status and career paths 
The absence of previous accreditation lists makes it difficult to examine the length of time 
for which the correspondents accredited during the 1950s were already working in Spain. 
The list of Civil War correspondents compiled by Armero and additional archival sources 
nevertheless allow for some general impressions.637 Indeed, altogether twelve staff 
correspondents accredited during the 1950s had already covered the Spanish Civil War.638 
Some journalists, like Ralph Forte of UP and the Italian Cesare Gullino, were already in 
Spain before the Civil War and remained there throughout the following decades. Most of 
these journalists worked for international news agencies and thereby reflected the general 
composition of the foreign press corps at the time. Many of these journalistic Civil War 
veterans were correspondents from the Axis Powers who had found refuge in Spain after 
1945 like the previously mentioned Germans Heinz Barth Werner Schulz and the Italian 
Cesar Gullino. For the pro-Fascist Gullino, political reasons also played a role in his 
remaining in Spain.  
Most of the other Civil War correspondents like Henry Buckley and Richard S. Mowrer 
had left Spain before or shortly after 1939 in order to cover the Second World War. The 
most travelled among these correspondents was probably the journalist Cedric Salter, who 
gained a reputation as ‘the most chased about of British correspondents’639 during the 1930s 
and 1940s. Although strongly in favour of the Second Republic, Salter had covered the 
Spanish Civil War, among others, for the pro-Rebel Daily Mail from the Rebel territories.640 
After leaving Spain, he covered the Polish campaign until the German victory, reported on 
the further developments of the war in Eastern Europe and Turkey, went to Singapore and 
                                                          
637 Armero, España fue noticia, 409-436. 
638 Based on a comparison of Amero’s list with the list of accredited correspondents published in Dirección 
General de Prensa, Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1955-1956, 207-211.  
Correspondents accredited in 1955 who already had covered the Civil War (newspapers refer to 
accreditation in 1955): Anton Dieterich (Badische Neueste Nachrichten), Ralph Forte (UP), Henry Buckley 
(Reuters), Werner Schulz (Stadt Anzeiger), Richard S. Mowrer (Christian Science Monitor), Giuliano 
Magnoni (Agencia Telegraph), Heinz Barth (Süddeutsche Zeitung), Cedric Salter (North Amercian 
Newspaper Alliance), William T. Stuttard (Evening Standard), Cesare Gullino (ANSA), Piero Saporiti 
(Time), Hans Decke (Badische Zeitung).  
639 Michael P. Roth, Historical Dictionary of War Journalism (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997), 272. 
640 Preston, We saw Spain die,150-151.  
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Burma, China, India and Tibet.641 During this period, he still found the time to publish 
books on his experiences in Spain as well as Poland.642 Following the end of the Second 
World War, Salter returned first to Turkey and then to Spain as a correspondent before 
eventually concentration on travel writing.643  
In contrast to the 1950s, the existing accreditation lists allow for a detailed examination of 
the further development of the foreign press corps until the end of the Franco regime in 
1975. Figure 6 gives an overview of the results of this examination for the entire foreign 
press corps, both full-time and part-time correspondents. Structured in to cohorts by the 
accreditations lists from 1955, 1960/61, 1965, 1970 and 1975, the figure shows how many 
accreditations from one cohort were renewed in the next, the one after and so on. This 
examination, of course does not allow for a detailed analysis of the average accreditation 
times. A correspondent, who was for the first time included in an accreditation list in 1970, 
was accredited at one time or another after 1965. Nevertheless, the comparison of the 
different accreditation cohorts in Figure 6 allows for a general examination of continuity 
over time.  
Figure 6 indicates that considerable personnel continuity characterized the foreign press 
corps in Francoist Spain and the comparatively long accreditation times of correspondents. 
In 1970 and 1975, approximately half of the entire foreign press corps was already 
accredited for five or more years. This included 20 journalists who were working in Spain 
for two decades or more. In fact, even some former Civil War correspondents (namely 
Richard S. Mowrer and the German Anton Dieterich) were still working in Spain in 1975.644 
Figure 6 also shows, however, strong differences in accreditation times between the 
examined cohorts. Correspondents accredited during the 1950s or before, remained in 
Spain longer than foreign journalists who came thereafter. Almost half of the 157 
correspondents accredited in 1957 were still working as journalists in Spain five years later 
and roughly a quarter of these correspondents were still accredited in 1965.  
 
                                                          
641 Roth, Historical Dictionary of War Journalism, 272. 
642 Cedric Salter, Try-Out in Spain (London, New York: Harper & Brother, 1943); Cedric Salter, Flight 
from Poland (London: Faber and Faber, 1940). 
643 From the mid-1950s Salter wrote travel guides. See, for example, Cedric Salter, Introducing Spain 
(London: Methuen & Co, 1953); Cedric Salter, Northern Spain (London: Batsford, 1975). 
644 AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 3: Sección de Prensa Extranjera, Corresponsales de prensa 
extranjera acreditados en España 1975 [undated]. 
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Figure 6: Accreditation times of correspondents in Spain 1955-75 645 
During the 1960s, however, this tendency changed. From each of the cohorts of newly 
accredited journalists in 1960, 1965 and 1970, only around one third remained in Spain as 
officially accredited correspondents for five or more years. In particular, the fluctuation of 
correspondents who came to Spain around 1960 is remarkable. After five years, only 30 % 
of these journalists were still accredited, and in 1970 only 15% still worked as 
correspondents. At the same time, the cohort of new correspondents from 1965 was rather 
stable and still almost a quarter (24%) of these journalists continued to work in Spain in 
1975.  
These observations must be seen against the background of the previously made argument 
about the overall development of the foreign press corps as well as the different 
accreditation categories. Chapter 3 has shown that after a rapid increase of accreditations 
during the first half of the 1960s, the overall number of correspondents noticeably 
decreased thereafter. It was argued that it was not the decreasing international media 
interest, but the temporary accreditation of many part-time correspondents, which caused 
these changes. The examination of accreditation times further supports this argument. 
Figures 7 and 8 show that it was indeed mainly part-time journalists, who remained 
accredited only for short time periods. The most obvious explanation for this fluctuation is 
economic reasons. Seemingly, few part-time journalists were able to establish themselves 
as correspondents in a way that would have justified the renewal of their accreditations. 
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Furthermore, the impact of the reform of the accreditation guidelines in 1966-67 led to the 
cancellation of numerous accreditations.  
 
Figure 7: Accreditation timesof full-time 
correspondents, 1955-75646 
 
 
Figure 8: Accreditation times of part-time 
correspondents, 1955-75647 
 
 
The examination of accreditation times by accreditation status in Figures 7 and 8 further 
reveals that staff correspondents were indeed accredited for long periods of time. By 1965, 
for instance, 43% of all full-time journalists had already been accredited for at least ten 
years. The percentage remained roughly stable until 1975. Thereby, this analysis not only 
confirms the previous argument that the fluctuation of the press corps during the 1960s did 
not reflect a decreasing media interest but rather the contrary. Many of the accredited staff 
correspondents remained in Spain and continued to report on the Franco regime throughout 
the following years. This shows that the foreign press corps was, by the end of the regime, 
composed of a considerable number of journalists with years or even decades of experience 
in Spain. In the context of the previous chapter, it is also noticeable that the longest 
accredited journalists in Spain in 1975 are not related to a particular national group. Until 
the 1960s, the general long accreditation times indeed can be explained at least partly by 
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the continued presence of the many German correspondents. Or, as the German 
correspondent Anton Dieterich put it in an interview with Lehmann, ‘the Germans came 
and stayed’648. By 1975, however, the situation had changed. Only a quarter of the 
correspondents with ten or more years of experience in Spain who were accredited in 1975 
were Germans. This was less than the overall percentage of the German correspondent in 
the entire press corps at the time. 
The duration of the accreditations of correspondents in Spain, in international comparison, 
was remarkable. Hannerz highlights that in contrast to contemporary foreign 
correspondence ‘in the past it was clearly more common […] to keep correspondents as 
long as decades in major postings, especially in important European capitals’649. While this 
general media policy might at least partly explain the long accreditations of correspondents 
in Spain, the Franco regime certainly was not a major posting. Furthermore, a comparison 
with Morrison’s and Tumber’s findings shows that Francoist Spain was indeed a special 
case. In their examination of the foreign press corps in London in the beginning of the 
1980s, Morrison and Tumber found that the correspondents on average had five and a half 
years of experience in London.650 A detailed examination of the first accreditations of all 
correspondents accredited in Spain in October 1975 reveals, however, that these journalists 
on average had more than seven years experience in Spain.  
The comparatively long average accreditation times of correspondents in Spain, therefore, 
only partially reflected the general policy for postings of foreign correspondents at the time. 
Instead, they must be seen as a particular characteristic of the foreign press corps in 
Francoist Spain. Three possible explanations present themselves for this observation. First, 
the total size of the press corps was still relatively small. The proportional impact of these 
long-serving correspondents, therefore, was relatively strong. Second, the last section of 
this chapter will show that the limited official information available increased the 
importance of local knowledge and contacts for correspondents in Francoist Spain. For 
foreign editors, therefore, the risk of their correspondents ‘going stale’ could have been less 
important than the access to information by well-experienced and connected 
correspondents. This was, for instance, the case for the correspondent of the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Walter Haubrich, whose foreign editor was a studied Romanist himself 
and well aware about the working conditions in Francoist Spain. Third, the next section 
                                                          
648 Lehmann, Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren, 89 [note 305]. 
649 Hannerz, Foreign News, 83. 
650 Morrison and Tumber, The foreign correspondent: date-line London, 462. 
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will show that the secondary importance of Spain for foreign media made the Franco regime 
an interesting market for freelancers, who in some cases made a living over time by working 
for a number of media. 
 
Freelancers, Stringers and Staff-correspondents 
The reasons for media to hire either stringers or employ staff correspondents in order to 
receive news from a particular region or country were and are primarily economic. Reuters, 
for instance, outlines in its Handbook of Journalism, a guide for its own employees: 
Reuters, like many news organisations, uses freelance journalists to supplement 
its network of staff journalists. We use “stringers” in places where the flow of 
news is not sufficient to justify the presence of a staff correspondent, in 
countries where the authorities may not allow Reuters to assign a staff journalist 
or to cover stories of a specialist nature when we do not have the necessary 
expertise among our own staff. We also occasionally use ad-hoc stringers for 
individual stories and assignments.651 
With respect to Francoist Spain, the most likely reason to hire stringers was certainly the 
first in this list, and even more so for the numerous smaller newspapers which could neither 
afford nor were actually in need of a staff correspondent in Spain. The previous chapter has 
shown that some major media only started to employ full-time staff correspondents from 
the end of the 1960s. Before, a large number of freelancers provided even minor media with 
news from Francoist Spain.  
The strong presence of freelancers, however, was not only a Spanish particularity, but also 
reflected general trends in journalism after 1945. The use of stringers grew during the 1950s 
and publications like the magazine Time, for instance, claimed to have ‘435 correspondents, 
stringers, and writers reporting from 33 locations around the world by 1958’’652. At the 
same time, more and more new, and often small, niche publications came on to the market 
which could not afford staff correspondents. Using stringers therefore became the option 
of choice for many Western media who wanted to publish news from abroad without having 
to afford a staff correspondent.653  
For the case of Francoist Spain, the actual presence of freelancers was even higher than the 
formal category of part-time journalists, who often only remained accredited for short time 
                                                          
651 Reuters, “Dealing with stringers,” in Reuters Handbook of Journalism, ed. Reuters (2008), 
http://handbook.reuters.com/?title=Dealing_with_stringers (accessed 20 March 2016). 
652 Judy Polumbaum, “Freelance Writers and Stringers,” in Encyclopedia of journalism, ed. Christopher H. 
Sterling, 644–8 (Thousand Oaks, Calif. [u.a.]: Sage, 2009), 644. 
653 Ibid. 
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periods, suggests. Instead, many fully accredited staff correspondents worked on a 
freelance basis for a number of publications for years or even decades, especially during 
the 1950s and early 1960s. The above mentioned journalists Heinz Barth and Richard S. 
Mowrer, both of them fully accredited as staff correspondents but working for numerous 
media, were the most noticeable cases. 
The Spanish accreditation guidelines facilitated such arrangements. Chapter 1 has shown 
that full-time correspondents only had to prove that they were representing at least one 
media as a staff correspondent, received a regular monthly salary not lower than Spanish 
staff journalists and were exclusively dedicated to journalism. Given the comparatively low 
wages in Spain, the income criteria was unproblematic. Furthermore, the actual proof that 
the correspondent indeed received a sufficient fixed income was only based on the 
respective statement which the respective editors had to provide.  
These regulations facilitated mutually beneficial arrangements between media and 
journalists who were on the necessary letters from the editor’s actual staff correspondents. 
In practice, these journalists had non-exclusive agreements with their official staff media, 
for which they worked as fixed stringers. The correspondents thereby could gain a full 
accreditation, but also sell their work to other media. For the media which provided the 
correspondents with the necessary credentials in Spain, this had the advantage of including 
the prestigious by-line ‘from our correspondent’ without having to pay for a staff 
correspondent.  
The German correspondents Rolf Görtz and Sieglinde Herrmann, for instance, had such an 
arrangements. Görtz replaced Barth as the stringer of the German newspaper Die Welt in 
Madrid in 1962. Before coming to Spain, Görtz was a staff journalist of Die Welt. The 
editors of Die Welt, however, were not willing to pay a full staff correspondent’s salary for 
Görtz because of Spain’s limited newsworthiness. Instead, they offered him a deal as fixed 
stringer, which also allowed Görtz to work for other papers. In fact, Görtz took other parts 
of Barth’s Bauchladen, who had left as Die Welt’s staff correspondent to Paris. 
Nevertheless, Die Welt provided Görtz year after year with the necessary confirmation 
letter in order to renew his accreditation as staff correspondent.654 
Like Görtz, the correspondent Sieglinde ‘Linde’ Herrmann also remembered that she did 
not have any problems in obtaining the necessary confirmation letters for the accreditation 
as staff correspondent while only working as stringer. Herrmann had come to Spain in the 
                                                          
654 Rolf Görtz, interview by Tobias Reckling. 
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beginning of the 1960s for her husband Gustav Herrmann, who worked as correspondent 
for a number of German, Swiss and Austrian media since 1951.655 Sieglinde Herrmann first 
started to work with her husband and, after his death in 1963, took over his Bauchladen.  
Herrmann and Görtz outlined that while the limited international media interest in Spain 
until the 1960s made it difficult to indeed become a staff correspondent with a regular 
income, it also had its advantages. The general absence of staff correspondents provided 
stringers with the opportunity to sell the occasional newsworthy reports to a wide network 
of media. Herrmann eventually did this through a bureau in Zurich, which offered and sold 
her articles to both Swiss and German media.656 Görtz’s predecessor Heinz Barth was able 
to use Spain as an economic opportunity even more so than Herrmann and Görtz 
themselves. According to the German Foreign Ministry, because of the wide distribution 
of his articles, Barth was considered the ‘best earning German journalist’ during the mid-
1950s.657 Lehmann also argues that it was the limited interest of the German media, which 
made Barth’s monopoly over the reporting of Spain possible in the first place.658 
The most remarkable case among the staff-correspondents working as stringers was 
Richard S. Mowrer. After his return to Spain in 1951, he was accredited for the same US 
newspapers, for which he had previously covered the Spanish Civil War: the Chicago Daily 
News and Christian Science Monitor. Mowrer came from a family of famous US newsmen: 
both his father, Paul Scott Mowrer, and his uncle, Edgar Ansel Mowrer (also a Civil War 
correspondent), had been employed by the Chicago Daily News before him, both winning 
Pulitzer Prizes for Correspondence for their work.659 In Spain, Mowrer established himself 
as, what was described by the US magazine Editor & Publisher in 1966, a ‘one-man 
syndicate for newspapers all over the world from headquarters in Madrid […].’660 Indeed, 
Mowrer wrote during the 1960s for ten large newspapers in the US, three in Canada, eight 
in Europe, two in Israel and one in Australia.661 Mowrer, who retired in 1977, can therefore 
                                                          
655 AGA, (03)049.021, 58.358, Folder Gustav Herrmann.: Accreditation Gustav Herrmann. See also 
Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling. 
656 Rolf Görtz, interview by Tobias Reckling; Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling. 
657 Cited in Lehmann, Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren, 88.  
658 Ibid. 84-85.  
659 See The Pulitzer Prizes, “Paul Scott Mowrer and Edgar Anselm Mowrer,” 
http://www.pulitzer.org/search/mowrer (accessed 20 March 2016). 
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661 The quoted portrait in Editor & Publisher lists the following US publications for Mowrer’s articles in the 
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be described as a ‘transnational super-stringer’. It can only be speculated as to how far his 
background from a family of journalists and the contacts in the newspaper industry which 
came with it, helped him built his large network. In contrast to Herrmann, Mowrer 
distributed his articles himself. While researching new subjects, he made remarks in his 
notebooks as to whom he could sell particular stories.662 Mostly, however, he sold his 
articles on a first come, first served basis, as he explained to Editor & Publisher. His 
working routine also gives an impression of the economic necessities of freelancers like 
Mowrer and how many articles they had to sell in order to make a living: 
I aim at four stories a month with interpretive background on the current news 
and occasionally write a feature story. […] The copy is mailed out to all client 
newspapers and they are free to take it or leave it. Enough take it regularly to 
make the maintenance of the office feasible.663  
From an ideological point of view, reporting for numerous different media resulted for 
some freelancers in remarkable constructs. Like Barth, for instance, his successor Görtz 
was reporting for the conservative Die Welt as well as for the liberal-left newspaper 
Süddeutsche Zeitung. In fact, when writing for other publications than Die Welt, Görtz 
usually used the pseudonym Richard Aschenborn. According to Görtz himself, this was 
necessary because of the different ideological orientations of the newspapers and their 
resulting position towards the anti-communist Francoist Spain.664 While the Spanish 
authorities were aware of Görtz’s commitment to various papers and also his use of 
pseudonyms,665 for German readers interested in Spain, these often very similar reports 
sometimes came as a surprise. The later Spain correspondent Walter Haubrich, for instance, 
remembered that, as a student in Germany, he was annoyed that the liberal Süddeutsche 
Zeitung’s Spain correspondent Richard Aschenborn would have often the same point of 
view as the conservative Die Welt’s representative in Spain.666  
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On some occasions, however, Görtz adapted the tone and subject to the ideological 
orientation of the newspapers, as, for instance, he did in the context of the 25th anniversary 
of the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1964. On the anniversary, Franco had announced a 
partial amnesty and his plans to step down as head of state in the near future. Görtz used 
both announcements for articles in Die Welt and the Süddeutsche Zeitung, which the two 
newspapers published on the same day.667 Articles on the Spanish Civil War accompanied 
these brief reports. In his articles for Die Welt, which devoted only one text to the 
anniversary, Görtz concentrated on the personality of Franco. He highlighted the current 
‘change of the dictatorship’ because of the non-ideological regime of Franco, while the 
Spanish Civil War itself was only treated marginally.668 Instead, Görtz stressed that the 
contemporary Spanish authorities did not talk about victory in the war anymore and the 
Civil War memory in general had declined in importance. Thereby Görtz’s articles reflected 
the official propaganda of the regime. In contrast to previous years, the anniversary of the 
end of the Spanish Civil War in 1964 was no longer celebrated as a victory over the 
communist and anti-Catholic republican troops, but as 25 Años de Paz (25 years of peace). 
While Victory Parade by the Spanish military marching through Madrid was renamed into 
Peace Parade,669 the overall emphasis of the regime’s propaganda was put on the peace, 
stability and economic progress achieved under Franco.  
The Süddeutsche Zeitung, however, dedicated an entire page to the Civil War anniversary. 
Besides two articles by the paper’s Moscow correspondent670 and an eye-witness report 
from the last days of the Civil War,671 Görtz also published a long text. For the liberal-left 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, however, the correspondent concentrated on the current socio-
economic changes in Spain as well as the importance of the EEC for Spain’s development 
without any emphasis of the importance of Franco himself.672 Görtz, therefore, adapted his 
articles to the different editorial lines of the newspapers. Nevertheless, it should also be 
noted that Görtz was by no means a defender of the Franco regime. In fact, he also 
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frequently published critical reports in Die Welt, which resulted in complaints from more 
Franco-friendly readers within the German community in Spain.673 
Görtz was not just a remarkable case because of his ideologically flexible reporting, but 
also because of his career path. His decision to leave his job as staff journalist in Germany 
in order to become a stringer in Spain was an unusual career choice. Based on Hannerz’s 
examination of correspondent’s careers, the following section will examine the more 
typical career paths of correspondents in Francoist Spain  
 
Correspondents’ Careers 
As an introduction to the study of correspondent’s careers in Francoist Spain, Hannerz 
presented two pieces of career advice that a senior correspondent received at the beginning 
of his career from two established journalists:  
One told him he should go to a place where news was made or about to be 
made, write as a freelancer, and make himself indispensable – then someone 
would hire him. The other told him to get hired by the best paper he could, 
begin by doing local news and move on to foreign news whenever an 
opportunity arose.674  
Based on these exemplary career starts and Hannerz’s examination of correspondent’s 
careers, some questions regarding the analysis of the press corps in Francoist Spain can be 
posed: Did the foreign correspondents start as journalists while already in Spain (either as 
a stringer or not), or were they sent to Spain by their home media? If the latter applied, did 
they have previous postings as correspondents before coming to Spain, or was Spain their 
introduction into foreign correspondence?  
The previous section and chapters have shown that the professional situations and careers 
of correspondents in Francoist Spain were highly diverse, as the case of Görtz revealed. 
Some correspondents, such as Mowrer, followed their families’ tradition of journalistic 
work. Others, like some of the exiles from Cuba, became correspondents out of necessity. 
In general, however, correspondents followed relatively typical career paths, as discussed 
by Hannerz. The following section will discuss three such typical career paths that 
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correspondents in Francoist Spain took under the labels New Staff Correspondents, 
Transnational Correspondents, and National Correspondents. 
The first category, New Staff Correspondent, refers to one of the typical career paths 
presented by Hannerz: go abroad, start as freelancer and then get a job as a staff 
correspondent. This category therefore refers to journalists who got into foreign 
correspondence in Spain by working as freelancers before becoming staff correspondents. 
However, typical as it may be in other countries, this path into foreign correspondence was 
the exception for the foreign press corps in Spain. With the exception of particular 
occasions such as the Burgos trials in the end of 1970, Spain was not one of those places 
‘where news was made or about to be made’. Or, to put it differently, it was rather difficult 
to make oneself indispensable for foreign media in Spain since, in principal, news from 
Spain was dispensable. This thesis has already shown that Hannerz’s typical career path 
from stringer to staff was therefore rather unlikely for most correspondents in Spain. 
Numerous freelancers left journalism in Spain after relatively short time periods. Others, 
as the previous section has shown, took advantage of the generally limited presence of staff 
correspondents by establishing themselves as stringers for years or even decades.  
Nevertheless, this thesis has also shown that the media interest in Spain increased from the 
end of the 1960s, which was reflected in a growing number of staff correspondents. While 
most of these new staff correspondents were sent to Spain, the rising media interest also 
allowed a number of already present freelancers to become actual staff correspondents. This 
applied, for instance, to the Dutch correspondent Kees van Bemmelen. Van Bemmelen was 
in Spain from 1964 onwards. After giving up his initial dream to become a painter, van 
Bemmelen started to work as a freelancer for Dutch radio and print media. This eventually 
led to his hiring by the major Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf, once the newspaper became 
interested in having a staff correspondent in Madrid at the beginning of the 1970s.675  
In terms of media importance, the most noticeable cases of freelancers becoming staff 
correspondents in Spain were Harry Debelius of The Times and Walter Haubrich of the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Haubrich had already established himself as an expert on 
Spain well before he joined the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as staff correspondent in 
1969. Haubrich was one of the very few correspondents with an explicit academic 
background on Spain. Besides German literature, he had followed Romance linguistics at 
the universities in Frankfurt and Mainz and had spent time as an exchange in student in 
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Dijon, Madrid and Salamanca. After his studies, he became a lecturer in German studies at 
the universities in Valladolid and Santiago de Compostela in the second half of the 
1960s.676 There, he also started to work as a freelancer for the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, which eventually hired him as a staff correspondent. Before employing Haubrich, 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung relied on reports filed by fixed stringers, namely the 
aforementioned Werner Schulz. Haubrich remained the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s 
staff correspondent in Spain until his retirement in 2002. 
Haubrich and van Bemmelen do not just represent the typical career path of freelancer to 
staff correspondent. Their almost parallel employment as staff correspondents around 1970 
also supports the observation made in chapter three on the development of the foreign press 
corps and international media interest in Francoist Spain. The increased interest in the 
Franco regime, therefore, also opened career paths for freelancers already working in Spain. 
In fact, both van Bemmelen and Görtz directly linked their employment as staff 
correspondents to the massive international media interest in the Burgos trials at the end of 
1970s.677 In the opinion of these correspondents, the strong presence of the Franco regime 
in media all over the world convinced the editors that from now on a staff correspondent in 
Spain would be a worthwhile investment. Choosing freelancers with a profound knowledge 
of Spain instead of sending their own correspondent seemed like the best choice for these 
media.  
While the latter certainly applied to Debelius’ employment as staff correspondent by The 
Times in 1970, the case was different. The prestigious English newspaper The Times was 
among the few foreign media which continuously had a staff correspondent in Francoist 
Spain since the end of the Spanish Civil War. When The Times’ long-term correspondent 
and co-founder of the ACPE, Stuttard, died in 1969,678 however, the newspaper was in need 
of a replacement. The Times’ editors chose Debelius who at the time had been working in 
Spain for more than a decade. Debelius was born in Baltimore, where he started to work 
for local and student papers while studying literature. He came to Spain to work on one of 
the American military bases under construction in the 1950s.679 During the late 1950s, 
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Debelius started to work as a freelancer for UP.680 Thereafter, he moved on to the radio and 
television broadcaster American Broadcasting Company (ABC),681 for which he reported 
from all over the world from the mid-1960s.682 In 1970, Debelius eventually became the 
staff correspondent of The Times in Spain and was therefore the only American 
correspondent of the British newspaper.683 The Times, which certainly had no shortage of 
available journalists, decided to choose a correspondent with vast experience in Spain 
instead of sending a newcomer.  
The second category, Transnational Correspondents, refers to correspondents who received 
their journalistic training abroad, became correspondents and then, at one point in their 
career, were sent to Spain. In contrast to the previous category, Spain was therefore not the 
first post abroad for these correspondents. The careers of these correspondents followed the 
policy of many major media and news agencies to regularly rotate their staff. In Hannerz 
terms, they were ‘spiralists’684.  
One correspondent who followed this career path in Spain was Manfred von Conta. Von 
Conta became the first staff correspondent in Spain for the German Süddeutsche Zeitung in 
1968 when the newspaper decided to replace their stringer (Görtz). He had left his 
university studies unfinished to pursue his first goal, becoming a journalist, in Munich. 
Besides some freelance work for other media, it was von Conta’s explicit aim to get a job 
with the renowned Süddeutsche Zeitung. Based on the advice given to Hannerz’s 
prospective correspondents, von Conta took the second option: getting hired by the best 
newspaper around. He succeeded in becoming a local reporter for the Süddeutsche Zeitung 
in 1954. After moving up to local reporter in Germany, the Süddeutsche Zeitung sent von 
Conta as correspondent to Vienna from 1962-68. Vienna was at the time the base for many 
Eastern European correspondents, and besides Austria von Conta also covered Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia. Following his reports on the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, 
the communist authorities expelled von Conta from Prague as a ‘CIA-Agent, whose 
writings had instigated counterrevolution’685. When the foreign editor of his home paper, 
‘looking for a place where a supposed CIA-Agent could work for them in safety’, asked if 
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he would go to Spain in 1969, von Conta ‘jumped with joy’686. However, although von 
Conta was ‘contaminated’687 with a love for both foreign correspondence and journalism 
as a youngster by reading Hemingway, he came without any prior experience of Spain or 
knowledge of Spanish. Von Conta started his stay in Spain, therefore, with an intensive 
programme of language learning and getting to know the country.688 
Von Conta remained in Spain for three years and then became the Süddeutsche Zeitung’s 
correspondent in Brazil. Therefore, von Conta represented the typical case of a ‘spiralist’, 
whose newspaper frequently rotated their correspondents. But his career was also typical 
in another respect for some correspondents in Francoist Spain. Media with an international 
network of correspondents like the Süddeutsche Zeitung interchanged their correspondents 
between Spain and Latin America, primarily because of the necessary language skills. The 
Süddeutsche Zeitung mainly used the posts in Spain as preparation for Latin America. 
Friedrich Kassebeer, von Conta’s successor in Spain, for instance, was also sent to Latin 
America after covering Spain from 1972 to 1978.689 In the case of The New York Times, 
the exchange went both ways. While The New York Times correspondent Sam Pope Brewer 
was sent from Spain to Latin America in the beginning of the 1950,690 his successors in 
Spain, Richard Eder691 (in Spain 1968-72) and Henry Giniger (in Spain 1972-1976), both 
had previous experiences in Mexico.692  
The last category of staff correspondents, National Correspondents, in principle also 
followed Hannerz’s typical career path: getting their first journalistic experiences at home 
and then, when the opportunity arises, taking up a post as foreign correspondent. However, 
in contrast to the former, for these correspondents Spain was their first beat, but others 
followed. They were therefore also ‘spiralists’ in Hannerz’s terms, but in their career were 
just one step behind the correspondents with previous postings. A correspondent who 
followed this career path was von Conta’s successor Kassebeer.  
Kassebeer belonged to the first generation of German journalists who had started their 
careers after the Second World War. In fact, Kassebeer, a rather rare case for the time, had 
even received formal training as journalist in Germany. He had attended the first school for 
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journalism693 (founded as an experiment and part of the Allied democratization 
programme) together with the first licensed German newspapers after 1945 in Aachen in 
the American occupied zone.694 Following his formal education, Kassebeer started his 
journalistic career at local and regional newspapers. From the 1960s onwards, he became 
the regional correspondent in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia for the magazine 
Der Spiegel and Die Welt before spending some time as editor for one of Germany’s 
regional broadcasters. In 1968 he joined the staff of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, again as 
correspondent for North Rhine-Westphalia.695  
When the Süddeutsche Zeitung’s Spain correspondent Manfred von Conta left Spain in 
1972, Kassebeer took his post in Madrid. Spain, therefore, was his first beat as a foreign 
correspondent after more than 20 years in journalism. In contrast to the freelancers who 
became staff correspondents like Debelius and Haubrich, therefore, Kassebeer had little 
previous knowledge of Spain, which he had only visited during summer holidays. This also 
applied to his language skills: like von Conta, he started to learn Spanish when his posting 
to Madrid was decided.696 Kassebeer remained in Madrid until 1978, when he once more 
replaced von Conta, this time as the Süddeutsche Zeitung’s correspondent in Latin America. 
 
Nationality and gender 
The popular image of the typical foreign correspondent was (and partly still is) that of a 
‘lonely, hardened man’697. Foreign correspondence was indeed for a long time a man’s 
occupation. Of course, famous women reporters had been around since the first half of the 
20th century. In particular, women correspondents in the Spanish Civil War such as Martha 
Gellhorn and the photographer Gerda Taro are often presented as examples of early women 
correspondents.698 However, Taro and Gellhorn were still remarkable exceptions. A survey 
conducted by Theodore Edward Kruglak among US correspondents and stringers during 
the 1950s, found that only 1.9% of these journalists were women.699 An almost parallel 
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survey among foreign correspondents in the US found that the presence of women among 
these journalists was, at 5.4%, higher, but still very limited.700 This situation only started to 
change slowly. Still in 1975, Ralph Kliesch shows, only 10% of all US correspondents were 
women.701 It was only since the 1980s that women, as in other occupations, were 
increasingly employed as correspondents by US media.702  
Although less studies and surveys are available for European women correspondents and 
women correspondents in Europe, it can be assumed that the situation was similar. Antje 
Robrecht, for instance, does not mention any women correspondents at all in her study of 
the British press corps in Germany and German correspondents in Britain between 1945 
and 1962.703 At the beginning of the 1980s, Morrison and Tumber still found that that 
‘although the term “foreign newsmen” refers also to women, it is not that inaccurate as an 
inclusive term since only 15 percent of the foreign media corps [in London] are women.’704  
Newsmen also dominated the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. However, compared 
to the US press corps, women correspondents were far more numerous in Spain. From 1955 
until 1975, women correspondents represented between 10% and 16% of all accredited part 
and full-time correspondents. If only the full–time correspondents were counted, the 
percentage of women correspondents was slightly less, but compared with the above 
findings, still remarkably strong. Indeed, between 8% and 15% of all accredited full-time 
correspondents were women from 1955 until 1975. Particularly noteworthy is the relatively 
strong presence of women correspondents during the 1950s. In the mid-1950s, almost 10% 
of all full-time correspondents were women, five times as many as in Kruglak’s survey of 
US foreign correspondents at the time.  
At least to some extent, the relatively strong presence of women correspondents was a 
reflection of the particular development of international media interest in Spain. The 
previous chapter has shown that the active promotion of Francoist Spain as a fashion and 
tourism centre, under Fraga especially, resulted in the increased accreditation of 
correspondents of specialized magazines during the 1960s. Many of these journalists, such 
as Aline Griffith, the previously mentioned correspondent of the fashion magazine Vogue, 
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were women correspondents. Other examples were the correspondents for the US 
magazines Look and Harper’s Bazar, Marylin Kaytor705 and Elisabeth Howell706, both of 
whom were accredited during the mid-1960s. Therefore, the presence of women 
correspondents reflected a general employment policy of magazines, especially those 
dedicated to special interests like fashion. Indeed, Morrison and Tumber have shown that, 
in the beginning of the 1980s, magazines were ‘the best employers [for women], being the 
only medium with over half (52.9 percent) female staff. To a certain extent this is due to 
the specialized women’s interest sections […]’707.  
The accreditation of some women correspondents for fashion magazines, however, cannot 
explain the strong early presence of newswomen in Spain. A closer examination of these 
correspondents in Francoist Spain not only allows for a partial understanding of the 
relatively strong presence of these women correspondents but also provides insights into 
the composition of the foreign press from a sociological point of view beyond the gender 
aspect alone.  
A crucial aspect in understanding the relatively strong presence of women correspondents 
during the 1950s is the observation that some were the wives or partners of the German 
correspondents with a past in Nazi Germany who remained in Spain after 1945. The 
previously outlined relaxation in accreditation policy also allowed these women 
correspondents to become accredited for the same media of their husbands. Notable 
examples were Ilse von Finckenstein,708 a relative of the Nazi Minister of Economics 
Hjalmar Schacht and partner and later wife of Otto Skorzeny; Ilse B. Schulz,709 the wife of 
Werner Schulz; and Amalia Tichmann,710 the wife of Karl Tichmann. Although a somewhat 
special case, Helga Lindscheidt also belongs on this list. Lindscheidt came to Spain with 
her husband Friedrich Lindscheidt for the German news agency DIMITAG in 1940.711 After 
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the death of her husband she remained in Spain. Following the re-foundation of DIMITAG 
after 1945, Lindscheidt became the news agency’s Spain correspondent in 1950.712  
These double accreditations (with the exception of Lindscheidt) must be seen as another 
reflection of the attractiveness of the accreditation status and its associated privileges. By 
simply becoming accredited, these women correspondents contributed to their household 
income by, for instance, doubling the coupons for gasoline, which the Francoist authorities 
gave to all staff correspondents. The reform of the accreditation guidelines in 1966, 
however, ended these double accreditations. In fact, the new guidelines explicitly stated 
that only news agencies and broadcasters could have more than one staff correspondent at 
a time.  
Besides these German couples, also a surprising number of women correspondents with 
different nationalities were married to other correspondents. The American Elizabeth 
Buckley, who in 1965 was accredited for the US magazine Harper’s Bazaar, was married 
to the British Reuters correspondent Henry Buckley. Likewise, the partner and later wife 
of the correspondent William Cemlyn-Jones, Jane Walker, was working for both The 
Guardian and the magazine Time during the Spanish transition. Sieglinde Herrmann was 
even successively married to two foreign correspondents in Spain.713  
Some correspondents couples, like The New York Times correspondents Camille and Jane 
Cianfarras during the 1950s, only remained briefly in Spain.714 They came together and 
planned to move on together to the next post. Both, however, died in the infamous sinking 
of the Andrea Doria on their way back to New York in 1956.715 The majority, however, 
were ‘long-timers’. The Tichmanns, Buckleys, Cemlyn-Jones and Walker and others 
remained for decades in Spain. In fact, some of these couples even founded entire journalist 
families. Patrick Buckley, the son of Elisabeth and Henry Buckley, for instance, started out 
in journalism in Spain for AP before becoming a scriptwriter. The son of Cemlyn-Jones 
and Walker, David Cemlyn-Jones, became more serious about journalism. He started to 
work for the Spanish news agency EFE, before moving on to UPI and, in 1972, Reuters.716  
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The married women reporters were almost exclusively not Spaniards, but foreign nationals 
that had come to Spain with their husbands or at least met there. This is important with 
regard to the journalistic career of many of these women correspondents. In most cases, the 
husbands were accredited first, while the wives were accredited later on. This suggests that 
the husbands, at least in some cases, facilitated the access of their wives into the men’s 
world of foreign correspondence. This career path certainly applies to a number of women 
correspondents who took over the Bauchladen of their husbands after their deaths, namely 
Amalia Tichmann, Sieglinde Herrmann, and Ilse Schulz.  
Sieglinde Herrmann gave some insights into her career into journalism through her 
marriage. Shortly after arriving in Spain in the beginning of the 1960s, she started to support 
her husband Gustav Herrmann, first informally and then as an accredited correspondent. 
Gustav Herrmann worked as a stringer for a number of Swiss, Austrian and German 
publications since 1953 and was one of the few early German correspondents who strongly 
opposed the Franco regime (further discussed in Chapter 6). Herrmann explained that 
getting into journalism was a rational choice for her in order to increase the household’s 
income. In the beginning, she argued in an interview, it was easier for her to publish her 
reports under her husband’s name. Following Gustav Herrmann’s death, Sieglinde 
Herrmann took over his Bauchladen. 
Of course, not all accredited correspondent’s wifes were mere semi-professionals, simply 
taking advantage of their husband’s occupation. Although their husbands were undoubtedly 
crucial in facilitating their access to the men’s world of foreign correspondence, Herrmann 
in particular became a well-known and influential correspondent in her own right. The 
following chapter will show that, due to her widely distributed journalistic output as well 
as her good contacts with the democratic opposition, Sieglinde Herrmann became one of 
the most influential correspondents in the foreign press corps. On the opposite side of the 
political spectrum, Helga Lindscheidt also became an influential correspondent in her own 
right. At the beginning of the 1960s, Lindscheidt was accredited for the important German 
economic newspaper Handelsblatt.717 The Spanish press attaché in Bonn reported in 1965 
that ‘her articles convey a love for Spain and a real desire to understand the positive aspects 
of our country, her institutions and her politics’718.  
                                                          
717 AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.969, Folder Helga Lindscheidt: Accreditation Helga Lindscheidt. 
718 AGA (03) 049.021, 64.969, Folder Helga Lindscheidt: Agregado de Prensa at Spanish Embassy in Bonn 
to DG de Prensa, 28 July 1965. 
 172 
It would also be incorrect to imply that all women correspondents became correspondents 
because of their husbands. The American Jocelyn Bush, who married the Time 
correspondent Pierro Saporiti in the 1950s, for instance, was already a well-established 
correspondent for the Chicago Tribune in her own right. After their marriage, she continued 
her journalistic work independently.719 The most noticeable example of a woman 
correspondent in Spain during the 1950s was, however, Jacqueline Darricarére d'Etchevers, 
bureau chief of AFP from 1957 to 1962. 720 Her appointment as bureau chief for a major 
international news agency was not only exceptional for the foreign press corps in Spain at 
the time, but also in international comparison. Another of the very few women staff 
correspondents during the 1950s was Annemarie Schwyter, the first wife of Gustav 
Herrmann, Sieglinde’s later husband. Schwyter later on became one of the best known 
Swiss journalists. Between 1951 and 1960, she was reporting from Spain for the Swiss 
news agency Schweizer Depechenagentur,721 and returned frequently to the Franco regime 
thereafter.722 Furthermore, the Colombian journalist and poet Dolly Mejia is another 
example of an influential women correspondent in Francoist Spain. Accredited since the 
end of the 1950s,723 Mejia reported until the end of the dictatorship for a number of 
Colombian and Argentinian newspapers, agencies and magazines.724 
Besides these prominent examples, foreign correspondence remained a men’s domain in 
Spain which in turn was a reflection of the international media market. Not only were 
women correspondents few in numbers but even fewer women correspondents were 
accredited as staff correspondents for major media. The majority of the full-time women 
correspondents in Spain worked as stringers like Herrmann or Mejia. Therefore, the 
employment policy of foreign media in Francoist Spain reflected a general and long-
standing tendency. Kevin Williams outlines that ‘prior to the 1980s women were three 
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times as likely to be employed as a stringer as men’725. Furthermore, despite their relatively 
large number in Spain, women correspondents were also marginalized in the 
correspondent’s organizations. Until 1975, Dolly Mejia was the only women correspondent 
who held any position (a speaker in her case) in any of the three organizations for 
correspondents, the ACPI.726 Even Darricarére d'Etchevers, as bureau chief of a major news 
agency, never held any position on one of the correspondent’s organizations in Francoist 
Spain. Instead, the ACPE’s and CIP’s board of directors was exclusively composed of men 
throughout the Franco regime and some of them, like the aforementioned president 
Tichmann, only worked for minor publications.  
This situation only started to change during the 1970s, parallel to the earlier outlined (but 
still very limited) increased employment of women in other press corps. In 1970, 15% of 
all staff correspondents were women. Since the previous reform of the accreditation 
guidelines had ended the regime’s laissez-faire accreditation policy, these women 
correspondents were indeed working as professional journalists. Furthermore, the type of 
media which employed women correspondents changed. Jane Walker, for instance, during 
the Spanish transition became Time magazine’s full-time correspondent in Spain.727 The 
German news agency dpa replaced, after the death of Franco, Hans Rahm, the agencies 
long-time, pro-Francoist correspondent in Spain, with the experienced women 
correspondent Elisabeth Guth.728 Finally, and with some further delay, the position of 
women correspondents within the foreign press corps and the correspondent’s 
organizations also changed. In 1979, Amalia Tichmann was named honorary member of 
the ACPE, while Guth was elected in the association’s directorate. However, it still took 
until 1984, before the first women correspondent, Sieglinde Herrmann, was elected as 
president of the CIP.729 
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Foreign foreign correspondents and local hands 
It was and still is common practice for media to hire what has been termed foreign foreign 
correspondents: correspondents of another ‘nationality’ than the media they work for.730 
The foreign press corps in Spain was no exception in this regard. The correspondent 
Mowrer, with his very international media contacts, and some of the German and Latin 
American stringers were examples of such foreign foreign correspondents. These and 
others of what could also be termed transnational stringers filled the limited demand of 
newspapers and other media for news in Spain which could or would not afford a staff 
correspondent. The presence of other transnational stringers reflected the Franco regime’s 
particular ideological orientation, its foreign policy and the contemporary international 
context. This applied to the foreign foreign correspondents among the Cuban and Eastern 
European émigrés in Spain.  
Besides these rather specific groups of transnational stringers, the hiring of foreign foreign 
correspondents as staff correspondents was for other media a normal part of personnel 
policy. This applied to the global news agencies Reuters, UPI, AP and AFP – although to 
different degrees. While both AFP731 and Reuters732 mainly employed French and British 
nationals respectively, the press corps of the American news agencies was far more 
international. AP, for instance, employed at one point or another correspondents of seven 
different nationalities until the death of Franco.733 Foreign foreign correspondents were 
even more strongly represented in the UPI staff in Spain. Not only did UPI employed 
correspondents from nine different nationalities but non-Americans also directed the UPI 
office in Madrid at various times: the Spaniard Carlos Mendo (1962-65), the Italian Aldo 
Trippini (1966-74) and the Swiss Peter Gregor Übersax (1975-1977). 
The appointment of the Spaniard Carlos Mendo as bureau chief of UPI in Spain points to 
the special case of Spaniards as foreign foreign correspondents. The hiring of locals as 
correspondents was not, of course, just a Spanish speciality. In order to save the money for 
more costly staff correspondents, it was and is common practice for foreign editors to hire 
                                                          
730 See Wu and Hamilton, US Foreign Correspondents: Changes and Continuity at the Turn of the Century, 
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local journalists.734 In the case of a modern dictatorship like Spain, however, the 
employment of Spaniards as correspondents was nevertheless of particular importance.  
Spanish journalists as correspondents were nothing new in Spain. The Spaniard Julio 
Alvarez del Vayo was, as president of the first ACPE, one of the most prominent foreign 
correspondents in Madrid. During the Franco regime, however, the previously outlined 
restrictions made it more difficult for Spaniards to become foreign correspondents. They 
were only accredited as correspondents if they were first signed into the official register for 
Spanish journalists. The stricter application of these guidelines under Fraga since the 
beginning of the 1960s caused some problems for Spanish correspondents of news agencies 
who were not signed into the official register for Spanish journalists. In general, however, 
the requirements for Spanish correspondents could easily be fulfilled and had little impact 
on the actual employment policy of international news agencies in Spain. AP had in its staff 
a number of Spanish journalists who had already been working for the agency for decades. 
José Torres Victoria, one of agency’s long-term employees, had started to work for AP 
during the Civil War;735 and his brother, Alejandro Torres Victoria, started to collaborate 
with the agency in 1933 and became staff in 1941. Both journalists remained with AP until 
the 1970s.736 The Torres brothers were no exception. Spanish correspondents like Emilio 
Moya and Alfredo Gómez Legendre also started to work for AP prior to 1945 and remained 
employed until after Franco’s death.  
AP’ employment of Spanish journalists during the 1940s can be seen as a strategy to keep 
the cost of a functional bureau (in a post of secondary importance such as Francoist Spain) 
to a minimum. However, AP as well as other international news agencies, continued to hire 
Spaniards thereafter.737 The most prominent case of a Spaniard working for an international 
news agency was Carlos Mendo, who became the UPI bureau chief in Spain at the age of 
29 in 1962. 
The appointment of Mendo also points to a political aspect of the hiring of Spaniards by 
international news agencies. In general, the Spanish journalists working for AP and other 
news agencies since the 1940s and 1950s were rather sympathetic towards the Franco 
                                                          
734 See for example Wu and Hamilton, US Foreign Correspondents: Changes and Continuity at the Turn of 
the Century, 528; Hamilton and Jenner, Redefining foreign correspondence, 306. 
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regime. Alejandro Torres, for instance, was described by the MIT as a ‘right-wing person 
and of excellent behaviour’738. Of course, international news agencies did not have much 
to choose from at this time. The Civil War, the massive repression of the supporters of the 
Republic and the exile of numerous Spanish journalists739 as well the strict control imposed 
by the Francoist authorities on media and journalists, did not leave many other options. It 
can be assumed, however, that the employment of regime-friendly Spanish journalists in 
international news agencies was in the interest of the Francoist authorities. Indeed, the 
Spanish authorities tried early on to improve their relations with international news 
agencies as EFE signed contracts first with Reuters and then with UP in 1945 in order to 
‘gain free world favour’740. Henry F. Schulte, first UP and then UPI bureau chief in Spain 
from 1956 to 1962, claims that the Francoist authorities put their hopes on UP in particular: 
One can only conjecture that the Spanish government was hopeful that United 
Press, a privately owned news agency obligated only by business ties to clients, 
would be more malleable and less likely to be anti-Franco than Associated 
Press, which, as an organization constituted by member U.S. newspapers, might 
be inclined to the reflect the anti-Francoism believed [to be] rampant in the 
United States. The feeling that the purchase of the U.P. service entitled Spain 
to favourable treatment permeated some areas of government and did, to this 
writer’s personal knowledge, enter into exchanges between governmental 
officials and U.P. correspondents.741 
Schulte himself highlights that this agreement never affected UP’s respectively UPI’s 
reporting during his time in Spain. Nevertheless, against this background it is surprising 
that an American news agency was willing to accept a Spaniard - who, incidentally, would 
later go on to make his career within the Francoist system - as bureau chief. Unfortunately, 
the well known appointment of Mendo as UPI bureau chief has received no academic 
interest so far, and no further information on the background of Mendo’s appointment could 
be found in the files of the MIT.742 However, Mendo’s later career as well as UPI policy, 
nevertheless suggest that his appointment was a compromise that the UPI struck in order 
to appease the Francoist authorities and Fraga in particular.  
                                                          
738 AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.971, Folder Alejandro Torres Victoria: Untitled report on Torres, 16 February 
1962. 
739See for example.Juan C. Sánchez Illán, ed., Diccionario biográfico del exilio español de 1939: Los 
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740 Schulte, The Spanish Press 1470-1966: Print, Power and Politics, 28.  
741 Ibid. 
742 As outlined in the introduction, it was not possible for this thesis to access the archives of news agencies 
such as UPI.  
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Indeed, Mendo was not just a successful journalist, but a ‘faithful follower of Fraga’743, 
which was reflected in Mendo’s later career. Following his stay at UPI, Fraga appointed 
Mendo as director of the state owned news agency EFE in 1965.744 During the Spanish 
transition, Mendo also served as the press chief of Fraga’s right-wing party Alianza 
Popular. Furthermore, while Fraga’s interest in placing a man of his confidence on top of 
the bureau of a major international news agency is self-evident, UPI generally showed its 
willingness to compromise with the dictatorship on other occasions. A former UPI 
employee highlights that ‘UPI tried to have people in foreign capitals who could "get along" 
with the regime. This was on the premise that it was better to have some reporting from 
these capitals than none. The clients demanded it.’745 Chris Patterson and Vanessa Malila 
show in their study on South Africa’s attempt to buy into global news during the early 
1970s that UPI was vulnerable to the PR interest of dictatorial regimes.746 Indeed, Carlos 
Arias Navarro, by then Director-General of Security, had threatened Mendo’s predecessor 
Schulte with expulsion in 1962.747 The appointment of Mendo in the same year, therefore, 
could be seen as an attempt by UPI to please its Spanish costumer. However, the question 
of how the appointment of Mendo came about and how much of an impact it had on Spain’s 
image in the UPI wires in the beginning of the 1960s must be left to future research. 
Nevertheless, the above arguments shed light on a particular case of the employment of 
Spaniards by foreign news agencies in Spain. 
While Mendo was supportive of the regime, political aspects also played a role in the 
employment of other young Spanish journalists during the 1960s, albeit but from the 
opposite position. These were representatives of a young, more critical generation of 
Spanish journalists. They had left the MIT controlled Official Journalism Schools or 
alternative institutions by the Catholic Church.748 Some of the church controlled journalism 
schools were especially open to more democratic ideas. In Barcelona in particular, where 
demands for democracy and regionalist autonomy reinforced each other, journalism 
students found themselves in an ‘environment most politicized and hostile towards the 
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official Madrid’749. But also in Madrid, journalism students took part in the growing student 
resistance against the Franco regime during the 1960s (further discussed in the following 
chapters). Or, as José Antonio Martínez Soler, better known under his journalistic 
pseudonym JAMS put it: ‘Going into journalism was a political decision at the time. We 
wanted to fight for democracy’750. JAMS himself was one of these young journalism 
students who became journalistically active against the regime. At the beginning of the 
1970s, he founded the Franco-critical weekly Doblón. Shortly after the death of Franco, 
JAMS was kidnapped and tortured by the Francoist authorities and thereby became a 
symbol of the journalistic fight for democracy.751 
Researchers have already highlighted that this generation of young journalists played an 
important role during the Spanish regime change.752 What this research has largely 
overlooked, however, is that some of these journalists received part of their journalistic 
education as correspondents for foreign media. The best known among them was probably 
Juan Luis Cebrián Echarri, who became accredited as the first Spain correspondent of the 
Italian news agency Inter Press Service in 1964, the year of the agency’s foundation.753 
After the death of Franco, Cebrián co-founded the Spanish newspaper El País in 1976, 
which became of central importance for Spain’s democratization process.754 Other 
prominent examples were José ‘Pepe’ Oneto, who worked for AFP at the beginning of the 
1970s,755 and Miguel Ángel Aguilar, who was accredited as correspondent for Belgian 
publications.756 Aguilar and Oneto both became central journalistic actors during the 
regime change.757  
Aguilar and Oneto had been journalistically active before becoming correspondents in the 
regime critical newspaper Madrid. Fraga’s partial liberalization of the press law in 1966 
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which ended the pre-censorship for Spanish media resulted in a thriving and more critical 
Spanish media landscape. However, the partial liberalization of the Franco regime’s control 
over the press did not mean complete freedom of expression and overly critical publications 
were frequently brought back into line with economic sanctions. The most direct expression 
of this control over the Spanish press was the closing down of Oneto’s and Aguilar’s 
employer, the newspaper Madrid, in 1971.758 It was thereafter that the two journalists 
sought employment for foreign media. As both journalists outlined, the work as 
correspondents not only provided them with a new source of income but, more importantly, 
gave them the opportunity of free expression that they did not have in the Spanish press.759 
Journalists like Oneto and Aguilar were only two of the most prominent examples. Besides 
other formal employments of Spanish correspondents, news agencies also relied on Spanish 
journalists as informants and stringers, and were careful to protect their identity. AP, for 
instance, received (from at least the mid-1960s) news from Barcelona from two Spanish 
journalists: Juan Tomas Hernandez, who worked for the newspaper Diario de Barcelona 
and, from 1966, Pedro Pascual Piquer, who worked for El Correo Catalan.760 Neither of 
these two Spanish journalists, however, was officially registered as a correspondent. In fact, 
the by then director of AP in Madrid, Harold Milks, actively protected the identity of these 
two Catalan journalists. In a telephone call (which was overheard and interpreted 
thoroughly by the Spanish authorities), Milks not only informed Hernandez that he had 
hired Piquer as a new freelancer but also explicitly demanded that his name was not to be 
mentioned under any circumstances – a measure taken to protect the Spanish journalist.761  
That these Spanish journalists used foreign news agencies in particular to publish 
information that was critical of the Franco regime was also noted by the MIT. In a report 
from 1970, the MIT’s Liaison Office came to the conclusion that ‘a great part of the news 
and commentaries hostile to the Spanish regimen […] come from a small group of very 
young Spanish journalists which work for foreign news agencies in Madrid.’762 Working 
for foreign news agencies, therefore, became a way for these young journalists to 
undermine Francoist censorship. At the same time, this relationship was mutually 
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beneficial. The Spanish journalists with close ties to the illegal political opposition provided 
foreign news agencies with information which was otherwise difficult to obtain. 
Although news agencies were the most important employers of Spanish correspondents, 
they were not the only foreign media to do so – although only to a very limited extent. 
Besides the above mentioned Aguilar, only nine Spanish full-time and three Spanish part-
time correspondents altogether were accredited for other foreign media than news agencies 
until the end of the regime.763 Nevertheless, and as the following chapter will discuss, in 
some cases it was precisely these Spanish journalists, and the Le Monde correspondent José 
Antonio Novais in particular, who played a central role within the foreign press corps. 
Besides his work for Le Monde, Novais also wrote for Portuguese, Brazilian and Mexican 
newspapers.764  
Journalists, however, were only the most visible Spaniards working for foreign media in 
Spain. As elsewhere,765 foreign media in Spain - in particular, news agencies and 
broadcasters with fully staffed bureaus and well-equipped newspaper correspondents - 
employed Spaniards as so-called hands, drivers, secretaries and translators.766 In some 
cases, the importance of these local hands also went beyond these tasks. The New York 
Times correspondent Camille Cianfarra, for instance, hired a ‘tipster’ at a local newspaper 
with access to the wires of the Spanish news agencies. This ‘tipster’ had to inform Cianfarra 
about any important news which would break at night, when Cianfarra was asleep.767 Other 
former correspondents also stressed the importance of their local hands. Manfred von 
Conta, the correspondent of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, for instance, explicitly highlighted 
the importance of his assistant Bernardo Fernandez for his journalistic work. Fernandez not 
only helped von Conta with improving his Spanish and reading the Spanish newspapers, 
but also with the interpretation of the news. Von Conta further stressed that Fernandez,  
opened many contacts deep within the intellectual and artistic underground that 
occupy the many noisy tapas bars until long after midnight. [… ] The relation 
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with my assistants was important to maintain contact with the reality of the 
outside world.768  
Fernandez himself described his own role for von Conta as not so much that of a secretary, 
but rather as a guide through Spanish life.769 With regard to the establishment of contacts, 
other correspondents such as Wolf Hanke, the correspondent of the German broadcaster 
ARD, described the role of his Spanish cameraman in similar terms.770  
 
Working conditions: Reporting from Francoist Spain 
This section examines the working conditions and working routines of correspondents in 
Francoist Spain. First, this section will address the question of where the correspondents 
worked, both within Spain and within the city where they were placed. The later aspect 
relates to the location of the actual workplace of the correspondent, their offices. Second, 
this section will examine the practical working routines of correspondents in Spain. The 
section will argue that the work of correspondents in Francoist Spain was in many respects 
not so different from that of foreign press corps in democratic countries. At the same time, 
however, the section will also show that the particular context of the Franco regime resulted 
in the development of specific strategies in order to gather information.  
 
Location: Madrid and the rest 
As in any other country, the capital was the place to be for foreign correspondents. The vast 
majority of all accredited correspondents in Spain lived and worked in Madrid. However, 
and in contrast to Morrison’s and Tumber’s findings for the foreign press corps in Great 
Britain,771 a small but noticeable group of correspondents was also accredited outside of 
Madrid. In 1955, this applied to 20 foreign journalists, which represented 13% of the entire 
foreign press corps at the time.772 With 16 accredited correspondents, the second largest 
Spanish city, Barcelona, was the obvious choice after Madrid. However, this finding should 
not be overestimated as a particular interest in Catalonia. Half of these journalists were only 
part-time correspondents and most of the other only remained accredited for short time 
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periods. A noticeable exception to this was the Dutch correspondent Theo Stols, who was 
accredited in Barcelona from 1952 and throughout the entire Franco regime.773 Another 
noteworthy but only briefly accredited correspondent in Barcelona was the Annemarie 
Schwyter, the only women in the Barcelona press corps.774 In general, however, Barcelona 
was of minor importance as a location for foreign correspondents during the 1950s. None 
of the news agencies AP, UPI, dpa and Reuters had a correspondent or stringer in 
Barcelona. In fact, only Reuters had an officially accredited freelancer in Valencia, their 
only journalist outside of Madrid.775  
This situation started to change slightly throughout the 1960s with the general increase of 
the number of foreign correspondents in Spain. The head of the Reuters office in Madrid, 
Henry Buckley, for instance, in 1965 put his stringer in Valencia on the payroll as staff 
correspondent, much to the surprise of the Francoist authorities. The MIT officials noted 
that so far ‘none of the foreign news agencies which have an office in Madrid have any 
accredited correspondents in the provinces’776. However, since ‘various newspapers which 
have correspondents in Madrid and also in Barcelona, Palma, Las Palmas, Gran Canarias 
and other Spanish provinces’777, the Section for Foreign Press had no objections. Reuters, 
however, not only accredited a correspondent in Valencia, but also, shortly thereafter, a 
freelancer in Bilbao in the Basque Country.778 Other news agencies followed. Buckley’s 
son Patrick, for instance, worked as stringer for AP in Barcelona in 1970.779  
The increased interest by international news agencies reflected a growing media attention 
towards the Spanish regions. This was reflected in the total numbers of correspondents 
accredited outside of Madrid, their accreditation status and, although only partly, in the 
media they represented. In 1970, 17 full-time correspondents worked outside of Madrid, 
twice as many as in 1955780. After working for a decade for minor publications, Stols 
became the correspondent for the major Dutch newspaper De Volkskraant in the mid-
1960s.781 A central factor for this development was Spain’s booming tourist industry. Three 
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correspondents were accredited on the island of Mallorca alone, which at the time had 
developed into one of Spain’s most important tourist destinations. The tourism up and down 
the Catalan Costa Brava contributed to the increased placement of correspondents in 
Barcelona. The German tabloid Bild, for instance, had since 1965 placed its only Spain 
correspondents in the Catalan capital.782 Indeed, the still rather small foreign press corps in 
Barcelona started to develop a stable social life with regular meetings among the 
correspondents since the end of the 1960s.783  
 
Location: Offices 
For most contemporary correspondents, the practical conditions of working abroad are very 
different from jobs at their media at home. Instead of working at a desk in a crowded 
editorial room, press correspondents in particular do their job in splendid isolation from 
their homes. Only seldomly would the expensive posting of a correspondent also allow for 
a separate office, as Morrison and Tumber observed in their study.784 This mainly applied 
to the international news agencies and fully staffed bureaus of international broadcasters 
maintaining its own offices. 
Francoist Spain was in this respect not very different to other countries. The contact details 
provided with their accreditations, as well as the interviews, leads to the conclusion that 
most press correspondents in Spain worked from their homes. International news agencies 
had separate bureaus, which in most cases they kept for decades. Many of the Madrid 
correspondents had chosen homes close to the centre, which allowed for easy and short 
journeys within the city. Numerous correspondents lived often only a few streets from each 
other along one of Madrid’s main streets, the Paseo de Castellana, close to the ministries, 
embassies and some Spanish media.785 Other correspondents seemed to have followed in 
the choosing of their apartments their particular journalistic interests. José Antonio Novais 
of Le Monde, who frequently reported on the students protests in Madrid, lived in the 
university district Moncloa.786 Others preferred comfort over practicality. The German 
                                                          
782 Ibid. 
783 Robert Bosschart de Lang, interview by Tobias Reckling, 1 August 2012, Madrid. 
784 Morrison and Tumbler, for instance, made similar observations about the work situations of London 
correspondents during the 1980s. See Morrison and Tumber, “The foreign correspondent: date-line 
London,” 458.  
785 See for example Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 14 July 2011. 
786 See for example Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior (henceforth AGMI), 183, 62: Asunto José 
Antonio Novais Tomé, 2 February 1967. 
 184 
correspondent Friedrich Kassebeer, for instance, lived in a house outside of the city 
centre.787  
If press correspondents did not work from home, they often had shared offices in the 
bureaus of news agencies. UPI, which seemingly had plenty of space in its bureau on Plaza 
de la Cortes, rented office space to the correspondents of the Italian broadcaster 
Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI), Time and McGraw-Hill World News and others.788 For 
some time, the correspondents Kees van Bemmelen, William Cemlyn-Jones and Harry 
Debelius shared an office at UPI. This location had multiple advantages for these 
correspondents and a direct impact on their working routines. The following section will 
show, that the daily contact and exchange of information with colleagues in particular was 
of central importance for correspondents in Spain. Furthermore, these journalists also had 
direct access to the news wires of UPI.789 Kees van Bemmelen summed up the advantages 
of his office in a nutshell: ‘I got most of my information from there’790. 
However, it was not only foreign media such as UPI that rented out offices to other 
correspondents. Although only exceptionally, Spanish media also made room for foreign 
correspondents and even the entire staff of news agencies. Reuters, in particular, had its 
office in the well-known building of the Spanish news agency EFE under the address Ayla 
5. That Reuters was the first international agency to sign a contract with EFE in 1945 
certainly facilitated this arrangement.791 Although the situation of Reuters at the EFE 
building was still an exception, it was also the foundation of a tradition of foreign 
correspondents working in the building of the Spanish news agency after the death of 
Franco. When EFE moved its offices in 1977,792 not the Reuters journalist went along, but 
numerous other foreign correspondents were also given offices in the new building on 
Espronceda 32. These included, among others, the correspondents of Radio France, the 
German news agency dpa, the Yugoslavian agency Tanjug as well as van Bemmelen and 
his colleagues, who moved over from UPI.793  
 
Working routines 
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Hannerz points out that the routines by which contemporary correspondents proceed in 
order to fulfil their task of gathering information and producing reports for their home 
media are (at least in the self-estimation of correspondents) highly individual.794 In a 
number of case studies researchers have nevertheless identified routines and similarities in 
the work of correspondents in general and the core tasks of correspondents gathering 
information in particular.795 The interviews conducted for this thesis confirmed these 
findings in the case of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. 
If gathering information is the most important aspect of the work of correspondents, sources 
of information can become a central structural element for their daily routine. This leads to 
the question of which informational sources the correspondents in Spain used the most. The 
answers given to this question during interviews resulted in the following sources: Spanish 
media, Spanish journalists, non-state political actors, other correspondents, official 
information, and foreign media. While this list is, for the outlined methodological reasons, 
in some regards defective, it nevertheless can serve as a starting point for the following 
discussion of the listed informational sources. Furthermore, with regard to the central 
importance of the Spanish press, an observation made by Morrison and Tumber could also 
be confirmed: that the correspondents interviewed were eager to point out that not only did 
they rely on the Spanish press but also used other sources of information such as the 
personal contacts with opposition groups in particular.  
This section will discuss the particularities of Spanish media, Spanish journalists, foreign 
media, and contacts among the correspondents as informational sources. The regime’s 
information policy and contacts to the political opposition represent aspects of the political 
function of the correspondents in Francoist Spain, which the next chapter will examine. 
 
Spanish media 
The central importance of the media of the host countries as a source of information was 
also confirmed by the few researchers who have examined the working conditions and 
routines of foreign press corps.796 During interviews, however, the correspondents 
struggled with this fact and were eager to point out that they did not merely rely on Spanish 
                                                          
794 Hannerz, Foreign News, 147. 
795 See for example Morrison and Tumber, “The foreign correspondent: date-line London”; Hannerz, 
Foreign News; Tulloch, Corresponsales en el extranjero, 131-174.  
796 See for example ibid., 134-136; Morrison and Tumber, “The foreign correspondent: date-line London,” 
466-467. 
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media alone but also highlighted the use of other sources of information such as personal 
contacts with opposition groups. Morrison and Tumber were confronted with a similar 
reaction during their research.797 In practice, however, Morrison and Tumber argue that,  
[…] a foreign correspondent is as good as the local media will allow. […] To a 
large extent it is the news, or more accurately, the departing point upon which 
to build their news. It could hardly be any other way, given the limited resources 
available to most correspondents.798 
Besides the correspondents’ hesitations, the interviews conducted with former foreign 
correspondents have shown that Spain was no different in this respect. Reading the Spanish 
press and (although less important) listening to Radio Nacional de España was a part of the 
daily routines of most staff correspondents. Accordingly, Manfred von Conta described his 
daily routine as follows: 
A typical working day was mostly dull: getting up at 7, making coffee, going 
down to get the half a dozen newspapers of the day, coming back to my 
apartment on the third floor, opening the door for my assistant who comes at 
eight. READING, READING [sic!] with a pencil marking what has to be 
clipped.799 
Collecting clippings was a common habit among correspondents. Some, like Gustav 
Herrmann, even turned this journalistic necessity into a hobby and compiled entire books 
with Spanish newspaper clippings.800 Others, like Richard S. Mowrer, preferred his already 
mentioned notebooks to collect and order information on subjects which might be worth a 
story for one of the many media he worked for.  
However, the Franco regime’s strict control over the public sphere in general and the press 
in particular necessarily limited the value of information. This made a certain cross-reading 
strategy and more reading was necessary to make the most of the information that was 
publicly available. Again, von Conta, who was supported in the ‘interpretation’ of the 
Spanish news by his assistant claims that,  
The secret in hermetic systems is to detect the difference in the description 
different papers give of the same timeframe: what lacks in ABC will appear in 
Informaciones, La Vanguardia dares to talk about something Ya will not reveal 
or describe in a different way. After a while you get the structure of what’s 
going on.801 
                                                          
797 Morrison and Tumber, “The foreign correspondent: date-line London,” 467. 
798 Ibid., 466.  
799 Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling. 
800 Gustav Herrmann’s notebooks were accessed during the interview with Sieglinde Herrmann.  
801 Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling. 
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After the reformulation of the Spanish press law in 1966 in particular, the Spanish press 
became a bit more outspoken. Information not available before could now be at least partly 
derived from Spanish newspapers and magazines. Nevertheless, the gaps remained and the 
Spanish press (however important it was as a first source of information) was only a 
partially sufficient source of information for the correspondents work, at least if they took 
it seriously.  
The media, which the correspondents consumed on a regular basis - as well as the 
informational value for their work - was diverse. Nevertheless, the answers given in the 
interviews provide a general impression. Among the five media which the correspondents 
considered generally of the greatest importance for their work, were the two magazines that 
were central for the democratic opposition in Spain: Cuadernos para el Diálogo and 
Cambio 16. Cuadernos para el Diálogo, founded by the former Minsiter of Education 
Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez in 1963, started as a Catholic publication but ‘in time brought 
together the entire opposition’802. Cambio 16, which was only founded in 1971 after the 
reform of the press laws, became the most successful of these new publications and was 
also crucial for the democratic opposition on the brink to democracy.803  
Rather surprisingly, besides these two magazines, the five media of the greatest 
informational value named by the correspondents only included two daily newspapers, La 
Vanguardia Española and Informaciones. Both newspapers, which were already published 
in pre-Civil War Spain, were characterized by their comparatively liberal attitude and their 
reliable information. Published in Barcelona, La Vanguardia Española was, together with 
the traditional monarchic newspaper, ABC, with 200,000 issues the most widely distributed 
newspaper in Spain in the mid-1960s. 804 Although far less widely distributed, the Madrid 
newspaper Informaciones was on the daily reading list because of its perceived distance to 
the regime and the information on politics in the Spanish capital.  
The fifth Spanish medium which the correspondents valued most highly as an informational 
source, was neither a newspaper nor a magazine but the private Spanish news agency, 
Europa Press. Following the liberalization of Spanish press law, the far more liberal and 
objective Europa Press developed in to a strong competitor for EFE on the Spanish market. 
                                                          
802 Tusell, Spain: From dictatorship to democracy, 161. For an in-depth study of Cuadernos para el 
Diálogo see Javier Muñoz Soro, Cuadernos para el diálogo (1963-1976): Una historia cultural del segundo 
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803 See Tusell, Spain: From dictatorship to democracy, 225. 
804 Barrera, Periodismo y franquismo, 110. 
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Europa Press’ attempts to deliver objective domestic news on issues like student protests 
and strikes resulted in disciplinary proceedings by the Francoist authorities.805  
The correspondents interviewed naturally named other major newspapers like the Catholic 
Ya, the regime critical Madrid, and the traditionally monarchist major Spanish newspaper 
ABC as valuable sources of information – although the latter only came in ninth place on 
the list. Madrid probably would have been higher in this ranking if the Francoist authorities 
had not closed down the newspaper in 1971. The state-controlled Radio Nacional de 
España was considered as providing considerably little valuable news. Although some 
correspondents with the corresponding political leanings like Sieglinde Herrmann, 
however, valued the programme of the Communist broadcaster Radio España 
Independiente very highly, although this exile broadcaster was not a Spanish medium in 
the strictest sense. Of practically zero importance was the – also state-controlled – 
television media which came relatively late to Spain. In 1962 television was, with 300,000 
TV sets in all of Spain, still of minor importance.806 The Ministry of Information and 
Tourism under Fraga promoted television and its importance for the Spanish public strongly 
increased throughout the following decade.807 As source of information for the foreign 
correspondents, however, it remained also thereafter marginal.  
In sum, the correspondents highlighted that they relied strongly on media with a certain 
distance to the regime, which also provided reliable information on sensitive issues. At the 
same time, however, such rankings on the relative informational importance of particular 
media should also be considered with care. While the correspondents interviewed 
considered newspapers that were extremely close to the regime, such as El Alcazar and 
Arriba, of little informational value, this does not mean that they ignored them. Or, as the 
Dutch correspondent Bosschart de Lang put it: ‘I read them, but I never bought them.’808 
Von Conta’s ‘READING, READING [sic!]’809 of all kinds of newspapers, therefore, was 
the daily routine.  
 
Spanish Journalists 
                                                          
805 Carlos Barrera and José Apezarena, “In Democracy as in Dictatorship: Government Pressures on the 
Spanish Private News Agency Europa Press,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 18, no. 2 (2013), 
192-193. 
806 Barrera, Periodismo y franquismo, 86. 
807 Ibid. 
808 Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling. 
809 Ibid. 
 189 
Spanish journalists, the correspondent’s second most important source of information, 
often filled the informational gaps that remained in the censored Spanish press. 
Surprisingly, research on foreign correspondence in dictatorial regimes has so far paid no 
attention to the importance of the exchange of information between the journalists of the 
host countries and foreign correspondents. In the case of the Franco regime, at least, this 
informational exchange was central and mutually beneficial. Spanish journalists provided 
correspondents with information, which they could not publish in the censored Spanish 
press. Therefore, they could at least make them public abroad. At the same time, 
correspondents received valuable information for their reports. 
For correspondents who had their offices in the buildings of Spanish media, this exchange 
of information with Spanish colleagues was particularly easy. Thomas ‘Tom’ Burns, who 
started to work for Reuters in the EFE building in 1974, highlighted: ‘I found the EFE-
journalists extraordinary nice and helpful. They gave me - they gave all of us - stories that 
they themselves couldn’t publish’810. While the state-controlled news agency EFE was not 
generally critical towards the Franco regime, for journalists of pro-democratic media this 
exchange of sensitive information with correspondents was even more important. Indeed, 
the passing of information to the foreign press became a central way of criticizing the 
Franco regime. The Spanish journalist José Antonio Martínez Soler, for instance, expressed 
the importance of this relationship with the foreign correspondents:  
All of us democratic journalists were natural allies of the foreign 
correspondents from democratic countries. We were friends. We gave them 
many of our exclusive information, we did their work. […] The role of the 
foreign press was highly important to us. What was said outside of Spain also 
created within Spain a public opinion inside of the Spain among the elites and 
the middle class which was very favourable for the democratic process before 
the death of the dictator.811 
Although the actual extent of this informal informational exchange between Spanish 
journalists and correspondents is difficult to measure, its importance was confirmed 
throughout the interviews. Indeed, some of the regime critical Spanish journalists who 
temporarily worked as correspondents themselves, such as the journalists of Madrid José 
Oneto and Miguel Ángel Aguilar, were frequently named as important sources of 
information. The importance of these contacts between foreign correspondents and regime 
critical Spanish journalists will be further discussed in the following chapter.  
                                                          
810 Tom Burns Marañón, interview by Tobias Reckling. 
811 José Antonio Martínez Soler, interview by Tobias Reckling. 
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Reading foreign media 
In their discussion of correspondents work, researchers have only given very little attention 
to the importance of other foreign media as sources of information for correspondents. 
Hannerz mentions that he ‘could glimpse piles of newsmagazines like Time, Newsweek 
and Economist, as well as the International Herald Tribune’ on the desks of 
correspondents.812 Morrisson and Tumber also found that at least some of the London 
correspondents who answered their questionnaire read US publications.813 The existing 
research on foreign correspondence in dictatorial systems like the Soviet Union 
unfortunately does not discuss the importance of foreign media for correspondents’ 
work.814  
The above list on the importance of informational sources for foreign correspondents in 
Francoist Spain confirms this general lack of academic interest. The correspondents 
interviewed named foreign media as the least important source of information. Nonetheless, 
the limited international media interest in Francoist Spain also gave little reason to rely on 
foreign media as a source of information. Nevertheless, some correspondents were eager to 
stress their awareness of famous international media such as The New York Times. One 
Argentinian correspondent, for instance, claimed to have read on a regular basis, among 
others, the Washington Post, The New York Times, Time Magazine, Le Monde, Le Figaro, 
Times and the Daily Telegraph, in addition to the Spanish press.815 Generally, however, the 
correspondents mainly read media from their home countries. German correspondents 
would regularly read one or two newspapers or, more often, journals like Der Spiegel in 
order to keep informed about home affairs.  
Despite these reservations, two foreign media were indeed of great importance for the 
foreign press corps in Francoist Spain: Le Monde and the Spanish-language programme of 
the BBC. Approximately 80% of all interviewed correspondents stated to have regularly 
consumed at least one of the two. The following chapter will show that Le Monde and, to a 
lesser extent, the BBC were indeed important sources of information in Francoist Spain not 
only for the correspondents, but also for the general public. Foreign correspondents, 
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therefore, followed in their reading of foreign media the particularities of the situation in 
Francoist Spain.  
 
The evolution of cooperation: Correspondents inform correspondents 
Williams highlights that foreign correspondents ‘cultivate an image of a community which 
is that of a tightly knit group’816. However, Williams also stresses that this ‘community’ 
among correspondents in Western democracies should not be overestimated and has little 
impact on the correspondent’s journalistic work. Correspondents working in splendid 
isolation and in competition with each other seems to be the more common situation.  
Although surprisingly little research has been done on this question, Hannerz argues that 
the different working conditions in dictatorships have a profound impact on the interaction 
between journalists.817 In his examination of the foreign press corps in Bejing, Hannerz 
comes to the conclusion that the shortage of information results in close cooperation and 
sharing of information among foreign journalists.818 The same can be said about 
correspondents in the Soviet Union during the Cold War, as a report from the German 
embassy in Moscow from the end of the 1960s about the Western foreign press corps 
suggests: 
The special conditions in Moscow with little news and the difficulties to gain 
any information beyond the official proclamations have resulted in the 
development of a steady exchange of information and news among the Western 
correspondents […].819 
Although access to information was less restricted, a similar development can be observed 
in Francoist Spain. While the correspondents interviewed named their colleagues as only 
the fourth most important source of information further interviews suggest otherwise. 
Indeed, correspondents with previous experience in journalism who came in the mid-1970s 
or later to Spain, such as the German TV correspondent Horst Hano or the correspondent 
of the Süddeutsche Zeitung Udo Bergdoll, were surprised by the willingness of their 
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colleagues to openly share their contacts and information.820 Relying on information from 
colleagues was, at least for some correspondents, part of their daily work routines. Kees 
van Bemmelen, for instance, remembered the American super-stringer Richard S. Mowrer 
going around every day in his car to visit colleagues and asking what was new;821 and for 
Manfred von Conta, the call to colleagues in order to discuss the published news in the 
Spanish press belonged to his daily routines as did the reading of the press.822 
Like in the Soviet Union, this cooperation among correspondents was born out of necessity. 
The necessary efforts in order to gather information beyond the censored press and the 
scarce official announcements could often only be accomplished in cooperation or, as 
Haubrich formulated retrospectively: ‘Logically one had to collaborate with colleagues and 
pass information to one another, because nobody could be everywhere’823. The 
precondition for this cooperation with colleagues was, according to Haubrich, 
professionalism, trust, and reciprocity. The latter was particularly important since the 
information which the correspondents shared were often connected to the political 
opposition in Spain. The protection of these sources was naturally of central importance.824 
Haubrich also outlined that this cooperation sometimes went beyond mere passing of 
information and took the form of active and coordinated sharing of workloads and specific 
tasks among correspondents. When, for instance, the Francoist authorities only allowed a 
very limited number of correspondents into the courtroom during the Burgos trials in 1970, 
the correspondents gave turns to each other.825 While some attended the trials, others 
covered developments in the Basque country or elsewhere in Spain and later on exchanged 
their information.826 Furthermore, Friedrich Kassebeer revealed that he organized a meeting 
with members of the political opposition in his house outside of Madrid. It was also normal 
that various correspondents took part and were also involved in its preparation.827  
The outlined analysis of social networks leads to further, more general insights into this 
cooperation among correspondents. Most importantly, the level of cooperation was by no 
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means a commonly shared featured among all or even the majority of correspondents. The 
correspondents interviewed named on average 30 correspondents, or 25% of all staff 
correspondents, with whom they had ‘meaningful professional relations’828. The range in 
the number of named journalists was between 9 and 55, which was between 7.5% and 45% 
of all accredited staff correspondents in 1975. If the examination is limited to ‘very 
important professional relations’ with other correspondents, this group consequently 
becomes considerably smaller.829 Indeed, the correspondents interviewed named on 
average twelve other foreign journalists with whom they maintained very important 
professional relations.  
These ‘meaningful’ or ‘important’ professional networks among correspondents were very 
much along national and cultural lines. For the interviewed European correspondents, the 
contacts to Latin American journalists were for instance – and with a few exceptions - of 
very little importance. Since the interviews were mostly conducted with German 
correspondents, the existence of national networks becomes most visible for the German 
press corps. Although less data is available on other nationalities, the information provided 
by the few interviewed British and Latin American correspondents suggests that such 
national-transnational networks were not a German speciality. However, the German and 
German-speaking journalists maintained particularly close relations with each other. 
German correspondents, for instance, were the only group within the foreign press corps 
that maintained regular social gatherings for decades. Since 1961 at least, German press 
correspondents met at a monthly Stammtisch (group of regulars) in the still existing 
Bavarian-German restaurant Edelweiss, right next to the Spanish Cortes.830  
Two further observations (which are closely connected) can be made about the professional 
networks of correspondents: the professional status of particular correspondents played a 
crucial role and the networks were centred around a small number of prestigious long-term 
correspondents. These two groups were mostly but not completely identical. The German 
correspondent Anton Dieterich, for instance, was ‘only’ writing for the regional newspaper 
Badische Neueste Nachrichten, but practically all the German correspondents interviewed 
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named him as an important source of information. The studied Romanist and long-time 
resident in Spain was a respected authority on Spanish culture and art history. Even 
correspondents like Haubrich, who held very different political views from those of 
Dietrich, mentioned his special status among the German press corps.831 At the same time, 
however, simply being an old hand among the correspondents was also not enough in order 
to play a prominent role within the foreign press corps. Richard S. Mowrer, for instance, 
had similar long-term experiences in Spain but was far less valued as a partner for the 
exchange of information since he was less generous with sharing his own knowledge.  
While the national networks had a social function, professionalism, the prestige of the 
media the correspondents worked for, and the quality of information on offer were at the 
centre of networks operating on a transnational basis. José Antonio Novais (Le Monde), 
Harry Debelius (The Times), Walter Haubrich (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) and, to a 
lesser extent, William Cemlyn-Jones (The Guardian) fulfilled these criteria. Almost all of 
the journalists interviewed considered these correspondents as very important for their 
work. Furthermore, and as far as this can be said from the few interviews conducted with 
correspondents of major publications, these journalists also maintained among each other 
closer professional relations to each other than with other journalists. Walter Haubrich 
remembered that he regularly exchanged information with selected German colleagues and 
the correspondents of major US and British media, news agencies and the well-connected 
Novais from Le Monde in particular at the beginning of the 1970s.832.  
The close cooperation between Haubrich and the correspondents of the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung - in particular Manfred von Conta but also with his successor, Friedrich Kassebeer 
- is an especially telling example of the willingness of correspondents to share information. 
In Germany, the liberal-left Süddeutsche Zeitung and the conservative Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung were fierce competitors on the media market.833 Under normal 
circumstances, the relations between the journalists of both papers could more accurately 
be characterized by competition than cooperation. In Spain, however, the cooperation 
between the correspondents of both papers was particularly close. The cooperation between 
these correspondents was facilitated by good personal relations (the correspondents were 
roughly the same age) and the commonly shared dislike of the Franco dictatorship. In fact, 
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the political stance towards the Franco regime was also one of the core preconditions among 
correspondents.  
The exchange of information between correspondents, of course, not only took place over 
the phone among a small group of journalists. In fact, correspondents who maintained 
contacts with the political opposition were particularly careful in what to say or not to say 
over the phone. The CIP, which many correspondents frequented, not least because of the 
good and highly subsidized restaurant, had some importance for meeting with other 
journalists. However, and as the second chapter has argued, correspondents were very well 
aware that the CIP was an institution of the Ministry of Information and Tourism. They 
were therefore very careful about whom to bring and what to talk about. Far more important 
were Madrid’s bars, where journalists not only met with their Spanish colleagues but also 
fulfilled a correspondent’s cliché by meeting each other.  
 
Conclusion 
Based on current research on foreign correspondents, it was the aim of this chapter to 
provide an understanding of the foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain as media 
professionals. The section has examined the accreditation times of correspondents, their 
employment status and exemplary career paths. Correspondents remained accredited in 
Spain for unusual lengths of time. Many of these long-time correspondents were stringers 
who profited from the fact that relatively few foreign media had staff correspondents in 
Francoist Spain. This increased the general market for stringers, who could sell their articles 
to a wide range of media, which could not afford or justify their own correspondents in 
Spain. At the same time, stringers could profit in Spain from accreditations as full-time 
correspondents. The examination of exemplary correspondent’s careers in Spain has 
provided further understanding of the journalistic careers of particular groups of 
correspondents.  
The second section has examined women correspondents and the nationality of foreign 
correspondents in Francoist Spain. A comparatively large number of women 
correspondents were accredited in Spain. However, a surprisingly high number of these 
women correspondents were married to correspondents and worked as semi-professionals 
with their husbands, in some cases even for the same media. This was partially facilitated 
by the regime’s accreditation policy. Nevertheless, some women correspondents became 
influential correspondents in their own right. These cases, however, remained exceptional 
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and women were marginal figures in both the foreign press corps and in the correspondent’s 
organizations in Spain.  
The section also has shed light on the particular importance of Spanish journalists as 
correspondents for foreign media and foreign news agencies in particular. Employment in 
foreign media became of special importance for a young, pro-democratic generation of 
Spanish journalists during the 1960s. These journalists partially used their employment for 
foreign media, which were not subjected to the Francoist censorship, in order to publish 
regime critical reports. At the same time, the Franco regime attempted, with the 
employment of the Spaniard Carlos Mendo as UPI bureau chief in Madrid, to influence this 
major news agency’s reporting in their favour. However, further research on this case 
remains necessary. Finally, the section has highlighted the particular importance of local 
Spanish assistants to correspondents who partially facilitated local contacts and knowledge 
for their employers. 
The final section has examined the working conditions and routines of correspondents in 
Francoist Spain. While most correspondents worked in Madrid, the Spanish regions, and 
Barcelona in particular, gained in importance for correspondents from the 1960s. 
Furthermore, the section has highlighted the special importance of the actual working 
location, the offices of correspondents. It has shown that some correspondents shared 
offices in Spanish and foreign news agencies, which had a profound impact on their access 
to information.  
Access to information was the starting point for the final examination of the 
correspondent’s working routines. The section has argued that the Spanish press and 
regime-critical publications especially were central sources of information for the foreign 
press corps. However, confronted with the strict censorship by the Francoist authorities, 
ipersonal contacts became more important. Spanish journalists were a central source of 
information for foreign correspondents. This was a mutually beneficial relationship since 
pro-democratic journalists used their contacts with correspondents to make information 
public abroad which could not be published in Spain. Furthermore, the exchange of 
information among correspondents was also crucial. Both personal and informal sources of 
information were particularly important aspects of the correspondents’ work in Francoist 
Spain. 
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5. Reading the foreign news: The foreign press and the 
Franco regime  
The Spanish public in principle had access to foreign publications and therefore the reports 
of foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain. International broadcasters and the BBC in 
particular, beyond the reach of the Francoist authorities directly beamed their programmes 
in Spanish towards Spain. In contrast to the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, foreign 
press was also allowed to be sold in Francoist Spain shortly after the end of the Second 
World War. The need of the isolated regime to at least attempt to create a pseudo-liberal 
image in the eyes of the world was too strong. Of course, the Franco regime compromised 
its claim to internal informational control by allowing the distribution of uncensored foreign 
media.  
Against this background, this chapter will examine the distribution of and access to foreign 
media in Spain as well as its importance for the Spanish public. The chapter will argue that 
foreign print media and broadcasters were not only an important source of uncensored 
information for the Spanish public but also that foreign media were of crucial importance 
for the Spanish opposition as both a source of information and a means of communication.  
The chapter is structured in to three sections. The first section will examine the general 
access to foreign news - both broadcasters and print media - in Francoist Spain. The second 
section will discuss the particular importance of the foreign press for the Spanish 
opposition. This discussion includes the question of how far this support impacted on the 
opposition’s struggle against the Franco regime. Finally, the last section will be dedicated 
to the analysis of the regime’s attempts to control the distribution of the foreign press. By 
examining the control of foreign media within Spain both in quantitative and qualitative 
terms, this section will not only show how the Francoist authorities tried to find a balance 
between the need to accept the distribution of foreign press in Spain and its continued 
striving for informational control. The examination of the control of foreign media also 
allows further conclusions on the attention and the attitude of the foreign press towards the 
Franco regime. 
 
International Broadcasters 
Foreign radio broadcasts provided the Spanish public with the most direct access to foreign 
news (foreign broadcasts here refers exclusively to radio). In principle, Spanish citizens 
 198 
could receive a wide range of foreign broadcasts. In 1975, the British BBC, in an attempt 
to stress the importance of the Spanish market for its own Spanish programme, counted 29 
foreign broadcasters which ‘daily beam their programmes to the Iberian Peninsula’834. For 
language reasons most of these broadcasts were, of course, only of limited direct value for 
the vast majority of Spanish listeners. Broadcasts in French were the only exception to this 
rule due to the relatively widespread knowledge of French in Spain. French was ‘the 
predominant foreign language in Spanish classrooms’835 with which most Spaniards grew 
up. Britain and the US, with the support of parts of the Francoist elites, tried with 
considerable success to break this monopoly during the 1960s and 1970s by promoting 
English teaching in Spain. This strengthening of English teaching, however, only had an 
impact on later generations. French broadcasts and, as this chapter will argue in the 
following, the French press in general were therefore accessible to a far greater number of 
Spaniards than any other foreign media. 
A number of foreign radio stations, however, also broadcasted in Spanish. They included 
the communist broadcasters from Eastern Europe, of which Radio España Independiente 
was the most important one. Radio España Independiente and major Western international 
broadcasters, in particular the French Radio Paris and the British BBC, not only 
broadcasted towards Spain in Spanish but also had programmes in Spain’s regional 
languages. Therefore, international broadcasters directly undermined Francoist 
centralization policy and repression of any expression of (mainly Basque and Catalan) 
regional identity and culture.836 For the case of Catalonia, Cinto Niqui has shown that Radio 
Paris in particular was initially of central importance. In 1947, for instance, the president 
of the Catalan Generalitat in exile, Josép Irla, called for a boycott of the Francoist 
referendum on 8 July via Radio Paris.837 Indeed, Gérard Malgat shows that Radio Paris 
                                                          
834 BBC Written Archive (henceforth BBC WA), E, 40, 732: Head of BBC’s Southern European Service to 
Central European Service, 30 October 1975. 
835 Óscar J. Martín García and Rodríguez Jiménez, Francisco Javier, “¿Seducidos por el inglés? Diplomacia 
pública angloamericana y difusión de la lengua inglesa en España, 1959-1975,” Historia y política: Ideas, 
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took the place of French as the main foreign language taught in Spain.  
836 Daniele Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation 
(Reno, Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 2000), 80-108, 109-140. 
837 Niqui, “Chronology of international radio in the Catalan language in the 20th century,” 97. 
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was a central medium of communication not only for Catalans but also for the large Spanish 
exile community in France in general.838  
Although Radio Paris’ Catalan broadcasts were suspended in 1964,839 the Spanish 
programme continued throughout the Franco regime. In 1975, its director claimed in a 
meeting with the Spanish ambassador that Radio Paris had ‘hundreds of thousands 
listeners’840 in Spain. The French radio station was thus not only an important source of 
information for the Spanish public beyond the reach of the Francoist censors but also, by 
regularly reporting on news about Spain from the French press, functioned as a 
transnational broker between the French and the Spanish public spheres. Therefore, Radio 
Paris also gave the Spanish public direct access to at least some of the reports by French 
correspondents in Spain. 
The BBC was the other major foreign international broadcaster, which broadcasted in 
Spanish and had a significant audience there. As part of its External Services, the BBC had 
already started its Spanish Service with news bulletins during the Spanish Civil War in June 
1938 and continued its work throughout the Franco regime.841 Shortly after 1945, the BBC 
also included programmes in regional languages.842 Like its French counterpart, the BBC 
became an important source of uncensored information for the Spanish public. In contrast 
to Radio Paris, however, the BBC’s Spanish Service during the Franco regime, while 
sometimes mentioned,843 has received very little attention by researchers so far.  
The BBC’s Spanish Service also differed in its content from Radio Paris in that it mainly 
concentrated on world news and British-Spanish relations as well as cultural subjects and 
language lessons. The only partial exception were weekly press reviews on ‘Spain seen 
from abroad’, which were based on British press reports about Spain. Like Radio Paris for 
                                                          
838 Gérard Malgat, “Voix de la France, voix de l'exile. Les emissions en langue espagnole de la 
Radiodiffusion Francaise entre 1945 et 1968,” (Mémoire de DEA, Université de Paris X-Nanterre, 1997). 
Although only a Master’s thesis, Malgat’s study is nevertheless highly useful for the understanding for the 
importance of Radio Paris in Spain – especially in the absence of further studies on the subject. 
839 Ibid., 98. 
840 AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09030, Folder 7: Untitled report by the Spanish ambassador in Paris on a 
meeting with the director of Radio Paris, 20 January 1975 [the report was propapbly directly sent to the 
Ministry of Information and Tourism]. 
841 BBC WA, E/1/2.345: Spanish Service, Development of Spanish Service for Europe (undated). On the 
BBC’s service during the Spanish Civil War see David Deacon, “‘A quietening effect’? The BBC and the 
Spanish Civil War (1936–1939),” Media History 18, no. 2 (2012). 
842 Niqui, “Chronology of international radio in the Catalan language in the 20th century,” 96. The BBC’s 
Catalan programmes, for instance, were started in 1947.  
843 See for example Sahagún, El mundo fué noticia, 230. 
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France, therefore, the BBC’s Spanish Service also functioned as a transnational 
intermediary between the British and Spanish public. 
The BBC’s regular listeners’ polls and letters from the audience show that world news in 
particular was highly valued in Spain.844 This appreciation reflected the initially limited 
access to international news in Spain after the Second World War. Felipe Sahagún shows 
that, besides the official censorship, most Spanish media had a very limited network of their 
own correspondents.845 Furthermore, Spanish media heavily relied on the monopoly of the 
news agency EFE. Until the mid-1950s, EFE depended in turn on its contract with UPI. It 
was only after Spain was able to overcome its international isolation that EFE also signed 
contracts with other major news agencies like AP, Reuters and AFP.846 While the Spanish 
media increasingly widened its network of correspondents, it was only after the passing of 
the new press laws in 1966 that the private news agency Europa Press broke EFE’s 
monopoly.847 International broadcasters like the BBC, therefore, filled an important 
informational gap after 1945.  
While important for a particularly interested part of the Spanish public, however, the 
general interest in world news was relatively limited and the BBC’s audience in Spain 
remained rather small after 1945. According to the BBC’s office in Madrid, this resulted 
precisely because of the lack of information on internal Spanish affairs:  
The BBC is providing an excellent service of its kind, but it is not the right 
kind. The need is for something to fulfil the functions, as far as possible, of a 
free National Press. That is first, a complete news service and, secondly, a 
forum in which all kinds of public affairs, especially Spanish affairs, can be 
examined and freely discussed.848  
However, the limited, indirect comments on Spain’s internal politics through the BBC’s 
press review led to repeated conflicts with the Franco regime. In the beginning of the 1950s, 
the BBC’s office in Madrid reported back that Franco called the British broadcaster an agent 
                                                          
844 See BBC WA, E/3/97/3: BBC External Broadcasting Listener Research Report, South European Service 
– Spanish Section, Annual Report 1952. 
845 Sahagún 1986, 230. 
846 Ibid. 
847 Barrera and Apezarena, “In Democracy as in Dictatorship: Government Pressures on the Spanish Private 
News Agency Europa Press”.  
848 BBC WA, E/1/1.198: Report on the BBC Spanish Service by Roderick Walter, Broadcasting Office 
Madrid, 21 Februar 1947. 
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of ‘international freemasonry’849. Spanish media, in particular Radio Nacional de España, 
frequently attacked the BBC for its reports.850  
The BBC therefore remained careful with its comments on Francoist Spain’s internal 
affairs. Despite the BBC’s formally independent status, this restraint also reflected the 
broadcaster’s particular relation with the British government, especially the Foreign Office. 
Researchers have shown that, even after its propagandistic efforts during the Second World 
War, the BBC closely coordinated it programmes with the Foreign Office for the sake of 
what they perceived as the British national interest. Alban Webb shows in his examination 
of the relations between the BBC’s External Services and the Foreign Office during the 
Cold War that this relationship was not a strictly formalized cooperation: ‘it was not the 
job of the BBC to conduct foreign policy’851. Instead, ‘overseas broadcasting was based on 
a continually negotiated understanding’852 between the BBC and the Foreign Office.  
In contrast to the post-war British Labour government,853 the Conservative governments of 
the 1950s and early 1960s took a pragmatic approach towards the Franco regime. This 
policy change was driven by British economic interests and resulted in the temporary 
selling of arms and military equipment to the Franco regime.854 In this context, the British 
Foreign Office and especially the British embassy in Madrid repeatedly tried to change the 
BBC’s programme for the sake of improving relations with Spain. By 1955, the British 
embassy in Madrid felt ‘that broadcasts in regional languages were an irritant which it was 
desirable to eliminate in the present phase of Anglo-Spanish relations’855. The British 
diplomats presented this eventually successful demand to the BBC together with a report 
‘according to which Franco had once turned the knob of his wireless-set on his yacht during 
a weekend fishing trip and picked up the BBC in Catalan. This had sent him into a blind 
fury […].’856 Consequently, the BBC suspended its broadcasts in regional languages to 
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Spain for the sake of British-Spanish relations the following year.857 Later attempts to re-
start the programme in order to provide an alternative to the communist broadcasters and 
Radio Paris came to nothing, as the Foreign Office pointed out that ‘their revival would 
stick out like a political sore thumb.’858  
In 1961, the British embassy in Madrid went a step further in asking for more ‘programmes 
showing the positive achievements of the Regime’859. With this demand, however, the 
British embassy had less success. To begin with, the BBC office in Madrid highlighted that 
the British press simply lacked such positive articles on the Franco regime on which the 
BBC could report. Moreover, as the BBC journalists stressed, their Spanish listeners hardly 
expected the BBC to produce such reports – ‘however much it might please the Spanish 
regime’860. The Foreign Office was well aware of this problem, which the Assistant Under-
Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Ralph Murray, had already outlined in the previous 
year. Murray, a former BBC journalist,861 had spent time in Spain as Counsellor at the 
British embassy in Madrid in the beginning of the 1950s.862 Following a complaint about 
the BBC by the Spanish ambassador in 1960, he pointed out that it cannot ‘be claimed that 
the B.B.C are not echoing public opinion when they do publicize such items, because the 
plain fact of the matter is that public opinion in this country is highly critical of the Spanish 
regime’863.  
Despite these political restraints, the BBC continued to provide an important service of 
uncensored news for the Spanish public. With the worsening of British-Spanish relations, 
the Foreign Office also put less pressure on the BBC to report more positively on the Franco 
regime from the mid-1960s onwards. A central cause for British-Spanish disagreement was 
the permanent ‘bone of contention’, Gibraltar864. The Spanish’ attempts to regain Gibraltar, 
pushed by Foreign Minister Castiella since 1966, ‘galvanized the entire Spanish foreign 
                                                          
857 BBC WA, E/1/2.345: Foreign Office to BBC’s European Service, 10 January 1956. 
858 BBC WA, E/1/2.345: Report by the Foreign Office, 15 June 1959. 
859 BBC WA, E/1/2.345: Report by BBC office in Madrid to BBC’s Southern European Programmes, 6 
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863 National Archives (henceforth NA), FO 371/153279: Report on the Spanish Ambassador’s complaints 
about the B.B.C. by Ralph Murray, 6 April 1960. 
864 Florentino Portero, “Spain, Britain and the Cold War,” in Spain and the great powers in the twentieth 
century, ed. Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston, 210–28 (New York: Routledge, 1999), 226. 
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policy’865. The struggle over ‘the Rock’ further worsened British public opinion on Spain, 
while Castiella, in coordination with the MIT, reacted by stirring up ‘strong nationalist, 
anti-British sentiment in Spanish public opinion’866. Thereafter, the BBC also became more 
openly critical towards the Franco regime. ThereforeAs such, the BBC not only reflected 
the general change in the British-Spanish relations on the propagandistic front but also 
fulfilled the demand that its Madrid correspondents had already highlighted during the late-
1940s: providing the Spanish public with uncensored information on internal Spanish 
affairs. The BBC’s listeners’ polls showed that such information was indeed highly valued 
by the Spanish audience. At the beginning of the 1970s, a teacher from Valladolid, for 
instance, commented: ‘As you broadcast to a Spanish audience, topics covering Spain 
should occupy a more important part because we are not given a lot of information about 
our own political affairs.’867 A very similar comment came from a student: ‘To me your 
political programmes are always impartial and truthful. In any case I would not be able to 
tell if they were not because here the press, radio and television never speak about Spanish 
political affairs.’868 
Such programmes made the BBC an important source of information in Francoist Spain 
towards the end of the dictatorship. Foreign special correspondents, who came to Madrid 
in the aftermath of Franco’s death at the end of 1975, noted the BBC’s importance. The 
American journalist Martha Gellhorn, for instance, who had already covered the Spanish 
Civil War together with her husband at the time, Ernest Hemingway, returned to Madrid in 
1975 in order to report on the end of Franco. During a phone conversation with Amnesty 
International, in which its Head of Information and Publications reported back to the BBC, 
Gellhorn was full of praise for the British broadcaster: 
I have just had a telephone call from a top American journalist who had been 
to Spain for the first time in many years. For your information, she told me that 
everybody she came across - from intellectuals to taxi-drivers to people in 
villages in remote areas - was tuned in to the BBC Spanish service. They told 
her that this was the only way that they could get any news about what was 
happening in their own country.869  
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Distribution of and access to foreign print media  
Besides international broadcasters, the Spanish public had access to foreign print media as 
sources of information. After the Spanish Civil War and throughout the Second World War, 
the Francoist authorities strictly controlled the distribution of foreign press and allowed 
only a limited number of foreign media for distribution in Spain. As we have seen in 
Chapter 1, this changed rapidly after 1945, however, as the regime tried to improve its 
international reputation. Throughout the next two decades, the number of imported and 
distributed foreign print media increased continuously. By the mid-1960s, the MIT counted 
633 different foreign print media altogether with 430,000 copies that were authorized for 
distribution in Spain.870  
A closer examination of this total number reveals strong differences in the imported media 
types, however. Almost 80% of these publications (497 in total) were imported foreign 
magazines ranging from news magazines like the German publication Der Spiegel and the 
US magazine Time to much less politically relevant media such as fashion magazines, for 
example. Daily and weekly newspapers - 77 (12%) and 59 (8%) respectively - were 
imported in far smaller numbers. Even stronger and crucial to the examination of the impact 
of the foreign press on the Spanish public, were the differences in the origin of the imported 
media, which Figure 9 illustrates. 
French and US publications were by far the most widely distributed foreign print 
publications in Spain, followed by British, German and Italian publications. However, as 
Figure 9 shows, these figures are meaningful in terms of news value to only a very limited 
extent. Indeed, the distributed US press almost exclusively consisted of altogether almost 
200 different magazines, while only two daily and four weekly newspapers were 
distributed. With the exception of Belgium and Austria, all listed European importers of 
newspapers exceeded this number, especially print media from France, Germany and Great 
Britain. Compared to the US, the larger numbers of imported newspapers during the mid-
1960s reflected Spain’s rising status as a European tourist destination. This became visible 
in the reports from the MIT’s branches in tourist regions. In 1963, for instance, the MIT 
office in Mallorca reported that more than 4,000 copies of the six authorized British daily 
newspapers were distributed on the island in June alone. The distribution of the two 
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[unsigned]. 
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authorized US newspapers was only 482 copies in the same month.871 Most of the British 
daily newspapers sold were tabloids such the Daily Express with 1,700 copies alone, 
however. The British Times only sold 200 copies in Mallorca in June 1963, almost exactly 
the same as The New York Times.872  
 
Figure 9: Distribution of foreign press in Spain in 1965 (by type)873 
 
The examination of the actual print run of the distributed foreign publications further 
relativizes the strong presence of European media. Figure 10 clearly shows that, despite the 
large number of imported US magazines, British but also European media in general were 
imported and distributed in far larger numbers.  
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Figure 10: Distribution of foreign Press in Spain in 1965 (by print run)874 
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What becomes very clear from the examination of the print run of foreign media in 
Francoist Spain is the massive distribution of French media, however. In 1965, more than 
160,000 copies of French magazines, almost 30,000 copies of French daily newspapers and 
approximately 15,000 copies of weekly newspapers were distributed in Spain. Only in the 
last category, weekly newspapers, was the distribution of French media slightly surpassed 
by the British press in 1965 because of the numerous separate Sunday issues of British daily 
newspapers. The above quoted report from the MIT’s delegation in Mallorca, for instance, 
lists more than 2,400 Sunday issues of distributed British newspapers.875 Spain, therefore, 
was an important market for French media and was treated by French publishers 
accordingly. This was, for instance, reflected in the context of the cancellation of the 
accreditation of the Le Monde journalist André Monconduit during the 1950s, which the 
following chapter will discuss. Parallel to the cancellation of Monconduit’s accreditation, 
the MIT also banned Le Monde from distribution in Spain. Consequently, in order to get Le 
Monde back in Spanish newspaper stands, the newspaper’s editors fired the correspondent 
for ‘economic reasons’876, as the Spanish press attaché in Paris reported back to Madrid.  
While the larger distribution of German and British compared to US press can be seen as a 
reflection of Spain’s tourism industry, this factor alone does not explain the massive 
distribution of French media. Two strongly interrelated reasons account for this 
observation. First, as mentioned above, it reflects the widespread knowledge of French 
which made the French press accessible to large parts of the Spanish public. Second and 
most importantly, the French press treated Spain not only as an important market but parts 
of the liberal-left French press also gave its neighbouring country more attention than the 
generally unexceptional presence of French correspondents in Spain suggests. Partly, this 
special attention reflected the French public’s interest in internal Spanish affairs. Aline 
Angousturres shows that French tourism to Spain but also the strong presence of Spanish 
exiles and, later on, migrant workers, had indeed boosted French public interest in Spain.877 
Indeed, in the direct aftermath of the Second World War, the organized political exile 
organizations such as the PSOE but also the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista 
de España, PCE) with their propagandistic activities constituted the ‘backbone of the 
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French public opinion’878 on the Franco regime. However, Chapter 3 has shown that the 
strong presence of Republican exiles was not reflected in the positing of French 
correspondents in Spain. Besides the general interest of the accessible French publications, 
this chapter will show that the obvious importance of French newspapers in Spain also 
reflected the special role of the liberal-left Le Monde and the reports of its Spain 
correspondents.  
The Spanish public, however, not only had direct, but also indirect access to information 
published in foreign media through the Spanish press. News borrowing,879 the use of 
information already published in foreign media, was a widespread practice among Spanish 
media. After the Second World War, the borrowing of foreign news by the highly controlled 
Spanish media was mainly an act of coping with the limited access to world news. In fact, 
some media did not even see the necessity to make the origin of the translated and published 
articles known to the reader and therefore crossed the line into open plagiarism of the 
foreign press. This impression is given by a formal complaint about the practice, which the 
Spain representative of the US press syndicate Editors Press Service sent in 1953 to the 
MIT after Spain had joined UNESCO and signed the Universal Copyright Convention. 880 
The reliance on news borrowing for world news remained a common practice throughout 
the following decades. The newspaper Madrid, for instance, had the special service El 
Mundo which consisted of translated articles from The Times, Le Figaro and the Sunday 
Times.881 According to the Madrid journalist Aguilar, however, the newspaper did not only 
create the cooperation with the foreign papers in order to provide the Spanish readers with 
a fuller picture of the world affairs than Madrid could have provided on its own. Aguilar 
explicitly highlighted in an interview that the section was not only about world news, but 
about uncensored news on Spain’s foreign affairs. Without taking the responsibility of 
authorship, the liberal newspaper therefore circumvented the formal rules of the Francoist 
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censorship and the authorities could not make any individual journalists responsible for the 
articles.882  
The use of news borrowing in order to make information available to the public which 
otherwise could not be published became, as Felipe Sahagún also briefly mentions,883 of 
particular importance with respect to domestic news on Spain’s politics, economy and the 
political opposition. Not only could the newspaper protect its journalists from direct 
harassment by quoting foreign news but the reliance on major foreign publications gave the 
published news further legitimacy. In particular, liberal newspapers like Madrid, 
Informaciones or Cambio 16 actively used this strategy as Sahagún, who himself worked 
at the end of the 1960s for Informaciones, further stressed in a personal interview.884 
Madrid regularly quoted newspapers like Le Monde or the Financial Times on Spain’s 
internal political affairs.885 In January of 1971, for instance, the Financial Times was a 
central source of information for an article by Madrid on the crisis of car manufacturer 
SEAT in Spain.886 
Spanish journalists, however, not only made use of the work of their foreign colleagues. 
The exchange of sensitive information between regime critical Spanish journalists and 
foreign correspondents must also be at least partly seen against this background. Indeed, 
not only did Spanish journalists pass information to foreign correspondents in order to make 
them public abroad. They also did so precisely in order to borrow from the foreign media 
the respective reports and quote them later on. Both Spanish journalists as well as foreign 
correspondents remembered this practice well. Spanish journalists who were active from 
the end of the 1960s and critical towards the regime like Aguilar, Oneto and Martínez Soler 
vividly recalled the passing of information and waiting for their publication abroad. 
Martínez Soler recalled in an interview: ‘They published it in their newspapers – and the 
next day we published it here. […] It was perfect.’887 
However, while Martinez Soler admitted that quoting foreign media instead of publishing 
the news themselves saved the Spanish journalists from taking direct responsibility for the 
authorship, this practice still came at a risk. Sahagún gives an example of the consequences, 
                                                          
882 Migual Ángel Aguilar, interview by Tobias Reckling. 
883 Sahagún, El mundo fué noticia, 232. 
884 Ibid., 232.  
885 Ibid. See also Migual Ángel Aguilar, interview by Tobias Reckling. 
886 Madrid, “Los fabricantes de automóviles con López de Letona,” 16 January 1971, 5 [unsigned]. 
887 José Antonio Martínez Soler, interview by Tobias Reckling. 
 210 
 
which news borrowing could have for Spanish media and journalists. In 1970, Madrid 
published a report by Le Monde on police controls in Spanish universities. This report 
resulted in a fine for the newspaper and its suspension for two months.888 Indeed, Sahagún 
indirectly links the closedown of Madrid in 1971 to this news borrowing on domestic news. 
The Spanish newspaper was officially shutdown for, among others, ‘manipulating the press 
law and official propaganda’889. Shortly after, Calvo Serer, who had become president of 
the Council of Administration of Madrid in 1966, had to go into exile in France.  
 
Foreign press and the Spanish opposition 
The previous section has shown that the Spanish public, through access to foreign media, 
to some extent had access to international news in general as well as uncensored reports on 
Spain. The foreign press became of particular importance for the political opposition 
against the Franco regime, however, both as a source of information and a means of 
communication. Indeed, as this section will argue, the foreign press became a central 
instrument for the political opposition for reaching a wider public outside and, to some 
extent, within Spain.  
Apart from the continued but limited underground guerrilla resistance by the Maquis, 890 
the political opposition within Spain was, according to Julían Casanova and Carlos Gil 
Andrés, ‘lost in wilderness’891 after the Second World War. This was the result of the 
Franco regime’s brutal suppression of any opposition after victory in the Spanish Civil War. 
As a result, the opposition against the dictatorship mostly re-organized outside of Spain. 
The thousands of anarchists, republicans, communists and socialists who had left Spain 
after the Spanish Civil War, actively continued their struggle against the Franco regime 
both in their own and foreign media like the above mentioned international broadcasters.  
Political and social resistance within Spain slowly started to develop during the 1950s. 
From the beginning, this opposition against the Franco regime received the attention of the 
foreign and French press in particular. Le Monde intensively covered the emerging 
resistance against the Franco regime – such as labour conflicts and students protests - 
towards the end of the 1950s. Because of his frequent reports on these matters, the MIT 
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saw in the Le Monde correspondent André Monconduit the ‘chronicler of Spanish strikes, 
[…] separatist manifestations, protests, social labour or economic unrest’892.  
Reports by correspondents like Monconduit on the protesting students and workers and 
their repression counteracted the regime’s striving for international acceptance. The 
importance of the foreign press and the correspondents in Spain for the resistance against 
the Franco regime in particular, however, initially went beyond mere reports. Instead, the 
foreign press also provided regime critics with a platform on which to reach a wider public. 
In the first instance, this concerned critics from within the regime. Monconduit, for 
instance, maintained close ties to monarchist followers of the Bourbon King Don Juan and 
members of the Opus Dei. In the beginning of the 1950s, it was members of these two 
groups who started to form an alliance which was to become known as Tercera Fuerza, a 
third force within the heterogeneous power structure of the Francoist system.893 Politically, 
this new group stood against both the Falange as well as the Regime Catholics around the 
Foreign Minister Martin Artajo. It aimed for a change of personnel in the government in 
order to secure the regime’s survival894. Monconduit gave the Tercera Fuerza and one of 
its most prominent members, the director of the National Scientific Council (Consejo 
Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, CSIC) Rafael Calvo Serer in particular, a voice in 
the French press up to the point of being labeled by the Francoist authorities as his personal 
‘spokesman’895. Well-connected international protagonists of the political opposition like 
Serer also made their own use of the foreign press as a means of communication without 
the correspondents as intermediaries. In September 1953, Calvo Serer attacked both the 
Falange and the Regime Catholics through the French Press.896 In contrast to the 
correspondents, however, such actions for Spaniards came at a considerable risk. The 
Francoist authorities dismissed Calvo Serer shortly after from his post at the CSIC.  
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While the particular attention which Monconduit gave Serer was based on the ‘cultivated 
friendship’897 between the two men, other foreign media and correspondents also became 
important transmitters of the early opposition against the Franco regime. This interest of 
the foreign press in the early internal opposition against the Franco regime was also 
partially born out of journalistic necessity. While the Spanish press was censored, chapter 
six will show that the Francoist authorities followed a very strict information policy towards 
the foreign press. The political opposition was both willing and in the position and need of 
filling this informational gap for the correspondents. As the Reuter’s bureau chief Henry 
Buckley outlined to an OID official in 1950: ‘in Spain one has much better information 
from the hostile or rebellious groups than from the government’898.  
Besides opposition from within the regime like Calvo Serer, for most of the 1950s there 
was, however, little organized opposition within Spain to pass information to the foreign 
press. It was not before the end of the decade that organized political opposition 
fundamentally opposed to the regime started to form. A turning point in this process was 
the meeting of representatives of opposition groups in Munich in July 1962, outlined in 
Chapter 1. It became, both within and outside of Spain, a symbol for opposition against the 
Franco regime. 
The group that became the strongest and best-organized opposition against the Franco 
regime were the Spanish communists. Through their control of the clandestine trade 
unionism of the Workers’ Commissions (Commissiones Obrerars, CC.OO), the Spanish 
communists became the ‘hegemonic force of the anti-Francoism’ in the 1960s899. The 
CC.OO became a central force in Spanish labour conflicts since the beginning of the 1960s, 
undermining the regime’s attempts to control the Spanish work force through its own 
unions.900 The relations of the Spanish communists within Spain with the foreign press, 
however, were complicated. The communists had, through their exiled comrades, access to 
their own media like the aforementioned international broadcasters through which they 
could reach the Spanish public. On the other hand, in the context of the Cold War, the 
communists could not count on making their views public in Western media like the 
moderate opposition could in the French press. Even many social democratic and other 
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centre-left newspapers and their correspondents, who were strongly opposed to 
communism in the Cold War and in their own countries, kept their distance from the 
communists. Manfred von Conta of the liberal-left Süddeutsche Zeitung, who had covered 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary before coming to Spain, even explicitly avoided any direct 
contacts with ‘anti-democratic’ elements of the opposition like the communists.901  
Nevertheless, besides these limitations the foreign press was still an important 
communicator for the communist opposition against the Franco regime. Foreign media 
regularly covered the communist organized labour protests and especially the repression of 
the communist resistance by the Francoist authorities. This became strongly visible when 
the Francoist authorities imprisoned, tortured and eventually executed the communist 
leader Julian Grimau in April 1963. The intensive media coverage of the events in Spain 
turned the execution of Grimau into an international media event,902 which the 
correspondents Görtz and Herrmann, both accredited since the beginning of the 1960s, still 
remembered well.903  
The attention of the foreign press for the repression of the communist opposition continued 
thereafter, as the CC.OO leader Marcelino Camacho vividly recalled in his memoirs. The 
Francoist authorities imprisoned Camacho in 1967 and he was only pardoned after the death 
of Franco in 1975. Camacho enjoyed the support of the foreign press both before and during 
his time in the Francoist prisons:  
We have never appropriately valued the help which the majority of the foreign 
correspondents gave to us. Personally, if I want to be just and honest, I have to 
recall and recognize that, in the almost ten years I spent in the Francoist prisons 
in particular, they maintained almost weekly contact with Joséfina, my partner, 
and with my sister Vicenta. They used almost all of my cards [from prison] for 
their reports when they looked for information alternative to the official; they 
“followed the fights of the prison, as well as the ones in the companies and the 
streets.904  
For the press, the story of the imprisoned workers’ leader and his wife waiting for him for 
almost ten years also constituted a human interest story and therefore made it even more 
interesting.  
                                                          
901 Manfred von Conta. Skype-Interview Tobias Reckling. 
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While parts of the foreign press kept their distance from the communists, the support of 
other, ideologically closer correspondents went beyond journalistic coverage. Some 
correspondents actively helped the communist opposition to establish contacts with foreign 
political parties and unions. According to Camacho, the correspondent Sieglinde Herrmann 
in particular ‘was a great help for us with the contacts to the German unions which followed 
our activities’905. The stringer Herrmann was officially accredited for, among others, the 
left-wing Frankfurter Rundschau in the mid-1960s and had excellent contacts with German 
trade unionists and social democrats.906 Although the German trade union IG Metall and 
the SPD, which were of central importance for the Spanish opposition, did not directly 
support the communists, these contacts were nevertheless important. In the apartment of 
Herrmann, Camacho, for instance, met on various occasions the Spaniard Carlos Pardo, 
among others.907 Pardo, a Spanish emigrant in Germany, was an active IG Metall trade 
unionist and, as the chief editor of the IG Metall’s highly Franco critical monthly magazine 
Exprés Español,908 a central actor in the trade union’s ‘educational programme’ for Spanish 
workers in Germany. Besides Herrmann, Camacho also explicitly mentions in his memoirs 
three other correspondents which were of particular importance for the CC.OO: the 
Argentinian Armando Puente, who was working mainly for French media, Harry Debelius 
of The Times and José Antonio Novais of Le Monde.909 The latter was very central to events. 
In an interview with the Spanish journalist Nativel Preciado, Camacho’s widow recalled 
that ‘whatever happened to the political prisoners appeared the next day in Le Monde, a 
thing which very much upset Franco’910. 
Le Monde, however, was not only important to Camacho during the 1960s, as it had been 
for the opposition within the regime during the 1950s but Le Monde and the Spanish-born 
Novais, who became the newspaper’s correspondent in 1961, were of central importance 
for the entire political opposition. In contrast to Monconduit, as his predecessor as Le 
Monde correspondent, Novais continuously reported for the French newspaper from Spain 
until after Franco’s death. The growing resistance against the Franco regime in the Spanish 
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universities was crucial for this development. Following the substantial expansion of the 
university system, more and more students as well as teachers started to show their 
discontent with the dictatorship throughout the 1960s.911 Like other protagonists of a young, 
regime critical generation of journalists, Novais had studied at one of the newly created 
departments for communication, which became one of the centres of student protests. As a 
correspondent, he chronicled the student protests against the regime. Students and later 
journalists like Aguilar have remembered him as the person to go to in order to make the 
student’s protests public.912 The extent of Novais’ coverage became visible in a number of 
issues of Le Monde, which the Francoist authorities retained because of his reports on 
student protests and their repression. In January and February of 1968 alone, the DG for 
the Press withheld altogether 25 issues of Le Monde.913  
The importance of Novais and Le Monde was not limited, however, to the reporting on the 
situation in Spain for the French public. Instead and as previously claimed, Le Monde was 
a central source of information in Spain and for the political opposition in particular. The 
Francoist authorities’ control of the French newspaper’s distribution only had a limited 
impact on the access to Le Monde by parts of the Spanish public. The Spanish journalist 
Aguilar and, among others, the correspondents Herrmann and Haubrich recalled in 
interviews, however, that the unauthorized issues of Le Monde were also illegally 
distributed in Spain and in Spanish universities in particular.914 The Spanish philosopher 
and essayist José Luis López-Aranguren highlighted this particular importance of Le 
Monde. López-Aranguren was a professor at the Universidad de Complutense de Madrid 
until 1966, when he was dismissed by the Franco regime because of his support of the 
student’s protests. For him, Le Monde during these years was the central ‘informational 
organ for Spaniards. A Spaniard, when he wants to know what is going on in Spain, must 
turn to “Le Monde” because in the Spanish newspapers one cannot inform himself.’915 
Today, Novais’ particular importance to the student protests is remembered in a street in 
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Madrid’s university quarter, which was named after the correspondent because of his ‘close 
relationship with the world of university’916 in 1998.  
Besides the students’ protests and communists, Le Monde, mainly because of its 
correspondent Novais, was also decisive for further development of the internal Spanish 
opposition as a central source of information and means of transnational communication. 
This applied to the reorganizing Spanish socialists within Spain. After the end of the Second 
World War, the Spanish socialists - namely the PSOE - were organized in exile in Toulouse 
under the long-term leadership of Rodolfo Llopis.917 From there, the PSOE organized its 
campaigns against the Franco regime both in a variety of its own media and through the 
French press.918 During the 1960s, however, socialists within Spain became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the ‘heavy hand of Llopis’ exiled bureaucracy’919. They perceived the 
exile leadership as increasingly disconnected from reality in Francoist Spain, and started to 
strive for independence. In 1968, this process resulted in the foundation of the Socialist 
Party of the Interior (Partido Socialista Interior, PSI) under the leadership of Tierno Galván. 
Galván, a university professor, was dismissed from his post by the Francoist authorities 
together with López-Aranguren in 1966 because of his support of student protests.  
Like Camacho, Galván also stressed in his memoirs the central agency of Novais as one of 
the correspondents ‘who worked the most in support and to the benefit of democracy’920. 
Although Galván does not elaborate on this point in his memoirs, it can be assumed that 
the publicity by Le Monde was of particular importance for him in his parallel struggle 
against the Franco regime and for independence from the exile leadership in France. It gave 
him the possibility to reach both the Spanish and French public.  
Besides its central role, Le Monde was of course not the only foreign medium, which the 
internal Spanish opposition used in order to make itself heard, as Galván further outlines: 
On many occasions we intervened like editors in the service of the foreign 
journalists, because it was us who gave the ready prepared news to the 
correspondents. There was hardly a morning when we, leaving for work, did 
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not pass by the offices of United Press and France Press […]. There, befriended 
journalists took the news we gave them and spread it throughout the world.921  
Even more than for Galván’s PSI, the foreign press was crucial to the other, eventually 
more successful, socialist party organization created in Spain during the Franco regime. 
The foundation of the PSI only was the first climax in the internal Spanish socialists’ 
striving for independence from the exile leadership. Following a conflictual process that 
began at the beginning of the 1970s, this process culminated in the creation of a PSOE 
executive and, eventually, a PSOE party organization within Spain. The young Felipe 
González, the later Spanish Prime Minister, became secretary general. In 1974, the Socialist 
International officially legitimized the so-called Renewed PSOE (PSOE Renovado)922 and 
the PSI, which was no longer the only internal socialist party, was renamed into the Popular 
Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular, PSP). Following the PSOE’s success in the first 
democratic elections after the death of Franco in 1977, PSP was eventually integrated into 
the PSOE in the following year.  
For the socialists around González, presence in the foreign press was not only important 
because of the general publicity both within and outside of Spain but also for reaching out 
to the international public which was crucial for the Spanish socialists in order to secure – 
in rivalry with the PSI – the necessary financial, logistic and ideological support from 
abroad. This applied in particular to the support from the German SPD and the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation, which was associated with it. Recent research has shown that foreign 
support was crucial to the PSOE’s eventual success.923 In fact, Antonio Muñoz Sánchez 
also explicitly mentions German and Swiss correspondents and the correspondents of the 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung in particular. Arnold Hottinger, for example, played an active part in 
the SPD’s eventual decision to concentrate its support exclusively on the PSOE within 
Spain.924 
However, and in contrast to Galván, central PSOE leaders such as González or Alfonso 
Guerra hardly mention the foreign press in their memoirs. Nevertheless, the available 
evidence strongly suggests that foreign correspondents and the foreign press in fact played 
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a central role. In particular, the interviewed German correspondents still remember very 
well the extremely active press work of the PSOE which was coordinated at the beginning 
of the 1970s by the later General Secretary of NATO, Javier Solana.925 Walter Haubrich in 
particular not only recalled the PSOE’s active presswork but also openly admitted that he 
was personally very much in favour of the PSOE and González or ‘the new star on the 
Spanish sky’ 926 as he called him in an article published during the transition. Haubrich 
personally spoke to González for the first time in 1974, shortly after the Socialist 
International officially recognized the Renewed PSOE. At this time, González was working 
clandestinely under his code name Isidoro out of Seville on the reorganization of the PSOE 
within Spain.927 Thereafter, Haubrich became one of the correspondents who most strongly 
supported the PSOE. This was reflected in his frequent and favourable press reports on the 
PSOE during the Spanish transition.928 The numerous awards which Haubrich, like Novais, 
received in democratic Spain, as well as the obituaries in Spanish media after his death in 
2015 reflected his importance for the democratic opposition during the Franco regime.929  
The relations of the foreign press with the political opposition against the Franco regime, 
however, must naturally remain incomplete. Too diverse was the loosely organized 
opposition against the Franco regime and too widespread were the contacts of the foreign 
correspondents. When asked about his contacts with the opposition by the time of Franco’s 
death, the Argentinian correspondent Puente, for instance, provided a long list, which 
included, besides the aforementioned groups, Falangists and Catholics critical of the 
regime, Basque and Catalan nationalists and important lawyers critical of the regime and 
who supported the opposition in the Francoist courts.930 Two groups whose representatives 
could also be found in Armando’s lists and which in some cases were identical, however, 
were nevertheless of special importance for the foreign press core in general: the moderate 
opposition which, at least in part, came from within the regime, and Spanish journalists. 
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As we have seen above, for Franco critical dissidents like Calvo Serer, the foreign press 
and the French press especially remained an important means of communication. Following 
his exile to France after the closing down of Madrid in 1971, Calvo Serer used the French 
press to make his criticisms of the Franco regime public as he had previously done in the 
1950s. By paraphrasing Emile Zola’s famous criticism during the Dreyfus affair in France, 
Calvo Serer attacked the Franco regime in a Le Monde article under the title ‘Moi aussi, 
j’accuse…’931 However, other members of the moderate opposition within Spain also 
maintained close relations to the foreign press corps. This applied to Joaquín Ruiz-
Giménez, the former Minister of Education who became a leader of the Christian 
Democratic opposition and founded the regime critical Cuadernos para el Diálogo during 
the 1960s. Another group of particular importance for the foreign press and vice versa were 
regime critical monarchists around José María Areilza, who after the death of Franco 
became Spain’s Foreign Minister. During the Spanish transition, in particular the Christian 
Democrats around Ruiz-Giménez received, like the socialists, considerable international 
support from European Christian Democratic party networks.932 Like Ruiz-Giménez, 
Areilza also had a career in the Franco regime and served as Spanish ambassador in Paris 
from 1960 until 1964 in addition to other posts. Since the mid-1960s, Areilza distanced 
himself from the Franco regime and became a leading figure of Spain’s moderate, pro-
democratic opposition.  
Among the examined memoirs of actors of the political opposition, Areilza dedicated the 
most attention to his contacts with the foreign press and its importance for his opposition 
to the regime.933 Besides numerous personal memories, Novais was to Areilza a ‘man of 
great civil courage in decisive moments’934. The relationship between central actors of the 
moderate opposition with the foreign press was, however, of special importance for both 
parties for two reasons. First, representatives of the moderate opposition like Areilza had 
the attention of the conservative, right of centre media that were not fully opposed to the 
Franco regime and rather suspicious of the left-wing opposition. Areilza, for instance, 
explicitly highlights his relation with Le Figaro`s Spain correspondent Jacques Guillemé 
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Brulon as his ‘best link […] to the conservative French press’935. While for Areilza, 
Guillemé Brulon was a representative of the ‘most conservative right-wing’ of France and 
in favour of the Franco regime, he was nevertheless open to Areilza’s ideas for democratic 
change. In fact, the presence in Le Figaro was for Areilza ‘an aspect of great importance in 
order to attain in France the support of a great sector of the right Gaullists and post-
Gaullists’936.  
Second, the correspondents interviewed generally stressed the particular importance of 
these former Francoist politician’s for their understanding of the regime’s internal affairs. 
Areilza himself outlines this aspect very clearly in his memoirs. The foreign correspondents 
‘generally […] turned to me [Areilza] in order to obtain reliable information on what was 
going on on the political terrain.’937 Against the background of limited official information, 
Areilza saw himself mostly as a translator and interpreter of the Franco regime’s politics: 
‘My role was to compensate the voluntary absence of information which characterized the 
government spokespersons’938. Ruiz-Giménez described his relations with the foreign press 
in similar terms. In Ruiz-Giménez’s published diaries, his special importance for the 
foreign press becomes particularly visible in the context of the suppression of the growing 
resistance against the dictatorship at the end of the 1960s. Following the declaration of yet 
another state of emergency in January 1969, correspondents turned to Ruiz-Giménez in 
order to attain a better understanding of what was going on within the regime:  
Today, I spent almost the entire morning receiving foreign journalists who want 
to know and who try to understand what is almost incomprehensible. To all of 
them I emphasized the complexity of the matter, with current factors […] and 
background factors […].939 
Ruiz-Giménez’ day in January 1969 continued with visits and calls from foreign 
correspondents, which led to his conclusion: ‘The Government must know all this and can 
do nothing less than worry about (the tourism, the European Common Market, etc.)’940. 
The Francoist government was well informed about the reports in the foreign press through 
the MIT’s regular newsletters. The question remains, however, to what extent the attention 
of the foreign press and the relationship with the foreign correspondents made a difference 
for the Spanish opposition. Given the complexity of the evolution of the multi-faceted anti-
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Francoist opposition and the variety of internal and external factors involved, this question 
is difficult to answer. The available evidence nevertheless allows for some conclusions, 
however. 
The most immediate avenue of support in the foreign press corps for the Spanish opposition 
was the direct political involvement of individual correspondents. As such, the role that 
some correspondents fulfilled as transnational brokers and emissaries between the Spanish 
opposition and foreign political actors became of particular importance. Both Galván and 
Camacho have outlined the importance of Sieglinde Herrmann for the establishment of 
contacts with the German Social Democrats and IG Metall during the 1960s. Herrmann, 
however, was not the only correspondent to mediate between the political opposition and 
foreign political actors. Another example is the German correspondent Manfred von Conta, 
who delivered in the beginning of the 1970s information of the Spanish opposition to the 
German embassy in Madrid. A concrete example of when his support had a direct impact, 
was the imprisonment and subsequent impeachment of the journalist Carlos Pardo for 
‘illegal propaganda’941 in May 1971. The Spaniard Pardo was living in Germany where he 
edited Exprés Español, the highly Francocritical magazine of the German trade union IG 
Metall for Spanish workers. The Francoist authorities arrested him during a visit to Spain. 
Von Conta, who was contacted by the illegal socialist Spanish General Workers Union 
(Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT), not only immediately informed the Spanish 
embassy informally about Pardo’s imprisonment but the correspondent also delivered a 
letter from the UGT to the German ambassador,942 in which the Spanish trade unionists 
asked for German support on behalf of Pardo.943 This attempt was successful. After long 
diplomatic negotiations between the Francoist authorities and the German ambassador in 
Madrid, Hermann Meyer-Lindenberg944 and German SPD politicians,945 Pardo was 
released. 
The support of parts of the foreign press for the political opposition in some cases went so 
far that the foreign journalists themselves could be considered as active members of the 
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anti-Francoist opposition. This applied in particular to Herrmann, Novais and Haubrich. In 
the case of Haubrich, his proximity to the opposition became almost symbolically visible 
in the proclamation of the Democratic Junta of Spain. Parallel to the group’s official 
proclamation in Paris, the Democratic Junta’s branch within Spain was founded in 
Haubrich’s apartment Madrid in 1974.946 In interviews with him for this thesis, Haubrich 
admitted that he and his colleagues sometimes had their doubts in how far their support of 
the political opposition still was compatible with their professional ethics as journalists 
requiring a certain distance and objectivity.947 
This direct support of parts of the foreign press corps for the political opposition, however, 
was still exceptional. The question therefore remains as to how far their general coverage 
of the resistance against the Franco regime had an impact on the opposition’s situation. For 
the correspondent Manfred von Conta, there was little doubt that it had: 
For members of the opposition, those foreign press people that had an open ear 
for them could be life-saving, because harsh repression of opponents just for 
their ideological convictions was sure to be criticized in democratic Europe. 
Spain had to find out for economic reasons how to get along with the rest of 
Europe and could not behave at will – the men in charge of the regime might 
have felt an agonizing frustration because of that.948 
The occasion to which von Conta indirectly refers and in which he considered the foreign 
press as ‘life-saving’, was the Burgos trials at the end of 1970s. Following the intensive 
news coverage by foreign media and international protests, the Francoist authorities 
changed the six original death sentences into prison sentences. Like von Conta, his 
colleagues Herrmann, Haubrich and others as well as members of the opposition, also 
considered the support and news coverage during the Burgos trials as crucial. For Areilza, 
the ‘transmission of the international image of the events served as visible weight, decisive 
in the hour of the global commutation of the death penalties’949. In the aftermath of the 
oppositional euphoria after the Burgos trials, the Spanish journalist Aguilar even coined the 
phrase: ‘Franco, who until now had only felt responsible before God and History, also 
begins to be so before the foreign press’950. As Martínez Soler recalled in an interview, 
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Aguilar’s praise of the foreign press became a running joke among oppositional Spanish 
journalists.951  
There is no doubt that the international press coverage of the Burgos trials in 1970 had a 
strong impact on the regimes decision to reverse the death sentences on 30 December 1970. 
At the same time, however, the Burgos trials also took place in a very particular 
international situation that is overlooked in the literature that discusses them. Practically 
parallel to the Burgos trial, the so-called First Leningrad Trial took place in the Soviet 
Union against a group of 16 mostly Jewish Soviet citizens who had tried to hijack a plane 
in order to flee to Israel. The KGB arrested the group before the group could realize its 
plan. Although nobody was harmed, the entire group was put on trial in December 1970. 
On 24 December, a Soviet court condemned two members of the group to death and the 
others to long prison sentences only one day before the announcement of the verdict of the 
Burgos trials.952 Like the Burgos trials, massive international protests accompanied the trial 
in Leningrad.953 Indeed, Western media like the German magazine Der Spiegel perceived 
the two trials as comparable cases of ‘terror justice’954. A commentator in the strongly anti-
communist Springer daily newspaper Die Welt pointed out that ‘one has to name Madrid 
and Moscow in the same breath’955. The situation was therefore favourable for the Francoist 
propagandists to show mercy in the eyes of the international public in order to distance 
themselves from the communist enemy. The same thought might have also played a role in 
the suspension of the death sentences by the Soviet officials only one day after the Spanish 
announcement.  
What is more important than this contextualization of the Burgos trials in 1970 is, however, 
that it remained an isolated case. Other trials that resulted in death sentences ended, besides 
intensive international news coverage and protests, very differently. When the Francoist 
authorities sentenced the communist leader Julian Grimau to death in 1963, the Franco 
regime did not only execute Grimau but even executed the two anarchists, Joaquín Delgado 
and Francisco Granados, only four months after Grimau despite all international protests.956 
Furthermore, while Burgos indeed marked a turning point in the international perception of 
the Franco regime, the international media coverage of later trials did not change the 
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verdicts. In 1973, the Franco regime executed the Catalan anarchist Salvador Puig Antich 
with the garrotte despite massive international media coverage and protests including pleas 
for clemency by the Vatican. Two years later, the Franco regime carried out the executions 
of five members of ETA in September 1975 despite massive international media, public 
protests, and clemencies for mercy by European governments as well as European 
institutions.957 Ruiz-Gimenez quoted expectation that the consequences of such decisions 
for the Spanish tourism industry and relations with the EEC would make an impact, 
therefore, remained an unfulfilled hope. The executions in 1975 resulted in the temporary 
suspension of Spain’s trade agreement with the EEC and the withdrawal of 15 
governments’ ambassadors in Spain.958 
Nevertheless, the foreign press was a crucial means of communication, information and 
support for the Spanish opposition under the conditions of the Francoist dictatorship. The 
Spanish journalist Nativel Preciado is also right in stressing that foreign correspondents 
were the ‘spokespersons of the workers, unions, clandestine parties, Spanish journalists 
and, in general, of every individual whose mouth the regime intended to close’959. Preciado 
aptly concludes that the reports in international media ‘about the Burgos trial or the last 
executions of Franco contributed as a determining factor to the progressive erosion of the 
regime’960. Beginning with the international protests against the Burgos trials in 1970 and 
culminating in the international ostracization of the regime following the executions in 
1975, the reports of the foreign press on the situation in Spain without question contributed 
to the growing international isolation of the Franco regime. At the same time, the foreign 
press also contributed to the strengthening and international visibility of the political 
opposition throughout the last years of the regime. During the early months of the Spanish 
transition in particular, before the Spanish press gained greater independence, the support 
of the foreign press was crucial. Shortly after the death of Franco, for instance, the BBC 
gave the still illegal opposition a voice in Spain by broadcasting a series of interviews with 
key political actors. These included interviews with the Socialist leader Felipe González, 
and the exiled leader of the PCE, Santiago Carrillo.961  
Besides the importance of the foreign press for the political opposition however, the foreign 
media’s impact on the regime itself was limited, as the majority of cases of death penalties 
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and their execution despite international protests discussed above shows very clearly. In 
decisive moments like the aforementioned trials, the inner circle of the Francoist leadership, 
as Haubrich put it in an interview, simply ‘did not care’962. This does not imply that the 
Franco regime was indifferent about its image in foreign media. The next chapter will show 
that the Franco regime actively tried to influence and control the work of foreign 
correspondents in Spain. First, however, the following section will discuss how the 
Francoist authorities controlled the distribution of foreign press in Spain.  
 
Control of the foreign press by the Franco regime 
While the Franco regime allowed the import of foreign press in Spain in principle, this by 
no means implies that it gave up control over its distribution. As this chapter has already 
shown in the case of Le Monde, the Franco regime was careful not to allow the distribution 
of foreign print media with regime critical content. The Francoist authorities applied this 
indirect censorship from the beginning of the reauthorization of foreign press for 
distribution in Spain after the Second World War until the death of Franco and even 
thereafter. Analysis of the censored newspapers not only provides insight into this praxis 
but also, in connection with the previously highlighted examination of the distribution of 
foreign press and the importance it had for the political opposition, it also allows for 
conclusions on the actual reporting of particular foreign media on Spain.  
The Franco regime was not particularly discrete about the control of foreign press (which 
was obvious for interested Spanish readers anyway). In 1966, for instance, the MIT 
included in a publication for Spanish media professionals, lists of non-authorized foreign 
newspapers for the years 1964 and 1965. These lists, however, were mainly concerned with 
non-authorization because of pornographic or perceived amoral content. The Franco regime 
had ‘left public morality in the hands of the Catholic Church’963, for which such content 
was neither acceptable nor appropriate for the Spanish public. According to this 
publication, the MIT excluded 323 mainly German, French, British, and American 
publications from distribution for such reasons between 1962 and August 1965.964 This 
strict censorship of foreign publications was a long-standing policy, closely monitored by 
the Catholic Church. During the mid-1950s German publishers complained to the German 
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embassy in Madrid about the ‘all too strict’965 censorship practice of the regime. In a 
meeting with the German press attaché in Spain, a representative of the MIT then explained 
that the Francoist authorities followed ‘especially strict standards for pictures of pin-up 
girls and pictures of summery beach life’966. If the MIT’s own censors would not be 
thorough enough on this matter, the Catholic Church would directly intervene. Although 
even the MIT representative personally declared that he had ‘not always considered the 
strictness of the Church as justified’, he stressed that nothing could be done about this. The 
discussion ended with the recommendation from the MIT that, if German media had an 
interest in distribution in Spain, they would also have to accept in the future the ‘risk of a 
ban for photos of women exposing too much skin’967. This policy remained unchanged until 
the end of the regime. 
The MIT publication from 1965 also provided information on publications which the 
Francoist authorities had not authorized for political reasons. These included ‘tendentious 
or false information’968 as well as offences against the head of state. According to the MIT, 
however, very few foreign publications were actually banned for such reasons. This 
included four Swedish newspapers, including the popular daily Aftonbladet, which the MIT 
did not authorize for ‘rude lies in connection with alleged tortures in Spain’969. Primarily, 
however, the MIT banned Le Monde from the Spanish sales stands. In 1965, for example, 
the MIT did not authorize Le Monde for ‘tendentious or false information’970 from 3 March 
to 2 July. 
These numbers as well as the reasons given for the non-authorization, however, did not 
reflect the reality of the MIT’s actual policy. Although no data for 1965 is available - which 
would allow for a direct comparison - an internal MIT censorship list for foreign 
publications from 1968 allows for a partial comparison (Figure 11). In total, the MIT under 
Fraga refused to authorize 562 foreign publications for sale in Spain in 1968, despite 
Fraga’s self-promotion as a liberalizer. Not only was this number far higher than the official 
account in 1965 but the number of newspapers not authorized for non-moral reasons 
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increased, although this nevertheless remained the most frequent cause for the MIT’s non-
authorization of foreign publications.  
The comparison of these two lists is, of course, problematic. Spain had changed 
considerably between 1965 and 1968. Students articulated their discontent with the regime 
on a massive scale, while the number of workers strikes had tripled compared to 1966 and 
the Basque ETA had developed into an active terrorist organization.971 This growing 
resistance and its repression by the Franco regime also resulted in an increase in 
international news coverage. Besides these considerations, the comparison of these lists 
allows for further insights into the actual censorship praxis of the Francoist authorities. 
The difference to 1965 becomes visible, for instance, in the treatment of the US press. The 
official list of 1965 and the internal list of the MIT from 1968 both account for practically 
the same number of issues of US publications not allowed for sale in Spain (54 in 1965 and 
51 in1968). However, while the MIT, in order to protect the Spanish public from the ‘moral 
decay from abroad’, did not officially authorize these 54 US publications in 1965, the 
internal list of the MIT gives another impression. In 1968, the MIT accounted for 14 issues 
of US media which were not authorized for political reasons. These included, among others, 
an issue of Newsweek (4 November 1968) because of an article on demonstrations in Spain 
and an issue of Time (26 July 1968) on censorship in Spain.972 Given both the political and 
propagandistic importance of the Franco regime’s relationship with the US, it seems that 
the official publication of non-authorizations of US-media for political reasons did not seem 
opportune. 
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Figure 11: Foreign print media not authorized for sale in Spain in 1968973 
 
While this treatment of the US press sheds light on the actual MIT policy with respect to 
the control of the foreign press, it also reflects the limited interest of the US press in Spain’s 
internal affairs at the time. This conclusion follows from an analysis of the regime’s policy 
towards foreign press which followed Spanish politics with greater attention and especially 
towards the French press. Figure 11 shows that the French press was not only the most 
widely distributed foreign press in Spain, but also by far the most often non-authorized 
foreign press. Not only were more than a third of all not authorized publications in 1968 
French (217). Instead, the vast majority of these banned French publications (168) were 
stopped for political reasons from sale in Spain. This conclusion becomes evident by 
examining the attitude of the Francoist authorities towards media from other major 
European countries. Of the 110 non-authorized issues of German media, for instance, the 
MIT only banned 13 for political reasons in 1968. Almost 90% of the non-authorized 
German publications were excluded from sale for moral reasons - such as the five issues of 
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the magazine Wochenend which had women in bikinis on their front pages.974 The moral 
control of the Catholic Church remained intact besides the fact that Western European 
women were already omnipresent on Spanish beaches anyway.975 The examination of the 
British press provides a similar picture. 
The large number of French publications banned for political reasons further supports the 
argument made above regarding the special role of the French press. Not only was the 
French press the most widely distributed and, in terms of language, accessible foreign press 
in Spain but the large number of non-authorized French media in 1968 also supports the 
argument that the French press treated the Franco regime with a considerable and critical 
attention. This applied to Le Monde in particular. The French newspaper and its 
correspondent Novais in Madrid accounted for more than half (102 in total) of the French 
publications banned for sale in Spain in 1968. Therefore, Le Monde was and remained the 
single most non-authorized foreign print media in Spain. This strict attitude of the Francoist 
authorities towards Le Monde and, as the following chapter will show, its correspondents 
in Spain, was probably the most direct reflection of both the newspapers attention towards 
the Franco regime and its resulting importance for the Spanish public. Indeed, at times the 
justifications listed by the MIT for the non-authorization of Le Monde leave the impression 
that it contained a special section on Spain with daily reports. In February 1968 alone, for 
instance, the MIT banned 16 issues of Le Monde as a result of Novais’ almost daily reports 
on the situation in Spain and the growing student protests against the Franco regime.  
The examined censorship list of the MIT not only provides insights into the reality of the 
regime’s control of the foreign press at the end of the 1960sbut also shows that the majority 
of foreign press had seemingly little interest in Spain’s internal political affairs and 
therefore gave the Spanish censors little reason to intervene. Foreign publications were 
mostly banned for moral reasons. That the only occasional banning of other non-French 
publications for political reasons was a reflection of the obvious lack of general interest in 
Spain became visible when the Franco regime increasingly moved into the spot light of 
international media interest from the end of the 1960s.  
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Chapter 3 and 4 have shown that a new generation of staff correspondents came to Spain 
from the end of the 1960s. This had a direct impact on the Franco regime’s international 
media image. While the German press corps, with its many former Nazi correspondents, 
for instance, gave the Franco regime (until the end of the 1960s) little reason to censor, this 
fundamentally changed with the appointment of this new generation of journalists.  
 
Figure 12: Foreign print media not authorized for sale in Spain, October 1975976 
The more critical attitude of parts of the foreign press corps and the resulting increase of 
censored foreign publications became clearly visible in the context of the most important 
Spanish media event since the Civil War: the death of Franco. The long illness of the 
dictator as well as the previous execution of five alleged terrorists drew, since October 
1975, hundreds of correspondents into Spain who reported intensively on events.977 Figure 
12 shows that the MIT coped with this situation with an equally intensive policy of non-
authorization of foreign publications. In October 1975 alone, and therefore still almost a 
month before the actual death of Franco on 20 November 1975, 287 issues of foreign media 
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were not authorized for distribution in Spain. The examination of the censored publications 
reveals two fundamental changes. First, while French publications still accounted for 
almost a third of all non-authorized foreign publications, the distribution in terms of 
nationality had changed significantly. Italian and Swiss media were also increasingly being 
non-authorized, while the censorship of US publications had become marginal. Second, 
political reasons had become the single most important reason for the MIT’s non-
authorization of foreign media. Of the almost 50 censored German publications, for 
instance, almost 90% (42 issues) were non-authorized because of reports on political 
developments in Spain. While this result must be seen in the context of the executions in 
October 1975 and Franco’s terminal illness, it nevertheless strongly reflects the changed 
attitude and attention of the German press towards Spain.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the access, control and importance of foreign media in Francoist 
Spain. The chapter has shown that French media were of particular importance to the 
Spanish public, both because the attention they dedicated to Spain and the widespread 
knowledge of French. International broadcasters with Spanish programmes, in particular 
Radio Paris and the BBC, also gave the Spanish public direct access to foreign news. The 
examination of the Spanish Service of the BBC has also shown, however, that this 
broadcaster was functioning under particular political constraints imposed by the Foreign 
Office. With the examination of the particularities of the BBC’s Spanish Service towards 
the Franco regime, the chapter has highlighted an aspect of the BBC’s broadcasts during 
the Cold War which so far has received little attention by researchers.  
Besides this direct access to foreign news, the chapter has stressed that the Spanish public 
also had an indirect access through republished or quoted articles from the foreign press in 
Spanish media. This practice of news borrowing was especially exploited by regime critical 
journalists in order to make information accessible that they could not directly publish in 
the Spanish press. These Spanish journalists explicitly passed information to foreign 
correspondents in order to quote them later on. For Spanish journalists, this practice not 
only provided their news with the additional legitimacy of referring to major foreign media 
but also, to a certain extent, protected them from repressions by the Francoist authorities 
because they did not take responsibility for the authorship of the published news. 
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The chapter has further shown that the foreign press and the contacts to the foreign 
correspondents were of central importance for all components of the political opposition. 
This was a mutually beneficial relationship since the political opposition was a crucial 
source of information for foreign correspondents. This applied especially to the moderate 
opposition with personal ties to the Franco regime. 
The foreign press provided the opposition not only with access to an international public. 
In particular, the widely read and distributed French newspaper Le Monde also was crucial 
for the opposition as means of communication within Spain. Instrumental for Le Monde’s 
importance was its Spanish-born correspondent José Antonio Novais. However, other 
correspondents and their media, namely Walter Haubrich of the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, were also crucial transnational communicators for the Spanish opposition. In this 
respect, the personal support of correspondents like Haubrich, Novais and others for the 
political opposition went beyond journalistic neutrality.  
The crucial importance of Le Monde and its Spain correspondents for the Spanish public in 
general and the opposition in particular was reflected in the frequent censorship of the 
newspaper by the Francoist authorities. Other foreign media were mainly censored because 
of, from the point of view of the conservative Catholic Franco regime, amoral content. The 
chapter has shown, however, that this changed with increased international interest in the 
regime and the accreditation of a new generation of staff correspondents from the end of 
the 1960s. Foreign media thereafter also became generally more critical about the Franco 
regime, as was reflected in the intensified censorship of foreign publications.  
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6. Foreign correspondents and the Franco regime: between 
control and persuasions 
The presence of foreign correspondents was for the Franco regime, as for other modern 
dictatorships that tolerated the presence of foreign journalists, a necessary abnormality. For 
the sake of its foreign image and the stability of its slowly recovering international 
acceptance after 1945, the Franco regime had little other choice than also accept the 
presence of foreign correspondents. However, the actual work of these correspondents was 
often difficult to bear for the Francoist authorities without taking action – which they did 
regularly.  
This chapter examines the means employed by the Franco regime to directly influence and 
control foreign correspondents. Rosendorf, who briefly discusses this subject, argues that 
‘the Franco regime had a rather steep learning curve during the 1950s when it came to 
handling the US press, particularly newspaper correspondents based in or frequently 
visiting Spain. But learn they did, and in fairly short order’978. Rosendorf in particular 
discusses the case of the The New York Times correspondent Samuel Pope Brewer. In 1951, 
the MIT cancelled Brewer’s press card and asked the correspondent to leave Spain within 
two months. Shortly thereafter, however, the MIT revised its decision and re-accredited 
Brewer. Rosendorf, who is primarily concerned with the successful Spanish PR campaign 
in the US, argues that the massive negative press coverage of the episode in the US caused 
the MIT to reconsider. Rosendorf further presents this episode as a brief and very counter-
productive relapse in the regime’s successful attempt overall to improve its foreign image 
after 1945 and that ‘Francisco Franco was determined never to repeat... this mistake’979. 
Indeed, according to Rosendorf, ‘the Franco regime would never again harass foreign 
correspondents’980.  
Rosendorf based this conclusion exclusively on a book written by one of Brewer’s 
successors as The New York Times correspondent in Madrid, Benjamin Welles.981 Welles 
worked from 1956 until 1962 in Spain. We remember from Chapter 1 that Welles was 
surprised to work free of direct censorship in Spain. He also stressed that he never was 
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‘summoned to the Foreign, the Information, or any other ministry to be upbraided, 
threatened, or pressured. 982  
For Rosendorf, therefore, the Franco regime’s interest in the improvement of its foreign 
reputation far outweighed the temptation to use harsh means against too critical foreign 
journalists. This chapter shows, however, that the actual policy of the Franco regime was 
far less stringent. While it became particularly careful with the correspondents of the 
influential The New York Times, the Francoist authorities continued to sanction foreign 
journalists - including US correspondents - until the end of the dictatorship using a variety 
of means. Furthermore, besides expelling correspondents and withdrawing their 
accreditations, the Francoist authorities also made use of an entire tool kit of measures to 
control the foreign press corps in Spain. This included, among others, threats, public 
campaigns against particular journalists, surveillance and the attempt to use diplomatic 
channels. Besides such sanctions, buying sympathy for the Franco regime through bribery 
also played a role.  
Although the Francoist authorities did not learn as fast as Rosendorf suggests, learn they 
did nevertheless. Therefore, this chapter examines how the policy of the Franco regime 
towards foreign correspondents changed from the 1950s together with Spain’s return onto 
the international stage.  
The chapter has four sections. The first three sections address the Franco regime’s policy 
towards the foreign press corps as it evolved over time. The last section assesses to what 
extent the regime’s policy had any actual impact on the behaviour of foreign correspondents 
in Spain and their attitude towards the Franco regime. 
 
From international isolation to the ministry of Manuel Fraga 
This thesis has already shown that the policy towards the foreign press was a sensitive issue 
for the Franco regime after the end of the Second World War. Spain desperately tried, under 
the leadership of the newly appointed Foreign Minister Martin Artajo, to repair its 
international reputation. The adaption of the policy towards the foreign press corps was an 
integral part of this strategy. This became visible in the end of the pre-censorship of foreign 
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correspondents and the first attempts to install an international press club in 1945 as well 
as the subsequent liberalization of the distribution of foreign publications. 
At the same time, however, the Foreign Ministry under Artajo found itself in a constant 
competence struggle with the newly founded Ministry for National Education and its 
Directorate General for the Press. The DG for the Press was less willing to accept this new 
approach towards the foreign press. This conflict of interest became particularly evident 
once the regime’s attempt to avoid its ostracization by the Allies had failed. Thereby, Artajo 
had lost the central argument in order to implement a less strict policy towards the foreign 
press corps. In 1947, the Ministry for National Education expelled a number of 
correspondents from Allied countries from Spain due to their critical reporting despite the 
negative consequences for the regime’s attempts to improve its international reputation. 
Most noticeably, the DG for the Press withdrew the accreditation of the AFP correspondent 
Raymond Hubert because of his alleged false reports in March 1947. This resulted in 
official complaints by French diplomats.983 Only a month later, the DG for the Press even 
cancelled the accreditation of a US correspondent, thus demonstrating that the Francoist 
authorities still had its difficulties with the new policy of non-censorship for 
correspondents. Similarly, after intercepting a telegram from the New York Post 
correspondent Francis E. McMahon to his newspaper, the DG for the Press immediately 
withdrew the journalist’s credentials.984 Although the DG for the Press did not expel 
McMahon from Spain, without his accreditation he was no longer able to send telegrams 
or communicate with his paper through official channels. Only fully accredited 
correspondents could send their reports through the Spanish telecommunication facilities. 
The particular case of McMahon not only led to reports in major publications such as The 
New York Times, but also to the further worsening of the diplomatic relations with the US. 
Indeed, the case resulted in a lengthy exchange of letters between the US Chargé d'affaires 
in Madrid and the man who had worked so hard for the improvement of relations with the 
US, Foreign Minister Artajo.985 Artajo, however, was in this case only the intermediary. 
What made the case even more difficult was that McMahon, who was actually a philosophy 
professor on leave for his journalistic activities, was also (although with strongly liberal 
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views) an outspoken Catholic and well known in the US.986 Although Artajo sent a lengthy 
reply to the American embassy in which he defended the decision of his fellow minister, 
he also dedicated a part of letter to assure the US administration that the withdrawal of 
McMahon’s credentials would not mean ‘any rectification in the firm and proven criterion 
which the Spanish Government maintains to assure without any censorship or control 
complete liberty of behaviour for foreign correspondents duly accredited in Spain’987.  
That the Foreign Ministry was indeed not pleased with the decision of its colleagues in the 
Ministry for National Education became clear when the UP called the foreign ministry´s 
Office for Diplomatic Information a few days later. The OID simply answered to the 
demand for an official statement on the matter that ‘they don’t have anything to say on this 
since this is a matter of the DG [for the press]’988.  
The policy towards the foreign press corps remained an issue between the two ministries 
and its responsible sub-departments. Following the diplomatic frictions after the 
withdrawal McMahon’s accreditation, however, Artajo’s influence was once more 
strengthened and other correspondents were expelled until 1951. Nevertheless, the DG for 
the Press still tried to keep the foreign press corps in line. One of the measures taken was 
that the DG for the Press simply refused to give accreditations to correspondents it 
considered as problematic. This policy, which the Francoist authorities continued to use, 
aimed at avoiding too critical correspondents and the need to expel them later on. The most 
noticeable case of a correspondent whose application for an accreditation was refused was 
the previously mentioned French correspondent André Monconduit in 1950.  
The previous chapter has already shown that Monconduit became, as correspondent of Le 
Monde, of great importance for dissidents within the regime and Calvo Serer in particular. 
The French journalist, however, was an ambiguous figure and had a complicated 
relationship with the Franco regime. According to Onésimo Díaz Hernández, Monconduit 
was ‘profoundly Catholic, anti-communist and anti-liberal’989. A former member of the 
right wing, monarchist and Catholic Action française, Monconduit had later joined Jacques 
Doriot’s pro-fascist French Popular Party (Parti populaire français) and held official posts 
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in the Vichy regime.990 After the Allied victory, Monconduit went, like other member of 
the Vichy regime,991 to Francoist Spain and started work as correspondent for the French 
publications Nuit et Jour and La Revue Française.992 In accordance with his political and 
ideological convictions, Monconduit was initially sympathetic towards the Franco regime. 
French diplomats reported that Monconduit actively contributed to the Franco regime’s 
attempts to improve its foreign image.993  
Monconduit developed and intensified his ties with monarchist and Catholic circles and 
with the influential Opus Dei member Calvo Serer during these years.994 At the same time, 
Monconduit’s reports on the Franco regime became increasingly critical. This became 
apparent, for instance, in the context of the referendum for the Law of Succession, which 
the Francoist authorities held in July 1947. Aimed at both weakening the monarchist 
opposition within Spain as well as further improving the regime’s foreign image, the 
referendum established Spain as a kingdom without, however, practical consequences on 
the regime’s structures.995 Monconduit reported that ‘enthusiasm for the referendum was 
false’ and that under free conditions the Spanish people would have voted ‘no’996. In other 
articles, the journalist criticized the Falange and highlighted the regime’s oppression of 
critical voices.997 In light of the journalist’s past and much to the surprise of the French 
diplomatic representatives in Madrid,998 Monconduit became, with the support of his 
Catholic contacts, Spain correspondent for the left-liberal Le Monde in 1950.999 Against the 
background of his previous criticism of the Franco regime, the DG for the Press viewed 
Monconduit’s future reports for the widely distributed Le Monde with great concern. 
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Consequently, the DG for the Press denied Monconduit’s accreditation despite the weak 
position of the still internationally isolated Spain in 1950.1000 It was only after repeated 
interventions by the Foreign Ministry’s OID and embassy in Madrid that Monconduit was 
eventually accredited in the following year.1001. 
The Francoist press authority’s willingness to lean hard on correspondents despite the 
Foreign Ministry’s interest to improve the international perception of the regime became 
even more visible in the case of Brewer. In April 1951, the DG for the Press cancelled 
Brewer’s accreditation because of the journalist’s ‘insidious campaigns often incompatible 
with the truth and the dignity of our country’1002. Brewer himself explained that the Franco 
regime ‘apparently thought it safe to get tough with U.S. correspondents’1003 in 1951. By 
that time, Spain had started to overcome her international isolation. In the end of 1950, the 
US had granted desperately needed economic help to Spain and the UN had lifted its ban 
on Spain. The US resumed diplomatic relations with Spain in 1951.  
However, the Franco regime was still far from having overcome its international pariah 
status. It would be another two years before the signing of the Madrid treaty with the US in 
1953, which further boosted the Franco regime’s international standing, secured its 
economic survival. The timing of the withdrawal of the influential left-liberal The New York 
Times’ correspondent’s accreditation, therefore, was hardly in the interests of Artajo’s 
continued attempts to improve Spain’s international reputation. And, as Rosendorf outlines, 
the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation certainly did hard harm Spain’s reputation with 
a ‘torrent of negative coverage in the American press’1004.  
The consequences of the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation hardly could have come as 
a surprise for the Francoist authorities. The reactions to the above discussed cancellation of 
McMahon’s credentials were similar. The question, therefore, remains why the DG for the 
Press had still decided to take actions against Brewer - a decision which still puzzled 
Spanish diplomats more than a decade later.1005  
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The DG for the Press certainly disliked Brewer’ writings reports about Spain. The multi-
angled strategy employed by the DG for the Press to counter Brewer’s reports also give an 
impression of the variety of means that the Francoist authorities used to cope with critical 
correspondents at the beginning of the 1950s. In order to limit Brewer’s influence on other 
correspondents, the DG for the Press issued communiques that gave the official Spanish 
view on Brewer’s reports and distributed them within the foreign press corps in Spain. At 
the same time, Spanish newspapers such as ABC, concerned about the impact of Brewer’s 
report on the upcoming UN vote on Spain in 1950, printed attacks on both Brewer and The 
New York Times.1006 These internal measures were externally accompanied by frequent 
demands for corrections, which the Spanish Chargé d'affaires in the US sent to The New 
York Times’s office.1007 These measures, however, had no effect. Cyros Leo Sulzberger, 
The New York Times’ chief foreign correspondent in Paris, outlined in a letter to his uncle, 
Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the publisher of the newspaper, that the Spanish complaints were 
a sign ‘that Sam is doing a good job’1008.  
In short, the Francoist authorities did everything short of actually expelling Brewer 
altogether. That the DG for the Press eventually used this available last means indeed 
reflected the changed diplomatic situation for Spain in the beginning of 1951, although only 
partly for political reasons. The newly appointed US ambassador Griffis disliked Brewer 
personally due to some previous conflicts with the correspondent. At the end of 1950, C.L. 
Sulzberger stressed that Griffis’ appointment as potentially problematic for Brewer’s 
position in Spain.1009 Indeed, Griffis called the publisher of The New York Times a few days 
after his appointment and asked for the Brewer’s transfer. Griffis received a negative 
answer, together with the warning that ‘even if I [A. H. Sulzberger] wished to order Brewer 
away, which I don’t, it would create a feeling against him, Griffis, which I thought was 
very undesirable’1010. A. H. Sulzberger and C. L. Sulzberger had already agreed in advance 
that Brewer would remain in Spain. The Franco regime would interpret Brewer’s transfer, 
so C. L. Sulzberger argued, ‘as a change in policy in the New York Times towards the 
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Franco regime’1011. Creating such an impression was for the chief foreign correspondent - 
who himself met Franco for an interview in 19591012 - not in the interest of the newspaper: 
‘No New York Times correspondent who does a good job will ever [sic] please the Franco 
regime.’ 1013  
Against this background, the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation aroused in A. H. 
Sulzberger ‘a little bit of the feeling that it was Griffis and not Franco that was basically 
responsible’1014. The timing, so shortly after Griffis appointment, indeed was peculiar and 
both The New York Times and the US embassy in Spain concluded that the ‘decree against 
Brewer was not occasioned by any particular story and is aimed at the New York Times as 
well as Brewer personally’1015. Furthermore, the Francoist authorities were very well aware 
about Griffis’ history with Brewer. The US correspondent Edward Knoublaugh, a well-
known correspondent who covered the Spanish Civil War, had outlined to the head of the 
Section for Foreign Press personal conflicts between Brewer and the new ambassador, 
including Griffis’ own attempt to have Brewer transferred.1016 These circumstances, 
therefore, strongly suggest that the DG for the Press took advantage of the situation and 
hoped that Griffis’ dislike of Brewer would make the expulsion of Brewer acceptable 
without too much harm to the regime’s relations with the US.  
Griffis, seemingly hopeful that the Francoist authorities’ decision to cancel Brewer’s 
accreditation would be the solution to his problem with the correspondent, shortly thereafter 
asked A. H. Sulzberger ‘what the attitude of the New York Times was in case the Spanish 
Government should suggest that they would not reaccredit Brewer, but would accept 
another correspondent’1017. The attitude of The New York Times had not changed and the 
newspaper publisher pointed out that it ‘will never permit a foreign government to name 
our correspondent for us’ and ‘that the correspondent we had named in Madrid was 
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Brewer’1018. A. H. Sulzberger also pointed out to Griffis that if Brewer’s credentials were 
not reinstated, The New York Times would send no new correspondent to Spain and that 
Spain’s image in the newspaper would not improve. At the same time, The New York Times 
also made its point of view clear to the US State Department1019 by demanding to ‘apply 
more heat’1020 to the Francoist authorities. Eventually, this left Griffis with little other 
choice than to protest against the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation. Following this 
diplomatic pressure, the Francoist authorities soon gave in. After the Spanish government 
had even discussed the matter in cabinet meeting,1021 the DG for the Press quietly reinstated 
Brewer’s credentials without officially revoking its decision, a procedure to which Brewer 
had also agreed.1022 The New York Times, therefore, won its battle. However, the newspaper 
did not keep its correspondent in Spain for long. At the end of 1951, it replaced Brewer 
with the similarly critical Camille Cianfarra. A.H. Sulzberger had already discussed this 
solution to the problem between Brewer and Griffis - to transfer the correspondent at a later 
point in time - before.1023 First, however, The New York Times wanted to make its point 
clear, which it certainly succeeded in doing.  
The case of the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation, therefore, was far more complex 
than Rosendorf is aware of. Besides the involvement of Griffis, it is particularly important 
to note that the Francoist authorities did not reinstate Brewer’s credentials because of bad 
PR in the US, but because of diplomatic interventions. In the end, the DG for the Press had 
no reason to hope that the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation would in result in a more 
positive attitude of The New York Times towards Spain. Instead, the decision was a 
thoroughly failed attempt by the Franco regime to show strength with regard to critical 
correspondents.  
Following this experience with the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation, the Francoist 
authorities refrained, though only temporarily, from further direct actions against foreign 
journalists. In 1951, the Ministry of Information and Tourism under the Falangist Arias-
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Salgado attempted to smooth relations with the foreign press corps. As we have seen in 
Chapter 2, the first attempt to create an international press club was a reflection of this 
change. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry tried to use the opportunity of the MIT’s 
creation to enhance again its influence over the policy towards the foreign press corps. 
Indeed, Monconduit’s eventual accreditation was mainly a success of the Foreign Ministry 
in the end of 1951.  
However, neither the experience with the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation nor these 
administrative reforms resulted in a fundamental change of regime’s attitude towards the 
foreign press corps. Chapter 1 has already shown that the MIT’s personnel gave little reason 
to expect a more liberal attitude towards the foreign press. The new DG for the Press, Juan 
Aparicio, had already held the same post in the highly restrictive and Falange controlled 
VSEP (see Chapter 1). At the same time, Arias-Salgado’s MIT was also not willing to give 
up its competences over the foreign press. Although the new ministry initially remained 
careful to not directly sanction foreign correspondents, other means of control such as the 
surveillance of the communication of foreign journalists, remained intact. In 1952, the new 
correspondent of The New York Times, Camille Cinafarra, complained to his foreign editor 
about the constant ‘tampering with my mail’ by the Francoist authorities1024. The MIT used 
other methods that were more direct in order to keep the correspondents. Cianfarra, for 
instance, reported to his foreign editor that he was summoned by Aparicio after the 
publication of critical articles, a practice which was also continued by the MIT throughout 
the following decades.  
The MIT, however, did not restrain itself to such soft means of control for long. Following 
the signing of the Madrid agreement with the US in 1953, the Francoist authorities 
seemingly felt secure enough to once again lean hard on correspondents in Spain. Not even 
two years after the journalist’s eventual accreditation for Le Monde, the DG for the Press 
not only cancelled the accreditation of the correspondent Monconduit, but fully expelled 
him from Spain. The DG for the Press justified its decision with Monconduit’s ‘constant 
tendentious intervention in Spain’s internal affairs’1025. As we have seen in the previous 
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chapter, the actual background of Monconduit’s expulsion was the correspondent’s close 
ties with regime critics and with Calvo Serer in particular.  
The previous chapter has also shown that Le Monde was less protective about this 
correspondent than The New York Times was with Brewer. While negative press coverage 
accompanied the expulsion, the left-liberal newspaper let the Vichy collaborator 
Monconduit go in order to secure Le Monde’s further distribution in Spain. While the 
expulsion of Monconduit therefore initially seemed to be a success for the Francoist 
authorities, it soon turned into a diplomatic disaster. In contrast to Le Monde, the French 
Foreign Ministry was less willing to accept the expulsion of a French correspondent by the 
Franco regime. It reacted by choosing the Spanish newspaper which ‘would suffer the most 
from the absence of a correspondent in Paris’1026, the widely distributed ABC, and expelled 
its correspondent, Pedro Rocamor, from France.  
This diplomatic intervention was hardly in the interest of Spain’s foreign policy towards 
France, which was ‘one of the strongest supporters of Spain’s international 
ostracization’1027 after 1945. Against the background of the Spanish-US rapprochement 
from the beginning of the 1950s, however, the attitude of the French government towards 
Spain also started to change. In the context of the Madrid Pacts with the US in 1953, the 
French government even started to discuss the lifting of its ban on arms sales to Spain, 
which it eventually did in 1955.1028 The expulsion of the correspondent of the important Le 
Monde in this still sensitive time of Spain’s relations with its northern neighbour was 
therefore a particular delicate matter. For the Francoist authorities, however, it was 
seemingly a necessary step. Too close were Monconduit’s ties with the Tercera Fuerza, the 
moderate critics from within the regime around the Opus Dei member Calvo Serer. Calvo 
Serer wanted to secure the regime’s survival by excluding representatives of the Falange as 
well as Catholics such as Artajo from the government.1029 Monconduit’s expulsion, 
therefore, was part of an internal power struggle and also in the interest of the Foreign 
Ministry.  
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His expulsion in 1953, however, was not the end of Monconduit’s journalistic career in 
Francoist Spain. Two years after the strengthening of the Opus Dei in the new government 
of 1957, his close ties to Opus Dei helped him to become accredited as correspondent for 
the French journal Combat.1030 
Monconduit’s expulsion in 1953 remained the last time that the Francoist authorities 
expelled a correspondent until the 1960s. This did not exclude, of course, the continued 
practice of other means of control such as (often only temporary) withdrawals or denial of 
accreditations. In these cases, however, the Foreign Ministry and the OID soon intervened 
for the sake of Spain’s foreign relations. When, for instance, the correspondent of the 
magazine Time, John Blake, faced problems in gaining an accreditation in 1956, José Maria 
Areilza, by then Spanish ambassador to the US, intervened. Areilza outlined to the MIT 
that although Time was not at all in favour of Francoist Spain, the non-accreditation of its 
correspondent ‘in the end does not serve our political interest’1031. Not only was Time 
extraordinarily ‘influential abroad and in certain powerful sectors of the American public, 
above all in the Republican circle’, but its owner, Henry Luce, and his wife, Clare Boothe-
Luce, herself US ambassador to Rome under the Republican President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, had close personal ties to the White House.1032 The MIT accredited Blake 
immediately thereafter.  
In 1955, DG for the Press Aparicio also tried to keep the foreign press corps under control 
by renewing a number of accreditations for shorter periods than the usual six months. To 
the surprise of the Spanish ambassador in Bonn, the DG for the Press not only applied this 
measure to critical voices such as The New York Times correspondent Cianfarra, but also 
the regime friendly and highly influential Heinz Barth.1033 Lehmann, who discusses this 
incident exclusively in German diplomatic sources, shows that not only the Spanish 
ambassador, but also the German embassy in Spain was very much surprised about this 
decision. In the opinion of the German diplomats, Barth’s generally favourable reports 
about the Franco regime had given little reason for this sanction.1034 Instead, Lehmann 
argues that Barth’s closeness to the Falange partly contributed to the shortening of Barth’s 
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accreditation by the DG for the Press.1035 Barth not only maintained close relations with the 
Falange during his time as a journalist in Spain before 1945 but the Falange also had helped 
Barth by employing him in their press department after the defeat of Nazi Germany. Against 
this background, the Falangist Aparicio, who was also in charge of the foreign press in the 
VSEP, seemingly expected even more loyalty from Barth than the correspondent had 
already shown and reacted strongly to any form of slight criticism in Barth’s reports. 
Besides the reports from the Germany embassy, which Lemann quotes,1036 a report by 
Aparicio to the Minister of Information and Tourism also support this interpretation.1037 
Lehmann further argues that Aparicio also might have tried to use the rivalry among the 
German correspondents in order to improve the general reporting about Spain by 
weakening Barth’s extraordinarily strong position.1038 
Barth himself reacted, as the Spanish ambassador in Bonn reported, by threatening to move 
to Portugal and report on Spain from there. The Spanish ambassador therefore strongly 
argued for the revision of this sanction against Barth, whom he considered ‘of great help 
for us’1039 in Germany. Lehmann stresses that the Spanish Foreign Ministry also let the 
German diplomats directly know that it considered this action of the MIT as ‘idiotic and 
stupid’1040. This evaluation, very strongly reflected the two ministries’ different approaches 
towards the foreign press. Eventually, and following official interventions by the German 
embassy, the MIT also reversed this decision.1041 
Besides sanctions against correspondents, the MIT also actively tried to improve the Franco 
regime’s foreign image through ‘softer’ means. Spain’s external PR campaigns, which 
Rosendorf has examined in the case of the US, also included the employment of foreign 
journalists. The Spanish embassy in Washington, for instance, employed in the 1950s the 
former Time journalist Anatole Visson as public relations officer. Visson used his media 
contacts in order to get positive news coverage about Spain.1042 But also within Spain, the 
MIT tried to use foreign correspondents for its PR.  
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Previously, the Francoist authorities were notoriously uncommunicative towards the 
foreign press, a fact Henry Buckley had complained about to the OID at the beginning of 
the 1950s. The Foreign Ministry tried to change this and regime friendly correspondents 
like Barth ‘entered and left the […] [OID] like his own home’1043 in order gain information. 
In 1954, the MIT also decided to improve its information policy towards the foreign press 
by creating an information office within the Section for Foreign Press.1044 The success of 
this attempt to channel pre-selected information to the foreign press corps, however, was 
limited. Neither Görtz nor Herrmann, who were already in Spain from the beginning of the 
1960s, recalled using the MIT’s information office.1045 Nevertheless, this was a change in 
the MIT’s information policy.  
The MIT under Arias-Salagdo did not stop at providing correspondents with material 
designed to improve Spain’s image. The Francoist authorities also set out to financially 
incentivize correspondents to report more positively on Spain in ways that went beyond the 
already existing privileges that came with accreditation status. Lehmann quotes from a 
German embassy report from 1955, which states that the MIT provides some 
correspondents with certain ‘advantages – according to reliable, although not provable 
information even of a financial nature’1046. In his discussion of the sanction against Barth, 
Lehmann connects the granting of these ‘advantages’ to the MIT’s general attempt to use 
the competition among German correspondents for the purposes of the regime by favouring 
some correspondents over others. While this might have played a role for the German press 
corps, it is more likely that bribes were generally part of the Francoist policy towards the 
foreign press. Due to the lack of further documentary evidence and interviews with 
correspondents who were already in Spain at this time, the extent to which the MIT bribed 
correspondents remains difficult to examine for the 1950s. The continued use of bribes 
under Fraga during the 1960s, which the next section will examine, suggests nevertheless 
that this was indeed a well-established part of the MIT’s policy towards the foreign press 
corps. 
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The situation for the foreign press further improved after the governmental reshuffle in 
1957. Both the Foreign Minister Castiella and the Opus Dei technocrats in the new 
government ‘worked hard to streamline the political image of the dictatorship’1047. Arias-
Salgado increasingly came under pressure for his restrictive press policy.1048 It was this 
context that Arias-Salgado and its new DG for the Press, Adolfo Muñoz Alonso, whom 
Aparicio was replaced by in 1958, allowed the creation of the two associations for foreign 
correspondents, first the ACPE and then the ACPI. That Arias-Salgado was indeed able to 
follow a different approach towards the foreign press when it directly served the regime’s 
purposes became visible in 1959. When the Republican US President Eisenhower, under 
whom Spanish-US relations strongly improved, visited Madrid as part of his world tour, 
the MIT’s DG for the Press in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry’s OID managed the 
foreign press ‘extremely well’ according to Welles:  
several dozen American correspondents were travelling with him, and at least 
a hundred American, European, African, and Asian reporters arrived to cover 
the visit. To everyone’s surprise, the regime organized press facilities with 
remarkable efficiency. […] A press room was set up in the Castellana Hilton 
hotel, extra telex and telephone links were specially installed. Typewriters, 
paper, and desks were provided, press stickers for correspondents’ automobiles 
were printed. Eisenhower’s quarters at the Moncloa Palace were opened for 
inspection; even television and newsreel trucks were included for the arrival. 
Every facility that the press might need was there.1049 
The Franco regime, for which the personal visit of the US President marked a boost in its 
international recognition, turned Eisenhower’s stay into a propaganda coup. Even Franco 
himself, as C.L. Sulzberger recalls, kept a signed photograph of Eisenhower in his study.1050 
Welles, however, further highlights that this attention for the foreign press was very short-
lived. ‘The next day, Eisenhower flew away and the honeymoon was over. The facilities 
ended and the press was back where it started. The Spanish performance was brilliant – for 
one day.’1051 Arias-Salgado also continued to sanction correspondents during his last years 
in office. Against the background of the attention the Franco regime gave to its relations 
with the US, it is remarkable that the MIT decided once more to lean hard on a US 
correspondent. In April 1962, and despite the journalist’s many years in Spain, the DG for 
the Press refused the accreditation of the US correspondent Richard S. Mowrer. Welles, on 
whom Rosendorf bases his conclusion that the Francoist authorities never again sanctioned 
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any correspondent after Brewer, does not mention the case of Mowrer although he still was 
in Spain at this time.  
For the MIT, Mowrer’s articles were ‘characterized at all times by his open hostility 
towards the Spanish regime (which he constantly describes as Franco dictatorship)’1052. In 
particular, the MIT was concerned about ‘reputational threats’1053 resulting from Mowrer’s 
frequent reports on a particularly sensitive issue in Spanish politics: the situation regarding 
religious minorities, namely Protestants and Jews, in Catholic Spain. Because of the 
dominant role of Protestantism in public and political life, this was a particular sensitive 
issue in the US, but also in Europe. Rosendorf highlights that the discrimination of these 
groups in Spain ‘incensed co-religionists and a broad swath of liberals in America, which 
resulted in an ongoing barrage of US secular and religious media invective and political 
activism’1054. Mowrer, who officially was accredited for the Boston-based Christian 
Science Monitor but distributed his articles as a freelancer to a wide network of media 
(discussed in Chapter 4), not only kept these debates alive by continuously addressing the 
topic1055 but also informed other US correspondents to the situation of Jews and Protestants 
in Spain. In the opinion of the MIT, the ‘anti-Spanish’ articles of Cinafarra in The New York 
Times especially ‘were not in few cases inspired by Mowrer’1056 during the 1950s. 
Rosendorf shows that. under the new Foreign Minister ‘who brought with him the 
conviction that these oppressive policies were both substantively wrong and inimical to 
Spain's international reputation and goals’1057, Spain started to change its policy towards 
religious minorities. Not renewing Mowrer’s accreditation was unlikely to solve the 
problem and actually made it worse. Mowrer in particular was not only an important 
correspondent, but was from the offspring of a famous family of journalists. Any action 
against him by the Francoist authorities was therefore likely to result in a strong media echo 
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in the US. The Spanish ambassador to the US therefore asked the MIT for the immediate 
reversal of its decision, which it did.1058  
That the MIT under Arias-Salgado was willing to sanction a correspondent like Mowrer 
despite harming Castiella’s foreign policy strategy must be seen at least partly against the 
background of the difficult personal relations between the two ministers. According to 
Cianfarra’s successor as The New York Times’ correspondent, Benjamin Welles, Arias-
Salgado’s ‘morbid jealously of Foreign Minister Castiella was […] proverbial. Foreign 
press criticism of Spain by Arias’ minions and rushed daily to Franco to demonstrate the 
alleged incompetence of Castiellas’s diplomats’1059. The situation, however, was solved 
shortly after Mowrer’s sanction with the appointment of Fraga as new Minister of 
Information and Tourism.  
 
Manuel Fraga and the Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1962-1969 
The previous chapters have frequently stressed that Fraga tried hard to improve Spain’s 
international image during the 1960s. The foreign press became instrumental to this 
purpose. This resulted in his massive external PR campaigns which Rosendorf examines 
thoroughly for the US and Gienow-Hecht and Fischer briefly for Germany.1060 The 
regime’s external PR policy included the hiring of foreign PR firms, the production of 
specialized print media for foreign audiences such as the Spanish Newsletter in the US 
(published 1962-1972),1061 and the invitation of tourism journalists to Spain. Gienow-Hecht 
and Fischer show that the Franco regime saw the invitation of journalists as a ‘relatively 
expensive, but extremely effective measure’1062 for the improvement of the Franco regime’s 
image through its promotion as a tourist destination. The importance of tourism as both a 
means and an end for Fraga’s external PR strategy was, as Gienow-Hecht and Fischer 
further highlight, reflected in the creation of a National Tourism Award for Foreign 
Journalists in 1962. For journalists outside of Spain, the award came with a trip to Spain, 
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while correspondents already working in the Franco regime received 50,000 pesetas.1063 
Furthermore, the new Minister of Information and Tourism also tried to improve relations 
with foreign media on a personal level. Following a round trip through the US after the 
opening of the World Fair in 1964, the new Minister of Information and Tourism met 
almost daily with chief editors of major US media such as Newsweek, The New York Times, 
Washington Post, NBC and the Chicago Tribune.1064 Even Franco himself joined the 
Spanish PR efforts by giving a TV interview to the US broadcaster CBS in 1963.1065  
In the examination of the International Press Club, Chapter 2 has already shown that the 
foreign press corps within Spain were included in Fraga’s PR campaign. Fraga, however, 
also implemented more general policy changes in the regime’s relations with the foreign 
press. On the surface, Fraga’s policy towards the foreign press was more attentive and 
cooperative than the approach of his predecessors. Shortly after his appointment and, as 
Benjamin Welles remembered, ‘to the astonishment of the many foreign journalists whom 
Arias had shunned’, Fraga invited correspondents of major foreign media to dinner.1066 He 
announced to the correspondents that ‘we respect the information you send to your 
newspapers […]. We believe that you will be able to objectively report what the Movement 
has done, is doing, and hopes to do’1067. That the new minister and his new personnel, with 
which he replaced Arias-Salgado’s staff,1068 would implement a new approach became 
visible for the correspondents early on in his information policy. Henry F. Schulte, from 
1956 to 1962 bureau chief of UPI in Spain, describes this departure from the previous 
information policy in his book on the history of the Spanish press:  
Under the direction of Fraga, Ministry of Information personnel cooperated 
more with foreign correspondents, providing information that would have been 
unavailable during the period when Arias-Salgado was director. Fraga himself 
held regular press conferences and took over some of the responsibilities of 
government spokesman, a role ignored by his predecessor.1069 
The CIP became central to this changed information policy. Chapter 2 has shown that 
besides Fraga himself, other high-ranking Francoist officials also gave frequent press 
conferences in the CIP.  
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However, Fraga’s new information policy had rather strict limits and did not go beyond the 
means it served: the improvement of the Franco regime’s foreign image. Critical questions 
were therefore not welcome. The correspondents soon learned this lesson as well as the fact 
that Fraga was far less liberal that his self-promoted image when away from the wider 
public. Welles highlights that ‘despite the cooperation of the Ministry personnel and his 
own accessibility, Fraga’s attempts at working closely with the foreign press were not 
completely successful’1070. Fraga, according to the correspondent Édouard de Blaye, was 
infamous for his ‘unpredictable access to fury’1071 and reacted harshly to unwanted 
questions. Influential correspondents such as Harold Milks (AP) and Pierre Brisard (AFP) 
soon started to refuse to attend Fraga’s briefings because, as Milks explained in an 
interview to Schulte, ‘we are insulted if we ask a pertinent question’1072.  
Nevertheless, Fraga’s approach in the field of official informational policy still did mark a 
change in the regime’s attitude towards the foreign press. The MIT accompanied these 
changes with the continuation of already previously established measures for the 
improvement of the correspondent’s attitude towards Spain, namely the bribing of foreign 
journalists. Several of the correspondents interviewed pointed out that the regime granted 
financial or other material favours to certain correspondents.1073 The Dutch correspondent 
Kees van Bemmelen even had the ultimately unrealized plan to ‘write a book about certain 
correspondents who accepted apartments or envelopes in exchange for favouring 
Franquism’1074. A common bribery was, for instance, to offer the correspondents 
apartments in Madrid or elsewhere at a reduced price. Haubrich, for instance, recalled a 
visit by Spanish officials shortly after his arrival in Spain, who offered him a ‘very 
affordable’1075 holiday apartment. 
None of the interviewed correspondents, however, admitted to have accepted any bribe 
beyond the privileges of the accreditation status and yearly Christmas presents from 
Spanish ministries’ such as boxes of wine from the Ministry of Agriculture. It is therefore 
practically impossible to evaluate the success of this policy. It may be the case that 
correspondents who already benefited from accreditations as honorary correspondents, a 
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sign of the regime’s appreciation, also accepted further offers from the Francoist 
authorities. These journalists were, however, already in favour of the Franco regime 
anyway. The more regime critical correspondents like Haubrich and Herrmann also 
speculated, without presenting any factual proof, about the acceptance of bribes by some 
of the CIP’s presidents during the 1960s, who were elected with the support of the MIT. 
The statement of the regime friendly Cuban exile and long-term vice-president of the CIP, 
Chelala López, that the Franco regime ‘did everything to welcome the foreign 
correspondents in Spain’,1076 indeed shows that less critical correspondents appreciated the 
regime’s efforts. However, Chelala López also did not mention in the conducted interview 
any direct bribes. 
The bribing of foreign correspondents by state authorities was, of course, not a Spanish 
speciality. Herzer shows that Nazi Germany also used such means in order to improve 
relations with the foreign press corps and that ‘the transition from more or less appropriate 
support to open bribery was fluent’1077. The same applied to the Franco regime. The 
privileges for accredited staff correspondents and the CIP with its subsidized restaurant, 
both of which were well accepted even by regime critical correspondents, were on the one 
end of the scale, and direct bribes, such as apartments at a reduced price, on the other. The 
regime’s financial support for the ACPI were somewhere in between.  
Fraga’s attempts to improve relations with the foreign press corps did not end with an 
improved information policy and bribery. Instead, one of the most remarkable aspects of 
Fraga’s policy towards the foreign press corps was his success in informally influencing 
the placement of correspondents for foreign media. The previous chapter has already 
discussed the case of the appointment of Fraga’s confidant Carlos Mendo as UPI bureau 
chief in 1962. Almost parallel, Fraga also managed to influence the replacement of the 
bureau chief of AFP, Jacqueline Darricarére d'Etchevers. Mendo explained to Henry F. 
Schulte in an interview that AFP replaced Darricarére d'Etchevers with Pierre Brisard in 
return for a contract that allowed AFP to supply news to EFE in 1962.1078 Foreign 
correspondents working in Spain were well aware of this extraordinary compromise by a 
major international news agency. Besides Schulte, the former correspondent Édouard de 
Blaye also later wrote in his book on the Franco regime that Fraga, ‘dissatisfied with the 
way that the Madrid correspondent of Agence France-Press […] was reporting the political 
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evolution of the régime [sic] – or, more correctly the lack of evolution – discreetly secured 
her replacement’1079. Furthermore, opposition groups also referred to the replacement of 
the AFP correspondent in a leaflet that attacked the MIT’s press policy and circulated in 
Bilbao a few years later.1080  
UPI and AFP did not remain Fraga’s only successes in exercising influence over the 
personnel of the foreign press corps in Spain. In 1965, the MIT, in close cooperation with 
Castiella’s Foreign Ministry and its diplomats, even managed to affect the appointment of 
a new correspondent by The New York Times. The Spanish embassy in the US received 
information in March 1965 that The New York Times planned to send Thomas J. Hamilton 
as its new correspondent to Spain. The information came from Welles, who had left his 
post as The New York Times’ correspondent in Madrid in 1962 but seemingly maintained 
good relations with Spanish diplomats in the US.1081 The Spanish diplomats received this 
news with considerable concern because they knew Hamilton. He had already covered 
Spain for The New York Times from 1939 to 1941 and ‘did not precisely distinguish himself 
for his sympathy’1082 towards Spain, as the Spanish press attaché in Washington, Luis 
Lopez Ballesteros, highlighted. Shortly thereafter, Hamilton also published the book 
Appeasement’s Child. The Franco regime in Spain,1083 followed by the article Spanish 
Dreams of Empire in the influential journal Foreign Affairs.1084 Both publications, 
according to the Spanish ambassador Alfonso Merry del Val, very much ‘disliked by the 
government of this epoch’1085 since Hamilton had strongly attacked the Franco regime.  
The Spanish authorities’ reacted differently to the notification of Hamilton’s appointment. 
This time, however, the opinions not only differed between the Foreign Ministry and the 
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MIT, but also among Spanish diplomats. Víctor de la Serna Gutiérrez-Répide, descendent 
of an important Spanish journalist dynasty and at the time the Spanish representative at the 
UN, recommended accepting Hamilton’s appointment.1086 De la Serna knew Hamilton, 
who had been for the last 20 years The New York Times chief correspondent at the UN. He 
pointed out that the journalist always tried to inform himself about the official Spanish 
position when writing about matters concerned with the Franco regime. De la Serna further 
highlighted that ‘much water had gone under the bridge’1087 since the publication of 
Hamilton’s book and it therefore should not be overestimated.  
The Spanish ambassador Merry del Val saw things very differently. He was convinced of 
Hamilton’s continued anti-Spanish attitude that would result in ‘very serious and 
unpleasant conflicts which could lead to his definitive expulsion from our country’1088. 
Furthermore, the ambassador considered the planned appointment of Hamilton a ‘real 
provocation on the side of the New York Times’1089.  
The MIT and the Foreign Ministry agreed with the Merry del Val and therefore wished to 
deny Hamilton’s accreditation. However, while the Spanish press attaché in Washington 
believed that ‘the book is more than enough reason for international observers to deny an 
accreditation’, he was rather unsure on how to proceed. López-Ballesteros was worried that 
the rejection of Hamilton’s accreditation would ‘provoke in The New York Times a negative 
reaction and they would send another person with a less clear record but darker 
intentions’1090. Instead, therefore, the Spanish embassy in Washington started to use all 
informal channels available in order to avoid Hamilton’s appointment. Merry del Val made 
his concerns about Hamilton known to the State Department1091 and to the newly appointed 
US ambassador to Madrid, Angier Biddle Duke, by highlighting that Hamilton’s 
appointment would be a bad start to his mission.1092 At the same time, the Spanish embassy 
repeatedly called The New York Times foreign editor Sidney Gruson.1093 Merry del Val 
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reported back that, although Gruson would not provide any further information, he ‘was 
aware that the appointment of Hamilton would not be suitable’1094 and ‘understands our 
position’1095.  
Fraga initially had little hope that these attempts aimed at making a point for the ‘respect 
of our system of government’1096. Partly, this insistence on making a point against The New 
York Times can be seen against the role, which the newspaper had played in recent Spanish 
politics. In 1960, the Spanish authorities had secretly negotiated with Germany about the 
creation of bases and training facilities for the German military in Spain. Not least because 
of memories of the former ties between Nazi Germany and the Franco regime, which the 
realization of this plan would arouse, the US, Great Britain and France unsuccessfully 
intervened through diplomatic channels. However, it was The New York Times that 
eventually stopped the plan by making it public in C.L. Sulzberger’s foreign policy 
column.1097 ‘Certainly not without the knowledge of the US-administration’1098, Sulzberger 
had received confidential information from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(NATO) Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, the American Lauris Norstad.1099 
Sulzberger told Norstad that his column ‘might very well raise enough reaction to kill the 
entire project. He smiled.’1100 
This involvement of The New York Times in foreign policy plans important to the Franco 
regime was the background against which the MIT decided to show its strength against the 
US newspaper. The resistance to the appointment of Hamilton, however, not only remained 
a symbolic gesture that indeed led to a success. Instead of Hamilton, The New York Times 
appointed Ted Szulc as its new correspondent in Madrid.1101 In the opinion of López-
Ballesteros, the intervention of the US ambassador in Madrid and the US State Department 
were instrumental for this decision.1102 However, while Szulc ‘was young enough to lack 
emotional prejudices and political nostalgias’1103 with regard to Spain, López-Ballesteros 
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pointed out to Fraga that Szulc was still far from being a ‘comfortable correspondent’1104. 
Indeed, the MIT soon found itself collecting Szulc’s frequent articles ‘on negative aspects 
of the national life’1105. Nevertheless, the avoidance of Hamilton’s appointment was still a 
striking success for the Spanish authorities. For Hamilton, however, this decision was easy 
to bear. De la Serna pointed out that Hamilton had his doubts about returning to Spain 
anyway.1106 The reluctance of the Spanish authorities might just have offered him an easy 
way out of this appointment. 
 
Control and sanctions 
In contrast to his predecessor, Fraga tried to use ‘soft’ means and less public interventions 
in order to improve both Spain’s foreign image and cope with critical correspondents at 
home. Far less visible was also the intensified control and monitoring of the press corps 
and the foreign press during his term in office. Chapter 1 has shown that the newly created 
Liaison Office became a central sub-department within the MIT for the collection, 
evaluation and exchange of information on foreign media within the MIT. Furthermore, 
Chapter 3 has highlighted that the CIP remained controlled by the MIT and served as a 
means of control of the foreign press corps.  
The intensity of the MIT’s monitoring of the foreign press and the press corps in Spain 
became visible, for instance, in the case of Walter Haubrich. Haubrich started to write 
without an official accreditation as a freelancer for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
while still working as a lecturer at the University of Santiago de Compostela in 1965. The 
MIT immediately noticed that the new articles were signed, in the usual style of the German 
newspaper, with the unknown acronym wha.1107 The Spanish officials swiftly tried to find 
out the identity of the author, predominantly because wha’s article was far more critical 
towards the Franco regime than the usual reports by the newspaper’s officially accredited 
correspondent, Werner Schulz. Schulz, as Chapter 3 has shown, was one of the many 
German correspondents with a Nazi past, and was willing to disclose Haubrich’s identity 
and protest to the newspaper’s editors about the critical reports.1108 The MIT, however, did 
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de Prensa, 16 August 1965. 
1108 Ibid. 
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not need his help. In conjunction with various sub-units and the Spanish press attaché in 
Germany, Haubrich’s identity was revealed within a few days.1109 Numerous detailed 
reports on correspondents in Spain and their political attitude towards the regime, which 
were included in their accreditation files, further document the MIT’s intensified interest 
in information about the foreign press corps. Compared to Arias-Salgado’s time in office, 
the number of the reports increased under Fraga. 
The MIT under Fraga, however, was not only more interested in who was reporting what 
from Spain and the political attitude of the correspondents but it gave also particular 
attention to the journalist’s sources within Spain and their contacts with the political 
opposition. The MIT under Arias-Salgado most likely had the same interest. The 
importance of the foreign press for the growing opposition, however, made this information 
more important during the 1960s. At the same time, the interviews with correspondents 
who worked in Spain during this decade also allow for a better understanding of the MIT’s 
monitoring of the correspondent’s work. Interviewed correspondents with close ties to the 
political opposition such as Haubrich, Herrmann and van Bemmelen all reported that 
foreign journalists were well aware that their telephones were bugged. Herrmann 
remembered that she frequently heard a click during her calls, which she interpreted as the 
turning on of the recording machines. One time, something had gone wrong with the 
surveillance and she could hear the unwanted listeners drinking coffee and talking.1110 
Transcripts on various phone calls received and made by the correspondent José Antonio 
Novais document the extent of this surveillance.1111 In charge of this part of the surveillance 
was, however, the DG for Security, subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior and 
responsible, among other things, for the Spanish police forces, which passed the reports on 
to the MIT. Personal meetings therefore remained, under the pseudo-liberal Fraga, the 
method of choice for the passing of sensitive information.  
Fraga, however, did not stop with the collection of information. The intensified and 
improved monitoring of foreign media was the basis for frequent complaints by Fraga or 
his subordinates to particular correspondents. Sieglinde Herrmann, who practically lived 
across the street from the MIT, still remembered these meetings vividly.1112 The MIT 
                                                          
1109 AGA (03) 049.021, 58.383, Folder Werner Schulz: Delegado Provincial del Ministerio de Información 
y Turismo in La Coruna (Galicia) to the DG for the Press, 27 August 1965. 
1110 Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling. 
1111 See AGMI, 183, 62: Reports on telephone conversations by José Antonio Novais from 21 July 1968 and 
10 July 1968. 
1112 Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling. 
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summoned some correspondents so often that both the journalist and the MIT officials 
started to joke about it. When André Monconduit was called to MIT due to his ‘erroneous 
and false’1113 reports for Combat in October 1963, he greeted the Head of the Section for 
Foreign Press with the question of whether a button on the table was to start the microphone. 
The MIT official jokingly replied that ‘this is not how we do it. This is a button for calling 
the Guardia Civil’1114.  
Complaints, bribery or informal interventions did not solve the MIT’s problems with the 
foreign press corps and foreign journalists continued to report critically about the Franco 
regime from Spain. In some cases, the MIT under Fraga accepted the resulting negative PR 
and reacted in the same way as in previous years by sanctioning individual correspondents. 
In fact, and besides all his liberal announcements, Fraga’s strong attention to the foreign 
press was also reflected in his willingness to temporarily cancel accreditations of eight 
correspondents because of their reports on Spain, more often than any of his predecessors 
after 1945 or any of his successors at the top of the MIT. Therefore, his attitude towards 
the foreign press was in line with his policy towards the Spanish press, where sanctions and 
pressure against journalists and Spanish media was frequently used as a means of control. 
This attitude earned Fraga the description of an ‘all-powerful dictator of the press’1115 by 
the former correspondent Édouard de Blaye.  
Although Fraga frequently used sanctions against correspondents, he nevertheless used 
them differently. He was aware that the cancellation of accreditations did not actually solve 
any problems but only created negative PR. The MIT’s more frequent cancellation of 
accreditations under Fraga was more of a warning in order to keep the press corps in line 
than actual sanctions. Both the continued use of sanctions and Fraga’s different approach 
became at the same time symbolically Kafkaesque in the MIT’s treatment of Monconduit.  
After returning to Spain in the end of the 1950s, Monconduit continued with his criticism 
of the Franco regime, closely monitored by the MIT.1116 Since the Section for Foreign 
Press’ complaints seemingly made little impact on the correspondent, the MIT decided to 
                                                          
1113 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder Jean Creach/ André Monconduit: Report on the visit of the 
correspondent of Combat, Jefe Sección Prensa Extranjera to Director General de Prensa, 13 October 1962.  
1114 Ibid. 
1115 Blaye, Franco and the politics of Spain, 234. 
1116 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder Jean Creach/ André Monconduit: Reseña de comentarios e 
informaciones sobre España difundidas con la firma del corresponsal André Monconduit Crech [sic] en 
periódicos y emisoras extrajeras (1957 a 1964), April 1964 [undated]. 
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the cancel the correspondent’s accreditation in March 1964.1117 Monconduit, who as we 
have seen already was expelled from Spain by Arias-Salgado, subsequently became the 
first correspondent sanctioned by the MIT under Fraga not even two years after his 
appointment as Minister of Information and Tourism. However, Monconduit worked for 
two French media, the journal Combat and the broadcaster Radiodiffusion-Télévision 
Française. While his Franco critical attitude was apparent in his reports for both, the MIT 
only withdrew his credentials because of a recent and presumably false report for the French 
broadcaster. His accreditation for Combat remained valid. This resulted in the surreal 
situation that when the MIT informed Moncuduit to return his press card for 
Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française, it also asked him to send two new photos so that his 
accreditation for Combat could be renewed.1118 The cancellation of his accreditation, 
therefore, had only limited consequences for the correspondent and he could continue to 
work in Spain. It was a clear warning by Fraga that he was willing to use sanctions against 
critical correspondents. But he obviously was not willing to risk negative PR and diplomatic 
problems by once more expelling the correspondent. The MIT continued to use sanctions 
as a means of deterrence in a similar manner thereafter, as became evident in the 
cancellation of Harald Grossmann’s accreditation in 1967. 
Grossmann, of Swiss nationality, wrote from Spain for a number of Swiss and German 
publications since 1961.1119 In 1967, he published in the Swiss journal Die Weltwoche an 
interview with the exiled leader of the Spanish communists, Santiago Carrillo. That ‘a 
foreign correspondent accredited in Spain and published declarations of leaders of an illegal 
organization even if the interview has been realized outside of the national territory’1120 
was unacceptable for the MIT and it immediately cancelled Grossmann’s accreditation, a 
clear warning to the foreign press corps in Spain. The MIT, however, did not expel 
Grossmann and he remained in Spain and journalistically active.1121 In 1972, three years 
after the end of Fraga’s ministry, Grossmann, for instance visited the press corner for 
foreign correspondents, which the MIT had installed for the upcoming wedding of Franco’s 
niece. Because of his missing accreditation as correspondent, he was ‘invited to leave the 
                                                          
1117 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder Jean Creach/André Monconduit: Nota relative ala retirada del carnet 
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1118 Ibid. 
1119 AGA, (03)049.021, 58.355, Folder Harald Grossmann: Accreditation Harald Grossmann.  
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June 1967 [General access restricted until 2024 for the protection of personal data. The AGA granted partial 
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room’1122, but nothing more. In fact, later that year the MIT accredited Grossmann again as 
correspondent, this time for the German weekly journal Stern.1123 Like Grossmann, other 
correspondents such as Kees van Bemmelen also remained in Spain and continued to work 
as correspondents despite the MIT having cancelled their accreditations. The MIT had 
withdrawn van Bemmelen’s accreditation because of his critical reports in the second half 
of the 1960s,1124 but re-accredited him for the Dutch newspaper in De Telegraaf  in 
1971.1125 In the meantime, van Bemmelen had nevertheless continued to report as a 
freelancer from Spain.1126 
Though fond of using sanctions, Fraga was extremely careful in their practical application. 
Nevertheless, in two exceptional cases the MIT not only cancelled accreditations but also 
expelled the correspondents from Spain. When the MIT expelled the Austrian 
correspondent Gustav Herrmann in 1964, however, it only did so under particular 
circumstances which allowed the MIT to publically justify its decision in the eyes of the 
world instead of cancelling only for the correspondent’s criticism of the regime.  
Herrmann, the first husband of Sieglinde Herrmann, had written for a number of Swiss, 
Austrian and German newspapers from Spain since 1951.1127 In contrast to many of his 
German or Austrian colleagues from this time, Herrmann was highly critical towards the 
regime, however. The MIT had followed for some years the criticism on Spain in 
Herrmann’s reports and had at least since 1962 (already under Fraga) considered the 
cancellation of his accreditation.1128 Herrmann regularly reported on, among other issues, 
political repression and police violence in Spain.1129 What particularly offended the MIT 
was Herrmann’s constant reference to the Franco regime as a ‘fascist dictatorship’1130. In 
1964, the MIT eventually found a reason which allowed it to expel Herrmann without 
contributing to the regime’s external perception as a repressive dictatorship. Herrmann had 
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falsely reported that Soviet military aircrafts were spotted over Spain,1131 in the context of 
the Cold War a good reason for the MIT to expel Herrmann. Against this background, the 
Foreign Ministry also accepted the MIT’s decision ‘without any reservation’1132. An 
intervention by the president of the ACPE, the AP bureau chief Harold Milks, did not 
change the MIT’s decision. While the president of the CIP, the regime friendly German 
correspondent Tichmann, did not see any reason to protest, Milks highlighted the ‘effects 
on the foreign public opinion’1133 of Herrmann’s expulsion. Justified with Herrmann’s false 
report and disregarding the correspondent’s considerably poor health at the time, the MIT 
expelled him anyway. His late wife Sieglinde Herrmann in her interview blamed the stress 
caused by the expulsion for his death shortly thereafter.1134  
Besides his carefulness in the use of sanctions against correspondents, Fraga also expelled 
one foreign correspondent in March 1967, the French journalist Jacques Guillemé-Brûlon, 
without any appropriate justification and despite the potential consequences for Spain’s 
international reputation. Guillemé-Brûlon was Le Figaro’s first staff correspondent in 
Spain, accredited since 1964.1135 That Fraga was willing to expel the correspondent of an 
influential conservative newspaper like Le Figaro was remarkable. Under de Gaulle, at the 
time President of the Fifth Republic, French-Spanish relations had improved, in particular 
economically,1136 and Le Figaro was strongly pro-Gaullist. Guillemé-Brûlon’s expulsion, 
therefore surprised contemporary observers like the British ambassador in Madrid, who 
reported to the Foreign Office:  
The "Figaro" correspondent had always seemed to lean over backwards to be 
kind to the regime and it is surprising that he should have suddenly found Fraga 
more than he could take. Novais of "Le Monde" who has often had Guilleme-
Brûlon held up to him as a model of objectivity and moderation must be 
laughing. […] The expulsion of the correspondent of a paper so moderate and 
pro-Government as the "Figaro" […] must have had a cooling influence on 
French-Spanish relations. […] The incident reinforces the view […] that the 
trend towards liberalism in Spain should not be taken for granted. 1137 
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Within Spain, the press close to the regime, such as the newspaper Pueblo, reported that 
Guillemé-Brûlon was expelled because of his general ‘informational conduct’1138. The 
actual background, however, was that the journalist had offended Fraga during a press 
conference on religious freedom in Spain following the minister’s harsh reaction to one of 
his questions. Although AFP officially reported that the Spanish authorities only expelled 
the correspondent after he had written about the incident in Le Figaro,1139 the notoriously 
choleric Fraga took the decision on the day of the conference and before the actual 
publication of the article. Van Bemmelen, who was present at the press conference, recalled 
this chain of events.1140 It also was explicitly highlighted in a later report on Guillemé-
Brûlon by the MIT.1141  
Although Angoustures surprisingly does not mention the expulsion of Guillemé-Brûlon in 
her examination of perception of the Franco regime in the French press,1142 it had a strong 
impact. Besides Le Figaro, Le Monde also dedicated articles to Guillemé-Brûlon’s 
expulsion.1143 Noteworthy was also the reaction within Spain. Opposition groups circulated 
the previously quoted leaflet in Bilbao in which Fraga was attacked for his expulsion of 
Guillemé-Brûlon and his past sanctions against correspondents.1144 Furthermore, and as in 
the case of Herrmann, the different attitudes of the president of the CIP and the ACPE 
towards the Franco regime also became more visible. While the ACPE officially protested 
against Guillemé-Brûlon’s expulsion,1145 the president of the CIP, at this time the regime 
friendly Portuguese correspondent Juan Alberto de Oliveira, even excused Guillemé-
Brûlon’s behavior and thanked Fraga for his presence.1146 Despite these internal protests by 
correspondents and the effects in the Spanish press, Fraga did not reverse his decision. 
Fraga’s willingness to accept a fall out with the French conservative press because of a 
personal conflict was even more remarkable considering the Franco regime’s already 
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existing problems with Le Monde and its Spain correspondent, José Antonio Novais. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, the Spaniard Novais was highly critical towards the 
Franco regime and of central importance to the Spanish opposition. As the frequent non-
authorization of Le Monde suggests, it is therefore not surprising that Novais himself came 
into conflict early on with the regime. In fact, the MIT never collected more information 
on nor had such a conflict-ridden relationship with any other correspondent.1147  
Compared to his foreign colleagues, however, Novais was more difficult to control than 
other foreign correspondents. As the correspondent George Axelson explained to the 
readers of the Swedish newspaper for which he reported from Spain, Sydsvenska Dagbladet 
Snällposten, the MIT could not expel Novais because he was a Spaniard.1148 However, the 
Francoist authorities also did not simply imprison Novais and Fraga only decided to cancel 
his accreditation in March 1965.1149 By this time, as a thorough MIT report on Novais’ 
journalistic work since the beginning of the 1960s shows,1150 the correspondent had already 
published with great frequency critical reports on the Franco regime for approximately 
three years. His articles in Le Monde as well as in the Brazilian newspaper O Estado São 
Paulo as well as the Mexican Novedades for which he worked as freelancer, were 
characterized in the opinion of the MIT by his constant ‘negative intentions’1151 towards 
the Franco regime. Fraga’s constraint to take earlier or more severe action against the 
correspondent suggests that Novais’ was to a certain extent protected from the regime’s 
sanctions by his prominent status and the newspaper’s special attention to Spain. At the 
same time, the regime’s previous experiences with the expulsion of the Le Monde 
correspondent Monconduit might also have served as a warning.  
That Novais was indeed a particular case for the MIT became more visible in the context 
of the cancellation of his accreditation because of Novais ‘constant deformation of the truth 
about certain events which have taken place in Spain’1152. In contrast to previous 
cancellations, the MIT accompanied the withdrawal of Novais’ credentials with an 
intensive press campaign both inside and outside of Spain. That Fraga saw the need to 
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justify his sanction of the prominent correspondent internationally was reflected in the fact 
that he started his campaign not in the Spanish press, but in an interview with the Danish 
newspaper Ekstra Bladet. Spanish newspapers reprinted parts of the interview, while the 
MIT’s own newspaper El Español published the complete text.1153 It is noteworthy that the 
Danish newspaper had no permanent staff correspondent in Madrid. Given the content of 
the interview and in particular his attacks on Novais and the correspondents strong standing 
within the foreign press corps in Spain, it can be assumed that Fraga selected the newspaper 
on purpose. 
In the interview itself, Fraga extensively stressed the changed and liberalized political 
atmosphere in Spain. He highlighted that Spain ‘is open for observation to the entire world’ 
and that all kinds of correspondents were ‘following their professional tasks with full 
freedom’ but that ‘unlimited freedom should not be mistaken for the right to give a false 
image of our country’1154. Against the background of these general arguments, Fraga 
justified the withdrawal of Novais’ accreditation by the correspondent’s lack of 
‘professional ethic[s]’, reflected in his ‘false’ and ‘tendentious’ reports.1155 Fraga further 
argued that the correspondent not only had close links to opposition groups, but in particular 
to the ‘most extreme elements of Falangism’1156. In a somewhat paradoxical turn, therefore, 
the authoritarian Fraga justified the cancellation of the correspondent’s accreditation with 
his alleged anti-democratic, Falangist conviction.  
The MIT’s newspaper El Español repeated the same arguments, together with personal 
attacks on the correspondent and his alleged alcoholism, in a special issue dedicated to the 
‘causa Novais’1157. The MIT also used Novais’ ties to the Falange as an argument against 
the correspondent. Novais was in his youth indeed a dedicated follower of the Falange. 
Although he had distanced himself from the Falange thereafter, the Ministry of the Interior 
highlighted in a report that he continued to use his connections with high ranking Falangists 
as a source of information.1158 It could be speculated that these contacts also might have 
initially protected him from sanctions by the MIT. That the MIT particularly used the 
correspondent’s ties to the Falange as an argument against him within Spain, however, 
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reflected recent developments within the Franco regime. Following the governmental 
reshuffle in 1957 and the dismissal of the Falangist Arias-Salgado 1962, the Falange - in 
particular of the Opus Dei technocrats - had further lost their power within the regime. The 
most right-wing Falangist hardliners thereafter opposed the very limited liberalization 
under Fraga. The Falange’s left, social-reformist wing, with which Novais particularly 
maintained contacts,1159 increasingly opposed the regime.1160 Shortly after the cancellation 
of Novais’ accreditation, Le Monde, for instance reported that the Falangist newspaper 
Arriba published a letter demanding the ‘legalization of the opposition1161‘, addressed to 
Fraga. The MIT’s highlighting of Novais’ relations to the Falange within Spain, therefore, 
must be seen against the internal conflicts among the ‘families’ of the regime.  
The withdrawal of Novais’ accreditation and the attacks on the Le Monde correspondent 
did not work out as planned, however. Fraga received the unwanted negative PR and 
foreign media, both in France and elsewhere, reported intensively on the matter. The Spain 
correspondent of the British Economist, Richard Comyns Carr, for instance, wrote that 
among the regime’s attempts to oppress the growing opposition 
one of its silliest actions has been to attempt to discredit and silence Don José 
Antonio Novais […]. It is a measure of the gap still separating Spain from the 
free world that the minister of information should believe that by withdrawing 
Sr. Novais’s press-card he can intimidate either correspondent or editor.1162  
The consequences of his action against Novais became even worse for Fraga when the 
correspondent decided in a surprising move to sue both Fraga1163 and Jesus Ezcurra, the 
DG for Television (who had promoted the issue of El Español),1164 for defamation. 
According to AFP, this was the first ever time that any Spanish citizen had sued a 
minister.1165 Consequently, the ‘causa Novais’ continued to receive further international 
media attention.1166 Novais’ lawyer, Eduardo Cierco Sanchez, who was also close to the 
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political opposition,1167 further stirred French attention by giving a press conference on the 
action against Fraga in Paris.1168 Even more surprising than Novais’ choice of weapons was 
the result. Before the matter was eventually closed quietly and action dismissed, the judge 
in charge ordered fines against both Fraga1169 and Ezcurra1170 for not showing up in court. 
What started out as a carefully coordinated attack on Novais resulted therefore in a PR 
disaster for Fraga. For Novais himself, the entire affair ended in victory and had no effect 
on his journalistic work. While he continued, like other correspondents, to report from 
Spain also without a press card, he was eventually re-accredited in the end of the 1960s. 
Besides all liberal propaganda and the improved information policy, Fraga’s general policy 
towards the foreign press remained highly restrictive. He experimented, however, with a 
more multi-faced strategy in order to improve the regime’s control over the foreign press. 
Nevertheless and while more carefully than his predecessor, Fraga continued to use 
sanctions against foreign correspondents, at times besides all negative external PR. 
Following the expulsion of Guillemé-Brûlon in 1967, Fraga refrained from further direct 
sanctions of correspondents for the last years of his ministry.  
 
The late Franco regime and the foreign press, 1969-1975 
Besides his authoritarian style, Fraga was one of the driving forces of the regime’s 
‘apertura’ during the 1960s. He did implement a limited liberalization, most strongly 
visible in the new press law of 1966. As we have seen in Chapters 1, this brief phase of the 
regime’s ‘apertura’ ended with the governmental reshuffle in 1969 and Fraga’s 
replacement with the Francoist hardliner Sánchez Bella in 1969. In line with the generally 
more repressive attitude of the new government under Carrero Blanco, also Sánchez Bella 
took a more restrictive stance towards the foreign press and ended the improved 
information policy of Fraga. According to Haubrich, he even publically - and rather 
absurdly - accused correspondents of Western media of their alleged communist agency 
and their funding by ‘Moscow’s gold’1171. Such accusations seemed even more ridiculous 
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in the context of the regime’s own rapprochement with Eastern Europe and China under 
the new Foreign Minister López-Bravo. 
However, while the correspondents Herrmann and Haubrich recalled threats by the MIT 
under Sánchez Bella against correspondents,1172 it stopped at that. No correspondents’ press 
cards were actually withdrawn under Sánchez Bella and no correspondents expelled. The 
Foreign Ministry closely monitored and upheld this restraint towards the foreign press for 
the sake of Spain’s foreign relations. In the context of the regime’s recent external policy 
successes, namely the signing of the trade agreement with the EEC in 1970, the Foreign 
Ministry was careful not to provoke international protests or diplomatic interventions by 
expelling correspondents. After the dismissal of Fraga, the Foreign Ministry through its 
OID, once again took a more active role in the policy towards the foreign press of the MIT 
under Sánchez Bella. This became evident when Sánchez Bella threatened to close down 
the CIP following complaints from foreign correspondents in 1970 and the OID intervened 
(see Chapter 2).  
This MIT’s carefulness in its relations with foreign journalists became evident in its 
treatment of the French correspondent Édouard de Blaye. De Blaye provoked the MIT 
because he ‘always finds the occasion to spray all the poison he can against the regime and 
against Spain’1173 in his reports for French and Belgian broadcasters since his accreditation 
in 1969. As president of the ACPE, he also tried to include José Antonio Novais on its 
board of directors in 1970 (discussed in Chapter 2). In fact, in the opinion of the MIT, he 
consciously tried to provoke his expulsion in order to promote his Franco critical book he 
was working on.1174 The DG for the Press was convinced that an expulsion would be for de 
Blaye ‘great propaganda, which would assure the success of his book’1175. Instead of 
expelling the journalist, therefore, the DG for the Press ‘adopted with him an attitude of 
considerable carefulness’1176.  
The MIT’s restraint in the use of direct sanctions under Sánchez Bella was also a 
compromise to the changed general presence and attitude of correspondents in Spain since 
the end of the 1960s. He was confronted with a new generation of self-confident and regime 
                                                          
1172 Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011; Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by 
Tobias Reckling. 
1173 AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.975, Folder Édouard de Blaye: Informe: Édouard Albert de Blaye, April 1970 
[undated]. 
1174 Ibid. 
1175 Ibid. 
1176 Ibid 
 268 
 
critical staff correspondents of major foreign media, which contributed to the massive 
international coverage of the Burgos trials. These journalists, as became evident in the 
conflict surrounding the CIP, were also less willing to accept the MIT’s control. This, 
however, not only applied to the correspondents of liberal-left media but also conservative 
media and their correspondents became more critical towards the regime. Most notably, 
this was the case for Haubrich and his work for the conservative German newspaper 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The new Spain correspondent of the most conservative 
British newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, however, also reflected this development.  
During the 1960s, the Spanish ambassador to London described The Daily Telegraph as 
‘the most favourable of the London newspapers (which is not much to say)’1177 towards 
Spain. This was not in the least due to the sympathies that the newspaper’s long-term Spain 
correspondent Alan Walker, president of the CIP in 1965,1178 had for the regime1179. This 
situation, however, fundamentally changed with the appointment of Harold Sieve as The 
Daily Telegraph’s new Spain correspondent in 1969. A Spanish journalist described Sieve 
as ‘enfant terrible of the correspondents in Madrid because he says everything that he thinks 
and writes everything that he says’1180. Because of his ‘tendentious style about the problems 
of our country’1181, as a MIT report outlined, Sieve became one of the fiercest critiques of 
the regime. While without a foreign correspondent in Spain, the French Le Figaro was also 
highly critical of the Franco regime. Writing from France, the expelled correspondent 
Guillemé-Brûlon published frequently critical reports about the regime.1182 It can be 
speculated that Guillemé-Brûlon’s expulsion by Fraga had not improved his or his editors’ 
opinion of Francoist Spain.  
Sánchez Bella also refrained - besides threats - from direct actions even against very critical 
correspondents such as de Blaye, Sieve and Haubrich. Like Fraga, the MIT continued to 
use other, less public means in order to exercise control over the foreign press corps. This 
included, although only exceptionally, the denial of accreditations of new correspondents 
who were considered as potentially too critical. In 1972, the MIT refused to issue an 
                                                          
1177 AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.971: Folder Alan Walker, Spanish embassy in London to Manuel Fraga, 17 
April 1963. 
1178 Club Internacional de Prensa, El Club Internacional de Prensa 1962-1972, 19. 
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April 1963. 
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1181 AGA (03) 49.021, 64.971, Folder Harold Sieve: Untitled report, 22 January 1974. 
1182 AGA (03) 49.021, 58.356, Folder Jacques Guillemé-Brûlon: Actuación profesional de M. Jacques 
Guillemé-Brûlon de Le Figaro, 16 June 1971. 
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accreditation for Wolf Hanke, whom the German public broadcaster ARD planned to send 
as its first staff correspondent to Spain.1183 The MIT was concerned of Hanke’s alleged 
‘radical left wing’ ideology and his ‘known differences with the Spanish regimen’1184, both 
reflected in the MIT’s opinion in the correspondent’s financial donations for political 
refugees from Spain.1185 While the MIT report only quotes confidential sources for this 
information, Hanke was convinced that the new Spanish ambassador in Bonn, Francisco 
Javier Conde, was behind this.1186 His colleague Von Conta, who had reported on the matter 
to the chief foreign correspondent of his newspaper, Hans Ulrich Kempski, held the same 
opinion.1187 Hanke further speculated that his previous post for the ARD as the only Western 
TV correspondent in Prague might have contributed to the suspicion of the Francoist 
authorities and the denial of his accreditation.1188  
In the practical handling of the denial of Hanke’s accreditation, however, the carefulness 
with which the MIT under Sánchez Bella treated the foreign press also became visible. An 
open rejection of the accreditation would have provoked international media coverage. 
Instead, the MIT decided to react with administrative silence and therefore not at all 
publically. Hanke never received any official information of the status of his application 
for an accreditation.1189 
In their assumption that the Spanish ambassador to Germany was behind the denial of 
Hanke’s accreditation, von Conta and Hanke were probably right. Since the beginning of 
the 1970s, the relationship between the Francoist authorities and the German press corps in 
Spain became highly problematic. At the centre of these conflicts were the strongly Franco 
critical correspondents Walter Haubrich and Manfred von Conta of the two major German 
newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung but also others such 
as Herrmann. Besides print media, the correspondent of the German broadcaster ZDF, 
Michael Vermehren, also contributed to the negative image of the Franco regime by 
producing and broadcasting reports on the Spanish opposition.1190  
                                                          
1183 AGA (03), 49.021, 42.8931, Folder 5: Nota Informativa. Asunto: Corresponsal de TV Alemana en 
España, 11 February 1971. 
1184 Ibid. 
1185 Ibid. 
1186 Wolf Hanke, interview by Tobias Reckling, 28 September 2011, Madrid. 
1187 PAAA, B 26, 451, Manfred von Conta to Hans Ulrich Kempski, 21 January 1972. 
1188 Wolf Hanke, interview by Tobias Reckling. 
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The MIT and the DG for the Press, however, only played a secondary role in evolving 
conflicts with the German press. Instead, it was in this ‘war with the Germans’1191, as a 
former OID employee put it in an interview with Felipe Maraña Marcos, that the active role 
of the Foreign Ministry, primarily through the OID and its ambassador in Bonn, became 
visible.  
The starting point of the conflicts with the German correspondents was the, in the opinion 
of the Francoist authorities, ‘persistent press campaign in Europe’1192 against Spain during 
and following the Burgos trials. After official complaints to correspondents and newspapers 
had brought no success, the OID decided to discuss this situation and possible reactions in 
a dedicated meeting with representatives of the MIT and other Francoist institutions in 
March 1971.1193 The Francoist officials highlighted the particularly problematic German 
news coverage on Spain and its possible impact on Spanish migrant workers in Germany. 
However, it was pointed out that direct sanctions of correspondents were ‘neither politically 
nor diplomatically useful in these moments’1194. Instead, the OID decided to apply ‘a 
persistent diplomatic pressure’1195. The Foreign Ministry, therefore, took the lead.  
All attempts to implement sanctions against the German correspondents through diplomatic 
channels, however, remained unsuccessful. The examination of the course of action chosen 
by the Franco regime, however, not only shows the important role that the Spanish Foreign 
Ministry took in the regime’s policy towards the foreign press after Fraga. It also reflects 
more generally the regime’s continued authoritarian attitude towards the foreign press corps 
during the last years of the Franco dictatorship, despite its abstention from direct sanctions. 
The Foreign Ministry was still willing to invest considerable time and energy in order to 
have problematic correspondents removed from Spain.  
The Spanish authorities started to apply their strategy by the end of 1971. Following a 
continuation of critical reports on Spain in the German press, the State Secretary of the 
Spanish Foreign Ministry asked the German ambassador in Madrid, Hermann Meyer-
Lindenberg, for a personal audience.1196 Meyer-Lindenberg was appointed as ambassador 
to Spain under the social democrat Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister in 1968. Through his 
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marriage to the sister-in-law of the Spain correspondent of the German broadcaster ZDF, 
Michael Vermehren, Meyer-Lindenberg maintained close personal ties to the German 
foreign press corps in Spain. Like Vermehren, Meyer-Lindenberg had emigrated during the 
Nazi regime and only returned to Germany in 1954.1197 Unlike some of the other German 
diplomats and correspondents in Spain such as the former Nazi judge Nüßlein, from 1964 
to his retirement in 1974 honorary consul of Germany in Barcelona1198, Meyer-Lindenberg 
was rather unlikely to have any sympathies for the Francoist authorities. 
The Francoist authorities were aware of Meyer-Lindenberg’s biographical background.1199 
His unwillingness to accept sanctions against German correspondents, therefore, should not 
have come as a surprise. Following complaints about the ‘deformed and tendentious 
reports, which only treat negative phenomena’1200 by parts of the German press corps, the 
Spanish State Secretary explained that the existing evidence would suggest at least the 
withdrawal of Haubrich’s and von Conta’s accreditations. Meyer-Lindenberg replied, as he 
reported back to the German Foreign Ministry, by highlighting the great harm such actions 
would cause for Spanish-German relations and that it would be seen ‘as sign of censorship 
and intolerance and therefore prove the enemies of the regime right’1201.  
Following this meeting, the Francoist authorities took no direct action against the 
correspondent. However, they also did not give up and continued diplomatically to prepare 
the ground for sanctions. Meyer-Lindenberg, who also had informed the correspondents 
about the meeting, reported back a few weeks later that the State Secretary’s approach was 
part of a larger campaign led by the Spanish ambassador in Bonn against Haubrich and von 
Conta in particular. Conde, according to Meyer-Lindenberg ‘had during the last months 
attempted to arrange measures against some of the German correspondents in Spain’1202. It 
was also shortly thereafter, that von Conta sent his report to Kempski, in which he 
highlighted the denial of Hanke’s accreditation as the first success of Conde’s more far-
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fetching attempts to ‘silence critical voices in German journalism’ in Spain.1203 The chief 
foreign correspondent of the Süddeutsche Zeitung took this seriously enough to forward the 
letter to the German Foreign Ministry.1204  
While Meyer-Lindenberg had strongly opposed the Franco regime’s attempts to take action 
against the correspondents, the German Foreign Ministry showed more understanding for 
its Spanish colleagues. In an internal report, not only the Spanish ambassador was defended 
as a ‘renowned scientists and diplomat’ but it also argued that von Conta and Haubrich ‘so 
strongly identify with the opposition against the regime that their objectivity as 
correspondents did not remain untouched’1205. But, not the least because von Conta was to 
leave Spain anyway in the end of the year, no further action, either for or against the 
correspondents, was suggested.  
In the meantime, however, the Spanish Foreign Ministry continued to seek for ways in 
which to discredit the German correspondents, both within Spain and through its 
ambassador. One occasion to do just this came for the head of the OID, José-Vicente 
Torrente Secorum, during German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel’s visit to Spain in June 
1972. Together with Scheel came the head of German Foreign Ministry’s press department, 
Guido Brunner. Meyer-Lindenberg reported that Torrente directly approached Brunner 
during the visit in order to complain about von Conta and Haubrich as ‘the last straw’1206. 
Seemingly, Torrente hoped that Brunner, who was born in Madrid and had a Spanish 
mother, 1207 would have sympathies for the Spanish position. 
Brunner remained the focus of the Foreign Ministry’s and the OID’s campaign against 
some of the German correspondents. Shortly after Scheel’s visit, the Spanish Foreign 
Ministry suggested to the Spanish ambassador in Germany to continue to approach 
Brunner. He was to highlight the correspondents’ work could have a negative ‘impact on 
the friendly relations between both countries’1208 if they should continue to remain in Spain.  
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The available evidence suggests, however, that ambassador Conde neither saw any realistic 
possibility to pursue this matter with Brunner nor that the German diplomat became active 
on behalf of the Franco regime. What he did, however, was to initiate a campaign in the 
Spanish press against the German correspondents. In July 1972, only one month after 
Scheel’s visit to Madrid, the Spanish newspaper ABC attacked Haubrich, Herrmann and 
von Conta personally in an article written by the journalist Alfredo Semprun.1209 Semprun 
complained that for these correspondents ‘our development, our initiatives in foreign policy 
etc. […] do not exist’. Instead, they continued after the «anti-Spanish December of 1970» 
- the Burgos trials - to contribute ‘to the campaign most tendentious and hostile’1210 towards 
Spain in all of Europe1211. Following a visit to the office of ABC in Madrid, Meyer-
Lindenberg reported that Semprun wrote his article without the knowledge of the editors of 
ABC and used the absence of the foreign editor in order to place it. The ABC editors 
personally suggested to Meyer-Lindenberg that the ambassador Conde was behind the 
affair.1212 
That this was very likely the case was reflected in the promise of ABC’s Bonn 
correspondent Miguel Angel Gozalo, at the time on vacation in Madrid, to make up for 
Semprun’s attacks. Indeed, a few weeks later, he published in ABC an article that must have 
come as a surprise for careful readers of ABC. Gozalo wrote that the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, Haubrich’s employer, was characterized by ‘its good information and it politics of 
separation from all extremes’1213. A few weeks later, Gozalo also praised both the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as one of the ‘most 
independent and serious newspapers of Germany’1214. Although Gozalo did not refer 
directly to Semprun’s attacks and did not mention the German correspondents, the message 
was clear and understood as such by Meyer-Lindenberg.1215 Besides the continued 
complaints by the OID, these articles in ABC marked the end of Spanish attempts to have 
the German correspondents replaced.  
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Following these unsuccessful efforts against the German correspondents, both the MIT and 
the Foreign Ministry refrained from further direct and indirect action against 
correspondents under the short ministry of the more liberal Pió Cabanillas (January–
October 1974) and his ‘tolerance towards the liberty of expression’1216. Correspondents 
who worked under both Sánchez Bella and Cabanillas explicitly highlighted in their 
interviews the improved information policy and the less strict censorship through non-
authorization of foreign publications.1217 It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that it was under 
Cabanillas that the MIT cancelled the accreditation of a staff correspondent in Spain for the 
last time. However, as was pointed out in Chapter 3, the circumstances that led to the 
cancellation of the press card of the Taiwanese correspondent Eduardo Sou-er Mo in April 
1974 were very particular. The decision was a consequence of Spain’s recent 
rapprochement with China and not a reaction to the correspondent’s work.  
However, and despite the acceptance of the reform of the CIP, under Cabanillas’ successor, 
Herrera Esteban, the MIT once more applied a stricter policy towards the foreign press. 
Besides the intensive non-authorization of foreign publications (Chapter 5), this also 
included (albeit very limited) sanctions against foreign correspondents in the last months 
of the regime.1218 Felipe Maraña Marcos also mentions the expulsion of the Nicaraguan 
journalist Joaquin Mejia Mejia in January 1975 but didn’t provide any further details. 
Mejia, however, was not a foreign correspondent but worked for a Spanish newspaper. It 
was his criticism of the Franco regime in the Spanish weekly newspaper Granada Semanal 
that eventually caused his expulsion from Spain.1219 While this incident reflected Herrera 
Esteban’s stricter attitude towards the press, it was not technically a sanction against the 
foreign press corps. 
The last foreign correspondent against whom the MIT applied a sanction was de Blaye. The 
French correspondent had left Spain at the beginning of the 1970s and published his already 
quoted book on the regime with a caricature of Franco on the cover in 1974.1220 In October 
1975, de Blaye applied for an accreditation as a special correspondent in order to cover the 
military trials and following executions of five alleged terrorists as well as the expected 
death of Franco. Against the background of his book and the previous conflicts with the 
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correspondent, however, de Blaye’s was the only one of the almost 400 applications for 
accreditations by special correspondents coming to Spain in the end of 1975 which the MIT 
rejected for political reasons.1221  
 
Conclusions 
The chapter has shown that the Francoist authorities applied a number of means in order to 
control the foreign press corps to influence the correspondent’s reporting from Spain. These 
means ranged from the change of the official information policy over bribes, informal and 
diplomatic interventions, public press campaigns against and defamation of particular 
correspondents to the sanctioning of correspondents through the cancellation of press cards 
and expulsions. The Francoist authorities, however, faced a basic dilemma in their 
treatment of the foreign press. The MIT tried to extend its control over the foreign press 
corps, but direct sanctions of foreign correspondents always came at the risk of provoking 
negative international PR and even diplomatic interventions. Following their experiences 
with the consequences of expulsions during the 1950s and for the sake of its foreign policy 
interests, the Francoist authorities used these means carefully. Instead, the Francoist 
authorities and the MIT under Fraga in particular, tried other, less public, methods such as 
diplomatic and informal interventions in foreign media’s personnel policy in order to 
exercise control over the foreign press corps. The dilemma of attempting to exercise control 
over the foreign press corps without provoking an international reaction led to some absurd 
situations. Under Fraga, the MIT withdrew the press cards of correspondents without 
expelling the correspondents from Spain. They therefore simply continued to report from 
Spain.  
However, and in contrast to Rosendorf’s previously quoted conclusions, the Franco regime 
continued to expel correspondents until the end of the 1960s despite all negative effects. 
Even after the Francoist authorities refrained from the direct sanction of correspondents, it 
continued to intensively use (without success) diplomatic channels in order to try and have 
correspondents expelled. Besides the relative freedom of correspondents in Spain, the 
Francoist authorities, therefore, were only able to come to an acceptance of the dilemma 
they faced during the very last years of the regime.  
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The chapter has further argued that the Francoist authorities also used sanctions against 
particular correspondents as a means of deterrence for the rest of the press corps. The 
question that remains is whether or not these attempts to exercise control over the foreign 
press corps were successful. Success can be understood as an active influence over the 
foreign press corps in the interest of the Francoist authorities.  
Fraga’s successful influence on the personnel policy of foreign media on the surface seems 
particularly successful. Although further research is needed on this topic and especially on 
the (presuming it exists) change of the news agencies reports on Spain, this applied in 
particular to the appointment of Carlos Mendo as bureau chief of UPI. The instalment of a 
Spanish correspondent as close to the regime as Mendo, however, remained an absolute 
exception. In the few other cases where the Francoist authorities managed to influence the 
appointment of particular correspondents, the foreign media choose their own replacement. 
Thereby, Fraga’s victories remained superficial and, in fact, had little impact on reporting 
from Spain. Following Darricarére d'Etchevers replacement with Pierre Brisard as AFP 
bureau chief, Fraga hoped that the economic leverage that had helped him to have 
Darricarére d'Etchevers replaced, the deal between AFP and EFE, would allow for an 
ongoing control over the new AFP bureau chief. Soon after his arrival in Madrid, Brisard 
received demands to submit his reports to the MIT before sending them to France. Schulte, 
however, highlights that Brisard successfully refused to follow this demand.1222. In fact, the 
previous chapter has shown that AFP became, through the employment young Spanish 
journalists, an important medium of communication for Spanish regime critics during the 
1960s. In the case of Szulc, whom the The New York Times sent to Spain instead of 
Hamilton, the MIT soon reported the he tended ‘in his articles to pick up the negative 
aspects of the national life, for which his has be warned on more than one occasion’1223.  
The replacement of correspondents through pressure on their editors, however, only ever 
succeeded in exceptional situations. Instead, and as has been outlined, the Francoist 
authorities mainly concentrated on correspondents in Spain and either tried to threaten and 
pressure them or use bribes in order to influence their reporting. The chapter has argued 
that, although difficult to examine, bribery most likely only affected correspondents already 
in favour of the regime.  
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The use of sanctions had a limited impact as a means of deterrence and control of the foreign 
press corps. The Dutch correspondent Roger Stephan Bosschart de Lang, for instance, 
remembered having to explicitly avoid particular phrases like ‘Franco dictatorship’ in his 
reports during his first years as correspondent in Spain so as not to provoke conflicts with 
the Francoist authorities.1224 Although Bosschart de Lang was the only correspondent to 
admit such self-censorship, his case is nevertheless indicative. At the time, towards the end 
of the 1960s, Bosschart de Lang was only working on a freelance basis for a number of 
Dutch, Belgian and British media. He was therefore economically dependent on his 
accreditation in Spain. Furthermore, the Dutch journalist also did not live in Madrid with 
its large community of correspondents but in relatively isolated Barcelona.  
Bosschart de Lang himself stressed in his interview that his economic situation together 
with his personnel attachment to Spain, where he very mush wished to stay, were the central 
reasons for his self-censorship. It ended as soon as he became a staff correspondent and 
moved to Madrid in the beginning of the 1970s1225. While noteworthy, in the absence of 
further evidence it only can be speculated whether the fear of sanctions had a similar effect 
on other freelancers.  
On staff correspondents, the deterrence strategy of the regime, however, had little to no 
impact. Von Conta, for instance, saw no reason for being afraid of expulsion from Spain. 
If he had been expelled by the MIT, so claims von Conta, the Süddeutsche Zeitung simply 
‘would just have sent me somewhere else’1226. Von Conta already had some experience of 
such situations due to his previous banning from Czechoslovakia.1227 
Like von Conta, other regime critical staff correspondents also saw no reason for being 
afraid of the Francoist authorities. Van Bemmelen pointed out that, in case of expulsion, ‘I 
would have been famous’1228, which might indeed have boosted his journalistic career1229. 
The chapter has shown that the MIT believed that de Blaye wanted to provoke his expulsion 
precisely for this reason. Like other correspondents such as Haubrich and Herrmann, van 
Bemmelen was very well aware of the dilemma the Francoist authorities therefore faced: 
‘they [the Francoist authorities] did not want that kind of publicity’1230. As a means of 
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deterrence and a tool for exercising control over the foreign press corps, sanctions against 
correspondents were therefore of very little success.  
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Conclusions 
Building on the findings in the previous chapters, the conclusions will highlight this thesis’ 
contribution to current research on three levels. First, it will bring out how the insights from 
the examination of the foreign press can improve our understanding of the nature of the 
Franco regime. Second, the conclusions will discuss how the combination of approaches 
from historical research and social and communication research in this thesis can fruitfully 
be applied to relevant research topics. Third, the conclusions will discuss possible future 
research, which can be developed from the findings of this thesis.  
 
Foreign correspondents in the Franco regime 
The examination of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain sheds new light on the Franco 
regime’s internal and external development during the Cold War. To begin with, the 
quantitative and qualitative examination of the correspondent’s presence in Francoist Spain 
provide insights into the constitution of the foreign press corps itself. By understanding 
correspondents in this context primarily as representatives of international media interests, 
this approach contributes to the still understudied international perception of the Franco 
regime from a global perceptive. It shows how international media interest increased 
throughout the 1960s. Since the end of that decade especially, major European media 
started to employ staff correspondents in Spain. This general development only partially 
reflected the development of the Spanish economy and its large tourist industry. In fact, the 
Francoist repression of the growing resistance against the regime during the 1960s and in 
particular the Burgos trials in 1970 fuelled this rising media interest.  
The discussion started with the assumption that the general composition of the foreign press 
corps could also be explained through Spain’s external economic, political and other 
relations. The thesis generally confirms this finding from communication research. Besides 
Spain’s economic relations, the composition of the press corps reflected the Franco 
regime’s special ties with Latin America. Latin American correspondents even had their 
own association in Francoist Spain from the end of the 1950s, the Association of Ibero-
American Press Correspondents. At the same time, however, the Franco regime’s political 
orientation also had an impact on the press corps, which did not reflect particular foreign 
media interest. Most importantly, numerous German journalists with a past in Nazi 
Germany found in the right-wing Franco regime a new field of activity after 1945. These 
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journalists had a fundamental impact on the image of Spain in Germany during the 1950s. 
Aschmann and Lehmann have already stressed the special importance of the German 
correspondent Heinz Barth.1231 Through his multiple media contacts he was a central figure 
for the formation of German public opinion about Spain during 1950s. This thesis shows, 
however, that Barth was only the most prominent case among many. Thus, the examination 
of this particular group of correspondents also provides further insights into the 
development of German journalism in general. Norbert Frei, Johannes Schmitz and others 
have already shown that despite the Allied’s denazification policy, many journalists with a 
Nazi past continued their careers after the end of the Allied occupation in German 
media.1232 This phenomenon was especially pronounced in the German press corps in the 
right-wing Franco dictatorship. 
German correspondents were not the only group of correspondents that were particularly 
attracted by the right-wing Franco dictatorship and much less representatives of any 
international media interest. Political exiles from communist countries and from Cuba after 
Castro’s revolution also were accredited in Francoist Spain. The Franco regime’s relations 
with communist countries also impacted in other ways. With the exception of Cuban 
correspondents, no journalists from communist countries were accredited in the deeply anti-
communist Francoist Spain for the first two decades after 1945. This changed, however, in 
the course of the rapprochement between Spain and the communist countries in Eastern 
Europe and China. Parallel to the tightening of economic relations from the end of the 
1960s, Spain exchanged correspondents with communist countries – although both were 
mutually subjected to strict regulations. In fact, Soviet correspondents played a semi-
diplomatic role in the beginning of Spanish relations with the Soviet Union. Thus, by 
examining parallels between the composition of the foreign press corps and the Franco 
regime’s foreign policy, the thesis sheds new light on the still relatively unstudied relations 
of the Franco regime with the communist world during the Cold War.  
Apart from the particular restrictions for correspondents from communist countries, foreign 
journalists could work relatively freely in Spain. The Francoist authorities ended the 
censorship of correspondents’ despatches shortly after the end of the Second World War. 
This step must be seen as part of the regime’s general attempts to improve its foreign image. 
Thereafter, the Franco regime also tried to improve its external perception by improving 
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relations with the foreign press corps. The accreditation status for correspondents was, for 
instance, highly attractive even for semi-professionals because of the economic privileges 
that came with it. Furthermore, a number of the correspondents interviewed pointed out 
that the regime used bribes in order to improve the reporting of foreign correspondents. The 
foundation of two independent associations for correspondents at the end of the 1950s 
further reflected attempts to gain the favour of the foreign press corps. The Minister of 
Information and Tourism, Manuel Fraga, worked in particular on improving the regime’s 
external image by paying greater attention to the foreign press during the 1960s. Besides 
an intensified information policy, his foundation of the CIP was the most visible result of 
this change. The Franco regime’s policy towards the foreign press corps within Spain, 
therefore, reflected the regime’s (and in particular Fraga’s) general attempt to increase its 
international standing through soft diplomacy as has been recently examined by Rosendorf 
as well as Gienow-Hecht and Fischer.1233 
This was, however, not only a slow development but also only one part of the Francoist 
policy towards the foreign press. Despite the freedom to work in Spain, constant attempts 
by the Francoist authorities to control the foreign press corps through threats, the 
cancellation of accreditations, diplomatic interventions, informal negotiations with foreign 
media and expulsions were also made. Despite its weak international position, the Francoist 
authorities expelled or cancelled the accreditations of correspondents of major foreign 
newspapers including The New York Times and Le Monde. In contrast to Rosendorf’s 
assumption, the Franco regime continued to use such measures, although only occasionally, 
thereafter. Despite his external self-promotion as a liberalizer, Fraga too continued to use 
harsh sanctions even against the correspondents of prestigious newspapers such as Le 
Figaro. However, he accompanied this kind of direct action with more indirect attempts to 
control the foreign press corps during the 1960s. This included the successful intervention 
in the personnel policy of foreign media. Fraga’s authoritarian approach towards the foreign 
press was symbolically reflected in the CIP. While announced as an organization for and 
by foreign and Spanish journalists, it remained under the control of the Francoist 
authorities.  
The examination of the Francoist policy towards the foreign press further reveals that it was 
not a one dimensional policy. In fact, the regime’s approach towards the foreign press corps 
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was a frequent point of debate within and among Francoist authorities. Formally, all 
competences over the foreign press lay with the Ministry of Information and Tourism and 
its institutional predecessors. The thesis shows, however, that the Foreign Ministry 
occasionally tried to influence policy towards the foreign press. While the MIT used 
sanctions in order to extend its internal informational control also over the foreign press 
corps, the Foreign Ministry intervened in the interest of the Franco regime’s foreign image 
and policy interests. Interventions by the Foreign Ministry - namely by its specialized sub-
department OID - in the MIT’s treatment of foreign correspondents continued until the last 
years of the Franco regime. 
This policy towards the foreign correspondents which oscillated between attempts at 
currying favours and sanctions combined with the struggle over competencies among a 
variety of actors, was not a Francoist particularity, however. In his examination of the 
foreign press corps in Nazi Germany, Herzer arrives at similar results.1234 His research 
shows that in Nazi Germany, policy towards the foreign press was, much more than in 
Francoist Spain, a constant point of struggle between Goebbels’ Reich Propaganda Ministry 
and the Foreign Ministry. In Nazi Germany, this power struggle partly reflected the general 
rivalry among the totalitarian regime’s institutions. To a certain extent, this also applied to 
Francoist Spain and the rivalry between the Foreign Minister Artajo and the Minister of 
Information and Tourism Arias-Salgado during the 1950s. In the Francoist dictatorship, 
however, this struggle over competencies was more the result of the regime’s evolving 
international ambitions and the parallel claim for internal informational control. 
Furthermore, the struggle over competancieswas not a constant one but strongly connected 
to the personalities at the top of the ministries and the general development of the regime’s 
policy. In contrast to the 1950s, for instance, the Foreign Ministry under Castiella and the 
Ministry of Information and Tourism under Fraga closely coordinated their policies. When 
the hardliner Sánchez Bella replaced Fraga at the end of the 1960s, however, the Foreign 
Ministry and its OID respectively once more tried to intervene. 
The Foreign Ministry’s intervention in the MIT’s policy under Sánchez Bella, however, 
shows that it did not necessarily try to establish a more liberal policy towards the foreign 
press corps. Instead, the Foreign Ministry was primary concerned with Spain’s external 
perception for the sake of the Franco regime’s foreign policy. This became evident in its 
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intensive use of diplomatic channels in order to have German correspondents replaced at 
the beginning of the 1970s.  
The conflicts between correspondents and the MIT over the management of the CIP in 1970 
also reflected a change in the regime’s relations with the foreign press. A new generation 
of staff correspondents, appointed towards the end of the 1960s, were not only more critical 
towards the Franco regime, but openly rejected the regime’s control over the foreign press. 
The organizational basis for this resistance was the independent Association of Foreign 
Press Correspondents. For the International Press Club, this resistance was eventually 
successful and it became independent from the MIT’s control before the death of Franco. 
Finally, the thesis highlights the particular role of foreign correspondents and the foreign 
press in general and for the Spanish public and the political opposition in particular. Foreign 
media were in principle freely distributed in Francoist Spain and were an important source 
of uncensored information for the Spanish public. This applied in particular to French 
media due to the widespread knowledge of French. At the same time, international 
broadcasters with Spanish programmes such as the BBC, Radio Paris and communist 
broadcasters from Eastern Europe gave the Spanish public direct access to foreign news. 
Furthermore, through news borrowing from foreign media in parts of the Spanish press, the 
Spanish public also indirectly had access to the content of foreign publications. The thesis 
argues, therefore, that the reports of foreign correspondents had a direct impact on the 
Spanish public. 
The importance of the foreign press was strongest for the Spanish opposition. Le Monde 
was crucial as a central means of information for opposition groups within Spain. The 
highly regime critical correspondent José Antonio Novais was especially influential. 
Novais, as well as other correspondents such as Haubrich, maintained close relations with 
the Spanish opposition. As such, they became important transnational communicators for 
opposition groups. This was a mutually beneficial relationship. The correspondents 
received valuable information from the political opposition, which otherwise was not 
available in the censored Spanish press or from the notoriously uncommunicative Francoist 
authorities. Spanish journalists who were critical of the regime were another crucial source 
of information for foreign correspondents. By highlighting the importance of these informal 
informational networks, this thesis not only sheds light on the particular importance of the 
foreign press within Spain. It further demonstrates the impact of dictatorial regimes such 
as the Franco dictatorship on the working conditions of foreign correspondents.  
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The findings on the foreign press as a source of information and means of communication 
within Spain in particular not only contributes to research on the Spanish political 
opposition but these observations can also provide new insights to the ongoing debate about 
the development of civil society in Francoist Spain since the 1960s and its importance for 
the Spanish transition. Neither Víctor Pérez Díaz1235 in his seminal book, The Return of the 
Civil Society, nor Pamela Beth Radcliff’s1236 more recent contribution to the subject, takes 
account of the foreign press. The presented evidence suggests, however, that foreign media 
and their correspondents in Spain played an important role for the diffusion of non-censored 
information. Therefore, the foreign press and correspondents might have contributed to the 
diffusion of pro-democratic ideas within the Spanish society.  
 
Mixed methods approach and the historical study of foreign 
correspondence 
This thesis also shows that the combination of an historical approach with methods from 
communication research and anthropology can be very useful for understanding foreign 
correspondence. Building on insights and concepts from communication research was 
crucial for the understanding of the foreign correspondents as media professionals. It was 
the starting point for this thesis which led to insights into the world of foreign 
correspondence in Francoist Spain. The application of these approaches to a historical case 
study has drawn on what historical research does best, namely the source based examination 
and understanding of context. The application of these approaches therefore not only 
contributes to the understanding of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain but also 
provides new empirical insights for the understanding of foreign correspondence in 
communication research and neighbouring disciplines.  
The quantitative examination of the composition of the press corps and the accreditation 
times of correspondents are instrumental for the understanding of foreign correspondence 
in Francoist Spain. Without a media analysis, which would hardly be possible on such a 
scale, this approach provides first insights into the general development of international 
media interest in Francoist Spain. The thesis further shows that the particular working 
situation in Francoist Spain had an impact on the correspondents’ accreditation times. The 
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difficult working conditions in the Francoist Spain made the appointment of experienced 
correspondents the more suitable choice for many media. 
The examination of the correspondents’ working conditions was an area where this mixed-
method approach proved particularly valuable. The insights from communication 
researchers allowed for the identification of the general working routines of correspondents 
and the particularities of the situation in Francoist Spain. This applies in particular to the 
understanding of the importance of personal networks. Researchers such as Hannerz only 
briefly mention the increased willingness of correspondents to share information under the 
conditions of dictatorial regimes. By highlighting this aspect through the analysis of social 
networks for the correspondents in Spain, this thesis therefore also builds on Hannerz’s 
observations with further empirical evidence.  
A new, but for Francoist Spain, crucial aspect was the importance of informal contacts with 
Spanish journalists as sources of information. Current communication research generally 
stresses the importance of the domestic press for foreign correspondence. While this 
importance decreases in dictatorial regimes like the Franco dictatorship, the thesis shows 
that informal information from Spanish journalists became crucial. By building upon 
insight from the social sciences, this thesis not only provides a better understanding of 
foreign correspondence in Francoist Spain from a historical perspective, but its findings - 
such as the particular importance of informal informational networks - also contribute to 
the study of foreign correspondence in general.  
The importance of the close contacts with regime critical journalists directly relates to the 
political importance of foreign media and the foreign press. Historical research generally 
highlights the political role of correspondents with regard to their involvement in and for 
diplomatic relations. In Spain, foreign media and correspondents became of particular 
political importance because of their crucial importance to the political opposition and the 
Spanish public in general. Therefore, this thesis sheds light on both the political agency of 
correspondents and the particular role of both correspondents and foreign press in 
dictatorial regimes. It has shown that correspondents served as a source of information and 
transnational intermediaries for the Spanish opposition. Because of the distribution of 
foreign media, Francoist Spain was in this regard, of course, special.  
In sum, this thesis has shown the particular value of a mixed-method approach for the 
understanding of foreign correspondence. At the same time, it also demonstrates that for 
the study of foreign correspondence in dictatorial regimes, a flexible understanding of the 
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role and agency of correspondents is necessary. The exclusive understanding of 
correspondents as media professionals in communication research comes with the risk of 
simplifications. Political aspects of their work or political agency do not fit into this scheme. 
Historians, at the same time, generally overstress this political importance of 
correspondents as ‘diplomats in shirt-sleeves’1237. On this basis, they may miss insights that 
can be drawn from the understanding of correspondents as media professionals. This thesis 
shows that a combination of the two understandings of foreign correspondents can prove a 
valuable approach instead. 
 
Future research 
The findings of this thesis also put a spotlight on its shortcomings and areas of future 
research. First, this applies to the thesis’ empirical basis. This thesis partly relies on 
interviews with correspondents. Besides the outlined methodological problems coming 
with this approach, the interviews with former correspondents necessarily remained 
incomplete. Not all former correspondents could be interviewed for practical reasons or 
because they were no longer alive. Given the time that has passed since the end of the 
Franco regime, however, this will become an even greater problem in future. 
Less a shortcoming than an area for future research is this thesis’ concentration on the 
understanding of foreign correspondence within Spain. Besides interviews, this thesis has 
primarily relied on Spanish sources. In order to understand possible political aspects of the 
foreign correspondents’ work in the area of international politics, only selected archives 
outside of Spain were consulted (France, Great Britain, Germany). Future research could 
therefore be extended by drawing on additional sources outside of Spain such as the US 
archives. Given Spain’s particular relationship with the US and the conflicts with US media 
and correspondents, research in US archives in particular would likely yield some excellent 
new data. Furthermore, the examination of the particular presence and role of Soviet 
correspondents in Francoist Spain through Russian archives could shed further light on this 
particular aspect of Cold War media history. Fainberg1238 and Metger1239 have recently 
shown that Russian archives can indeed be a valuable resource for the understanding of 
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foreign correspondence during the Cold War. Particularly interesting in this context would 
be additional research on the Soviet journalist Viktor Louis and his role for the Kremlin. 
The thesis has used archival material from two media, The New York Times and the BBC, 
because of their particular importance and accessibility. The introduction has argued that 
this limitation was not only a concession to the scope of this thesis but also that media 
archives are generally difficult to access. Future research nevertheless could attempt to 
build on this thesis by conducting further research in particular media archives. This 
research could provide insights into the understanding of particular media and 
correspondents such as Le Monde and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. More 
promising, however, would be the attempt to include the findings of this thesis in more 
general historical examinations of these particular media. For the understanding of foreign 
correspondence in Francoist Spain, additional research in newspaper archives would most 
likely only provide limited additional insights. 
Useful to the understanding of foreign correspondence in Francoist Spain, however, would 
be further research in the archives of international news agencies such as the UPI. This 
research could shed further light on the Franco regime’s successful attempt to influence 
directly the personnel policy of international media. By building on this thesis and existing 
research on the UPI’s role for South African propaganda however,1240 it also could provide 
more general insights into this private news agency’s relations with dictatorial regimes.  
The case of UPI directly relates to the most important area of research which could build 
on the findings of this thesis: studies on the international perception of the Franco regime. 
For the case of UPI, a thorough analysis of UPI reports on Spain for the beginning of the 
1960s could examine wherever the appointment of Mendo had an impact on the news 
agency’s reporting on Francoist Spain. Apart from this particular case, more general 
examinations on foreign media’s reporting on Francoist Spain are still an important gap in 
current research. Such research could directly connect to this thesis and to the recently 
growing number of studies on the international perception of the Spanish transition to 
democracy. 
This thesis also contributes, albeit from a different perspective, to the understanding of the 
Franco regime’s soft diplomacy after 1945. Rosendorf as well as Gienow-Hecht and 
Fischer have recently shown that the examination of the Franco regime’s soft diplomacy 
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provides new and valuable insights.1241 While Rosendorf has discussed only briefly the role 
of correspondents, future research on the Franco regime’s soft diplomacy could build on 
the insights of this thesis.  
Furthermore, future research could concentrate on a detailed examination of the practice of 
news borrowing from foreign publications in the Spanish press. Content analysis of Spanish 
media and a parallel crosschecking of foreign publications might be a fruitful approach for 
such a research project. More interviews with Spanish journalists who were active during 
the Franco regime would also be extremely helpful. Such a study would provide valuable 
insights for the understanding of this particular importance of foreign media and foreign 
correspondents for the Spanish public during the Francoist dictatorship. 
The examination of news borrowing from foreign media and the foreign press corps’ 
relations with Spanish journalists could directly relate to further in-depth research on the 
importance of foreign media and correspondents within Spain. Such a research project 
could be based, for instance, on interviews with Spanish political actors. At the same time, 
it could further examine, from a more general perspective, to what extent foreign media 
and correspondents have contributed to the distribution of democratic ideas in Spain. The 
results of such research project not only would be a valuable contribution to the 
understanding of the importance of the foreign press and correspondents in Francoist Spain. 
In addition to the findings of this thesis, they also could add an interesting perspective to 
the ongoing research on the formation of the Spanish civil society.  
This thesis, therefore, shows a number of promising areas for future research on Francoist 
Spain. At the same time, it was also the aim of this thesis to highlight both the value of 
foreign correspondence as subjects of historical research and the usefulness of methods and 
concepts drawn from the social sciences for their examination in historical perspective. 
Both can contribute to future research on the history of foreign correspondence. Studies on 
foreign correspondents in Portugal under Salazar, for instance, would provide a useful 
comparison. However, approaches from the social sciences can also contribute to the 
understanding of foreign correspondence in democratic countries. Historical research could 
therefore contribute beyond its disciplinary borders to a more general understanding of 
foreign correspondence. Historians could also test and evaluate approaches such as the 
importance of personal networks among correspondents and contacts to the journalists of 
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the host countries. As such, historical research could provide an understanding of foreign 
correspondence and political situations in particular, which might prove useful for 
communication research on contemporary press corps. This thesis could serve as a case 
study for such future endeavours in the world of foreign correspondents. This world is just 
too rich as a subject for historical research to restrict itself to the memoirs of 
correspondents.  
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